DANIEL v. LYONS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
BEATRIZ KOLA DANIEL, 	)
individually and as next 	)
friend of Baby Daniel, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:26-cv-00171-JAW
)
TODD LYONS, in his 	)
official capacity as Director of 	)
U.S. Customs and Immigration 	)
Enforcement, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
ORDER ON EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 WITH REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND
IMMEDIATE REUNIFICATION OF BREASTFEEDING MOTHER AND
INFANT CHILD
The court grants a petitioner’s petition for writ habeas corpus ordering the
respondent to immediately release the petitioner from custody and further enjoining
the respondent from re-detaining or otherwise separating the petitioner from her
infant child without prior notice to the petitioner’s counsel.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 2, 2026, Beatriz Kola Daniel, on behalf of herself and her infant child,
filed an emergency verified petition for writ of habeas corpus and an emergency
motion seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to
release her and reunite her with her nine-month-old child. 	Emer. Pet. for Writ of
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 with Req. for Emer. TRO, Prelim. Inj.,
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and Immediate Reunification of Breastfeeding Mother and Infant Child (ECF No. 1)
(Emer. Mot.). 1 Ms. Daniel, a resident of Lewiston, Maine, is a citizen of Angola, who
fled her home country due to political persecution on June 16, 2023. 	Id. ¶ 9. 	U.S.
Customs 	and 	Border 	Protection 	(CBP) 	apprehended 	and 	initiated 	removal
proceedings against Ms. Daniel when she arrived in the United States on May 1,
2024. Id. ¶ 10. On May 3, 2024, CBP released Ms. Daniel on personal recognizance.
Id. ¶ 11. Upon release, Ms. Daniel moved to Lewiston, Maine. Id. Ms. Daniel states
that she has complied with her conditions of release. She also reports that she is an
asylum applicant with an individual hearing scheduled for March 9, 2029 at the
Chelmsford, Massachusetts Immigration Court. 	Id. 	Ms. Daniel’s first language is
Portuguese.2 	Id. ¶ 12. 	She also speaks Lingala but does not speak fluent English.
Id. 	Ms. Daniel is the mother of a nine-month-old infant, whom she exclusively or
primarily breastfeeds. 	Id. ¶ 13. 	Breastfeeding is her child’s primary source of
nutrition, hydration, and immune protection. Id.
At the first teleconference of counsel held on April 3, 2026, counsel explained
to the Court that, on March 29, 2026, state police arrested Ms. Daniel after a domestic
dispute with her husband.3 	Min. Entry (ECF No. 9). 	On or about March 31, 2026,
1 	In issuing this order, the Court relies on the facts as provided in Ms. Daniel’s March 6, 2026
verified emergency petition.
2 	Petitioner’s counsel later confirmed that Ms. Daniel speaks French as one of her primary
languages.
3 	Ms. Daniel’s counsel reports that Ms. Daniel and her husband dispute the facts surrounding
the events of March 29, 2026. 	The Court simply acknowledges there is an ongoing state criminal
investigation into an alleged domestic dispute, and the Court takes no position on what may or may
not have transpired on March 29, 2026 between Ms. Daniel and her husband.
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U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE) took Ms. Daniel into custody,
separating her from her infant child. 	Id.; Emer. Pet. ¶ 15. 	Around the same time,
Ms. Daniel fell ill and tested positive for a serious infectious disease. Ms. Daniel was
later taken to Mercy Hospital in Portland Maine for treatment, where she has been
held in isolation to avoid further spread of her illness. Min. Entry.
Ms. 	Daniel 	reports 	ICE 	officers 	are 	stationed 	at 	the 	hospital, 	and 	she
anticipates they will take her into physical custody upon her discharge from the
hospital. Emer. ¶ 18. Ms. Daniel also anticipates ICE will transfer her to a detention
facility far from her infant child, her lawyer, and the Chelmsford, Massachusetts
Immigration Court. Id.
At the second teleconference of counsel held on April 3, 2026, Ms. Daniel’s
counsel 	informed 	the 	Court 	that 	the 	chief 	medical 	officer 	of 	Mercy 	Hospital
determined Ms. Daniel to be a public health risk and recommended eight weeks of
isolation to recover and to prevent further spread of her illness. Min. Entry (ECF No.
11). 	The chief medical officer also confirmed that Ms. Daniel could breastfeed her
child during the period of isolation because the infant had already been exposed. Id.
II. 	THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
Ms. Daniel alleges that her separation from her infant child violates her due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 	Id.
¶¶ 20-23. 	Because of their forced separation, her child is deprived of their primary
source of nutrition and essential immunological protection. 	Id. ¶ 16. 	Without the
ability to nurse, Ms. Daniel maintains that she is at serious risk of developing
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mastitis, a potentially dangerous infection that may require hospitalization and
intravenous antibiotics. 	Id. 	Ms. Daniel asks that this Court order Respondent to
immediately release her and reunite her with her nine-month-old breastfeeding
infant child, as well as an order prohibiting Respondent from re-detaining or
otherwise separating her from her infant child without prior notice to her counsel.
Id. ¶¶ 33-36; Min. Entry. At the recommendation of the chief medical officer at Mercy
Hospital, Ms. Daniel proposes that she and her infant remain in isolation for eight
weeks at her sister’s home in Lewiston, Maine. 	Min. Entry. 	Ms. Daniel further
proposes that she be released on personal recognizance subject to the same conditions
of her May 3, 2024 release on recognizance while she recovers in isolation at her
sister’s home. Id.
Respondent maintains that Ms. Daniel is subject to mandatory detention
pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) of the Immigration Nationality Act (INA), as dictated by
controlling agency precedent. 	However, Respondent acknowledge that the caselaw
from 	this 	Court 	has 	uniformly 	sustained 	challenges 	to 	Respondent’s 	asserted
interpretation of the INA.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Ms.
Daniel’s habeas petition. “District courts are limited to granting habeas relief ‘within
their respective jurisdictions,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), and “with respect to habeas petitions ‘designed to relieve an
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individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional rule has always been that
the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” Id. (quoting Carbo v.
United 	States, 	364 	U.S. 	611, 	618 	(1961)). 	Furthermore, 	under 	habeas 	law,
jurisdiction in a particular district is established when a petitioner is physically
present in the district at the same moment a petition is filed there on her behalf.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 435 (2004); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952);
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190 (1948). Here, the Court retains jurisdiction over
this matter, because Ms. Daniel filed her habeas petition when she was in custody in
the District of Maine.
B. 	The Merits
Consistent with the mass of recent caselaw addressing this question on similar
facts, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to Ms. Daniel. Rather, she
is subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing
before an Immigration Judge. Furthermore, given the unique circumstances of this
case, the Court suspends the deadline for Ms. Daniel to receive a bond hearing until
she is no longer a public health risk. In the meantime, the Court orders Ms. Daniel
released on personal recognizance, subject to the same conditions of her May 3, 2024
release on personal recognizance. 	The Court further orders Respondent must give
Ms. Daniel’s counsel seventy-two-hours prior notice before they may re-detain her or
otherwise separate her from her infant child.
1. 	Statutory Framework
a. 	Mandatory Detention under Section 1225(b)(2)
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Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two
categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings
v. 	Rodriguez, 	583 	U.S. 	281, 	287 	(2018) (plurality 	opinion). 	Relevant 	here 	is
§ 1225(b)(2).4 	Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall
be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,
§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. 	See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297
(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond
hearings”). 	As other courts have recognized, this language requires that “several
conditions must be met” to impose mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 	Lopez
Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). 	Specifically, the
noncitizen must be: “(1) an applicant for admission; (2) seeking admission; and (3) not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Id.; Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F.
Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025).
4 	Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially
determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to
expediated removal proceedings. 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).
Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,
if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of
persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” she is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
(B)(iii)(IV). Ms. Daniel is an asylum applicant, and Respondent assert only that Ms. Daniel is subject
to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), not § 1225(b)(1).
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b. 	Discretionary Detention under Section 1226(a)
By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary
hearing before an immigration judge. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). 	Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue
an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or
release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).
Section 	1226(a) 	thus 	“establishes 	a 	discretionary 	detention 	framework 	for
noncitizens.” 	Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d 265, 268 (D. Mass. 2025). 	However,
§ 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one exception: immigration authorities
“shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved in certain enumerated criminal
activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). None of those criminal activities is at issue here.
Once 	arrested 	under 	§ 1226(a), 	immigration 	authorities 	make 	an
individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to
release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer
that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien
is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). 	If the
immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of
that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 	8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)
(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and
convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by
preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-
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Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). 	An immigration judge’s decision to
continue detaining a noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).
In Jennings, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the difference between
the statutes, explaining that § 1225(b)(2) “authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under,” while § 1226(a) “authorizes
the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome
of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied); see also id.
at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the
country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”) (emphasis supplied)).
c. 	Parole Pursuant to Section 1182(d)(5)(A)
“Parole 	pursuant 	to 	Section 	1182(d)(5)(A) 	serves 	a 	unique 	function.”
Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 2:25-cv-6065 (NJC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
233224, at *34 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025). 	Although § 1182(d)(5)(A) does not grant
admission to the United States, it allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to
permit certain noncitizens “on a case-by-case basis” to enter or remain in this country
only for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A); 	Jennings, 	583 	U.S. 	at 	288. 	For 	example, 	§ 1182(d)(5)(A) 	is
simultaneously the only method of parole for those subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b), but it also covers asylum applicants who obtain advance parole to
travel into and out of the United States. Caiza v. Scott, No. 1:25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *16 (D. Me. Oct. 28, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(f)).
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However, parole is “not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien[,] and
when the purposes of such parole . . . have been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) mandates
that “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he
was paroled.” Id. Thereafter the parolee’s case “shall continue to be dealt with in the
same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Id.
In other words, parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A) “employs a legal fiction whereby non-
citizens are physically permitted to enter the country but are nonetheless ‘treated,’
for legal purposes, ‘as if stopped at the border.’” 	Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 216
(quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139).
2. 	Applicable Statutory Basis for Detention
The parties agree Ms. Daniel was paroled into the United States pursuant to
§ 1182(d)(5)(A), and neither party disputes that Ms. Daniel is “an applicant for
admission” or that she is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
Instead, the question here, as with so many immigration habeas cases to reach the
district courts in recent months, is whether Ms. Daniel is “seeking admission” such
that she is subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
As Respondents concede, recent decisions from district courts within the First
Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected Respondents’ interpretation of
§ 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme under similar factual circumstances. See
Mercado v. Francis, No.25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232876, at *9-10,
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that similarly situated petitioners “have
prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 [out of 362] cases decided by
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over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the
United States”) (collecting cases); Lopez v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-863, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 233128, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (rejecting DHS’s application of § 1225(b)
mandatory detention to re-detain noncitizen originally released under § 1226(a));
Caiza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195270, at *7-8 (collecting cases).5
The phrase “‘seeking admission’ is undefined in the statute but necessarily
implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 218. As other
courts to reach this issue have explained, ‘seeking admission’ “contemplates that
those arriving, i.e. those who appear at the border or a port of entry, [who] must be
inspected.” Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029 (LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199,
at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025); see also Wazilada v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00768, 2025
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *11 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025) (same); Rodriguez-Acurio,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233224, at *64-71 (same); Coalition for Humane Immigrant
Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 81-94 (D.D.C. 2025) (same).
In the context of § 1182 parole, the D.C. District Court has explained that when
the statute is “[r]ead according to its plain meaning, a noncitizen ‘arriving’ in the
5 	Most often, though not applicable here, this Court and other district courts have held that a
noncitizen continuously residing in the United States for more than two years cannot be considered
actively seeking admission and are therefore not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)
See, e.g., Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, 804 F. Supp. 3d 247 (D. Me. 2025). Rather, a noncitizen “already in
the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings” is subject to discretionary detention under
§ 1226(a), Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, and is therefore entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge. 	See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. 	This limitation comes from language in 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1), which courts across the country have consistently read to extend to § 1225(b)(2), too. See
Moraes v. Joyce, No. 2:25-cv-00583-JAW, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234386, at *9-10 (D. Me. Dec. 2, 2025). Ms.
Daniel entered the United States on May 1, 2024 and CBP paroled her on May 3, 2024, she therefore
has not resided continuously inside the country for more than two years.
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United States would be one who is in the process of reaching his or her destination
(the United States) and making an appearance here,” but “[i]t would not naturally be
read to refer to someone who previously reached the United States via a port of entry,
underwent inspection at that port of entry, and then was paroled into the United
States.” 	Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rts., 805 F. Supp. 3d at 90-91; see also 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (providing for “inspection of other aliens”) (emphasis supplied).
Although the expiration of § 1182 parole returns the parolee “to the custody
from which he was paroled,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), district courts across the
country have consistently held that the expiration of § 1182 parole does not require
treating the noncitizen as if they had never been paroled in the first place. 	See
Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1726, at *8-9 (W.D.
Mich. Jan. 6, 2026); see also Qasemi, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *30-35
(rejecting the argument that § 1182(d)(5)(A)’s prescription that a noncitizen be
returned to the “custody” from which they were paroled requires a return to the
detention authority to which they would have been subject prior to any grant of
parole); Rodriguez v. Rokosky, No. 25-17419 (CPO), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250239,
at *4-6 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2025) (same); see also Walizada v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00768,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *38-39 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025) (calling absurd the
idea that the expiry of petitioner’s parole now placed him in the “perpetual status” of
an “arriving alien”); Caiza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *16 (“However, it does
not necessarily follow that all those paroled under § 1182(d)(5)(A) were detained
under § 1225 in the first instance”); Aviles-Mena v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06783-RFL,
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2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173976, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2025) (“termination of parole
does not generally require treating noncitizens as if they had never been paroled in
the first place”).
Instead, “[s]ection 1182(d)(5)(a) suggests that rather than reverting to any
prior status, a noncitizen whose parole has expired is treated like the vast majority
of undocumented immigrants currently living in this country who are not subjected
to expedited removal” and mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Qasemi, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *34 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also
Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233224, at *52-58 (same); Vasquez-Rosario
v. Noem, No. 25-cv-7427, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13849, at *20-21 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26,
2026) (same); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
213487, at *14-19 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); Coalition for Humane Immigrant
Rts, 805 F.Supp.3d at 81-94 (same); Harmanpreet Singh v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-
01821, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260000, at *4-7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025) (same);
Walizada, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *38-39 (same); Rokosky, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 250239, at *4-6 (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 204373, at *20-21 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same); Aviles-Mena, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 173976, at *10 (same).
This logic applies neatly to the facts in Ms. Daniel’s case, who, having
previously been paroled by CBP, is already present in the United States with a
pending asylum application. Emer. Pet. ¶ 11. The expiration of her parole does not
renew the requirement to return to a port of entry and undergo a new inspection or
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screening. 	See Walizada, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256630, at *26-28; Qasemi, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *18-19, 30-35 (same). 	Neither do Respondents argue
that Ms. Daniel is required to undergo a new “credible fear” interview upon the
termination of her parole. Qasemi, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261199, at *18-19; see also
Caiza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211907, at *14-19 (looking to the circumstances of the
initial grant of parole to determine whether § 1226(a) and 1225(b) applied to an
expired § 1182 parolee).
Therefore, any determination as to Ms. Daniel’s detention must be conducted
under the discretionary detention framework of Section 1226(a), which “governs the
process of arresting and detaining noncitizens who have already entered the United
States pending their removal,” including expired parolees within the United States
pending the adjudication of their asylum claim. 	Tumba v. Francis, No. 25-cv-8110
(LJL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219101, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (quoting Jennings,
583 U.S. at 288).
3. 	Bond Hearing
Because Ms. Daniel is currently in the United States, she is “entitled to the
full procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”
Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 31 (D. Mass. 2025), which provides that she
will not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S.
CONST . amend. V; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining
“once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process
Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
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their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). As the petitioner,
however, Ms. Daniel bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the
evidence that her detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See De Oliveira v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-00291-LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *8
(D. Me. July 2, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn.
2025) (collecting authority)).
To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply
the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 	See
Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 27-28; see also Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d 247 at
261-264 (analyzing procedural due process challenge to the detention of noncitizen
held pursuant § 1226(a) using the Mathews test); Sampiao, 799 F. Supp 3d at 30, 34
(same). 	Under Mathews, a court must weigh the following three factors: (1) “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s 	interest, 	including 	the 	function 	involved 	and 	the 	fiscal 	and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
a. 	Private Interest
In her petition, Ms. Daniel asserts “the most elemental of liberty interests—
the interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.” 	Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom
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from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause] protects”). A noncitizen subject detained under § 1226(a) vindicates their due
process rights through a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge who requires the
government either to (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the evidence
that they pose a flight risk in order to detain them throughout the pendency of their
removal proceedings. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. In this case, Respondents
have refused Ms. Daniel the bond hearing she is guaranteed under § 1226(a) and have
failed to meet their burden for her continued detention as due process requires. Ms.
Daniel has therefore clearly established the first Mathews factor weighs in her favor.
b. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The 	second 	Mathews 	factor 	is 	“the 	risk 	of 	an 	erroneous 	deprivation 	of
[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The risk
of erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Respondents have made no showing
that Ms. Daniel presents any public safety or flight risk. 	Accordingly, the second
Mathews factor also weighs heavily in her favor.
c. 	Government Interest
Finally, 	the 	third 	Mathews 	factor 	considers 	the 	“Government’s 	interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 	Id. 	Respondents do
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not raise any governmental interest favoring Ms. Daniel’s continued detention
without a bond hearing. 	See Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 263 (identifying
governmental 	interest 	in 	favor 	of 	immigration 	habeas 	petitioners’ 	continued
detention without a hearing as an “across-the-board application of an inapplicable
statute”). In fact, the public interest weighs against detention without a hearing. See
Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (finding “unnecessary detention” of noncitizens
“imposes substantial societal costs”). Thus, the third Mathews factor weighs against
Respondents and in favor of Ms. Daniel.
The Court concludes that Respondent’s detention of Ms. Daniel without a bond
hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) therefore violates her due process rights.
IV. 	CURRENT STATUS
Although the Court determines Ms. Daniel is entitled to a bond hearing, given
the unique circumstances of this case, which involve a public health risk if Ms. Daniel
were to attend a bond hearing, the Court suspends its order requiring Respondent to
provide Ms. Daniel a bond hearing until she is no longer a public health risk. In the
meantime, the Court orders Ms. Daniel immediately released from Respondent’s
custody, subject to the conditions of her May 3, 2024 release on personal recognizance.
The Court further orders that Respondent may not re-detain Ms. Daniel or otherwise
separate her from her infant child without seventy-two-hours prior notice to Ms.
Daniel’s counsel. Once Ms. Daniel recovers from her current medical condition, if the
parties wish to seek amendment of this order, they are free to do so.
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V. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS in part and DISMISSES as moot in part Beatriz Kola
Daniel’s Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
with Request for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction,
and Immediate Reunification of Breastfeeding Mother and Infant Child (ECF No. 1).
The 	Court 	GRANTS 	her 	emergency 	petition 	for 	writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	and
DISMISSES as moot her request for emergency temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Respondent to immediately
release Beatriz Kola Daniel from their custody, subject to the conditions of her May
3, 2024 release on personal recognizance. 	The Court further ORDERS Respondent
may not re-detain Ms. Daniel or otherwise separate her from her infant child without
seventy-two-hour prior notice to Ms. Daniel’s counsel. 	Lastly, the Court ORDERS
Ms. Daniel to file under seal no later than three days from the date of this order a
copy of the letter from the chief medical officer at Mercy Hospital the Court relied on
for the additional facts at the second teleconference on April 3, 2026. 	Min. Entry
(ECF No. 11).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 3rd day of April, 2026
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