Jones v. Detroit Police Department

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BLAKE A. JONES,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 2:25-cv-10936
Hon. Brandy R. McMillion
Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman
v.
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING THE RECOMMENDED
DISPOSITION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION (ECF NO. 45); DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
TO EXTEND (ECF NOS. 24, 30); GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 33), AND OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S
OBJECTIONS (ECF NO. 47)
Plaintiff Blake A. Jones (“Jones”), proceeding pro se, brings the instant civil
rights action against the Detroit Police Department (“DPD”), alleging violations of
his constitutional rights arising out of an unlawful stop and the search and seizure of
his property. See ECF No. 21. Jones seeks relief in the form of monetary damages
for constitutional violations and emotional distress. The Court referred all pretrial
matters to U.S. Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). ECF No. 15.
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Plaintiff filed two motions to extend (ECF Nos. 24, 30), to which Defendants
responded (ECF No. 39). Defendant subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 33), to which Jones has also responded (ECF No. 36). 	The parties were
informed that the motions would be decided without a hearing (ECF No. 43). The
Court proceedings were accordingly stayed pending resolution of the instant
motions. 	See 	ECF No. 35. 	Magistrate Judge Altman issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) suggesting that the Court deny Plaintiff’s motions to
extend and grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
because the statute of limitations bars his claims and there is no basis for equitable
tolling. 	ECF No. 45. Plaintiff filed a timely objection to the R&R (ECF No. 47),
asking the Court to reject the R&R.
Having reviewed the objections and conducted a de novo review of the record
and briefs, the Court has determined that the applicable statute of limitations bars
the Plaintiff’s claims and dismisses the case on that ground. 	Further, Plaintiff’s
objections are improper and are therefore overruled.
Accordingly, the Court will ACCEPT AND ADOPT the recommended
disposition of the R&R (ECF No. 45); DENY Plaintiff’s Motions to Extend (ECF
Nos. 24, 30); 	GRANT 	Defendant’s Motion to 	Dismiss 	(ECF No. 33); 	and
OVERRULE Plaintiff’s Objection to the R&R (ECF No. 47).
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I.
Jones filed his original complaint on April 1, 2025 (ECF No. 1) and an
Amended Complaint on June 8, 2025 (ECF No. 21), alleging that DPD violated his
constitutional rights during an incident that occurred on May 4, 2019. According to
Jones, he was unlawfully stopped, frisked, and had his property seized by the DPD.
ECF No. 21, PageID.44-45. The conduct that forms the basis of his claims occurred
on May 4, 2019; thus, that is the date of Jones’ injury. 	As such, the statute of
limitations began to run on that date, for a three-year period, expiring on May 4,
2022. Jones, therefore, waited nearly six years after the alleged conduct to file his
claim, and three years after the statute of limitations had already expired.
II.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), if a party objects to a
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, the District Judge, in conducting a
de novo review, can “accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive
further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). When a party objects to portions of a Magistrate Judge’s report
and recommendation, the Court’s de novo review is limited to the objected portions.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Lyons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661
(E.D. Mich. 2004). The Court has no duty to conduct an independent review of the
portions of the R&R to which the parties did not object. 	Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
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140, 153 (1985). 	Moreover, the objections must be stated with specificity. 	Id. at
151; Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “A general objection to
the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same effects as would a failure to
object.” 	Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.
1991).
A de novo review of proper objections requires at least a review of the
evidence before the Magistrate Judge, and the Court may not act solely on the basis
of a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. 	See Hill v. Duriron Co., 656
F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981). 	But an objection that “merely restates the
arguments previously presented does not sufficiently identify alleged errors on the
part of the magistrate judge.” See VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F.Supp.2d 934, 937 (E.D.
Mich. 2004). The Court “is not obligated to address objections made in this form
because the objections fail to identify the specific errors in the magistrate judge’s
proposed recommendations, and such objections undermine the purpose of the
Federal Magistrate’s Act, which serves to reduce duplicative work and conserve
judicial resources.” See Owens v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-CV-47, 2013 WL
1304470, *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2013) (citations omitted).
III.
Plaintiff lodges two objections, both of which merely reiterate his previous
arguments. The objections identify no way in which the Magistrate Judge’s R&R
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was wrongly decided, but instead express Plaintiff’s disagreement with the outcome.
Neither objection is proper and, as such, is overruled.
Objection #1: “Legal Standards, B. DPD argues that Jones’ complaint is barred
by the statute of limitations.”
The Court finds from a review of the Complaint that Jones’s claims began to
run on May 4, 2019. 	Under Michigan law, he is subject to a three-year statute of
limitations to bring a Section 1983 civil rights claim. Roberson v. Macnicol, 698 F.
App’x 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2017). “The general rule is that the limitations periods for
unconstitutional search and seizure actions and unlawful arrest actions begin to run
at the time of the injury.” 	Goff v. Monroe, No. 23-10900, 2024 WL 340808, at *3
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2024) (citing Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2005)
and Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)). He failed to bring his lawsuit until April
1, 2025 – nearly six years after the alleged conduct occurred. Furthermore, he has
not met the standard to demonstrate that his claims should be subject to equitable
tolling. Jones cannot meet any of the factors set forth in the Sixth Circuit’s Zappone
test to determine if equitable tolling applies. 	Those factors are: (1) the plaintiff’s
lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the plaintiff’s lack of constructive
knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) the plaintiff’s diligence in pursuing [their]
rights; (4) an absence of prejudice to the defendant; and (5) the plaintiff’s
reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement.” Zappone
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v. United States, 870 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2017). His claims are therefore time-
barred, and Objection #1 is overruled.
Objection #2: “DPD would be prejudiced if forced to defend this action six
years after the alleged incident.”
Again, the objection does not in any way explain how the Court’s finding is
inaccurate or legally insufficient. That Jones disagrees with this statement is not a
valid objection. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that requesting DPD to
defend this action, six years after the fact, with no notice of any of these claims
before the complaint was filed, would be prejudicial. 	Objection #2 is therefore
overruled.
Accordingly, the recommended disposition of Magistrate Judge Altman’s
Report 	and 	Recommendation 	(ECF 	No. 	45) 	is 	hereby 	ACCEPTED 	AND
ADOPTED; the Plaintiff’s Motions to Extend (ECF Nos. 24, 30) are DENIED;
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33) is GRANTED; and Plaintiff’s
Objections (ECF No. 47) are OVERRULED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No.
21) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
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THIS IS A FINAL ORDER THAT CLOSES THE CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 3, 2025 	s/Brandy R. McMillion
Hon. Brandy R. McMillion
United States District Judge
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