MCKINNEY v. WING et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ANTONIO MCKINNEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
TROOPER WING, et al.,
Defendants.
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2:25-cv-00355-SDN
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff Antonio McKinney sued two Maine State Police officers and the Lewiston,
Maine, Police Department for allegedly violating his constitutional rights during a
roadside traffic stop where the officers strip searched him. ECF No. 1. On July 17, 2025,
Mr. McKinney filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a motion for
a preliminary injunction, seeking an injunction barring the Lewiston Police Department
and its officers from “[m]aking any physical or investigative contact with Plaintiff,”
“[d]etaining or attempting to detain Plaintiff without a valid court-issued warrant,” or
“[h]arassing, surveilling, or retaliating against Plaintiff in any form during the pendency
of this action.” ECF No. 7 at 3–4. On August 5, 2025, I issued an order denying Mr.
McKinney’s motions. ECF No. 22 (“the Order”). On August 8, 2025, Mr. McKinney filed
a self-described “motion to strike” the Order, which the Court construes as a timely
motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 24. The Lewiston Police Department filed a response
in opposition on August 22, 2025. ECF No. 27. For the reasons that follow, I deny Mr.
McKinney’s motion for reconsideration.
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DISCUSSION
This Order incorporates by reference the factual background as detailed in my
Order denying Mr. McKinney’s motion for a TRO. See ECF No. 22 at 1–3.
District 	of Maine Local Rule 7(f) allows a party to move to reconsider 	an
interlocutory order if they can “demonstrate that the order was based on a manifest error
of fact or law.” D. Me. Local R. 7(f)(1). In his motion, Mr. McKinney asserts that the Order
constitutes “judicial overreach” and “legal error.” ECF No. 24 at 1. The Court thus
presumes that Mr. McKinney is seeking reconsideration on the ground that my previous
decision was legally erroneous.
“The granting of a motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly.” U.S. ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 737 F.3d 116, 127 (1st Cir.
2013) (quotation modified). To prevail on such a motion, “a party normally must
demonstrate 	either 	that new and important 	evidence, 	previously 	unavailable, has
surfaced or that the original judgment was premised on a manifest error of law or fact.”
Ira Green, Inc. v. Mil. Sales & Serv. Co., 775 F.3d 12, 28 (1st Cir. 2014). The throughline
of Mr. McKinney’s current motion is analogous to that in his original motion for a TRO:
He seeks a finding by this Court that he has been subject to repeated misconduct by the
Lewiston 	Police 	Department 	and 	hence 	they 	should 	be 	prohibited 	from 	further
interaction with him. See ECF No. 24 at 3–4. But, as I have previously explained, to
succeed in a claim for prospective injunctive relief, the plaintiff must demonstrate a
likelihood of being wronged again “in a similar way.” City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
111 (1983). “Here, Mr. McKinney does not demonstrate he is likely to be illegally searched
or detained by Lewiston Police officers in the future. Nor does Mr. McKinney show any
defendants are likely to use his state court drug charge and related records in an unlawful
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manner in the future.” ECF No. 22 at 5. Mr. McKinney’s current “challenge renewed and
elaborated upon the same 	explanation . . . that [the movant] had advanced in its
underlying motion.” Caribbean Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Erikon LLC, 966 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir.
2020). Thus, he has not sufficiently shown that the Court has committed a manifest error
of law or fact in assessing the original merits of the TRO.1
Mr. McKinney raises other miscellaneous claims as to why the Court should
reconsider its original Order, none of which have merit. First, he contends he was denied
his right to due process because the motion was decided without oral argument. See ECF
No. 24 at 4. District of Maine Local Rule 7(e) states unequivocally that “all motions may
be decided by the Court without oral argument.” D. Me. Local R. 7(e) (emphasis added).
Second, Mr. McKinney urges the Court to find that the factual allegations in his
complaint should be deemed admitted because the Defendants have not answered. See
ECF No. 24 at 3. However, the Defendants have not been served in this matter, and thus
responsive pleadings are not yet required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (“A defendant
must 	serve 	an answer: 	within 	21 	days after being 	served 	with 	the 	summons or
complaint . . . .”).
Finally, Mr. McKinney appears to request a change in venue due to a perception of
judicial bias. See ECF No. 24 at 5 (“Assign all further review to a neutral magistrate or
judge not associated with the current denial . . . .”). 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which governs
transfers of venue, provides that “in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to
any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). “The
1 Although Mr. McKinney attaches an affidavit to his motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 24-1, it does not
appear to allege any new facts or evidence.
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burden of proving the propriety of a transfer lies with the party seeking it.” Johnson v.
VCG Holding Corp., 767 F. Supp. 2d 208, 212 (D. Me. 2011). Mr. McKinney cannot
demonstrate that this case should have been brought in another district. Nor has he
advanced any evidence of judicial bias. “[T]he mere fact of an adverse ruling . . . does not—
standing alone—create an inference of lack of partiality.” United States v. Giorgi,
840 F.2d 1022, 1035 (1st Cir. 1988).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. McKinney’s motion for reconsideration of my
August 5, 2025, Order denying his motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.
ECF No. 24.
S O ORDERED.
Dated this 31st day of October, 2025.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT J UDGE
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