SWINT et al v. CLATSOP COUNTY JAIL et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ROBERT JAMES SWINT, 	)
)
Plaintiff 	)
)
v. 	) 	2:26-cv-00168-SDN
)
CLATSOP COUNTY JAIL, et al., 	)
)
Defendants 	)
RECOMMENDED DECISION
AFTER REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, a resident of Oregon, attempts to assert claims against the State of Oregon
and 	other 	defendants 	based 	on 	events 	that 	evidently 	occurred 	in 	Oregon.
(Complaint, ECF No. 1.) 	Following a review of the complaint, I recommend the Court
dismiss the matter.
D ISCUSSION
Issues of subject matter jurisdiction “can be raised sua sponte at any time” because
they relate to the fundamental Article III limitations on federal courts. See McBee v. Delica
Co., 417 F.3d 107, 127 (1st Cir. 2005). 	“A district court may dismiss a complaint sua
sponte, regardless of whether or not payment of the filing fee has been received, where the
allegations contained in the complaint, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are
patently meritless and beyond all hope of redemption.” 	Baldi v. Mueller, No. 09-10320-
DPW, 2010 WL 1172616, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2010); see also, Yi v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
554 F. App’x 247, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) (“frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal
pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid. In
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addition, because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous
complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted); Evans v. Suter, No. 09-5242,
2010 WL 1632902, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010) (“Contrary to appellant’s assertions, a
district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte prior to service on the defendants
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) when, as here, it is evident that the court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction”); Rutledge v. Skibicki, 844 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The district court
may sua sponte dismiss a complaint prior to the issuance of a summons if the court clearly
lacks subject matter 	jurisdiction or lacks 	jurisdiction because 	the claim is 	wholly
insubstantial and frivolous”); Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (suggesting
that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction may be warranted for complaints such as “bizarre
conspiracy theories,” “fantastic government manipulations of their will or mind,” or
“supernatural intervention”). 	A court’s expeditious sua sponte review is based on the
longstanding doctrine that federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking when the legitimate
federal issues are not substantial. 	See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974)
(jurisdiction is lacking when claims are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely
devoid of merit,” “wholly insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” “plainly unsubstantial,”
“no longer open to discussion,” “essentially fictitious,” or “obviously without merit”);
Swan v. United States, 36 F. App’x 459 (1st Cir. 2002) (“A frivolous constitutional issue
does not raise a federal question, however”).1
1 Although the doctrine has been criticized for conflating jurisdiction over a claim with the merits of that
claim, see e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970) (the maxim is “more ancient than analytically
sound”); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946) (regarding “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” claims,
“[t]he accuracy of calling these dismissals jurisdictional has been questioned”), the doctrine nevertheless
remains good law. See Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Although
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Here, Plaintiff’s filing lacks any facts that could plausibly support a federal claim.
In fact, Plaintiff’s theory of recovery is indiscernible. 	In short, Plaintiff’s filing can be
reasonably characterized as “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of
merit.”2 Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536.
The Court previously warned Plaintiff of the consequence of further frivolous or
incomprehensible filings. See Swint v. Samsung, No. 2:24-cv-00238-JAW, 2024 WL
3653886, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 5, 2024).3 Because Plaintiff did not heed the warning, formal
filing restrictions would be appropriate.
C ONCLUSION
After a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, because Plaintiff’s complaint can fairly be
characterized as frivolous and devoid of any merit, I recommend the Court dismiss the
most of the Court’s statements of the principle have been dicta rather than holdings, and the principle has
been questioned, it is an established principle of federal jurisdiction and remains the federal rule. It is the
basis of a large number of lower-court decisions, and at this late date only the Supreme Court can change
it”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
83, 89 (1998) (approving of the doctrine); Cruz v. House of Representatives, 301 F. Supp. 3d 75, 77 (D.D.C.
2018) (applying the concept to dismiss obviously meritless claims).
2 Plaintiff’s filing also presents a venue challenge for Plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides, “[t]he district
court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if
it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” Plaintiff has alleged no facts to suggest that the District of Maine is a proper venue in which to
litigate whatever grievances he might have with the State of Oregon and the other named defendants. Even
if Plaintiff’s filing could conceivably be viewed as asserting a cause of action, therefore, dismissal is
warranted. 	See Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Whether dismissal or
transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court.”). see also Quinn v. Watson, 145
F. App’x 799, 800 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
3 In the recommended decision that the Court adopted, in accordance with Cok v. Fam. Ct. of R.I., 985 F.2d
32 (1st Cir. 1993), the Magistrate Judge recommended the Court warn Plaintiff against further groundless
filings. Swint v. Samsung, No. 2:24-cv-00238-JAW, 2024 WL 3276772, at *1 (D. Me. Jul. 2, 2024). The
Magistrate Judge determined that a warning was warranted “[b]ecause [Plaintiff] previously brought an
action in this court that was dismissed for being factually frivolous, and because he appears to be a serial
litigator across the country (a PACER search of his full name returns almost one hundred matters).” Id.
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matter. 	I further recommend the Court order that Plaintiff shall not file any further
pleadings without prior leave of the Court.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge's report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the
district court sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within
fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court's order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 7th day of April, 2026.
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