McSean v. St. Francois County Detention Center et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
KELLY LA GALE MCSEAN, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:25-cv-01102-ACL
)
ST. FRANCOIS COUNTY DETENTION 	)
CENTER, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Self-represented Plaintiff Kelly La Gale McSean1 brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for alleged violations of her civil rights which occurred while she was in the custody of the
St. Francois County Detention Center. The matter is now before the Court upon the motion of
Plaintiff for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or without prepayment of the required filing fees
and costs. [Doc. 2]. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in
support, the Court will grant the motion and assess an initial partial filing fee of $24.75. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). As Plaintiff is now proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review
her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on such review, the Court will dismiss this case
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).
Initial Partial Filing Fee
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or
her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an
1 Plaintiff identifies as a trans-woman and uses female pronouns. See [Doc. 1 at 6]. She was formerly known as
‘Larry J. Bemboom,’ but she legally changed her name in October 2021. See In re Larry J. Bemboom, No. 21SF-
DR00274 (24th Jud. Cir., St. Francois Cnty.).
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initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the
prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-
month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make
monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s
account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these
monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds
$10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff is a convicted and sentenced state prisoner incarcerated at the Eastern Reception,
Diagnostic & Correctional Center (ERDCC). [Doc. 1 at 2]. In support of her motion to proceed
without prepaying fees and costs, Plaintiff submitted an inmate account statement showing
average monthly deposits of $123.75 and an average monthly balance of $43.96 (as of the
twelfth of each month). [Doc. 3]. The Court finds that Plaintiff has insufficient funds in her
prison account to pay the entire fee and will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $24.75,
which is twenty percent of Plaintiff’s average monthly deposit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis
if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. When reviewing a
complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court accepts the well-
pleaded facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and it liberally construes
the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the
district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits the claim to be
considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir.
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2015). However, even self-represented plaintiffs are required to allege facts which, if true, state
a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980);
see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply additional facts
or to construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must
demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.”
Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. Id. at 679.
Background
I. 	Plaintiff’s State Court Criminal History
Some background on Plaintiff’s history with the Missouri Department of Corrections
(MDOC) is helpful for understanding Plaintiff’s allegations in this case and their relation to her
numerous other pending cases. Plaintiff was placed into the custody of MDOC in 2003, after she
pled guilty on November 17, 2003, to felony sexual assault and deviate sexual assault, and
received a five (5) year sentence. State v. Bemboom, No. 03CR169024-01 (13th Jud. Cir., Boone
Cnty.). Before her release, a Missouri Probate Court matter was opened on August 22, 2008,
seeking to have Plaintiff classified as a sexually violent predator under Missouri law due to her
history as a sex offender. In re Larry Bemboom, No. 08B7-PR00260 (13th Jud. Cir., Boone
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Cnty.). After a jury trial, Plaintiff was classified as a sexually violent predator on August 7,
2009. Id.
According to the ‘Annual Report of Mental Condition,’ dated October 31, 2019 and
submitted in the probate matter, Plaintiff arrived at the Sex Offender Rehabilitation and
Treatment Services (SORTS) facility in Farmington, Missouri, on or about April 1, 2009, before
the probate judgment was final. Later, she was transferred to the SORTS facility in Fulton,
Missouri. On July 14, 2014, Plaintiff was convicted of second-degree assault for attacking a
staff member at the Fulton SORTS program. She was sentenced to seven (7) years’
imprisonment with MDOC. State v. Bemboom, No. 14CW-CR00632-01 (13th Jud. Cir.,
Callaway Cnty.). In January 2019, Plaintiff was released from MDOC and readmitted to the
SORTS program in Farmington.
Based on court records, it appears that Plaintiff had difficulty readjusting to the SORTS
program. Between April 2019 and November 2022, Plaintiff was criminally charged six (6)
times in St. Francois County Court with attacking a Department of Mental Health (DMH)
employee, attacking another civil detainee, or destruction of DMH property. State v McSean,
No. 19SF-CR00730-01 (24th Jud. Cir.); State v. McSean, No. 20SF-CR01462-01 (24th Jud.
Cir.); State v. McSean, No. 20SF-CR01611-01 (24th Jud. Cir.); State v. McSean, No. 22SF-
CR00497-01 (24th Jud. Cir.); State v. McSean, No. 22SF-CR00973-01 (24th Jud. Cir.); State v.
McSean, No. 22SF-CR01035 (24th Jud. Cir.).
After pleading guilty to misdemeanor assault in the fourth degree for attacking a DMH
employee at SORTS in November 2022, Plaintiff was transported to the St. Francois County Jail
for a ninety (90) day sentence of imprisonment. State v. McSean, No. 20SF-CR01611-01 (24th
Jud. Cir.). On January 17, 2023, Plaintiff escaped from the St. Francois County Jail. She was
apprehended three (3) days later in Ohio and charged with felony escape from confinement. In
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February 2025, Plaintiff was sentenced to four (4) years’ incarceration for the escape. State v.
McSean, No. 23SF-CR00017-01 (24th Jud. Cir.).
Around that same time in February 2025, Plaintiff’s defense attorney filed a notice of
intent to rely on the defense of mental disease or defect in one of Plaintiff’s pending criminal
cases. State v. McSean, No. 22SF-CR01035 (24th Jud. Cir.). As a result, in July 2025, a mental
examination of Plaintiff for competency was ordered, and in August 2025, Plaintiff’s case was
suspended while Plaintiff awaited the exam. According to court records, as of December 21,
2025, Plaintiff had received the exam, but the court is still awaiting the mental examiners report.
Plaintiff has a state court hearing scheduled for January 22, 2026. Id.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Other Litigation in Federal Court
Plaintiff has filed numerous cases in federal court, under her current name and former
name (Larry Bemboom), dating back to 2008. See Bemboom v. Dunn, No. 2:08-cv-00067-JCH
(E.D. Mo. filed Dec. 22, 2008) (dismissed on Dec. 15, 2009, after summary judgment granted to
defendants); Bemboom v. Martin-Forman, No. 2:13-cv-4168-FJG (W.D. Mo. filed June 14,
2013) (dismissed June 24, 2013, for failure to state a claim); Bemboom v. Heyer, No. 2:14-cv-
4129-BCW (W.D. Mo. filed May 1, 2014) (dismissed on June 3, 2014, for failure to state a claim
and frivolity).
As of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has six (6) other open civil cases pending in this
Court. Her oldest pending case, filed in July 2023, names defendants associated with SORTS
and the DMH, and alleges claims of equal protection and deliberately indifferent medical care.
McSean v. Hacker, No. 4:23-cv-00878-JSD (E.D. Mo.). In August and September 2023,
Plaintiff filed five (5) civil actions—four (4) of which are still pending—that, like this case, are
regarding her treatment while confined at the St. Francois County Jail/Detention Center. See
McSean v. Bullock, No. 4:23-cv-01072-HEA (E.D. Mo. filed Aug. 24, 2023) (alleging due
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process violations regarding a January 2023 disciplinary segregation hold with no issuance of a
conduct violation or hearing); McSean v. Bainbridge, No. 4:23-cv-01086-CDP (E.D. Mo. filed
Aug. 28, 2023) (alleging First Amendment retaliation after Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding
the Jail’s denial of her request to purchase female undergarments); McSean v. Bullock, No. 4:23-
cv-01174-JMB (E.D. Mo. filed Sept. 18, 2023) (alleging denial of, and improper treatment for,
gender dysphoria; defamation of character; and emotional abusive with regard to the exercise of
transgender rights); McSean v. Chamberlain, No. 4:23-cv-01225-CMS (E.D. Mo. filed Sept, 29,
2023) (alleging Fourth Amendment violation regarding a strip search). Finally, more recently in
August 2025, Plaintiff filed a case against a St. Francois Jail employee, who she alleges yelled at
her for repeatedly requesting female undergarments. McSean v. Lemons, No. 4:25-cv-01314-
SPM (E.D. Mo. filed Aug. 29, 2025).
The Complaint
Although Plaintiff is currently detained at ERDCC—a MDOC facility in Bonne Terre,
Missouri—like many of her other pending civil cases in this Court, this case asserts violations
which occurred while Plaintiff was held at the St. Francois County Jail/Detention Center. [Doc.
1 at 1-8]. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her civil
rights against six (6) defendants: (1) St. Francois County Detention Center; (2) Brandy Unknown
(Head Cook); (3) Christina Rayoum (lieutenant/deputy sheriff); (4) Katie Harris (nurse); (5)
Randy Camden (lieutenant/jail administrator); and (6) Hardy White (lieutenant/general
coordinator). [Id. at 1-5]. Plaintiff names the five (5) individual defendants in both their
individual and official capacities. [Id.] For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory, nominal, and
punitive damages. [Id. at 9].
Plaintiff alleges that her rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were
violated by defendants, including her:
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A) Right to Redress,
B) Freedom of Speech,
C) The Equal Protection Clause,
D) Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
E) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED),
F) Inadequate medical attention/malpractice,
G) mental capacity exacerbation – mental health,
H) discrimination,
I) 	failure to train, supervise, & discipline [and]
J) 	Due Process Clause[.]
[Id. at 8].
As best the Court can decipher, these alleged violations are based on two unrelated
events: (1) Plaintiff’s placement on an undesired “cardiac diet” due to hypertension and (2)
limitations placed on Plaintiff’s ability to file grievances at the St. Francois Detention Center.2
I. 	Cardiac Diet
According to Plaintiff, she began taking medication (Amlodipine) daily for hypertension
(or high blood pressure) in August 2021. [Id. at 6]. Sometime around December 17, 2023,
Plaintiff requested to discontinue the medication. [Doc. 1-1 at 4].3 In response to the request,
2 Plaintiff also complains about many issues that are before the Court in her other pending cases. For example, she
cites to her pending case, McSean v. Bainbridge, and mentions an “ongoing problem” related to the refusal of county
officials to allow her female undergarments. [Doc. 1 at 7]. She also attached a grievance filing related to this issue,
and a grievance complaining about the lack of treatment for gender dysphoria generally. [Doc. 1-1 at 8, 10].
Plaintiff also mentions retaliation and harassment regarding her gender. [Doc. 1 at 7-8]. As discussed above, all
these issues are already being litigated in other civil actions pending in this Court. See McSean v. Bainbridge, No.
4:23-cv-01086-CDP (E.D. Mo. filed Aug. 28, 2023); McSean v. Bullock, No. 4:23-cv-01174-JMB (E.D. Mo. filed
Sept. 18, 2023).
To the extent Plaintiff is trying to bring another case in this Court raising the same issues currently pending in her
other civil litigation, the Court warns Plaintiff that she cannot split her cause of action. See Friez v. First Am. Bank
& Tr. of Minot, 324 F.3d 580, 581 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Res judicata prevents the splitting of a single cause of action
and the use of several theories of recovery as the basis for separate lawsuits.”); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley,
338 F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1964) (discussing how a party “cannot split his cause of action … and that res judicata
would preclude recovery for any further damages based upon the same cause of action.”); Guettel v. U.S., 95 F.2d
229, 230-31 (8th Cir. 1938) (discussing how a party cannot “split up their claim … and prosecute it piecemeal or to
present in their first suit only a portion of the grounds upon which they base their claim … and leave another ground
or other grounds to be presented in a subsequent action.”). Allegations raised in the instant complaint that pertain to
issues already pending in Plaintiff’s other actions will not be considered or discussed herein.
3 In assessing whether a complaint sufficiently states a valid claim for relief, courts may consider materials that are
attached to the complaint as exhibits. Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all
purposes.”).
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Plaintiff received a letter from a nurse Katie4—presumably defendant Katie Harris—explaining
what hypertension is, why it is necessary to treat, potential complications of nontreatment, and
why Plaintiff needs treatment based on her blood pressure and BMI. [Id. at 1, 4-5]. The letter
ended by stating that if Plaintiff still wanted to discontinue the medication, she needed to fill out
specific paperwork. However, even if she chose to stop the medication, nurse Katie stated that
Plaintiff would remain on the “cardiac diet.” [Id. at 4-5].
It appears that Plaintiff was put on a cardiac diet on November 10, 2023, due to her
hypertension. [Id. at 2]. At some point, Plaintiff obtained a copy of the “normal food schedule
and her specifically created diet schedule” which “disclosed the changes of the particular food
items” for the cardiac diet.5 [Doc. 1 at 6]. Plaintiff states that she did not want to be on the diet,
but that nurse Katie refused to take her off. 	[Id. at 7].
Plaintiff filed “multiple complaints” about the diet. [Doc. 1 at 6]; see also [Doc. 1-1 at 3,
6]. She alleges that on November 23rd, her food tray “wasn’t being supplemented properly,” but
she does not state what was improper. [Doc. 1 at 6]. The only food-tray change that Plaintiff
provides any details about occurred on January 21, 2024. Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining
that her breakfast sausage on that date had been replaced with bananas that were cold, partly
frozen, black, and slimy. [Id. at 7]; [Doc. 1-1 at 6]. Plaintiff protested that the sausage was “not
noted as an item that was to be changed.” [Id.] The “HC” or Head Cook—who Plaintiff names
as defendant Brandy Unknown—responded to the request form by stating that frozen bananas
4 Plaintiff states that this letter came from “Dr. Keddy,” a medical doctor hired through “Corizon” by St. Francois
County Sheriff’s Department. [Doc. 1 at 6]. However, the letter is clearly from “Katie, RN,” see [Doc. 1-1 at 5],
and there is no Dr. Keddy named as a defendant in this matter.
5 Plaintiff stated that she would supplement her pleadings with a copy of her cardiac diet schedule, but as of the date
of this Order, no such supplement has been received by the Court. See [Doc. 1 at 6]. Regardless, knowing the
cardiac diet schedule would not alter the Court’s analysis or opinion in this matter.
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were used instead of fresh bananas because fresh bananas go bad too quickly. The Head Cook
also reminded Plaintiff that her meal plan had been approved by her doctor. [Id.]
Plaintiff states that after she filed this grievance in January 2024, the Head Cook “made
several threats of retaliation” and she said that “she ‘will not take anymore complaints’” from
Plaintiff. [Doc. 1 at 7]. Plaintiff alleges that this caused her “much fear” of “unnecessary diet
substitutions.” [Id.] In the Complaint section regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies,
Plaintiff states that the Head Cook threatened her by saying: “Now if you wanna keep
complaining we can start serving you a peanut butter sandwich w/ beans for every meal, or we
can try meal loaf.” [Id. at 11].
II. 	Grievance Filing Limitations
Plaintiff also alleges unconstitutional limitations on her ability to file grievances at the St.
Francois Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 8]. Plaintiff states that she filed a grievance against
Lieutenant Hardy White on April 1, 2024, complaining that White told her that she should not
ask the Detention Center staff for their full names or badge numbers. [Doc. 1-1 at 7].
Apparently, this grievance was prompted by Plaintiff’s “Aunt using Christina Rayoum’s name
on the phone.” [Id.] Defendant White responded to the grievance by stating that inmates should
not refer to staff by their first names, that their names should not be given out to people, and that
they should not be receiving calls from people they do not know. [Id.]
By June 11, 2024, Plaintiff reports that her “high volume of complaints” provoked
lieutenant Christina Rayoum—a grievance and request form officer—to restrict Plaintiff’s access
to grievance forms to only one day a week (Tuesdays) and to a limited number of forms each
week. [Doc. 1 at 8 (indecipherable number of complaint forms allowed each week)]. After
those restrictions, Plaintiff filed a “general question” inmate request form, complaining that
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restrictions on her ability to ask questions violates her First Amendment free speech rights.
[Doc. 1-1 at 9].
Discussion
After careful review and liberal construction of the pleadings, the Court finds multiple
reasons why this case must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
First, for all of Plaintiff’s claims except those brought under the First Amendment, the
Complaint fails to state an actionable claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)
for compensatory damages. The PLRA states: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a
sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also McAdoo v. Martin, 899 F.3d 521, 525 (8th Cir.
2018) (“We interpret the PLRA to require more than a de minimis physical injury.”); but see
Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding prisoners may maintain actions for
alleged First Amendment violations without claiming a physical injury).
Plaintiff here does not allege that she suffered any physical injury. Plaintiff failed to
include the page of the Court’s form § 1983 complaint for listing injuries suffered. See [Doc. 1
at 3, 9 (skipping from section “II. Statement of Claim” to “IV. Relief” and missing the Court’s
form page 4 which includes “III. Injuries”)]. The only injuries Plaintiff mentions are “much
fear” from threatened food substitutions, and limitations on her ability to file grievances but no
actual injury as a result of the filing limitations. As Plaintiff has claimed no physical injury
arising out of the alleged violations of her constitutional rights, the PLRA bars recovery of
compensatory damages for all claims except those brought under the First Amendment.
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Second, the Court finds that the Complaint does not comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Even self-represented litigants are obligated to abide by these Rules. McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). Plaintiff cannot assert in a single lawsuit, claims
against different defendants that are related to events arising out of different occurrences or
transactions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (governing joinder of defendants). “Unrelated claims
against different defendants belong in different suits, ... [in part] to ensure that prisoners pay the
required filing fees - for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous
suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees.” George v.
Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). In Plaintiff’s Complaint, she asserts two unrelated
claims against different defendants: claims of a forced cardiac diet that provides improper food
substitutions and claims regarding restricted access to grievance filings. These claims are
improperly brought in the same suit in violation of the Federal Rules.
However, even if these deficiencies were not at issue, Plaintiff’s Complaint would still be
subject to dismissal because it fails to provide sufficient factual support to state a § 1983 claim
against any named defendant. As explained in detail below, this case will be dismissed as to all
named defendants for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. 	Defendant St. Francois County Detention Center and Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was designed to provide a
“broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that
the alleged deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
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Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal as to defendant St. Francois County
Detention Center because jails and local government detention centers are not suable entities
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Owens v. Scott Cnty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003)
(affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim because “county jails are not legal entities amenable to
suit.”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Jail, Corr. Inst., 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that neither county jail nor sheriff’s department is a suable entity under § 1983); see
also Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that
departments or subdivisions of local government are “not juridical entities suable as such” under
§ 1983).
Furthermore, official capacity claims against individuals are actually claims “against the
governmental entity itself.” White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a
“suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public
employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999); see also
Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit
against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”). In this case, the
five (5) individual defendants are all employees of St. Francois County. As such, in order for
Plaintiff to prevail on her official capacity claims against these individuals, Plaintiff must
establish St. Francois County’s liability for the alleged conduct. Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb.,
813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016).
A local governing body, like the County, can be sued directly under § 1983. Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Such liability may attach if
the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial
custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d
1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018); see also Marsh v. Phelps Cnty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2018)
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(recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a
theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that St. Francois County has any unconstitutional policy or
custom, or deliberately indifferent failure to train (related to the facts at issue in this case),6 that
makes it liable for the alleged violations of her constitutional rights. There is no mention
whatsoever of any policy or custom anywhere in the Complaint allegations. Specifically, there
are no allegations regarding a pattern of similar constitutional violations by other St. Francois
County employees. In fact, Plaintiff seems to assert the opposite when she alleges that she is
treated differently regarding grievance-filing limitations than other inmates. See [Doc. 1 at 8].
Therefore, defendant St. Francois County Detention Center must be dismissed because
the County Detention Center is not a suable defendant under § 1983. To the extent Plaintiff
intended to name the County itself—and because Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the
individual defendants are actually claims against the County—the Complaint fails to allege an
unconstitutional custom, policy, or failure to train related to the facts at issue in this case.
Defendant St. Francois County Detention Center and Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against
the individual defendants must be dismissed. See Ulrich v. Pope Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th
Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts
in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the
alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s rights).
6 The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff’s Complaint does assert a failure to train or supervise, but this failure is in
relation to the County Detention Center’s treatment of Plaintiff’s gender dysphoria and their general lack of
acknowledgment of her gender. [Doc. 1 at 8.] As mentioned above, claims regarding Plaintiff’s treatment for
gender dysphoria and harassment concerning her gender are issues in Plaintiff’s other civil litigation before the
Court. Any allegations relating to these claims should be brought in Plaintiff’s other pending cases.
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II. 	Defendant Nurse Katie Harris
Plaintiff asserts that defendant nurse Katie Harris refused her request to discontinue a
cardiac diet and violated her “right to refuse [the] diet” as “a medical right.” [Doc. 1 at 7].
Plaintiff appears to be asserting that Harris’s refusal to change her diet violated her Eighth
Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners
from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Luckert v. Dodge Cnty., 684 F.3d 808,
817 (8th Cir. 2012). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff must prove that she suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and that prison
officials actually knew of and disregarded that need. Roberts v. Kopel, 917 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th
Cir. 2019). A “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention.” Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoted case
omitted).
An inmate must demonstrate that a defendant’s actions were “so inappropriate as to
evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care.” Jackson v. Buckman,
756 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoted case omitted). “[D]eliberate indifference requires a
highly culpable state of mind approaching actual intent.” Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 643 (8th
Cir. 2017) (quoted case omitted). Allegations of mere negligence in giving or failing to supply
medical treatment will not suffice. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Nor will a
prisoner’s “mere disagreement with treatment decisions” support a claim of deliberate
indifference. Jones v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 512 F.3d 478, 482 (8th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff’s desire to discontinue a cardiac diet constitutes a disagreement with her medical
provider’s treatment decisions. Plaintiff points to no serious medical need that has been
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deliberately disregarded by defendant nurse Harris. As the Supreme Court explained in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989): “[W]hen
the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution
imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general
well-being” including providing “for his basic human needs – e.g., food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety.” Id. at 199-200. The County has a duty of care for
Plaintiff’s well-being and nurse Harris is assuming responsibility for this care by providing
Plaintiff with a cardiac diet, as part of Plaintiff’s treatment for hypertension.
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that nurse Harris deliberately disregarded
any serious medical need of Plaintiff’s. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a §
1983 claim against defendant Katie Harris.
III. 	Defendant Head Cook Brandy Unknown
Plaintiff alleges that Head Cook Brandy Unknown provided “improper,” “questionable,”
and “incorrectly supplemented” food substitutions for her cardiac diet, and that when Plaintiff
complained about them, Brandy threatened “unnecessary diet substitutions,” including peanut
butter sandwiches, beans, and meal loaf. [Doc. 1 at 7, 11]. Liberally construing the Complaint,
Plaintiff is alleging that Head Cook Brandy violated her Eighth Amendment right to avoid
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and her First Amendment right to be free of
retaliation.
a. 	Conditions of Confinement Claim
The United States Supreme Court has determined that prisoners have a protected liberty
interest in avoiding conditions of confinement that impose an “atypical and significant hardship
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995). To establish a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment, a
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prisoner must demonstrate (1) that the alleged deprivation was “objectively, sufficiently serious”
to result in the “denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) that the
defendant whose act or omission caused the alleged constitutional deprivation behaved with
“deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir.
2004). With respect to the “civilized measure of life’s necessities,” prison officials are required
to ensure that inmates receive adequate clothing, food, shelter, and medical care. Simmons v.
Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 807 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832).
Undoubtedly, prisoners have a right to nutritionally adequate food under the Eighth
Amendment. Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992). However, Plaintiff here
alleges only that “improper” food substitutions were made by defendant Head Cook Brandy and
that on one occasion, she was served a cold, partly frozen banana instead of breakfast sausage.
Plaintiff does not present any evidence that the food substitutions made by Brandy were
nutritionally inadequate, prepared in a manner that was dangerous to Plaintiff’s health, or that
Plaintiff’s health suffered as a result.7 Id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s Eighth Amendment
claim regarding “cold food, often contaminated with foreign objects” where plaintiff “presented
no evidence that the food he was served was nutritionally inadequate or prepared in a manner
presenting an immediate danger to his health, or that his health suffered as a result of the food”).
The facts alleged in the Complaint do not support a claim that Head Cook Brandy’s food
substitutions were a sufficiently serious denial of life’s necessities or that Brandy acted with
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health. As such, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth
Amendment claim against Head Cook Brandy Unknown.
7 Even if Plaintiff had alleged that she lost weight due to the cardiac diet, this would not necessarily indicate that the
diet was nutritionally inadequate. As noted in the letter to Plaintiff from nurse Harris, Plaintiff needs to lose weight
so that her BMI is no longer in the “overweight” range, as part of her treatment for hypertension. [Doc. 1-1 at 4].
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b. 	Threats and Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff’s allegations of threats and retaliation by Head Cook Brandy also fail to state a
claim. The Constitution does not guard against all intrusions on one’s peace of mind. King v.
Olmsted Cnty., 117 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997). “Generally, mere verbal threats made by a
state-actor do not constitute a § 1983 claim.” Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th
Cir. 1992); see also McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Verbal threats and
name calling usually are not actionable under § 1983”). In other words, fear or emotional injury
resulting “solely from verbal harassment or idle threats is generally not sufficient to constitute an
invasion of an identified liberty interest.” King, 117 F.3d at 1067 (citations omitted). The
Eighth Circuit has held “that a threat constitutes an actionable constitutional violation only when
the threat is so brutal or wantonly cruel as to shock the conscience, or if the threat exerts coercive
pressure on the plaintiff and the plaintiff suffers the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff only describes one threat by Head Cook Brandy—a threat that
Plaintiff will be served peanut butter sandwiches, beans, and meal loaf. This threat of food
substitutions is not “so brutal or wantonly cruel as to shock the conscience.” Id. Furthermore,
this single incident of threatened food substitutions (that do not appear nutritionally inadequate),
with no resulting injury to Plaintiff, is not enough to state a § 1983 claim. See Turner v. Mull,
784 F.3d 485, 492 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding a one-time, one-sentence threat did not amount to a
constitutional violation where the isolated threat resulted in no injury).
As to Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation, the right to be free from retaliation for availing
oneself of the grievance process is clearly established in the Eighth Circuit. Santiago v. Blair,
707 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 449-50 (8th Cir.
2010)). To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must assert that: (1) she
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engaged in a protected activity, (2) defendants took adverse action against her that would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was
motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity. Gonzalez v. Bendt, 971 F.3d
742, 745 (8th Cir. 2020) (internal citation omitted). Both filing a prison grievance and filing an
inmate lawsuit are protected First Amendment activities. Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029
(8th Cir. 2007).
In this case, Plaintiff filed grievances complaining about food substitutions made by
Head Cook Brandy, but Plaintiff does not describe any retaliatory actions taken by Brandy in
response to the filings. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that the threats of further food
substitutions chilled her grievance filings, the evidence before the Court does not support this
assertion. Plaintiff admits that she continued to file so many grievances at St. Francois County
Detention Center that eventually restrictions were put on her filings. Overall, Plaintiff provides
no evidence that Brandy’s actions would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in First Amendment protected activity. See Gonzalez v. Bendt, 971 F.3d 742, 745 (8th
Cir. 2020).
As Plaintiff presented no evidence that the cardiac diet provided by Head Cook Brandy
was nutritionally inadequate nor that Brandy’s threats of additional food substitutions chilled
further grievance filings, the Complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim against Head Cook Brandy
Unknown.
IV. 	Lieutenant Christina Rayoum
Plaintiff alleges that “grievance and request form officer” Christina Rayoum violated her
rights when she restricted Plaintiff to only filing a limited number of grievances and only on one
day of the week. [Doc. 1 at 8]. Plaintiff does not assert that she suffered any injury as a result of
the limitations on filings, but she does argue that “others were capable of filing as pleased any
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day.” [Id.] Plaintiff appears to be asserting claims against Rayoum based on equal protection
and a constitutional right to file institutional grievances.
a. 	Equal Protection Claim
The Equal Protection Clause provides, “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The Equal
Protection Clause generally requires the government to treat similarly situated people alike.”
Klinger v. Dep’t of Corrs., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994). However, unequal treatment of
“those who are entitled to be treated alike[] is not a denial of equal protection unless there is
shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Batra v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Neb., 79 F.3d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. 1, 8 (1944)). As such, the first step in an equal protection case is determining whether the
plaintiff has demonstrated that he or she was treated differently than others who were similarly
situated. In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 2018). Unless the plaintiff can make a
threshold showing that he or she is similarly situated to those who allegedly received favorable
treatment, the plaintiff does not have a viable equal protection claim. Id. In addition, a
plaintiff’s allegations must show purposeful discrimination – it is not enough for a plaintiff to
characterize an official’s decision as “unequal.” Snowden, 321 U.S. at 10.
In this case, Plaintiff does not provide any argument in support of her equal protection
claim, except to say that she was treated differently than others. The facts alleged do not
establish that Plaintiff was treated differently then any other similarly situated inmate by
defendant Rayoum. Plaintiff points to no other inmate who also filed a “high volume of
complaints,” but received no limitations on their filings by Rayoum. Plaintiff fails to make the
required threshold showing that she is similarly situated to anyone who received favorable
treatment. Also, nothing in the Complaint indicates intentional or purposeful discrimination on
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the part of Rayoum. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a viable equal protection claim against
defendant Christina Rayoum.
b. 	Right to Seek Redress Claim
To the extent Plaintiff is also arguing that Rayoum violated her constitutional right to file
grievances, this claim also fails. There is no federal constitutional right to a prison grievance
procedure, and neither state law nor state policy creates one. “A grievance procedure does not
confer any substantive constitutional right upon prison inmates.” Bostic v. Babich, No. 1:07-cv-
14-ERW, 2008 WL 906801 at *7 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 3, 2008) (internal quotation omitted).
Therefore, if a state elects to provide a grievance mechanism, violations thereof will not give rise
to a § 1983 claim. See Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (prison officials’
failure to process grievances, without more, is not actionable under § 1983). In addition, the
Eighth Circuit has recognized that “prisoners must understand that if they abuse the system by
repeatedly filing ill-founded grievances, reasonable limitations may be placed on their access to
the procedure.” Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing In re Tyler, 839
F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (affirming order of district court limiting petitioner to one
filing per month)).
In this case, Plaintiff admits to having filed numerous grievances in abuse of the system.
As such, Rayoum placed reasonable limitations on her access. Because Plaintiff has no
constitutional right to a prison grievance system, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim based on
these allegations against defendant Rayoum.
V. 	Lieutenant Hardy White
It is unclear what claims Plaintiff is attempting to assert against defendant Hardy White,
as he is not mentioned in the allegations of the Complaint. Plaintiff did attach a grievance filing
exhibit where she complained that Hardy informed her not to request the names or badge
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numbers of Detention Center staff. See [Doc. 1-1 at 7]. Liberally construing the allegations of
the Complaint, the Court cannot discern how this statement establishes the foundation for any
constitutional violation by defendant White, as required for a § 1983 claim. Because Plaintiff
fails to allege that defendant White is casually linked to, or directly responsible for, any violation
of her rights, this claim must fail. See Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)
(liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged
deprivation of rights). Defendant Hardy White will be dismissed because the Complaint fails to
state a claim for relief against him.
VI. 	Lieutenant Randy Camden
Similarly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against defendant Randy Camden because
Plaintiff never asserts any wrongdoing against Camden in her Complaint. Plaintiff does not
mention Camden in the facts alleged and never asserts that Camden is causally linked to, or
directly responsible for, violating her rights. Id. Plaintiff merely lists Camden as a defendant
without alleging, with any specificity, that Camden did anything to her.8 As a result, the
Complaint is legally frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to
defendant Randy Camden. See also Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974)
(“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the
complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the
complaint is properly dismissed, even under the liberal construction to be given pro se
complaints”); Krych v. Hvass, 83 F. App’x 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint against defendants who were merely listed as defendants in the complaint and there
were no allegations of constitutional harm against them).
8 Based on the Court’s review of the exhibits filed by Plaintiff, it appears that Camden may have responded to a
grievance filed by Plaintiff about access to female undergarments. See [Doc. 1-1 at 8]. As stated previously, this
claim is being litigated in one of Plaintiff’s other pending civil cases in this Court and is not properly raised herein.
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Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and an initial partial filing fee
of $24.75 is accessed against her. However, based on a review of the pleadings under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, this case is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Defendant St. Francois County Detention Center is not a suable
defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts to support a claim
against any of the individual defendants. This case will be dismissed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [Doc. 2] is GRANTED. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $24.75
within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance
payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his
prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original
proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to
issue upon the Complaint as to any defendant because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants St. Francois County Detention
Center, Brandy Unknown, Christina Rayoum, Katie Harris, Randy Camden, and Hardy White
are DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in
good faith.
An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
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Dated this 7th day of January, 2026.
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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