USA v. HODGES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:23-cr-00048-JAW-1
)
ALEXIS HODGES 	)
ORDER ON MOTION TO MODIFY CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED
RELEASE
The court dismisses without prejudice a defendant’s request to eliminate a
special condition of her terms of supervised released that requires the court’s written
pre-approval before she obtains self-employment. 	Consistent with First Circuit
caselaw, the court explains why the restriction is reasonably related to her underlying
conviction, necessary to protect the public, and the minimum restriction needed to
protect the public.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 2024, Alexis Hodges pleaded guilty to eleven counts of wire fraud,
arising from unauthorized wire transfers she made with a stolen bank account
number. 	Change of Plea H’rg (ECF No. 61); Am. Indictment (ECF No. 51). 	On
January 23, 2025, the Court sentenced Ms. Hodges to a twelve month and one day
term of imprisonment with three years of supervised release. 	J. (ECF No. 85). 	On
July 2, 2025, while serving her prison term, the U.S. Probation Office (Probation)
filed a request to modify Ms. Hodges’s conditions of release, including a special
condition that Ms. Hodges “obtain prior written approval from the Court before
entering into self-employment.” 	Req. for Modifying the Conditions or Term of
Supervision with the Consent of the Offender (ECF No. 97) (Consented to Modified
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Conditions). 	Probation’s 	request 	included 	a 	signed 	waiver 	from 	Ms. 	Hodges
consenting to the modification and voluntarily waiving her right to a hearing and
assistance of counsel to challenge her modified supervised release conditions. 	Id.,
Attach. 1, Waiver of H’rg to Modify Conditions (Waiver). 	The next day, the Court
granted Probation’s request to modify the conditions of Ms. Hodges’s supervised
release. 	Order (ECF No. 98). 	Ms. Hodges was released from prison, subject to her
conditions of supervised release, on November 14, 2025. 	Gov’t’s Opp’n to Mot. to
Modify Conditions of Supervised Release at 3 (ECF No. 104) (Gov’t’s Opp’n).
On December 16, 2025, Ms. Hodges filed a motion to modify her conditions of
supervised 	release, 	seeking 	to 	strike 	the 	special 	condition 	prohibiting 	self-
employment without prior written approval from this Court. 	Mot. to Modify
Conditions of Supervised Release (ECF No. 99) (Def.’s Mot.). 	The United States
Government filed their response in opposition to Ms. Hodges’s motion on January 16,
2026, Gov’t’s Opp’n, and Ms. Hodges filed her reply on January 23, 2026. Def.’s Final
Aggressive Suppl. Reply to Gov’t’s Opp’n (ECF No. 105) (Def.’s Reply).
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. 	Alexis Hodges’s Request
Ms. Hodges moves to eliminate her special condition requiring this Court’s
prior written approval before engaging in self-employment, which she characterizes
as a “wholesale ban on self-employment.” 	Def.’s Mot. at 6. 	Ms. Hodges avers the
Court cannot impose the special condition because the restriction is unlawful. Id. at
2. 	Specifically, Ms. Hodges claims her self-employment restriction is based on
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incorrect or unreliable information, unconstitutionally overbroad, undermines the
purpose of her supervised release, and less restrictive alternatives exist. 	Id. at 2-6.
Ms. Hodges asks the Court to remove the self-employment restriction from her
condition of supervised release and allow her to manage her three businesses, which
she emphasizes she “operated long before the alleged offense conduct.” 	Id. at 1, 6.
She also asks that “any employment-related conditions be narrowly tailored to
address legitimate risk” and “not based on inaccurate or speculative facts.” Id. at 6.
B. 	The Government’s Opposition
The Government opposes Ms. Hodges motion. Employment-based restrictions
as a condition of supervised release, the Government explains, are lawful so long as
they bear a reasonably direct relationship to the offense conduct and the restriction
is reasonably necessary to protect the public. 	Gov’t’s Opp’n at 3-4 (citing caselaw).
The Government maintains the self-employment pre-approval restriction directly
relates to her offense conduct, given her history of stealing customer account
information to perpetrate financial crimes, and reasonably protects the public from
future abuse of customer financial information by Ms. Hodges. Id. at 4-6.
In addition, the Government attached to its opposition screenshots of her
Facebook pages. Id., Attach. 1, Facebook Screenshots at 1-5 (Facebook). 	Pages four
and five depict Ms. Hodges’s advertising financial services for the 2024 tax season,
including a chat between Ms. Hodges and another person dated January 9, 2025. Id.
at 4-5. January 9, 2025 was two weeks before her federal sentencing date. See Min.
Entry (ECF No. 83). Pages one through three show Ms. Hodges operating the same
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financial services company, advertising notary services, tax preparation, LLC and
corporate taxes, audit protection, and advance loans for the 2025 tax season, and
stating that she was accepting new clients. 	Id. at 1-3. In her Facebook profile, Ms.
Hodges described herself as a tax and credit specialist, an allied health instructor, a
digital creator, a trainer at Caring Arms Mobile Labs, the owner and CEO of Q&A
Financial Services, and the Owner and Founder at Boss Divas Brows & Beauty. Id.
at 1.
C. 	Alexis Hodges’s Reply
In her reply, Ms. Hodges seeks “to correct factual inaccuracies and rebut
unsupported assumptions forming the foundation of the Government’s Opposition.”
Def.’s Reply at 1. As an attachment to her reply, Ms. Hodges penned a letter providing
the dates when she began operating her businesses. Id., Attach. 1, Letter. According
to her letter, Ms. Hodges serves in a managerial position and her staff, rather than
herself, handles all customer information. 	Id. at 1. 	She also disputes Probation’s
stated 	basis 	for 	her 	self-employment 	pre-approval 	restriction, 	arguing 	that
“advertising [her] business is not evidence of . . . misconduct.” 	Id. 	Finally, she
explains she “remained crime-free for more than 10 years before [the instant] case”
and claims she is “not the individual who committed the fraudulent acts” of her
underlying conviction. Id.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Upon consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a district
court “may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any
time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release.” 	18
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U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). 	Generally, a special condition of supervised release must be
“based 	on 	the 	circumstances 	of 	the 	offense 	and 	the 	defendant’s 	history” 	and
“‘involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to achieve
the 	goals 	of 	sentencing,” 	including 	protection 	of 	the 	public, 	deterrence, 	and
rehabilitation. 	United States v. Benoit, 975 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d)); see also U.S. SENT ’G G UIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.S.G.) § 5D1.3(b)
(U.S. SENT ’G COMM ’N 2025) (providing that district court may impose discretionary
conditions 	of 	supervised 	release); 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 3553(a)(2) 	(listing 	the 	goals 	of
sentencing). “Occupational restrictions, however, require even more.” United States
v. Reardon, 102 F.4th 558, 563 (1st Cir. 2024) (explaining “occupational restrictions
are subject to a heightened standard” because of “the impact such restrictions can
have on individuals’ ability to re-enter society after imprisonment”) (citing United
States v. Vélez-Luciano, 814 F.3d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 2016), then citing United States
v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 65 (1st Cir. 2005)).
As the First Circuit explained in Reardon, a district court may impose
occupational restrictions as a special condition of supervised release “only if it
determines that: (1) a reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant’s
occupation, business, or profession and the conduct relevant to the offense conviction”
and (2) “such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because there
is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to
engage in similar unlawful conduct.” 	Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5) (permitting occupational restrictions to the extent they are
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reasonably related to the § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) factors and “involve only such
deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes
indicated in section 3553(a)(2)”). Additionally, the district court may only impose the
occupational restriction “‘for the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary
to protect the public.’” Id. at 564 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(b)) (emphasis in original).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Violate First Ask Permission Later
Before reaching the merits of her motion, the Court addresses two issues.
First, the letter attached to Ms. Hodges’s reply confirms that she is currently in
violation of her special condition requiring this Court’s approval before engaging in
self-employment. In her letter, Ms. Hodges lists ongoing personal business ventures
for which she has not yet sought Court approval. Letter at 1. Ms. Hodges writes that
she opened her salon, BOSSDIVA BROWS & BEAUTY in 2015, her companion-care
business in 2021, and her financial services business in 2020, incorporating it in 2022.
Id. 	Ms. Hodges stresses that she does “not access PII” (presumably personal
identifying information) and assures the Court that her “office manager handles all
intakes” and “[s]even staff members process all documents, IRS uploads, and data
entry.” 	Id. 	Regarding her other businesses, she explains that she has “two booth
renters in my salon, one employee in companion-care services, and [that she]
teach[es] allied-health classes that do not involve financial information.” Id.
Ms. Hodges’s January 21, 2026 letter thereby unequivocally establishes that
she is now violating one of the special conditions that she consented to on June 2,
2025:
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The defendant shall obtain written approval from the Court before
entering into any self-employment.
Consented to Modified Conditions at 1. From the Court’s perspective, there is nothing
ambiguous or confusing about this condition. Before she engages in self-employment,
she must obtain court approval. She has not.
Moreover, Probation’s request for this condition was triggered by her running
a financial services business:
In addition, a tax service company, Q & A Financial Services, was found
to have been opened by the defendant while she was on pretrial
supervision. The most recent annual report was filed on March 25, 2025,
while she was awaiting her surrender to prison. Her pretrial conditions
states 	that 	she 	was 	not 	to 	have 	access 	to 	personal 	identifiable
information; 	however, 	she 	actively 	promoted 	her 	company 	on 	the
internet and social media. Due to the nature of the offense involving her
personally owned companies, these findings cause concern about her
ability to remain in compliance with her supervision conditions when
released.
Id. at 2. 	Thus, it is clear that the restriction against self-employment was directly
related to her continuing to operate a financial services company; yet Ms. Hodges
ignored the restriction and re-entered self-employment without requesting prior
permission from the Court. 	Ms. Hodges’s violate first and ask permission later
approach to supervised release compliance is entirely unacceptable to the Court.
Although Ms. Hodges may ask this Court to modify her special conditions, the
law unequivocally requires her compliance with those restrictions throughout her
term of supervised release unless and until those conditions are changed by the
Court. This includes the special condition requiring this Court’s approval before she
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engages self-employment, regardless of any precautions she takes to avoid handling
customer information. Id.
B. 	Violation of the Special Condition the Defendant Consented To
Second, the Court notes that Ms. Hodges previously consented to the special
condition that she now challenges as unlawful. 	See Waiver; Def.’s Mot. at 2-6.
Similarly, in signing the waiver, Ms. Hodges agreed with Probation’s stated grounds
for the self-employment restriction that the special condition was necessary “[t]o
address [Probation’s] concerns regarding her future supervision.” 	Consented to
Modified Conditions at 2-3. 	Ms. Hodges offers no explanation for this change in
position. Nor does she address any of the underlying concerns that caused Probation
to consider the self-employment restriction necessary.
C. 	Reasonably 	Direct 	Relationship 	between 	Occupational
Restriction and the Offense Conduct
The Court finds a reasonably direct relationship exists between this Court’s
self-employment pre-approval requirement and Ms. Hodges’s offense conduct. At her
guilty plea and at her sentencing hearing, Ms. Hodges, living in Florida, admitted to
committing a serious and sophisticated financial fraud against a family business in
Kennebunk, Maine. Somehow Ms. Hodges managed to gain access to the business’s
checking account and over the course of about two years, Ms. Hodges repeatedly and
continually stole money from the business, paying her personal bills out of the
business’s account. 	See Prosecution Version (ECF No. 50); Revised Presentence
Investigation Report (ECF No. 72) (PSR). 	The fraud here was significant, amounting
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to an intended loss of $99,571.49, PSR ¶ 12, and a restitution obligation of $72.291.33.
J. at 6 (ECF No. 85).
Moreover, Ms. Hodges’s offense conduct—unauthorized wire transfers with
stolen 	bank 	account 	information—bears 	a 	striking 	resemblance 	to 	her 	2011
conviction for identity theft, defrauding a financial institution, and schemes to
defraud in which Ms. Hodges, while an employee with CitiGroup, made unauthorized
charges to customer accounts. 	See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a); PSR ¶ 38. 	Considering Ms.
Hodges’s history of fraudulent schemes related to others’ personal identifying and
financial information, the self-employment pre-approval requirement allows the
Court to block Ms. Hodges from engaging in activity that involves the risk of abusing
customers’ personal and financial information in the future.
Indeed, Probation’s stated cause for requesting the self-employment restriction
arose from Ms. Hodges’s creation and online promotion of her tax preparation
business, 	Q 	& 	A 	Financial 	Services, 	while 	subject 	to 	pretrial 	conditions 	that
prohibited her access to others’ personal identifiable information. 	Consented to
Modified Conditions at 2. 	Upon release, Ms. Hodges has continued to promote her
tax filing services on social media, including offering advance loans. Gov’t’s Opp’n at
4-6; Facebook. 	At bottom, the self-employment pre-approval condition allows Ms.
Hodges to earn an income while simultaneously providing the Court a policing
mechanism to ensure she does not put the public at risk of financial fraud. See United
States v. Mercado, 777 F.3d 532, 539 (1st Cir. 2015) (“The conditions appear to draw
heavily on the defendant’s history and characteristics and are buttressed by case-
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specific reasons”) (citing United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 2007);
United States v. Turner, 88 F. App’x 307, 314 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (finding
reasonably direct relationship between defendant’s bank fraud and restricting his
self-employment as a roofer because he used his roofing business to facilitate the
fraud and, after initial sentencing, failed to provide information about his business
activities to probation).
D. 	Risk of Continued Unlawful Conduct without the Occupational
Restriction and the Need to Protect the Public
Next, 	the 	Court 	determines 	Ms. 	Hodges’s 	self-employment 	pre-approval
restriction is necessary to protect the public against future unlawful conduct. 	See
U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a). 	As explained above, Ms. Hodges has a history of abusing
customers’ personal and financial information to perpetrate fraud. 	Change of Plea
H’rg; J.; PSR ¶ 38. Notably, Ms. Hodges has not sought the Court’s approval for self-
employment with her company Q & A Financial Services. See Facebook. Thus, given
Ms. Hodges’s history of financial fraud, considered in combination with her disregard
for her pretrial conditions and her active violation of her special condition requiring
the Court’s pre-approval for self-employment through the creation and promotion of
her tax preparation business, the Court finds there is a high risk Ms. Hodges will
abuse others’ personal and financial information through entities such as Q & A
Financial Services. 	Pre-approval from this Court protects the public from this risk
by allowing the Court the opportunity to block Ms. Hodges’s from operating her tax
preparation 	business, 	which 	necessarily 	involves 	collecting 	personal 	financial
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information from customers who are not aware of Ms. Hodges’s history of defrauding
customers.
E. 	Scope of the Occupational Restriction
Finally, the Court determines Ms. Hodges’s self-employment pre-approval
restriction is the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public. See U.S.S.G.
§ 5F1.5(b). This special condition is precisely tailored to protect the public from the
risk of being defrauded by Ms. Hodges, while still allowing Ms. Hodges to obtain self-
employment if she convinces Probation and the Court that the public will be
protected. In other words, pre-approval from this Court will “preclude [Ms. Hodges’s]
continuation or repetition of illegal activities while avoiding a bar from employment
that exceeds [the scope] needed to achieve that result.” 	U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5 cmt.
Background 	(quoting 	S. 	Rep. 	No. 	225, 	at 	96-97 	(1983), 	as 	reprinted 	in 	1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3279-80); see also United States v. Fey, 834 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2016) (upholding scope of condition requiring defendant to “seek preapproval from
probation before accepting a job or volunteer activity that would bring him into direct
contact 	with 	minors” 	where 	underlying 	conviction 	arose 	from 	incident 	at 	his
workplace with a minor volunteer); United States v. DaSilva, 844 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.
2016) (“giving the probation officer some authority to make exceptions as warranted
is generally seen as a benefit of such orders in that it allows for flexibility and permits
personal circumstances to be dealt with as they arise”) (citing United States v. Pabon,
819 F.3d 26, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2016); Mercado, 777 F.3d at 539 (finding it significant
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that a condition was not “an outright ban” but instead “merely require[d] . . . pre-
approv[al] by the probation officer”).
To be clear, the Court’s self-employment restriction does not prevent her from
becoming self-employed. 	It only requires her to obtain pre-approval from the Court
before doing so. If Ms. Hodges wishes to engage in self-employment, she must present
the details of that employment to Probation, and both Probation and the Court will
review her planned self-employment to make certain that there are sufficient checks
and oversight to protect the public.
In addition, although it is apparent, the Court stresses that the restriction is
against self-employment, not against employment by others. 	Thus, if Ms. Hodges
wishes to work in the financial services industry or as a tax preparer, she can always
work for someone else, who will presumably have control of her access and use of
confidential information.
F. 	False Assertion of Innocence
With this said, before Ms. Hodges filed her reply, the Court has been under the
impression that she accepted full responsibility for eleven counts of wire fraud
against the Maine business charged in the indictment. 	Ms. Hodges pleaded guilty
and at the Rule 11 hearing, she admitted she committed the prosecution version of
the conduct that gave rise to the wire fraud charges. 	Chang of Plea Hr’g. 	At her
sentencing hearing, Ms. Hodges admitted that the contents of the revised presentence
investigation report, which contained a detailed description of her fraud, were true.
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Tr. of Proceedings 6:14-17 (ECF No. 90). 	When she allocated, Ms. Hodges stated to
the Court:
Your Honor, I stand before you today fully accepting responsibility for
my actions and what I’ve done. I’m extremely remorseful for what I’ve
caused 	to 	the 	victim 	and 	their 	business. . . . [A]nd 	I 	accept 	full
responsibility for what has happened.
Id. 44:13-21. But in her reply letter dated January 21, 2026, Ms. Hodges wrote:
Finally, it was acknowledged in court that I was not the individual who
committed the fraudulent acts. 	That person is deceased. 	I accepted
responsibility for negligence—not intentional fraud.
Letter at 1.
Ms. Hodges’s statement gives the Court considerable pause. Her statement is
false. 	Ms. Hodges admitted the truth of the prosecution version in this case that
stated:
From about November 27, 2019, and continuing until about October 12,
2021, Alexis Hodges knowingly and willfully devised and intended to
devise a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and
property 	by 	means 	of 	materially 	false 	and 	fraudulent 	pretenses,
representations and promises.
Prosecution Version at 1. For Ms. Hodges to attempt now to deflect responsibility for
her criminal acts and blame someone who is dead worries the Court that she has not
yet come to terms with her criminal acts and casts doubt on her willingness and
ability to be rehabilitated from a crime she no doubt committed but now denies.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice Alexis Hodges’s Motion
to Modify Conditions of Supervised Release (ECF No. 99).
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SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 2nd day of February, 2026
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