AMBILA v. JOYCE et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
EYIDI AMBILA,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN JOYCE,
Sheriff,
Cumberland County, et al.,
Defendants.
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2:25-cv-00267-SDN
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On May 22, 2025, Petitioner Eyidi Ambala filed a verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	ECF No. 1. He claimed that his prolonged
detention in federal immigration enforcement custody violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Id. at 14. On January 22, 2026, the Court
concluded his detention was unlawful and ordered his immediate release. ECF No. 44.
This Order fully sets forth the Court’s reasoning.
I. 	Procedural History
Mr. Ambila is a noncitizen who has lived in the United States since the age of seven.
ECF No. 1 at 1. He was born in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) but has no
official birth record there. Id. In October 2006, an Immigration Judge ordered his
removal to the DRC, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upheld the final
removal order in 2007. Id. at 5. He was released under an Order of Supervision1 (“OSUP”)
in 2007 and continued to live in the United States. Id. at 6. In 2018, Mr. Ambila submitted
1 In March 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) sought travel documents for Mr. Ambila’s
removal to the DRC, but it never received the documents from the Congolese government. ECF No. 1 at 8.
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a written passport application to the DRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was denied
because the country had no record of his birth or presence in the country, rendering him
“stateless.” 	Id. at 8. In 2020, he applied to the DRC a second time and was denied again.
Id. In 2024, after a state arrest and conviction for misdemeanor crimes of reckless
conduct and domestic violence, Mr. Ambila was transferred to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) custody at the Cumberland County Jail in Portland, Maine. Id. He
remained there from September 23, 2024, until his release by this Court’s order on
January 22, 2026, which totaled almost one year and four months of detention.
Mr. Ambila filed his habeas petition on May 22, 2025—eight months after ICE took
him into custody. ECF No. 1. Relying on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), he
argued that his continued detention 	had become 	unlawful because there 	was no
reasonably foreseeable prospect of his removal, due in part to the Government’s inability
to secure travel documents from the DRC.
On May 27, 2025, just days after he filed his habeas petition, ICE transferred him
to the Burlington, Massachusetts, ICE facility and informed him that he was to be
deported to the DRC “imminently”; on May 29, 2025, he learned the federal government
had obtained a temporary travel document that would ostensibly grant him entry to the
DRC, and he was booked on a flight to the DRC. See ECF No. 5-1 at 2. Mr. Ambila sought
a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) blocking his removal to the DRC in this Court, ECF
No. 6, claiming the travel document did not ensure DRC’s acceptance or recognition of
his status, and that he likely would be tortured or killed due to his statelessness, ECF No.
24 at 2. The Court granted the TRO, noting the failed efforts to obtain a Congolese
passport and travel documents for eighteen years. ECF No. 11 at 8–9.
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The Court subsequently issued an order to show cause as to why Mr. Ambila’s
habeas petition should not be granted. ECF No. 16. In response, the Government asserted
Mr. Ambila’s detention was lawful due to his imminent removal evidenced by the booked
flight, see ECF No. 18-1, and because the Congolese embassy had issued a temporary
travel document entitled “Laissez-Passer Standing Instead of Passport,”2 see ECF No.
18-2. However, Petitioner presented evidence to the Court from an expert that his
stateless status posed risks of torture or death upon removal to the DRC.
In June 2025, Petitioner moved in this Court for a stay of his habeas proceeding
and that his hearing be “postponed for good cause pending adjudication of his emergency
motions by the [BIA].” ECF No. 24 at 1–2. He had filed two motions with the BIA in light
of the expert’s report that he could be harmed upon his return to the DRC: a Motion to
Reopen and a Motion for Stay of Removal. See ECF No. 23-1. The requests were received
by the BIA on June 2, 2025. Id. On June 9, 2025, this Court agreed to postpone Mr.
Ambila’s habeas hearing per his request. ECF No. 29.
On October 3, 2025, Mr. Ambila filed a supplemental ineffective assistance of
counsel claim with the BIA. ECF No. 36 at 1. On October 14, 2025, he learned that the BIA
had denied his Motion to Reopen in August 2025, although he claimed he had not
received a copy of the denial. Id. at 2. He then challenged the BIA’s denial of his Motion
to Reopen before the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. On December 12, 2025, the
Government requested the First Circuit hold the case in abeyance pending a BIA decision
on a motion to reissue the denial with an updated date. ECF No. 40.
2 The document, which was issued on March 17, 2025, expired after September 16, 2025. ECF No. 18-2.
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On January 22, 2026, the Court held oral argument on the current status of Mr.
Ambila’s immigration cases and on the merits of his unlawful detention argument. ECF
No. 42. At the hearing, Petitioner requested the Court release the stay on the habeas
proceedings and grant the Petitioner’s habeas request. The Government opposed the
motion.
II. 	Analysis
Section 1231(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes DHS to
detain noncitizens once their final order of removal becomes “administratively final.”3
8 U.S.C. § 1241(a)(1)(B)(i). The statute requires that removal occur within a 90-day
period, after which detention may continue only in limited circumstances. Johnson v.
Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 578 (2022) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)). After the
period expires, the Government has discretion to detain only four categories of people:
“(1) those who are ‘inadmissible’ 	on certain specified grounds; (2) those who are
‘removable’ on certain specified grounds; (3) those it determines ‘to be a risk to the
community’; and (4) those it determines to be ‘unlikely to comply with the order of
removal.’” Id. at 579 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)).
Although the detention statute does not provide a specific time frame for how long
a person may be discretionarily detained after the 90-day period, the Supreme Court
interpreted 	Section 	1231(a) 	to mean 	that the statute 	“does not 	permit 	indefinite
detention”; it instead “limits a[] [noncitizen’s] post-removal-period detention to a period
3 For the purposes of this Order, the Court finds Mr. Ambila’s 2007 final order of removal is
“administratively final” despite his stayed case before the First Circuit challenging the denial of the Motion
to Reopen. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534 (2021) (“By using the word ‘administratively,’
Congress focused our attention on the agency’s review proceedings, separate and apart from any judicial
review proceedings that may occur in a court.”). Additionally, both Parties conceded at oral argument that
the open First Circuit case has no bearing on the habeas petition before this Court.
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reasonably necessary to bring about that [noncitizen’s] removal from the United States.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. To obtain release, the noncitizen must “provide[] good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” Id. at 701. The burden then shifts to the Government to “respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.
Although the Government argued at oral argument that Mr. Ambila’s excessively
long detention was based in part on his own actions in requesting a TRO from this Court
prohibiting his removal from the U.S. despite being booked on a flight in May 2025 and
thereafter requesting a stay from this Court on his habeas petition, the Government also
conceded that Mr. Ambila already had been detained for over eight months before filing
his habeas petition, exceeding the Zadvydas six-month threshold.4
To succeed on his habeas claim, Zadvydas imposes a minimal burden on Mr.
Ambila to produce good reason to believe his removal is not imminently foreseeable.5 The
Court finds Mr. Ambila provided two key pieces of evidence supporting his claim.
First, 	the temporary travel 	document the Government provided expired on
September 16, 2025, and the Government was not able to make assurances to the Court
as to how long it would take to secure a replacement. Previously, Mr. Ambila entered ICE
custody in September 2024, but the travel document was not issued until six months later
in March 2025, and was not provided to Mr. Ambila until two months after that, in May
4 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii), Mr. Ambila’s 90-day removal period began when he was released from
state custody in September 2024. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii) (“The removal period begins on the latest
of the following: . . . If the [noncitizen] is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the
date the [noncitizen] is released from detention or confinement.”).
5 See Singh v. Whitaker, 362 F. Supp. 3d 93, 101 (W.D.N.Y. 2019), abrogated on other grounds by Alvarez
Ortiz v. Freden, No. 25-CV-960, 2025 WL 3085032 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (“[T]he burden upon the
detainee is not to ‘demonstrate’ no reasonably foreseeable, significant likelihood of removal or ‘show that
his detention is indefinite’; it is something less than that.” (quoting D’Alessandro v. Mukasey, 628 F. Supp.
2d 368, 404 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)).
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2025. Where there is a lack of evidentiary support in the record as to how long a travel
document could take to issue, courts have been hesitant to find that imminent issuance
of the document is reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Abubaka v. Bondi, No. C25-1889,
2025 WL 3204369, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding “petitioner has sufficiently
shown good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future given the uncertain and protracted process for procuring
travel documents” (quotation modified)). The Government should not be permitted to
hold Mr. Ambila indefinitely while it seeks new travel documents that may or may not be
sufficient to facilitate his removal to the DRC. See Tran v. Bondi, No. C25-01897, 2025
WL 3140462, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2025) (“ICE is not permitted to hold [petitioner]
indefinitely while it waits for travel documents from [the third country].”).
Second, Mr. Ambila has adduced significant evidence in the record—in the form of
a detailed expert report from a scholar on the political situation in the DRC—to suggest
he faces imminent harm if he were to return to the DRC under these documents as a
stateless individual. Furthermore, the record does not indicate whether the DRC would
recognize Mr. Ambila’s continued residence in the country once the temporary travel
document expires. Both of those issues are of exceptional concern to the Court.
The Government has failed to rebut Mr. Ambila’s assertions that his removal is not
reasonably foreseeable. The Government has not submitted competing expert testimony
or reports as to the credibility and sufficiency of the temporary travel documents for Mr.
Ambila’s future permanent residency in the DRC, nor has it been able to speak to the
political situation Mr. Ambila might face upon his return. As of January 22, 2026, the
Government had not even begun the process of seeking new, unexpired travel documents
to facilitate his removal. See Do v. Scott, 25-cv-02187, 2025 WL 3470327, at *5–6 (W.D.
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Wash. Dec. 3, 2025) (granting petitioner’s Zadvydas claim where the record “does not
show that a completed travel document request has been submitted,” only that the
government was preparing to submit one); Abubaka, 2025 WL 3204369, at *5 (same).
III. 	Conclusion
The Court finds Mr. Ambila has demonstrated “there is no significant likelihood of
removal 	in 	the 	reasonably 	foreseeable 	future.” 	Zadvydas, 533 	U.S. 	at 701. 	The
Government has failed to rebut this evidence.6
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Mr. Ambila’s verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. ECF No. 1. As previously ordered on January 22, 2026, the Court ORDERS that
Mr. Ambila shall remain out of custody, subject to any necessary conditions of release.
The Court further ORDERS the Respondents not to re-detain Mr. Ambila absent a
showing of changed circumstances for his re-detention. Nothing in this Order should be
construed to prevent the Respondents from pursuing removal efforts in accordance with
the law.
S O ORDERED.
Dated this 24th day of January, 2026.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT J UDGE
6 Because Mr. Ambila’s requested relief is granted under Zadvydas, the Court does not reach the merits of
his due process claim. See Dupont v. Meserve, No. 25-CV-00593, 2026 WL 74112, at *3 (D. Me. Jan. 9,
2026) (“Finding [petitioner] has offered the Court good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood
he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future and that Respondents have failed to rebut those
good reasons [under Zadvydas], the Court need not address [petitioner’s] due process or third country
removal claims at this time.”).
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