Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ELDRIDGE C.W., SR.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 23-cv-13207
v. 	Hon. Matthew F. Leitman
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
__________________________________________________________________/
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (ECF No. 20)
In this action, Plaintiff Eldridge C.W., Sr. challenged the Social Security
Administration’s denial of his application for disability benefits. On March 3, 2025,
the Court entered an Order granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
denying the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and remanding the case
to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings (the “Remand Order”).
(See Remand Order, ECF No. 18.)
Plaintiff has now petitioned the Court for an award of attorney fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (See Mot., ECF No.
20.) 	For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is not
entitled to an award of attorney fees because the Commissioner’s position in these
proceedings was “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
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I
A
On March 19, 2021, Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income
benefits under the Social Security Act. (See Cert. Admin. Record, ECF No. 7-1,
PageID.38.) 	In his application, Plaintiff claimed that the following impairments,
among others, limited his ability to work: lumbar bulging discs, pain in both legs,
hypertension, headaches, memory loss, arthritis in his hands, depression, and
anxiety. (See id, PageID.231.) 	The Social Security Administration denied the
application in 2021 and denied Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration in March 2022.
(See id., PageID.38.)
B
After the Social Security Administration denied reconsideration, Plaintiff
requested a hearing on his application before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
(See id.) That hearing was held on December 21, 2022. (See 12/21/2022 Hr’g Tr.,
id., 	PageID.54-73.) 	The 	ALJ 	issued 	a 	written 	decision 	denying 	Plaintiff’s
application for benefits on January 11, 2023. (See id., PageID.38-48.) 	The ALJ
found that Plaintiff suffered from a number of “severe impairments”: “lumbar
degenerative disc disease with moderate stenosis, lumbar spine tiny disc protrusions
at L4/5 and L1/2, and chronic pain disorder.” (Id., PageID.40-41.) 	But the ALJ
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concluded that despite these severe impairments, Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform “light work” with several restrictions. (Id., PageID.42.)
In determining this RFC, the ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and
submissions from his doctors. 	Relevant here, the ALJ reviewed treatment records
and 	a 	Medical 	Source 	Statement 	from 	Dr. 	Gosalakkal, 	Plaintiff’s 	treating
neurologist. In the four-page Medical Source Statement, Dr. Gosalakkal answered
fifteen questions, some of which contained several sub-parts, and he offered
numerous observations about Plaintiff’s condition. (See id., PageID.499-503.) For
example, Dr. Gosalakkal said that Plaintiff could occasionally lift items of up to 10
pounds, could occasionally twist, stoop, crouch, climb ladders, and climb stairs, and
could continuously look down and turn his head right or left. (See id., PageID.501-
502.) In addition, he said that Plaintiff required the use of a cane or assistive device
for standing and/or walking. (See id., PageID.501.) 	He also said that due to
Plaintiff’s “chronic pain” and “multi-level degenerative disc disease,” Plaintiff
would likely be “off task” at least 20 percent of the time during the workday and
would be absent from work “[a]bout two days per month.” (Id., PageID.500, 502.)
Finally, Dr. Gosalakkal asserted that because of Plaintiff’s “pain” level, Plaintiff was
“incapable of [performing] even ‘low stress’ jobs.” (Id., PageID.500.)
The ALJ ultimately rejected the opinions offered by Dr. Gosalakkal in his
Medical Source Statement, providing the following explanation:
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As 	for 	opinion 	evidence, 	the 	claimant’s 	neurologist
completed a Medical Source Statement in May 2021
opining that due to the claimant’s chronic pain syndrome
and multilevel degenerative disc disease, he would likely
be off task 20% of a workday due to his symptoms causing
interference 	with 	attention 	and 	concentration.
Additionally, the doctor stated that the claimant was
incapable of even “low stress” jobs due to pain. He
indicated the claimant could sit, stand, and/or walk less
than two hours in an eight-hour workday, would require
periods of walking around every hour for five minutes,
would require shifting positions at will, and unscheduled
breaks once or twice a day. Further, the neurologist noted
the 	claimant 	requires 	a 	cane 	or 	assistive 	device 	for
occasional standing and/or walking. He could lift and
carry ten pounds occasionally, as well as twist, stoop,
crouch, and climb ladders or stairs. The doctor also stated
the claimant would likely be absent about two days during
a month (Exhibits 5F/2, 6F, and 10F/38). While the
determination 	of 	disability 	is 	reserved 	to 	the
Commissioner, the undersigned reviewed and considered
the neurologist’s opinion and finds it neither valuable nor
persuasive in accordance with 20 CFR 416.921b(c). The
doctor’s opinion is not supported by his medical record as
discussed more fully above. Further, there is no indication
that the claimant ever presented using a cane or that the
physician prescribed the use of a cane or assistive device.
(Id., PageID.45.)
The ALJ held that Plaintiff was not disabled and not entitled to benefits. (See
id., PageID.46-47.) 	Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council,
but that body denied review. (See id., PageID.22.)
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C
On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of
the administrative decision denying his application for benefits. (See Compl., ECF
No. 1.) Plaintiff and the Commissioner then filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. (See Pla. Mot., ECF No. 11; Comm’r Mot., ECF No. 13.) In his motion
for summary judgment, Plaintiff argued, among other things, that the ALJ did not
sufficiently explain why she rejected the opinions offered by Dr. Gosalakkal in his
Medical Source Statement.
The assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report & Recommendation (the
“R&R”) on the parties’ cross-motions on January 17, 2025. (See R&R, ECF No. 15.)
The Magistrate Judge disagreed with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s
treatment of Dr. Gosalakkal’s Medical Source Statement, and he recommended
granting the Commissioner’s motion and denying Plaintiff’s motion. (See id.)
D
Plaintiff filed a timely objection to the R&R on January 31, 2025. (See Obj.,
ECF No. 16.) 	He argued that the portion of the ALJ’s decision rejecting Dr.
Gosalakkal’s Medical Source Statement “did not conform to the proper legal
standards.” (Id., PageID.749.) Specifically, he argued that to the extent that the ALJ
rejected Dr. Gosalakkal’s Medical Source Statement on the basis that Dr. Gosalakkal
opined on “the ultimate issue of disability,” that was error because “Dr. Gosalakkal
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did not reach that conclusion” and, instead, “provided [only] an opinion as to
[Plaintiff’s] limitations.” (Id., PageID.747.) 	He asked the Court to “remand this
matter” for “further agency proceedings.” (Id., PageID.750.)
On March 3, 2025, the Court issued an Order in which it sustained Plaintiff’s
objection, 	granted 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	denied 	the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case to the
Commissioner for further proceedings. (See Remand Order, ECF No. 18.)
In that Order, the Court concluded that it “cannot yet determine whether there
is merit to Plaintiff’s criticism of the ALJ’s decision because there is ambiguity in
the decision.” (Id., PageID.761.) 	And “[o]n that basis, the Court agree[d] with
Plaintiff’s suggestion that a remand for further proceedings [was] appropriate.” (Id.
(citing Kellie B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 5154494, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
10, 2023).) 	Specifically, the Court identified the two bases on which the ALJ
rejected Dr. Gosalakkal’s opinions and concluded that “neither is presented with
sufficient clarity to permit meaningful review by the Court.” (Id., PageID.762.)
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case and ordered that on remand, 	the ALJ
should (1) “specifically identify the portions, if any, of Dr. Gosalakkal’s Medical
Source Statement that, in her view, impermissibly address matters reserved to the
Commissioner” and (2) “identify in some fashion those portions of Dr. Gosalakkal’s
Medical Source Statement that she regards as ‘unsupported.’” (Id., PageID.763,
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765). In addition, the Court noted that “[o]n remand, the ALJ, is, of course, free to
reject or discount some, or all, of Dr. Gosalakkal’s Medical Source Statement so
long as she provides a sufficient explanation for doing so.” (Id.)
E
After the Court ruled on Plaintiff’s objection, he petitioned the Court for
attorney fees under the EAJA. (See Mot., ECF No. 20.) The Commissioner opposed
Plaintiff’s request for a fee award. (See Def. Resp., ECF No. 21.) The Commissioner
argued 	that 	the 	Court 	should 	decline 	to 	award 	fees 	under 	EAJA 	Section
2412(d)(1)(A) because the government’s position in the litigation was “substantially
justified.” (See id.) 	In Plaintiff’s reply, he countered that the Commissioner’s
position was not substantially justified because “the ALJ’s primary failure was a
legal error, in failing to properly evaluate the opinion of a treating medical source.”
(Reply, ECF No. 22., PageID.797.) He also requested that the Court include in any
fee award fees for the time his attorney spent responding to the Commissioner’s
opposition to his fee petition. (See id., PageID.798.) In total, he requests $9,357.12
in attorney fees. (See id., PageID.799.)
The Court has reviewed the briefings and is ready to decide the issue.1
1 The Court concludes that it may resolve this motion without oral argument. See
E.D. Mich. Local Rule 7.1(f)(2).
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II
A
“The purpose of the EAJA is to remove financial obstacles to challenging
unreasonable government action.” Minor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 826 F.3d 878, 881
(6th Cir. 2016). 	“Under the EAJA, ‘a court shall award to a prevailing party’ in a
civil action against the United States ‘fees and other expenses . . . unless the Court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.” Glenn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 763 F.3d 494,
498 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) and DeLong v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 748 F.3d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2014)).
Here, the Commissioner does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.
(See generally Def. Resp., ECF No. 21.) The Commissioner also does not claim that
there are special circumstances that warrant denying Plaintiff attorney fees. (See id.)
Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees unless the Government’s position was
“substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
B
“The Government bears the burden of proving that a given position was
substantially justified.” DeLong, 748 F.3d at 725. 	To meet this burden, the
Commissioner must demonstrate that his position was “justified to a degree that
could satisfy a reasonable person” and that his position had “a reasonable basis both
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in law and fact.” Glenn, 763 F.3d at 498 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 565 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In 	reviewing 	whether 	the 	Commissioner’s 	position 	“was 	substantially
justified,” the Court considers both “the position taken by the United States in the
civil action [and] the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action
is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). The Court then makes a single determination
of whether the Government’s position “as a whole” was substantially justified.
Amezola-Garcia v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 553, 555 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting E.E.O.C. v.
Memphis Health Ctr., Inc., 526 F. App’x 607, 615 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Critically, the “Commissioner’s position may be substantially justified even
if a district court rejects it.” DeLong, 748 F.3d at 725. 	The Sixth Circuit has
explained:
The 	government’s 	position 	in 	defending 	the 	ALJ’s
analysis might be substantially justified despite remand,
for example, where remand was based solely on the ALJ’s
“failure to explain his findings adequately” and not on “the
weight 	he 	found 	appropriate 	for 	various 	medical
opinions.” DeLong, 748 F.3d at 727. Or the government’s
position in defending the reduced weight given to a
treating 	physician’s 	opinion 	could 	be 	substantially
justified where, although the case was remanded, the
reduced-weight could be justified by significant evidence
in the record such as a short treating relationship and
evidence that the claimant was enrolled in college full-
time. See Damron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 204 F.3d 853,
855–56 (6th Cir.1998). 	On the other hand, where the
government defends an ALJ decision that was reached by
selectively considering the evidence, its position is not
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substantially justified. Howard v. Barnhart, 376 F.3d 551,
554 (6th Cir.2004).
Glenn, 763 F.3d at 498 (emphasis in original).
C
The Court finds that the Commissioner’s position as a whole was substantially
justified because the Commissioner’s position in this Court was reasonable and
because the Court’s remand was based on the ALJ’s failure to explain her findings
adequately rather than the unreasonableness of the findings.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in DeLong is instructive in this regard. The court
in DeLong affirmed a denial of fees under the EAJA where the district court “vacated
the ALJ’s decision and remanded [the] case based on [a] procedural error rather than
on substantive grounds.” DeLong, 748 F.3d at 727. 	Specifically, the district court
had concluded “that the ALJ failed to provide ‘good reasons’ for the weight that he
gave the opinions of DeLong’s treating physicians.” Id. at 726. This was “the (sole)
reason that the District Court vacated the Commissioner’s decision and remanded
DeLong’s case for further proceedings in the first place.” Id. 	In remanding, the
district court also expressly noted that “[t]he record did not strongly establish
[DeLong’s] entitlement to benefits.” Id. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held:
[R]emand on procedural grounds may result in yet another
denial of benefits, and we might well sustain such a denial
on appeal. Accordingly, we hold that an ALJ’s failure to
provide an adequate explanation for his findings does not
establish 	that 	a 	denial 	of 	benefits 	lacked 	substantial
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justification. A fully justified position may be poorly
explained, and remand may be the most appropriate
vehicle 	for 	elucidating 	that 	position. 	Thus, 	although
remand on any ground theoretically may support an award
of fees under the EAJA, such an award is not appropriate
when nothing about the specific remand at issue implies a
lack of substantial justification.
Id. at 727 (emphasis added).
This case is much like DeLong. As in DeLong, the Court remanded the case
due to a procedural error – the failure to adequately explain findings. As the Court
explained:
The 	ALJ 	provided 	two 	reasons 	for 	rejecting 	Dr.
Gosalakkal’s Medical Source Statement, but neither is
presented with sufficient clarity to permit meaningful
review by the Court. The ALJ first said that “[w]hile the
determination 	of 	disability 	is 	reserved 	to 	the
Commissioner, the undersigned reviewed and considered
[Dr. Gosalakkal’s] opinion and finds it neither valuable
nor persuasive.” (ECF No. 7-1, PageID.45.) 	But Dr.
Gosalakkal did not expressly opine as to whether Plaintiff
suffered 	from 	a 	“disability,” 	and 	the 	ALJ 	did 	not
specifically 	identify 	any 	particular 	portion 	of 	Dr.
Gosalakkal’s 	Medical 	Source 	Statement 	that, 	in 	her
opinion, addressed a matter that is otherwise “reserved to
the Commissioner.” 	Moreover, it is not yet clear to the
Court that any portion of Dr. Gosalakkal’s Medical Source
Statement 	intruded 	into 	an 	area 	that 	is 	exclusively
assigned to the Commissioner. 	There has been some
suggestion that, perhaps, Dr. Gosalakkal intruded into the
Commissioner’s domain when he offered his opinions as
to how often Plaintiff may be (1) off-task during the day
due his physical issues or (2) absent from work due to
those issues, but at least some courts have held that such
opinions should not be discounted by an ALJ on the basis
that they address matters within the Commissioner’s sole
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purview. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022
WL 1089256, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2022) (holding
that opinions “from a treating medical provider” with
respect “to the percentage of time that [applicant] would
be ‘off-task] […] or absent [….] are not per se statements
that [an applicant] was ‘disabled’ or unable to work” and
therefore could not be rejected by an ALJ as “tantamount
to 	a 	disability 	opinion” 	that 	is 	reserved 	to 	the
Commissioner). 	The important point here, however, is
that without any specification from the ALJ as to which
portions of Dr. Gosalakkal’s Medical Source Statement
she rejected on the ground that they intruded into the
Commissioner’s domain, the Court cannot meaningfully
review the correctness of the rejection. 	On remand, the
ALJ should specifically identify the portions, if any, of Dr.
Gosalakkal’s Medical Source Statement that, in her view,
impermissibly 	address 	matters 	reserved 	to 	the
Commissioner.
The 	ALJ 	next 	explained 	that 	Dr.
Gosalakkal’s “opinion” was “not supported by his medical
record as discussed more fully above.” (ECF No. 7-1, ECF
No. 45.) 	But this reasoning is likewise not sufficiently
developed. 	Dr. 	Gosalakkal 	did 	not 	offer 	a 	single
“opinion,” writ large. 	Instead, he filled out a Medical
Source Statement on which he answered fifteen different
questions, 	some 	with 	several 	subparts. 	(See 	id.,
PageID.499-502.) 	And the ALJ identified only a single
statement 	by 	Dr. 	Gosalakkal 	as 	“unsupported”: 	his
suggestion that that Plaintiff required the use of a cane or
assistive walking device. (See id., PageID.45.) 	It is not
clear 	to 	the 	Court 	which 	other 	portions 	of 	Dr.
Gosalakkal’s Medical Source Statement, if any, the ALJ
deemed unsupported by Plaintiff’s medical records.
(Remand Order, ECF No. 18, PageID.762-764 (emphases added).)
Moreover, as in DeLong, the Court did not take issue with the substantive
reasonableness of the ALJ’s findings. 	On the contrary, the Court noted that the
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Magistrate Judge – after conducting the type of analysis that the ALJ should have
completed – had reached much the same conclusion as the ALJ with respect to Dr.
Gosalakkal’s opinions, and the Court observed that that conclusion “may well be
correct.” (Id., PageID.765.) The Court nevertheless remanded because that analysis
“should have been done in the first instance by the ALJ.” (Id.) Thus, as in DeLong,
the Court’s “remand on procedural grounds may result in yet another denial of
benefits.” DeLong, 748 F.3d at 727.
Plaintiff argues that DeLong does not control because the Remand Order
effectively made the substantive determination that the ALJ’s findings were
“unsupported by substantial evidence.” (Reply, ECF No. 22, PageID.796.) 	The
Court disagrees. The Remand Order made clear that the Court could not undertake
a fulsome substantive review of the ALJ’s findings. (See Remand Order, ECF No.
18, PageID.761-763.) In the Court’s words, it could not “meaningfully review the
correctness of the rejection” of Dr. Gosalakkal’s opinions. (Id., PageID.763.)
Finally, 	the 	fact 	that 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	recommended 	that 	the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment be granted, while not dispositive,
does “lend[] credence” to the conclusion that the Commissioner was substantially
justified in defending the ALJ’s findings. Gray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 23 F. App’x
436, 437 (6th Cir. 2001). As the Court noted in its Remand Order, the Magistrate
Judge “conduct[ed] a careful analysis of Dr. Gosalakkal’s treatment records” and
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concluded, 	like 	the 	ALJ, 	that 	those 	records 	“may 	be 	inconsistent 	with 	Dr.
Gosalakkal’s 	Medical 	Source 	Statement.” 	(Remand 	Order, 	ECF 	No. 	18,
PageID.765.) 	The Magistrate Judge’s analysis supports the conclusion that the
Commissioner’s position in defense of the ALJ had “a reasonable basis both in law
and fact.” Glenn, 763 F.3d at 498 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
III
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (ECF No. 20)
is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: December 10, 2025
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on December 10, 2025, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Ryan
Case Manager
(313) 234-5126
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