DOE v. SMITH

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JOHN DOE, 	)
)
Plaintiff 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:23-cv-00423-JAW
)
SARA SMITH, 	)
)
Defendant 	)
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS1
In this contentious breach of contract case, John Doe alleges that Sara Smith
violated the terms of their nondisclosure agreement by informing third parties about
his billion-dollar lottery winnings. 	Each side now moves for sanctions against the
other—Smith on the basis that the core allegation in Doe’s complaint is demonstrably
false and Doe on the basis that Smith’s motion for sanctions was filed for improper
purposes. 	See Smith’s Motion (ECF No. 31) (seeking sanctions under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11, 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1927, 	and 	the 	Court’s 	inherent 	power); 	Doe’s 	Motion
(ECF No. 75) (seeking sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11).
I do not find any sanctions are warranted at this early stage where the parties’
arguments turn on disputed facts. See, e.g., Pladott v. Ewers, 414 F. Supp. 2d 88, 90
1 Because I am not ordering any sanctions—dispositive or otherwise—this order is nondispositive.
See Phinney v. Wentworth Douglas Hosp., 199 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Magistrate Judge Muirhead—
whatever he might theoretically have done—in fact imposed only a monetary sanction. 	His order,
therefore, 	was 	nondispositive 	and 	the 	‘clearly 	erroneous’ 	standard 	obtains. 	See 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).” (footnote omitted)); Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511,
1519-20 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he penalty to be imposed, rather than the penalty sought by the movant,
controls the scope of the magistrate[ judge]’s authority. Even though a movant requests a sanction
that would be dispositive, if the magistrate judge does not impose a dispositive sanction the order falls
under Rule 72(a) rather than Rule 72(b).” (cleaned up)).
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2
(D. Mass. 2006) (denying a motion for sanctions filed early in a case because it
required “highly specific factual findings” that would have been “premature” given
the “hotly disputed facts and general finger-pointing” between the parties). Smith’s
motion and accompanying affidavits raise some significant questions about the
viability of Doe’s claims but do not definitively demonstrate that his claims lack any
factual underpinning or are otherwise unreasonable and vexatious. 	Doe’s motion
similarly depends on his version of highly contested events and, as such, does not
convince me that Smith filed her motion for sanctions to harass Doe or mislead the
Court with sensationalized claims. I am also not persuaded by Doe’s suggestion that
Smith was improperly trying to identify him or risk his or their daughter’s safety by
filing her motion for sanctions without moving to seal it. 	See Order on Motion to
Unseal (ECF No. 71) at 22-25 (unsealing Smith’s motion for sanctions and associated
documents after concluding they did not contain sufficiently sensitive information to
rebut the presumption of public access).
For these reasons, the motions for sanctions are DENIED.
NOTICE
In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a party may
serve and file an objection to this order within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to review by the District Court and to any further appeal of this order.
Dated: May 21, 2024
/s/ Karen Frink Wolf
United States Magistrate Judge
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