POWELL v. POWELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
SARAH LEYLA POWELL, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-00641-JAW
)
ADRIAN MAURICE POWELL JR., 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
FNDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In this international custody dispute over two minor children under the Hague
Convention, a mother petitions this court for an order allowing her to return to
Germany with her two children and for enforcement of the custody order of a German
court. 	Following the framework under federal and international law, the court
concludes that children’s habitual residence is Germany, no exception applies, and
that Germany is the most appropriate forum to adjudicate the custody dispute.
Accordingly, the court grants the mother’s petition and orders the children to return
to Germany.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action was initiated pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986), as
implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C.
§§ 9001-9011 (formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601 et seq.). 	Verified Pet. for Return of
Children to Germany and for Issuance of Show Cause Order (ECF No. 1) (Pet.).
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On December 22, 2025 Petitioner Sarah Leyla Powell filed her verified petition
pursuant to the Hague Convention directing the return of her two minor children (the
children), N.P. and Z.P. to Germany, Pet., along with her motion for expedited
consideration of the petition and the issuance of an order to show cause against the
Respondent, Adrian Maurice Powell Jr. 	See Mot. for Expedited Consideration of
Verified Pet. for Return of Children to Germany and Issuance of Show Cause Order
(ECF No. 3). The Petitioner alleges that the Respondent unlawfully kept the children
in the United States. Pet. ¶ 52. On December 23, 2025, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order, preventing the Respondent from removing the children from the
Court’s 	jurisdiction 	and 	directing 	the 	Respondent 	to 	relinquish 	the 	children’s
passports. TRO (ECF No. 5).1
The Court held a telephonic conference of counsel on this matter on January
9, 2026 at 3:30 p.m. EST. 	Min. Entry (ECF No. 14), and scheduled an expedited
evidentiary hearing for January 22-23, 2026 in federal court in Portland, Maine. Id.
Following the telephone conference, the Court issued a report of conference and
scheduling order outlining deadlines for the evidentiary hearing on the verified
petition, staying any state court proceedings, and directing the parties to notify the
state court that its proceedings have been stayed. 	Report of Conf. and Scheduling
Order (ECF No. 16).
1 	The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that on January 21, 2026, the Respondent complied
with this order and the children’s passports are now retained by the Clerk of Court. 	Receipt for
Surrender of Passports (ECF No. 48).
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On January 16, 2026, the Petitioner filed her trial brief, Pet’r’s Pre-Hearing
Brief (ECF No. 26), and on January 16, 2026, the Respondent filed his answer, Resp’t’s
Answer 	and 	Affirmative 	Defenses 	(ECF 	No. 	27), 	his 	amended 	answer 	and
counterclaim 	for 	reasonable 	attorney’s 	fees 	and 	costs, 	Resp’t’s 	Am. 	Answer,
Affirmative Defenses, and Countercl. (ECF No. 28), and his trial brief. 	Resp’t’s Pre-
Hearing Brief (ECF No. 29). 	The Petitioner opposed Respondent’s request for
attorney’s fees and costs arguing that ICARA only provides an award of fees to
prevailing petitioners. Answer to Countercl. at 1, n.1 (ECF No. 31).2
At the conclusion of the two-day evidentiary hearing on January 22-23, 2026,
the Court instructed the parties to file post hearing briefs. Min. Entry (ECF No. 52).
On February 18, 2025, the Respondent filed his brief, Resp’t’s Post-Trial Brief (ECF
No. 59), and, a corrected version of the same. Resp’t’s Post-Trial Brief (ECF No. 60)
(Resp’t’s Brief). The Petitioner also filed her brief on February 18, 2026. Pet’r’s Post-
Trial Brief (ECF No. 61) (Pet’r’s Brief). 	Both parties timely filed their responses on
2 	On January 17, 2026, after the Court scheduled the expedited evidentiary hearing consistent
with the Hague Convention requirements, the Respondent filed a motion seeking summary judgment
against the Petitioner’s verified petition and listing the Respondent’s statement of material fact.
Resp’t’s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 30). On January 20, 2026, the Court held a telephone conference
with the parties and explained that the evidentiary hearing would be the preferred way to handle the
dispute, but the Respondent objected to dismissal of the motion for summary judgment and the Court
expedited the Petitioner’s response. Min. Entry (ECF No. 33). The Respondent waived reply. Id.
On January 20, 2026, the Petitioner filed her opposition, Pet’r’s Obj. to Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF
No. 36), and an opposing statement of fact with additional facts. Opposing Statement of Material Facts
and Statement of Additional Material Facts (ECF No. 37). On the first day of the evidentiary hearing,
the Court orally denied the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment, Min. Entry (ECF No. 50), on
the ground that “there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute that preclude summary
disposition of the case.” Tr. of Proceedings, 3:24-4:1 (ECF No. 56). On January 29, 2026, the Court
issued a written order, detailing the same. Order Denying Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 55).
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February 20, 2026. Resp’t’s Reply Brief (ECF No. 63) (Resp’t’s Reply); Pet’r’s Reply to
Resp’t’s Post-Trial Brief (ECF No. 62) (Pet’r’s Reply). The Court did not allow replies.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Overview
The Hague Convention was adopted by the signatory nations—including the
United States and Germany—“[t]o address ‘the problem of international child
abductions during domestic disputes.’” 	Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 4
(2014) (citing Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010)); see also Diaz-Alarcon v. Flandez-
Marcel, 944 F.3d 303,305 (1st Cir. 2019) (noting the Convention “aims to deter
parents from abducting their children to a country whose courts might side with them
in a custody battle”); Mendez v. May, 778 F.3d 337, 343 (1st Cir. 2015) (explaining
“The Convention’s underlying principle is that the courts of a child’s country of
habitual residence should be the entities to make custody determinations in the
child’s best interest”) (citations omitted).
The Convention sets forth a statutory framework “to secure the prompt return
of children” under age sixteen who are “wrongfully removed to or retained in any
Contracting State” unless an exception applies. Hague Convention, arts. 1(a), 4, 13.
The return remedy follows “the Convention’s core premise that ‘the interests of
children . . . in matters relating to their custody’ are best served when custody
decisions are made in the child’s country of ‘habitual residence.’” Monasky v. Taglieri,
589 	U.S. 	68, 	72 	(2020) 	(citing 	Hague 	Convention, 	pmbl.). 	Accordingly, 	the
Convention’s “central operating feature is the return remedy.” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 9.
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Relatedly, “[t]he Convention’s return requirement is a ‘provisional’ remedy
that fixes the forum for custody proceedings. . .. Upon the child’s return, the custody
adjudication will proceed in that forum.” 	Monasky, 589 U.S. at 72 (citing Linda
Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Convention: In Search of a Global Jurisprudence,
38 U.C.D.L. REV . 1049, 1054 (2005)). 	“[I]t is the job of the courts of [the child’s
habitual residence], not the district court, to ‘make the appropriate custodial and
family law determinations.’” 	da Silva v. de Aredes, 953 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2020)
(quoting Mauvais v. Herisse, 772 F.3d 6, 21 (1st Cir. 2014)); see also Vieira v. De
Souza, 22 F.4th 304, 308 (1st Cir. 2022) (“Notably, an order of return pursuant to the
Hague Convention is not a final determination of custody rights. 	It simply ensures
that custodial decisions will be made by the courts of the children’s country of
habitual residence”) (citations omitted).
The United States implemented the Convention through the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act, which extends jurisdiction to federal courts over
Hague Convention disputes, 22 U.S.C. § 9003(a), and provides that courts “shall
decide [each] case in accordance with the Convention.” Id. § 9003(d). In “adjudicating
a dispute under the Convention,” the Court undertakes a threshold inquiry: “whether
the child was wrongfully removed from the jurisdiction” of habitual residence. Moura
v. Cunha, 67 F. Supp. 3d 493, 497 (D. Mass. 2014). 	An answer in the affirmative
“creates a presumption in favor of return” that governs unless the Court concludes
an affirmative defense rebuts the presumption. Id.
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B. 	Threshold Inquiry
Under ICARA, a parent can petition a court for the return of their wrongfully
removed child to the child’s country of habitual residence. 	See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b).
To prevail, the petitioning parent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the other parent “wrongfully removed or retained [the child] within the meaning
of the Convention.” 	Id. § 9003(e)(1). 	To establish that a retention3 is “wrongful”
under the Convention, the petitioning parent must show that she or he: (1) seeks to
return the child to the child’s country of habitual residence, (2) had custody rights
immediately prior to the child’s retention, and (3) was exercising those custody rights.
Mendez, 788 F.3d at 343 (citing Hague Convention, art. 3); see also Giguère v. Tardif,
No. 1:25-CV-10468-IT, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165575, at *30 (D. Mass. Aug. 26,
2025), appeal docketed No. 90-567 (1st Cir. Sept. 1, 2025) (discussing the same three
factors) (citing Hague Convention, art. 3).
C. 	Affirmative Defenses
Once a petitioner establishes wrongful retention under the Convention, ICARA
requires that the “[c]hildren who are wrongfully removed or retained within the
meaning of the Convention are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow
exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.” 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4). Affirmative
defenses include:
that (1) the child objects to being returned and is of sufficient age and
maturity for [their] views to be taken into account, Hague Convention,
art. 13; (2) the petitioner commenced the proceeding more than a year
after the child’s wrongful removal or retention and the child has become
3 	The Hague Convention contemplates both wrongful removal and wrongful retention. Here,
the Petitioner alleges wrongful retention.
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well-settled in his new environment, id. art. 12; and (3) returning the
child would pose a ‘grave risk’ to [their] physical or psychological well-
being or place him ‘in an intolerable situation,’ id. art. 13(b).
de Queiroz v. Schuenck, No. 4:25-CV-40161, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5175, at *5-6 (D.
Mass. Jan. 12, 2026) (citing Swett v. Bowe, 733 F. Supp. 3d 225, 242 (S.D.N.Y 2024),
aff’d sub nom. Urquieta v. Bowe, 120 F.4th 335 (2d Cir. 2024)). Although affirmative
defenses can ground a return order, “[t]his Court may exercise its discretion to order
removal even if it is found that one or more of these defenses apply.” De Aguiar Dias
v. De Souza, 212 F. Supp. 3d 259, 270 (D. Mass. 2016) (citing Hague Convention, art.
18).4
III. 	FINDINGS OF FACT5
A. 	The Parties
Petitioner Sarah Leyla Powell is a citizen of Germany. 	Pet. ¶ 2. 	The
Respondent, Adrian Maurice Powell, Jr. is a citizen of the United States. 	Id. 	The
Petitioner and the Respondent have two children, N.P. and Z.P., born in Germany in
2016 and 2020, respectively. 	Id. ¶ 3. 	The children are dual citizens. 	Tr. of
Proceedings Volume I of II at 69:18-20 (ECF No. 56) (Tr. Vol. I).
B. 	The Relationship
The parties met in 2015 while the Respondent was serving in the U.S. Air Force
in Germany. 	Id. at 72:2-6. 	They married in Germany on March 3, 2016, and the
4 	The Petitioner does not claim that any narrow exception applies.
5 	The Court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. C IV. P. 52
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Petitioner gave birth to her first child, N.P. later that year. 	Id. at 72:7-73:7. 	The
family of three lived in Germany for over a year until they moved to the state of
Georgia in 2017 on orders from the U.S. Air Force. 	Id. at 73:12-20. 	While living in
Georgia, the Petitioner and the Respondent experienced marital troubles and in
December of 2018 the parties were “breaking up” so the Petitioner and N.P. moved
back to Germany. Id. at 73:21-25-74:9, 74:24-75:12.
At some point after the Petitioner and N.P returned to Germany in December
2018, the Respondent was deployed to Africa. 	Id. at 74:24-75:12. 	The Respondent
video called but never visited Germany during this deployment; the Petitioner lived
with and cared for N.P. between December 2018 and October 2019. 	Id. at 75:1-22,
76:21-25. In October of 2019, the Respondent returned to Germany as a civilian, and
the couple briefly reconciled. 	Id. at 75:13-76:3. 	In 2020, the parties’ second child,
Z.P. was born. 	Id. at 76:11-12. 	By September of 2021, however, the parties were
again 	experiencing 	marital 	difficulties 	and 	decided 	to 	begin 	separating; 	the
Respondent moved back to the United States on November 30, 2021. 	Id. at 77:18-
78:4.
C. 	The Custody Agreement
When the Respondent returned to the United States in November of 2021, the
parties agreed that the children would stay with the Petitioner in Germany. 	Id. at
78:25-79:8. 	Because the parties were married, German law had automatically
granted them joint custody of the children, including the right to determine the
children’s residence. 	Id. at 13:14-15:23. 	In preparation for the Respondent’s move
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back to the United States, the parties visited a German official who prepared a
custody power of attorney. 	Id. at 78:25-79:8, 15:24-16:17; Pet., Attach. 1, Custody
Power of Att’y (Power of Att’y). As the Petitioner’s witness, Andreas Hanke, explained,
the custody power of attorney does not extinguish or alter the Respondent’s rights,
but it delegates the Respondent’s right to exercise joint custody to the Petitioner. Tr.
Vol. I at 15:24-17:7. 	The delegation includes the right to determine the children’s
residence. Id. at 17:5-7. Nothing in the record indicates that the Respondent revoked
the power of attorney. 	Id. at 92:4-12. 	According to Attorney Hanke, under this
custody agreement and the power of attorney, retention of the children outside their
country of habitual residence, without a joint custody holder’s consent, would violate
both German law and the delegation of rights in the power of attorney. Id. at 19:19-
20:6.
D. 	The Children’s Lives and Connections in Germany
Z.P. was one and N.P. was five when their father, the Respondent, moved back
to the United States. The Petitioner, as primary caregiver for the children, continued
raising 	them 	in 	Germany, 	supporting 	herself 	with 	her 	employment 	with 	the
Mannheim city government. Id. at 77:4-9, 84:3-86:5.
Although dual citizens, the children only hold active German passports. Id. at
212:11-212:21. The children’s first language is German, but both also speak English
as all German children take English lessons in school, many Germans are fluent in
English, and the Petitioner has read the children German and English storybooks
their entire lives. Id. at 83:15-84:9.
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N.P. completed five years of school in Germany and Z.P. completed three years,
as early education starts at age one. Id. at 86:6-88:12. The children have close friends
in Mannheim and lived in a cosmopolitan neighborhood with friends the children
played with “all the time,” id. at 90:10-12, many of whom spoke English. Id. at 88:13-
23. 	The neighborhood has affordable parks, gardens, public pools that the children
enjoyed. Id. at 88:25-89:6. The Petitioner was pregnant with Z.P. at the same time
her best friend was pregnant, making the two children fast friends from birth. Id. at
90:1-6.
The children were also connected to family; N.P. saw the Petitioner’s brother
every Monday; they all visited the Petitioner’s family every other weekend; and,
during some stretches of time, the children’s maternal uncle would cook for the
Petitioner and the children once a week. 	Id. at 89:7-11. The children also have
cousins and extended family near in age. Id. at 90:7-9.
Were the children to return to Germany, they would live with the Petitioner
and her grandparents, who call often and would be “very happy” to have the three of
them back in Germany. Id. at 159:18-160. The children would also spend time with
the Petitioner’s aunt, her brother, and all the children’s friends. 	Id. 	The children
would go back to school—N.P. would return immediately, as it is mandatory, and Z.P.
would apply for a spot in kindergarten after some time, as the Petitioner is worried
about how all the change has affected him. Id. at 160:4-12. The Petitioner has a job
offer as a manager at a climbing gym that will remain open for her until March 2026.
Id. at 160:19-25.
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E. 	The Children Visit the Respondent in the United States in the
Summer of 2023
In the Summer of 2023, the children visited the Respondent in the United
States, but to do so, the Petitioner had to give the Respondent a travel authorization,
notarized at the town hall, stating that any travel documents had to be returned to
the Petitioner when the children returned. Id. at 80:22-82-14. The Respondent flew
to Germany to pick up the children and when their visit was over, he flew them back,
returning the travel documents to Petitioner. Id. at 82:15-25.
F. 	Final Divorce
The Petitioner served her petition for divorce in July 2023. Id. at 90:19-91:1.
On September 6, 2023, the Petitioner and the Respondent entered a written divorce
agreement, drafted and recorded by a German official and presented to the German
family court on September 8. 2023. Id. at 91:20-25; Pet., Attach. 2, Divorce Agreement
(Divorce Agreement) (dated September 6, 2023). 	By the terms of the divorce
agreement, the children had their permanent residence with the Petitioner in
Germany. 	Divorce Agreement at 10; Tr. Vol. I at 17:8-18:6. 	The agreement also
obligated the Respondent to pay child and spousal support. Divorce Agreement at 10;
Tr. Vol. I at 17:23-18:6. By ordering child support, the divorce agreement recognized
that the children lived with the Petitioner and the Respondent had visitation. 	Tr.
Vol. I at 18:7-13. A final divorce judgment came several months later in May 2024 to
formally dissolve the marriage and divide pension rights. 	Id. at 18:14-19:18; Pet.,
Attach. 3, Decision (Final Divorce Judgment). The final divorce judgment referenced
the September 6, 2023 divorce agreement. Final Divorce Judgment at 3.
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G. 	The Decision to Travel to the United States
Just before the final divorce judgment issued in May 2024, the Respondent
reached out to the Petitioner about coming to the United States. Tr. Vol. I at 99:3-5.
At the time, the Respondent and his now wife, Kylie, were living in Maine. 	Id. at
99:21-25. 	The idea was for the Petitioner to attend York Community College on an
F-1 visa sponsored by the Respondent. Id. at 100:23-101:20. The F-1 visa application
indicated that the Petitioner would return to Germany after her studies, which could
extend four years or longer. Tr. Of Proceedings Volume II of II at 220:5-20 (ECF No.
57) (Tr. Vol. II).6 The parties submitted the appropriate paperwork, which confirmed
that the Petitioner needed to remain a full-time student to comply with her visa
status. 	Tr. Vol. I at 101:21-104:18. 	The Petitioner also understood that she would
have minimal work opportunities under the particular visa. 	Id. at 105:10-19. 	The
Respondent attested that he intended to provide room and board, a weekly allowance
of $500 a week, all school fees, for all basic needs, and transportation. 	Id. at
107:21:108-1. 	The parties agreed that if the Petitioner’s visa was not granted, the
children would return to Germany. Id. at 109:17-110:1.7
6 	The Respondent testified at the hearing that despite what the declarations said, he understood
that the Petitioner intended to remain in the United States after her schooling. Tr. Vol. II at 235:1-4.
On cross examination, the Respondent again agreed that the visa application indicated the Petitioner
would return to Germany at the end of her education and that the parties never discussed anything to
the contrary. Id. at 257:17-258:1. The Court views the Respondent’s testimony as his private hope
that the Petitioner and the children were permanently moving to the United States, not something
Petitioner agreed to do.
7 	On cross examination, the Respondent admitted that if the Petitioner did not get the visa
application approved, the children would return to her in Germany. Tr. Vol. II at 257:10-16.
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To get the visa, the Petitioner also had to submit evidence of her continuing
ties to Germany including bank accounts, insurance policies, driver’s license, family,
and debts. Id. at 111:1-113:2. Despite these continuing ties, the Petitioner also sold
many of the children’s belongings before sending them to the Untied States, and she
no longer has a lease in Germany. Id. at 187:8-23. The children traveled on one-way
tickets with clothes, a few toys, and some important keepsakes. Tr. Vol. II at 232:17-
22.
By the summer of 2024, the Petitioner had not been granted entry to the
United States, so the parties agreed that the children would travel to Maine with the
Respondent ahead of the Petitioner so that the children could begin school in Maine
on time. Tr. Vol. I at 113:3-25. Again, the parties agreed that if the Petitioner’s visa
were not granted, the children would return to Germany. Id. at 109:17-110:1. Like
the prior visit the United States, the Respondent had to get the Petitioner’s
permission to fly with the children to the United States with a travel authorization
that also instructed the Respondent to return the passports to the Petitioner when
the authorization expired on December 31, 2024, at the latest. 	Id. at 115:5-116:5,
210:18-24.8 The children left Germany for Maine on August 6, 2024. Id. at 125:18-
21.
The Petitioner’s visa was granted October 8, 2024, and she was authorized to
travel to the United States no earlier than December 14, 2024. Id. at 120:14-20. The
8 	The Respondent denied telling the Petitioner that he would return the children’s passports to
her when she arrived in the United States. Id. at 259:23-250:1. The Court credits the Petitioner’s
account given that the children’s prior travel to the United States also required the Petitioner’s
authorization and instructed the Respondent to return travel documents to her. Id. at 80:22-82-14.
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Respondent paid for her ticket, and she flew to Maine on December 14, 2024. Id. at
120:19-22.
H. 	The Children’s Lives and Connections in the United States
In August 2024, the children had emotional goodbyes in Germany and while
the older child, N.P., understood that the Petitioner would hopefully join the children
in Maine in a few months, the younger child, Z.P., did not understand and was upset.
Id. at 119:12-18. When the children first arrived in the United States in August 2024,
they missed their mother and the younger child, Z.P., had particular difficulty—he
thought his mother had left him. Id. at 122:21-123:9.
Despite the early behavioral struggles, Z.P.’s report card from January of 2025
confirmed that he made a lot of progress throughout the fall. Tr. Vol. II at 237:2-23.
N.P. was doing well in school. Id. Her third-grade teacher remarked that she quickly
made friends despite being new to the district and that she is a strong student,
especially gifted in reading. 	Id. at 238:11-25; Resp’t’s Am. Answer, Affirmative
Defenses, and Countercl., Attach. 15, Letter From Sarah Wilder. In fact, both children
have friends and community support in Maine. 	Tr. Vol. II at 239:1-10; Resp’t’s Am.
Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Countercl., Attach. 9, Letter from Katie Reynolds
and Darryl Jenkins.
In February 2025, the children were in karate lessons, but they stopped the
lessons because they did not enjoy the activity. Tr. Vol. II at 172:6-7.
In Maine, the children spend time with the Respondent’s now wife, Kylie, and
Kylie’s family. 	Tr. Vol. II at 241:24-242:4; see also Resp’t’s Am. Answer, Affirmative
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Defenses, and Countercl., Attach. 5, Letter from Angie Stewart (Kylie’s mother
explaining her closeness to the children and their adjustment to the United States);
id. Attach. 7, Letter from Jessica Richard (Kylie’s aunt explaining the same); id.,
Attach. 8, Letter from Kendra Quinn (Kylie’s sister explaining the same).
The Respondent’s parents and family also visit and call from Baltimore. 	Tr.
Vol. II at 241:24-242:10, 243:3-15; see also Resp’t’s Am. Answer, Affirmative Defenses,
and Countercl., Attach. 4, Letter From Alyssa M. Powell (the Respondent’s sister
explaining her view of the children’s adjustment to the United States). 	The
Respondent has plans to move back to Baltimore with his family. Tr. Vol. I at 161:23-
162:1.
The Respondent and Kylie have a dog named Winnie that the children love.
Id. at 246:6-11. The Respondent and Kylie were also expecting a son on February 4,
2026, the Court assumes the child was born and that the children now have a half-
brother. Id. at 244:2-11.
I. 	The Children’s Retention in the United States
The Petitioner traveled to the United States December 14, 2024 with a ticket
paid for by the Respondent. Id. at 120:17-22. At first, the Petitioner lived in a winter
rental in Old Orchard Beach, Maine, about five minutes from the Respondent’s home
and she saw the kids every day. 	Id. at 120:23-121:14. 	Soon after arrival, the
Respondent notified the Petitioner that the allowance would be bi-monthly, rather
than weekly. 	Id. at 121:23-122:20. 	The parties also had disagreements about the
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children’s nutrition and wellbeing. 	Id. at 122:21-123:2. 	The Petitioner’s classes at
York Community College began January 13, 2025. Id. at 121:15-17.
On February 7, 2025, the Respondent and his now wife informed the Petitioner
that she had until March to find a way to pay for half of the Old Orchard Beach rental,
otherwise, they would need to move the Petitioner to shared housing or student
housing, which would not allow the children to have overnight visits with the
Petitioner. 	Id. at 127:25-128:13. The Petitioner’s understanding had been that she
would have a place paid for by the Respondent where the children could regularly
visit and stay overnight. Id. at 128:8-13. The Petitioner felt like she had been tricked.
Id. at 130: 11-18. The Respondent explained that the Old Orchard rental only went
through May, tourists were likely to rent the spot, and the February 7, 2025
conversation was an effort to proactively discuss the Petitioner’s housing. Tr. Vol. II
at 	225:1-25. 	The 	Respondent 	acknowledged 	that 	the 	conversation 	upset 	the
Petitioner and that she may have taken him to say that if she did not get a job, she
would be kicked out. Id. 226:17-227:6. Both parties agree that when Petitioner left
the conversation, she felt lied to. Id.; Tr. Vol. I at 128:8-13.
On February 8, 2025, the Petitioner texted the Respondent that she wanted to
return to Germany with the children immediately and that she wanted the passports
and travel document back. 	Id. at 131:19-132:6, 133:24-134:4. 	The Respondent
refused. 	The Respondent stated on cross examination that he did not return the
passports to the Petitioner because he did not want her to return to Germany with
the children. Tr. Vol. II at 260:4-11.
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IV. 	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on its factual findings, the Court makes the following conclusions of law:
A. 	The Petitioner’s Threshold Case for the Children’s Return
The Petitioner has demonstrated that she “(1) seeks to return the [children] to
the [children’s] country of habitual residence, (2) had custody rights immediately
prior to the [children’s] removal, and (3) was exercising those rights.” 	Mendez, 778
F.3d at 343 (citing Hague Convention, art. 3).
1. 	Wrongful Retention
The 	alleged 	date 	of 	wrongful 	retention 	is 	February 	8, 	2025 	when 	the
Respondent refused to return the children’s passports, so that the Petitioner could
return to Germany with the children. 	Pet. ¶¶ 4; 36-37; Tr. Vol. I at 131:19-132:6,
133:24-134:4; Tr. Vol. II at 260:4-11 (“Q: Your reasoning for why you didn’t give her
back the passports was because you didn’t want her to return with your children to
Germany, Correct?” “A: Yes”).
From the Respondent’s perspective, this case is a simple one, because in his
view, there was no wrongful retention on February 8, 2025 and therefore the
Petitioner’s petition must fail. 	Resp’t’s Brief at 1-5. 	Consistent with his position in
filing the motion for summary judgment, the Respondent argues that prior to the
three-part threshold inquiry, the Court “must determine whether there was a
wrongful retention at all.” Id. at 1. The Respondent argues that there is no wrongful
retention because “the parties agreed that the children would reside in the United
States until Mother completed her” education and the Petitioner “had not completed”
her education “as of February 8, 2025, and still today is satisfactorily enrolled and
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attending school.” 	Id. at 2-3. 	Thus, according to the Respondent, retention cannot
become wrongful until after the Petitioner completes her education. 	Id. at 3 (citing
Demaj v. Sakaj, 3:09 CV 255-JGM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36725, at *27-28 (D. Conn.
2013)).
The Petitioner, on the other hand, cites two different definitions of wrongful
retention, both of which support her claim that the Respondent wrongfully retained
the children as of February 8, 2025. 	The Petitioner says that under Third Circuit
precedent, 	retention 	is 	wrongful 	where, 	as 	here, 	the 	Petitioner 	unequivocally
demonstrates that she no longer consents to the children living with the Respondent
and demands return of the children. 	Pet’r’s Brief at 16-17 (citing Karkkainen v.
Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2006); Blackledge v. Blackledge, 866 F.3d 169,
179 (3d Cir. 2017)). 	The Petitioner also argues the Respondent’s retention became
wrongful as of February 8, 2025 under the approach of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts when the Petitioner unequivocally withdrew
consent to the children living with the Respondent, and the Respondent clearly
manifested an intent not to return the children. Pet’r’s Brief at 16-17 (citing Zucker
v. Andrews, 2 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140 (D. Mass. 1998)).
Based on the evidence in this case, the Court finds that February 8, 2025 is the
date of wrongful retention and on February 8, 2025, the Respondent wrongfully
retained 	the 	children. 	In 	refusing 	to 	return 	the 	children’s 	passports 	to 	the
Petitioner—after she asked for them back and explained she wished to return to
Germany 	with 	the 	children 	immediately—the 	Respondent 	made 	clear 	to 	the
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Petitioner that he would not permit the children to return to Germany. To his credit,
the Respondent admitted that he had retained the children’s passports expressly to
prevent her from returning to Germany with them:
Q. You agree that the reason why you didn’t give her back the passports
is because you didn’t want her to return with your children to Germany?
A. Could you say that again?
Q. Your reasoning for why you didn’t give her back the passports was
because you didn’t want her to return with your children to Germany,
correct?
A. Yes.
Tr. of Proceedings 260:4-11 (ECF No. 57). This is textbook wrongful retention. The
Petitioner had custody of the children under the German court decree and asked for
their passports to return them to Germany. 	The Respondent wrongfully withheld
their passports with the express intent to prevent her from exercising her custodial
rights and returning with the children to Germany. 	See Darin v. Olivero-Huffman,
746 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding that wrongful retention occurred when the
petitioner had no legal way of remaining with his child long-term). 	In Darin, the
respondent refused to return to Argentina with the child and given that the
petitioner’s visa excluded the possibility of staying indefinitely in the United States
and the petitioner could not take the child back to Argentia alone, wrongful retention
occurred. Id.
Just so here. 	Here, the Respondent refused to voluntarily allow the children
to return to Germany, the Petitioner’s visa excluded the possibility of staying
indefinitely in the United States with the children, and the Petitioner could not take
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the children back to Germany alone because the Respondent refused to return the
children’s passports. 	As of February 8, 2025, the Petitioner had no legal way of
remaining with her children in the United States long-term. She did the only thing
she could to seek a remedy—file a petition under the Hague Convention.
The Court does not agree with the Respondent’s argument that wrongful
retention is not possible unless and until the Petitioner completes her education. The
F-1 	visa 	application 	contemplated 	a 	four-year 	bachelor’s 	degree 	and 	potential
additional training, but the visa was approved on Petitioner’s showing that she was
admitted to a two-year program at York Community College. The visa is itself open-
ended, allowing the Petitioner to remain here for two years if she graduates from
York Community College, four years if she were to transfer to a four-year program,
or even beyond four years in some circumstances.
In his reply, the Respondent argues that the visa set “a minimum return date”
and that “[t]he record is completely devoid of any discussion or agreement of the
parties that the children would return to Germany at Mother’s whim.” Resp’t’s Reply
at 2. In her reply, the Petitioner argues that her “consent to the children’s temporary
relocation to Maine was conditioned on her status as a student and Adrian’s financial
support.” Pet’r’s Reply at 2.
The Court finds that the Petitioner has the better argument under the Hague
Convention. 	Not only was there no fixed end-date to this “agreement,” but both
parties also failed to fully meet the anticipated terms. 	The Petitioner has not
completed her education, and the Respondent did not satisfactorily meet his promised
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financial and support obligations. Although the parties disagree about whether the
support the Respondent continues to provide complies with what he promised in the
visa application, the Petitioner’s allowance and housing were not what he had
promised and what she had expected.
February 8, 2025 is the date of wrongful retention for the additional reasons
cited by the Petitioner. See Pet’r’s Brief at 16-17. On that day, the Petitioner made
clear that she did not agree to an extension of the children’s stay in Maine on
February 8, 2025, and thus is the date of wrongful retention. 	See Blackledge v.
Blackledge, 866 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2017) (defining the “retention date” as “the
date beyond which the noncustodial parent no longer consents to the child’s continued
habitation with the custodial parent and instead seeks to reassert custody rights, as
clearly 	and 	unequivocally 	communicated 	through 	words, 	actions, 	or 	some
combination thereof”); Marks on Behalf of SM, AM, and BM v. Hochhauser, 876 F.3d
416, 422 (2d Cir. 2017) (identifying date of wrongful retention as that “on which the
child ought to have been returned to its custodians or on which the holder of the right
of custody refused to agree to an extension of the child’s stay in a place other than
that of its habitual residence”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that where a
parent permitted a child to travel to the United States without a specific return date,
retention 	became 	wrongful 	on 	the 	date 	the 	petitioner 	had 	“unequivocally
communicated her opposition to [the child’s] presence in the United States”); Zucker
v. Andrews, 2 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding wrongful retention occurs
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when the petitioner revokes consent and the respondent demonstrates refusal to
return the child).
2. 	The Children’s Habitual Residence
“Removal under the Hague Convention is only appropriate if the child is being
retained in a country other than his or her place of habitual residence.” Mendez, 778
F.3d at 344 (citing Sanchez-Londono v. Gonzalez, 752 F.3d 533, 540 (1st Cir. 2014)).
To sustain her burden, the Petitioner must show that the children were “habitually
resident” in Germany “immediately before the . . . retention.” Hague Convention, art.
3.
The Supreme Court determined that “a child’s habitual residence depends on
the totality of the circumstances specific to the case.” Monasky, 589 U.S. at 71. “No
single fact . . . is dispositive across all cases.” 	Id. at 78. 	A child’s “residence in a
particular country can be deemed ‘habitual,’ however, only when her residence there
is more than transitory. 	‘Habitual’ implies ‘[c]ustomary, usual, of the nature of a
habit.’” Id. at 76 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 640 (5th ed. 1979)). The aim of this
inquiry is “to ensure that custody is adjudicated in what is presumptively the most
appropriate forum––the country where the child is at home.” Id. at 79.
“For older children capable of acclimating to their surroundings,” courts
consider the following facts when determining whether children have acclimated to a
new place:
a change in geography combined with the passage of an appreciable period of
time, age of the child, immigration status of child and parent, academic
activities, 	social 	engagements, 	participation 	in 	sports 	programs 	and
excursions, meaningful connections with the people and places in the child’s
new country, language proficiency, and location of personal belongings.
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Id. at 78 n.3 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, J. Garbolino, The 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges
67–68 (2d ed. 2015)) (internal quotation marks removed). 	“Because children,
especially those too young or otherwise unable to acclimate, depend on their parents
as caregivers, the intentions and circumstances of caregiving parents are relevant
considerations.” Id. at 78. The place where a child is at home, at the time of removal
or retention, ranks as the child’s habitual residence.” Monasky, 589 U.S. at 77. Here,
the alleged wrongful retention occurred on February 8, 2025. Guided by the factors
set forth in Monasky, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances as of that
date.
a. 	More Than Transitory
By February 8, 2025, the children had only been in Maine for six months and
the Petitioner had only been in the country for about six weeks. Because both parties
agree that if the Petitioner’s visa had been denied, the children would have returned
to Germany, the period prior to the October 8, 2024, when the Petitioner’s visa was
approved, was explicitly transitory. Tr. Vol. I at 109:17-110:1, 120:14-20; Tr. Vol. II
at 257:10-16. In this way, the parties only contemplated a lasting stint in the United
States for the four months between October 8, 2024 and February 8, 2025, when the
Petitioner made clear she wanted to leave with the children. 	Tr. Vol. I at 131:19-
132:6, 133:24-134:4.
b. 	Age of the Children
N.P. and Z.P. were age eight and four, respectively, in February of 2025.
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c. 	Immigration Status of the Children and Parents
The children remain dual citizens, Tr. Vol. I at 69:18-20, the Petitioner remains
a German citizen, Pet. ¶ 2, and the Respondent remains an American citizen. Id. The
Petitioner’s visa status is entirely dependent on her continued enrollment in school.
Tr. Vol. I at 101:21-104:18. 	Without that, she will be forced to leave the United
States.
d. 	Community Ties
The facts here support that the children were at home in Germany. Although
dual citizens, the children only hold active German passports. Tr. Vol. II at 212:11-
212:21. 	The children have spent the majority of their lives enrolled in German
schools. Tr. Vol. I at 86:6-88:12. In Germany they have family, friends, social lives,
and meaningful connections with the people and places in the greater Mannheim
area. 	See supra Section III. D. 	When the children first came to Maine, they were
homesick for Germany and their mother. Tr. Vol. I at Id. at 122:21-123:9.
To the extent the children developed similar ties in Maine before February 8,
2025, see supra Section III. H., those connections were markedly shorter lived than
those the children had to Germany. 	The Court also agrees with the Petitioner that
the Respondent improperly relied on post-retention activities. Pet’r’s Reply at 4. For
example, the children were not yet participating in sports, but only briefly enrolled
in karate classes as of February 2025, later quitting because they did not enjoy the
activity, and they had not yet established pediatric care. 	Id. 	As to the family
connections in Maine and the United States, the Court agrees with the Petitioner
that the letters the Respondent provided, see supra Section III. H. (citing letters the
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Respondent provided), “contain many generalized statements of how the authors
believe the children are doing well and adjusting, which includes post-retention
events” and also many “of those authors also had limited opportunities to visit with
the children, because they came on holidays or vacations from Maryland.” 	Id. at 5
(citing Tr. Vol. II at 241:20 – 243:15.)
Further, the connections to Maine are undercut by the Respondent’s plans to
move the children to Maryland. Tr. Vol. I at 161:23-162:1. This factor favors finding
the children at home in Germany.9
e. 	Language Proficiency
The children speak German as their first language and speak English. Tr. Vol.
I at 83:15-18. 	The Petitioner is bilingual as well. 	The Respondent does not speak
much German. Id. at 94:10-14. It is mandatory to learn English in Germany, so most
Germans speak English. 	Id. at 83:19-24. 	Additionally, the Petitioner has read to
English 	and 	German 	storybooks 	to 	her 	children 	since 	birth. 	Id. 	at 	84:3-9.
Accordingly, the Court does not consider the children’s English fluency a factor
favoring being at home in the United States.
f. 	Location of Personal Belongings
The 	Respondent 	shared 	that 	the 	Petitioner 	sold 	most 	of 	the 	children’s
belongings before sending them to the United States with clothes, a few toys, and
keepsakes. 	Tr. Vol. II at 232:17-22. 	One the one hand, that the children no longer
have objects in Germany could suggest that they were moving more permanently to
9 	The children now have a half-brother, but that Kylie was not pregnant as of the date of
wrongful retention. Tr. Vol. II at 244:2-11.
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the United States, but on the other hand, culling items can be a financial necessity
given that storage units can be expensive.10
The Petitioner did not permanently relocate to the United States—her visa did
not allow it, requiring proof of her continuing ties to Germany. 	Tr. Vol. I at 111:1-
113:2. 	The Court concludes that the Petitioner did not permanently relocate her
children somewhere she herself could not permanently relocate.
g. 	Intentions and Circumstances of Caregiving Parents
“Although the First Circuit’s former approach of addressing shared intent as a
primary factor no 	longer controls, Monasky nevertheless highlighted that ‘the
intentions and circumstances of caregiving parents are relevant considerations’
where ‘children, especially those too young or otherwise unable to acclimate, depend
on their parents as caregivers.’” 	Giguere, 2025 WL 2452168 at *35-36 (citing
Monasky, 589 U.S. at 78). 	Because N.P. and Z.P. were age eight and four,
respectively, in February of 2025, the parents’ intentions are relevant.
“In discerning the parties’ intentions, [the First Circuit has looked] ‘specifically
to the last moment of the parents’ shared intent.’” 	Mendez, 778 F.3d at 344 (citing
Mauvais v. Herisse, 772 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2014)). “Where a child has moved with a
parent from one country to another, the record must evidence the parties’ latest
settled intention for the child to abandon a former place of habitual residence and
acquire a new one.” Id. at 344.
10 	The Respondent explained that his savings were depleted, in part, due to the cost of a storage
unit. Tr. Vol. II at 265:6-16.
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Although the Respondent may have intended to have the children abandon
Germany as a place of habitual residence and intended to have them take the United
States as permanent residence, the record fails to show that both parties shared this
intent.
The parties’ intentions suggest that moving to Maine was temporary, hinging
both on the Petitioner’s education and the Respondent’s satisfactory support of the
Petitioner, but it was not a decision to resettle indefinitely. 	“Their opinions about
whether their new lives were working out diverged after they arrived.” Giguère, 2025
WL 2452168 at *39-40.
This brings the Court to the circumstances of the Petitioner’s stay in the
United States. Soon after arrival, the Petitioner realized that she would not get the
level of support the Respondent had promised. First, her allowance was reduced from
weekly to bi-monthly and then she learned that she needed to find new housing. Tr.
Vol. I at 121:23-122:20, 127:25-128:7. When the Petitioner realized that life in Maine
was not going to work out as expected, she told the Respondent that she wanted the
children’s passports and travel documents back so she could return to Germany
immediately. Id. at 131:19-132:6, 133:24-134:4.
The Court concludes that the parties never expressly discussed moving the
children to the United States indefinitely. 	Accordingly, this factor favors Germany
as the children’s habitual residence.
h. 	Conclusion on the Monasky Factors
Under 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	the
Petitioner has demonstrated that Germany is the children’s country of habitual
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residence and that she wishes to return her children to Germany. 	While “no single
fact . . . is dispositive across all cases,” Monasky, 589 U.S. at 78, a preponderance of
the evidence indicates that the children’s habitual residence as of February 8, 2025
was Germany.
3. 	The Petitioners Custody Rights
The Petitioner established that she had custody rights immediately prior to
the children’s retention. 	“Rights of custody ‘may arise in particular by operation of
law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement
having legal effect under the law of [the] State.’” Aredes v. Aredes, No. 22-cv-10666,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110216, at *11 (D. Mass. June 22, 2022) (quoting Hague
Convention, art. 3). “Custody is determined by the law of country in which the child
was habitually resident.” 	Mendez v. May, 85 F. Supp.3d 539, 555 (D. Mass. 2015),
rev’d on other grounds, 778 F.3d 337 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Hague Convention, art.
3(a)). 	Here, the custody agreement—in effect immediately prior to the children’s
retention—establishes the Petitioner’s requisite custody rights.
Because 	they 	were 	married 	when 	the 	children 	were 	born, 	the 	parties
automatically have joint custody of the children. 	Tr. Vol. I at 13:14-15:23. 	As
Andreas Hanke explained, through the custody power of attorney, the Respondent
delegated his right to exercise joint custody to the Petitioner. Id. at 15:24-17:7; Power
of Att’y. The delegation included the right to determine the children’s residence. Tr.
Vol. I at 17:5-7. 	The divorce agreement stipulated that the children had their
permanent residence with the Petitioner in Germany. Divorce Agreement at 10; Tr.
Vol. I at 17:8-18:6. The agreement also obligated the Respondent to pay child support
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and spousal support. Divorce Agreement at 10; Tr. Vol. I at 17:23-18:6. By ordering
child support, the divorce agreement recognized that the children lived with the
Petitioner and the Respondent had visitation. Tr. Vol. I at 18:7-13. The final divorce
judgment, issued in May 2024 also referenced the September 6, 2023 divorce
agreement. 	Final Divorce Judgment at 3. 	Nothing in the record suggests that the
Respondent revoked the power of attorney. 	Id. at 92:4-12. 	Under this custody
agreement and the power of attorney, retention of the children outside their country
of habitual residence, without a joint custody holder’s consent, would violate both
German law and the delegation of rights in the power of attorney. Id. at 19:19-20:6.
The Respondent fails to point to any judicial decision that invalidated or
otherwise altered the Petitioner’s custody rights. 	Instead, the Respondent argues
that because the parties retained joint custody, the Petitioner “did not have the
authority to make a unilateral decision to retract her agreement for the children to
remain in the United States.” Resp’t’s Brief at 10-11. The Respondent thus concludes
that “the children remaining in the United States is not in breach of mother’s
custodial rights because she does not have the sole right to retract her agreement for
the children to remain in the United States.” Id. at 11.
The Petitioner counters that there is no requirement that she have sole
custody; in fact, the Convention provides “that retention is wrongful where it is in
breach of a petitioner’s custody rights under the state of the child’s habitual
residence, and ‘at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually
exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal
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or retention.’” 	Pet’r’s Reply at 9 (citing Hague Convention, art. 3). 	The Petitioner
argues that she would “would have exercised her right to determine the children’s
residence but for Adrian withholding the children’s passports.” Id.
Further, although not dispositive, the fact that the Respondent sought the
Petitioner’s 	permission—granted 	formally 	via 	the 	international 	travel
authorization—to 	travel 	internationally 	with 	the 	children 	demonstrates 	the
Respondent’s understanding of Petitioner’s custody rights at the time of the children’s
retention. 	By failing to return the children’s passports and any other travel
documents on February 8, 2025, the Respondent was in violation of the very travel
authorization that authorized him to take the children to Maine in August of 2024.
Tr. Vol. I at 115:5-116:5; 210:18-24.
4. 	The Petitioner’s Exercise of Custody Rights
The Petitioner established that she exercised her custody rights immediately
prior to the children’s retention. “Despite the fact that ‘a showing of “actual exercise”
is a necessary element of a claim for wrongful removal under the Hague Convention,’
the Convention itself does not define the term.” Krefter v. Wills, 623 F. Supp. 2d 125,
133 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing Bader v. Kramer, 484 F.3d 666, 670 (4th Cir. 2007).
Without a definition in the Convention, courts take a liberal approach to finding an
exercise of custody rights: it occurs “whenever a parent with . . . custody rights keeps,
or seeks to keep, any sort of regular contact with his or her child.” 	Friedrich v.
Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1065 (6th Cir. 1996) (Friedrich II); see also Mendez, 85 F.
Supp. 3d at 555, rev’d on other grounds, 778 F.3d 337 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing the same);
de Queiroz, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5175 at *18 (same). The Respondent concedes that
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the Petitioner was exercising her custody rights on February 8, 2025. 	Resp’t’s Pre-
Hearing Brief at 8 (“Should the Court reach this step in its analysis of Mother’s prima
facie case, Father concedes that Mother, on February 8, 2025, was exercising custody
rights”).
B. 	No Affirmative Defenses Raised
Given 	that 	Petitioner 	has 	demonstrated 	wrongful 	retention 	under 	the
Convention, the Court must order the children’s prompt return unless one of the
Convention’s 	“narrow” 	affirmative 	defenses 	apply. 	22 	U.S.C. 	§§ 9001(a)(4),
9003(e)(2). 	The Respondent did not raise an affirmative defense, so the Court does
not reach the issue.
C. 	This Court’s Limited Mandate
As the parties know, this Court’s role in this case is extremely constrained. It
is charged under the law only with making a preliminary decision as to whether the
courts of Germany or the United States should decide the custody issue. The family
courts in both Germany and the United States are much more adept than this Court
at resolving the sensitive and difficult issues of family law, especially child custody
issues. 	Thus, this Court’s determination is neither an endorsement of one parent
over the other nor a final determination regarding what is in the children’s best
interest, though as the Court told the parties, it strikes the Court that if the parents
can see their way to cooperating, the children could well be the beneficiaries of two
remarkable cultures under the care of two caring parents. 	Such assessments are
beyond the Court’s jurisdiction and are better handled by courts with specialized
expertise in family law. “The Convention . . . empower[s] courts in the United States
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to determine only rights under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying
child custody claims.” 22 U.S.C.A. § 9001(b)(4).
V. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons stated herein, the
Court GRANTS Petitioner Sarah Leyla Powell’s Verified Petition for Return of
Children to Germany and for Issuance of Show Cause Order (ECF No. 1), DENIES
Respondent Adrian M. Powell Jr.’s Respondent’s Amended Answer and Affirmative
Defenses (ECF No. 28) insofar as it seeks reasonable attorney fees and costs, and
ORDERS the following:
1. 	The Children’s passports are to be returned to the Petitioner;
2. 	The 	Respondent 	shall 	return 	to 	the 	Petitioner 	any 	other 	travel
documents, educational, or medical records provided by the Petitioner
or otherwise necessary for government or educational purposes in
Germany;
3. 	The Petitioner and the children may return to Germany immediately;
4. 	The 	proceedings 	in 	Biddeford 	District 	Court 	shall 	remain 	stayed
pending an order from a court of competent jurisdiction in Germany; and
5. 	The Petitioner may submit a motion for award of fees and costs within
seven days from this order with reply and response due within fourteen
and twenty-one days, respectively.
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SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 2nd day of March, 2026
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