USA v. LAPIERRE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES LAPIERRE,
Defendant.
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2:25-cr-00102-SDN
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
This matter comes before the court on Defendant James Lapierre’s motion for
discovery under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i), ECF No. 51, in connection with his motion
to dismiss for selective prosecution, ECF No. 29. The Court had previously scheduled a
motions hearing on November 17, 2025, to address Mr. Lapierre’s other pending motions
to dismiss and motion to suppress. However, I will resolve the motion for discovery prior
to the hearing to allow Mr. Lapierre the opportunity to adequately prepare for the motions
hearing. For the reasons discussed below, I deny Mr. Lapierre’s motion for discovery.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As alleged by the government, on April 24, 2025, law enforcement agents posted
an advertisement on a website commonly used to advertise commercial sex acts. ECF. No
1-1 at 2. The advertisement contained a contact phone number, images of what appeared
to be two young females, and language offering the availability of commercial sex acts. Id.
On or about April 24, 2025, the number listed in the advertisement received a text
message from a number ending in -5721 in response to the advertisement, and a
conversation ensued where the user of -5721 asked what services were provided and the
rates for services. Id. at 3. The law enforcement officer posing as author of the
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advertisement (“UC1”) stated that she had a fourteen-year-old girl available, referred to
as “Emma,” to perform sex acts in exchange for money, provided rates for such acts, and
provided the address of a hotel in South Portland, Maine. Id. at 3–4.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lapierre arrived at the Hotel where he approached a second
undercover law enforcement officer (“UC2”) posing as the author of the advertisement.
Id. at 4. Mr. Lapierre confirmed he was there for “Emma” and stated that he had the
money but did not want to provide the money to UC2 until he saw the minor female. Id.
UC2 provided Mr. Lapierre with a hotel key to a room and Mr. Lapierre proceeded to
approach the door of the hotel room. Id. Law enforcement officers then apprehended Mr.
Lapierre and took him into custody. Id. at 5. Upon his arrest, officers recovered two
condoms and around $160.00 in cash on Mr. Lapierre’s person, and his personal phone
and work phone in his vehicle, the latter of which rang when officers called the telephone
number ending in -5721. Id.; ECF No. 42 at 3.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 9, 2025, the Government indicted Mr. Lapierre on one count of attempted
sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18 §§ U.S.C. 1591(a)(1), 1591(b)(2), and 1594(a).
ECF No. 26. The following day, July 10, 2025, Mr. Lapierre filed his motion to dismiss the
indictment for selective prosecution. ECF No. 29. In his motion, Mr. Lapierre argues that
the Government decided to selectively prosecute him instead of a different individual
arrested as part of the same “sting operation,” based on a difference in each individual’s
proficiency in English. Id. at 1. In its response in opposition, the Government argues that
Mr. Lapierre has failed to demonstrate that its decision to prosecute Mr. Lapierre was
based on any discriminatory reason, and rather contends that the decision was a matter
of prosecutorial discretion based on the strength of the evidence in each case and the
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Government’s ability to proceed to trial. ECF No. 42 at 4–6. The Court will defer ruling
on the motion to dismiss for selective prosecution until the conclusion of the motions
hearing scheduled for November 17, 2025.
On September 24, 2025, Mr. Lapierre filed his motion for discovery pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) and in connection with his motion to dismiss for selective
prosecution. ECF No. 51. Specifically, Mr. Lapierre moves for “discovery of all government
documents, memoranda, or other items that informed the government’s decision not to
charge another similarly situated individual in federal court, as opposed to state court.”
ECF No. 51 at 2, ¶ 15. In its response in opposition, the Government argues that Mr.
Lapierre has failed to establish either a discriminatory effect or a discriminatory intent
behind the government’s decision to prosecute him. See ECF No. 42 at 3–4. The
Government further argues that Rule 16 is inapplicable to requests for discovery based on
selective prosecution claims. ECF No. 53 at 1–2.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Selective Prosecution
“In our criminal justice system, the Government retains broad discretion as to
whom to prosecute.” United States v. Cameron, 658 F. Supp. 2d 241, 244 (D. Me. 2009)
(quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). Once made, prosecutorial
decisions enjoy a “presumption of regularity” which “can be overcome only by a proffer of
‘clear evidence’ that the prosecutor acted impermissibly in pursuing a case.” United States
v. Lewis, 517 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 465 (1996)). “A showing of selective prosecution can, of course, undercut the
presumption of regularity.” Id. “The evidentiary threshold that a defendant must cross in
order to obtain discovery in aid of a selective prosecution claim is somewhat below ‘clear
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evidence,’ but it is nonetheless fairly high.” Id. (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468).
Instead, “a defendant must present ‘some evidence’ tending to show both discriminatory
effect and discriminatory intent.” Id. (citing United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211
(2d Cir. 1974)). “It follows that discovery will not be allowed unless the defendant’s
evidence supports each of the two furcula of his selective prosecution theory: failure on
one branch dooms the discovery motion as a whole.” Id. (citing United States v. Bass, 536
U.S. 862, 863-64 (2002) (per curiam)). Additionally, the law requires a showing that
“similarly situated individuals who do not share the protected characteristic were not
prosecuted and that the Government chose to prosecute at least in part because of, not
merely in spite of, the defendant’s protected characteristic.” Cameron, 658 F. Supp. 2d at
245 (quotation modified).
In reviewing prosecutorial discretion on the decision whether to prosecute, the
First Circuit has noted that a “multiplicity of factors legitimately may influence the
government’s decision to prosecute one individual but not another.” Lewis, 517 F.3d at 27
(citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607). These factors “may include, inter alia, the comparability
of the crimes, the similarities in the manner in which the crimes were committed, the
relative efficacy of each prosecution as a deterrent, and the equivalency of the evidence
against each prospective defendant.” Id. “This broad [prosecutorial] discretion rests
largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial
review.” Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. “Such factors as the strength of the case, the
prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.” Id.
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In his motion to dismiss for selective prosecution and motion for discovery, Mr.
Lapierre argues that the Government selectively prosecuted him in federal court instead
of another individual arrested in the same “sting operation” based on the distinction
between each individual’s nationality and proficiency in the English language. See ECF
No. 29 at 1; ECF No. 51 at 2. The other individual arrested, Mr. Yavor Dimov, was charged
in state court on charges of patronizing prostitution of a minor and solicitation of a child.
ECF No. 29-1. According to these filings, Mr. Lapierre faces a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten years if convicted, while Mr. Dimov faces no mandatory minimum and a
maximum sentence of five years on each count. ECF No. 51 at 2.
In response, the Government argues that Mr. Lapierre fails to acknowledge the
strength of the Government’s case against him, which is “one amongst other valid
considerations for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in indicting him federally.” ECF
No. 42 at 6. The Government asserts that Mr. Lapierre’s “fluency in English does not make
him a target for discriminatory prosecution but rather is a vital factor in the United States’
ability to proceed to trial.” Id. According to the Government, Mr. Lapierre’s proficiency in
English combined with his alleged conduct on the date of the offense would allow a jury
to more readily conclude that Mr. Lapierre attempted to engage in commercial sexual
activity with a minor, as opposed to a non-English speaker. See id. at 6–7.
Based upon the record before the Court, I find that Mr. Lapierre has failed, at this
stage, to demonstrate a discriminatory intent on the part of the Government in electing
to prosecute him in federal court, while declining to prosecute Mr. Dimov for similar
conduct. Specifically, Mr. Lapierre has failed to demonstrate that the Government’s
decision to prosecute him was because of his proficiency in English or his nationality, and
not merely in spite of it. A defendant’s fluency in English is particularly relevant when
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viewed in light of the specific conduct charged in this case, which involves the defendant’s
ability to understand the advertisement offering commercial sexual activity and the
subsequent text messages with undercover officers, all of which was communicated in
English. Multiple courts, including the First Circuit, have held that the strength of the
evidence of the government’s case against a particular defendant is a valid consideration
and exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Rundo, 108 F.4th 792, 803–
04 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding that the “strength of the evidence, i.e., how easily a prosecutor
can prove that an individual committed a crime . . . is a permissible consideration in
making prosecutorial selections”); see also United States v. Peterson, 233 F.3d 101, 105
(1st Cir. 2000) (finding that the prosecution of director of narcotics distribution
operation, while declining to prosecute minor participant in operation, was not selective
prosecution). Further, the Government’s decision to prosecute based on the strength of
the case against a particular defendant is “particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. Accordingly, Mr. Lapierre has failed at this juncture to
demonstrate that his prosecution in federal court is the result of a discriminatory intent
or animus toward him, instead of the exercise of permissible prosecutorial discretion, to
allow him to obtain the requested discovery.1
II. 	Rule 16
Mr. Lapierre further contends he is entitled to discovery in pursuit of his selective
prosecution claim under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a), as materials relevant
to preparing his defense. The relevant portion of Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) states, “Upon a
1 Because I find that Mr. Lapierre has, at this stage, failed to establish a discriminatory intent on the part of
the Government to obtain discovery on selective prosecution, I need not consider the other prong of the
relevant inquiry under Lewis v. United States, whether the government’s prosecutorial decision produces
a discriminatory effect. See Lewis, 517 F.3d at 25.
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defendant’s request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or
photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or
places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government’s
possession, custody, or control and . . . the item is material to preparing the defense.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i). The Supreme Court has previously interpreted Rule 16’s
materiality requirement to authorize defendants “to examine Government documents
material to the preparation of their defense against the Government’s case in chief, but
not to the preparation of selective-prosecution claims.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463.
Accordingly, because Mr. Lapierre’s request for discovery is made in preparation for his
motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, and not against the Government’s case in
chief, Rule 16 does not provide a legal basis for the relief sought by Mr. Lapierre.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Lapierre’s motion for discovery, ECF No. 51, is
DENIED without prejudice. I will reserve ruling on Mr. Lapierre’s motion to dismiss
for selective prosecution, ECF No. 29, until the conclusion of the motions hearing
scheduled in this matter for November 17, 2025. If anything comes to light at that hearing
that could change the analysis on discovery contained herein, I will allow Mr. Lapierre to
refile his motion for discovery.
S O ORDERED .
Dated this 27th day of October, 2025.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT J UDGE
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