Eastwood Construction Partners, LLC v. Bryant, Jr. et al

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION
In re: 	)
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	) 	Chapter 7
) 	Case No. 25-10147
)
Debtors. 	)
___________________________________)
)
Eastwood Construction Partners, 	)
LLC 	dba Eastwood Homes, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Adv. No. 25-02009
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
___________________________________)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This 	adversary 	proceeding 	came 	before 	the 	Court 	for 	hearing
on 	October 	28, 	2025, 	on 	the 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss, 	ECF 	No. 	16, 	filed
by 	James 	L. 	Bryant 	Jr. 	and 	Sharon 	R. 	Bryant 	(collectively
“Defendants”) and the Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 18th day of November, 2025.
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Dismiss 	filed 	by 	Eastwood 	Construction 	Partners, 	LLC
(“Plaintiff”). 	ECF 	No. 27 	(the 	“Response”). 	At 	the 	hearing,
Counsel 	for 	Plaintiff 	and 	Defendants 	appeared. 	Defendants 	are
proceeding 	pro 	se. 	At 	the 	conclusion 	of 	the 	hearing, 	the 	Court
took this matter under advisement. 	For the reasons stated herein,
the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY
The 	district 	court 	has 	jurisdiction 	over 	this 	proceeding
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 	Under 28 U.S.C. § 157, the United States
District 	Court 	for 	the 	Middle 	District 	of 	North 	Carolina 	has
referred this case and these proceedings to this Court by its Local
Rule 83.11. 	This is a statutorily core proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
§ 	157(b), 	and 	the 	Court 	has 	constitutional 	authority 	to 	hear 	and
determine 	this 	proceeding 	by 	final 	order. 	See, 	e.g., 	In 	re
Dambowsky, 526 B.R. 590, 605 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2015); see also ECF
No. 17 (consenting to this Court entering final orders). 	Venue is
proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff 	commenced 	this 	adversary 	proceeding 	on 	June 	5,
2025, 	and 	thereafter 	timely 	filed 	an 	amended 	complaint 	under
Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	15(a)(1)(B), 	made 	applicable 	to
this adversary proceeding by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
7015. 	ECF 	No. 	3 	(the 	“Amended 	Complaint”). 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	to
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have 	the 	Court 	determine 	that 	a 	debt 	owed 	to 	Plaintiff 	from
Defendants is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 	Id.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure
to 	state 	a 	claim 	on 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted, 	ECF 	No. 	16, 	and
filed Supplemental Exhibits in Support of the motion. 	ECF No. 28.
The 	Court 	has 	liberally 	construed1 	the 	motion, 	supplemental
exhibits, and Defendants’ statements on the record in open court.
Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	response 	to 	the 	motion 	on 	September 	22, 	2025.
ECF No. 27.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
On June 25, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendants contracted for the
purchase 	of 	residential 	real 	property 	in 	the 	Cottages 	at 	Piper
Village 	(“Piper 	Village”) 	in 	Randolph 	County 	North 	Carolina 	(the
“Contract”). 	ECF 	No. 	3, 	¶ 	9. 	On 	February 	9, 	2023, 	Mr. 	Bryant
entered an Eastwood Homes model home property at Piper Village and
1 The Court must construe filings by pro se litigants liberally. 	See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
2 The Court has accepted the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint, ECF
No. 3, as true for purposes of determining whether the Amended Complaint states
a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), except as specifically noted herein,
with respect to those facts of which the Court may take judicial notice. 	See
Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	12(b)(6). 	“[A]court 	may 	take 	judicial 	notice 	of 	its 	own
records.” 	Watkins v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CIV.A. 3:10-1004, 2011 WL 777895,
at 	*3 	(S.D.W. 	Va. 	Feb. 	28, 	2011); 	see, 	e.g., 	Anderson 	v. 	Fed. 	Deposit 	Ins.
Corp., 918 F.2d 1139, 1141 n.1 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that a district court
“should 	properly 	take 	judicial 	notice 	of 	its 	own 	records” 	at 	the 	motion 	to
dismiss stage); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). 	“[B]oth the Supreme Court of
the United States and the Fourth Circuit have found that courts may take judicial
notice of items or matters in the public record, even at the 12(b)(6) stage of
a proceeding.” 	Watkins, 2011 WL 777895, at *3; see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 268 n.1 (1986); Sec’y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484
F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007).
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complained to Plaintiff’s sales agent about certain real covenants
and 	the 	Homeowners 	Association 	of 	Piper 	Village. 	Id. 	¶
13. 	Plaintiff 	characterized 	Mr. 	Bryant’s 	actions 	as 	aggressive
and 	general 	counsel 	for 	Plaintiff, 	Allen 	Nason, 	emailed 	a 	Notice
of No Trespass to Mr. Bryant stating that Mr. Bryant was no longer
authorized to enter onto the Plaintiff’s property or approach any
of 	its 	employees 	within 	Piper 	Village, 	absent 	written 	approval.
Id.
Sometime in the middle of April 2023, Defendants placed, and
caused 	others 	to 	place, 	signs 	on 	their 	property, 	and 	at 	other
locations, 	that 	read 	“EASTWOOD 	SLAVE 	VILLAGE.” 	Id. 	¶ 	15.
Plaintiff 	further 	alleged 	that 	certain 	prospective 	buyers
commented on the signage and the negative environment it created.
Id. 	¶ 	16. 	Mr. 	Bryant 	began 	to 	approach 	potential 	buyers 	and
realtors 	viewing 	the 	available 	lots 	at 	Piper 	Village, 	allegedly
directing these potential buyers not to purchase homes there. 	Id.
¶ 17. 	On April 21, 2023, Mr. Nason contacted Mr. Bryant via email
requesting that he remove the signs which he represented to be in
violation 	of 	the 	Contract 	and 	certain 	real 	covenants. 	Id. 	¶ 	18.
Mr. Nason further demanded that Defendants desist spreading “false
and 	misleading 	information” 	about 	Plaintiff. 	Id. 	On 	or 	around
the 	same 	day, 	a 	customer 	of 	Plaintiff 	who 	was 	under 	contract 	to
purchase 	a 	home 	in 	Piper 	Village 	visited 	the 	neighborhood 	and
observed 	the 	signs, 	including 	the 	“EASTWOOD 	SLAVE 	VILLAGE” 	sign,
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which 	raised 	concerns 	about 	the 	neighborhood 	to 	this 	customer.
Id. 	¶ 	19. 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Mr. 	Bryant’s 	interaction 	with
this 	customer 	caused 	her 	to 	“pull[] 	her 	contract 	and 	[that 	the
customer] 	did 	not 	purchase 	property 	in 	Piper 	Village.” 	Id.
Defendants allegedly planned a “Buyer Beware Campaign Rally” that
was scheduled to take place on their front lawn the next day, April
22, 	2023. 	Id. 	¶ 	21. 	In 	advance 	of 	the 	rally, 	Mrs. 	Bryant 	made
the following post on TikTok captioned:
Everything 	that 	was 	suppose 	[sic] 	to 	be 	done 	in 	this
neighborhood legally is not being done and the builder,
[Plaintiff] 	nor 	the 	developer, 	TRENT 	ADAMS 	PROPERTIES
LLC, 	wants 	to 	do 	anything 	about 	it! 	This 	Saturday, 	at
12pm, we will be exposing their tails for the low down,
dirty 	businesses 	that 	they 	are!!! 	Jim 	Crow 	will 	not
pitch his . . . .
Id. 	¶ 	20. 	On 	the 	day 	of 	the 	rally, 	on 	or 	around 	2:48 	p.m., 	Mrs.
Bryant filmed, posted, and broadcasted the event on Facebook as a
live video. 	Id. 	During the rally, Mr. Bryant brandished a weapon
and remarked that “I got this sign out here in my yard and it says,
‘EASTWOOD 	SLAVE 	VILLAGE’ 	because 	I 	feel 	like 	a 	$400,000 	slave.
Bought 	this 	nice 	house 	right 	here 	. 	. 	. 	$400,000 	plus. 	But 	they
treating us like slaves out here.” 	Id. ¶¶ 23, 24. 	That same day,
Mrs. 	Bryant 	sent 	an 	email 	to 	various 	neighbors 	in 	Piper 	Village,
stating: 	“[i]n 	closing, 	we 	are 	winning 	the 	fight! 	One 	potential
buyer 	has 	already 	cancelled 	her 	contract 	to 	build 	and 	another 	is
strongly 	considering 	the 	same! 	We 	will 	continue 	to 	fight 	until
justice 	is 	done!” 	Id. 	¶ 	25. 	On 	April 	24, 	2023, 	Mr. 	Bryant
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responded to Mr. Nason’s email that directed Defendants to remove
the “EASTWOOD SLAVE VILLAGE” sign, refusing to remove the sign and
asserting 	that 	the 	sign 	was 	in 	fact 	legal. 	Id. 	¶ 	26. 	That 	same
day, 	Counsel 	for 	Plaintiff 	sent 	a 	formal 	cease 	and 	desist 	letter
demanding 	Defendants 	halt 	all 	conduct 	directed 	at 	threatening 	or
harassing Plaintiff’s employees, agents or customers and any other
activity intended to harm Plaintiff, its character and good name,
its 	homes 	and 	its 	employees. 	Id. 	¶ 	27. 	On 	April 	25, 	2023, 	Mrs.
Bryant posted a photograph of the “EASTWOOD SLAVE VILLAGE” sign on
Facebook; Mrs. Bryant captioned the image with statements that she
believed that Mr. Bryant was being harassed by Plaintiff and their
attorneys merely because he spoke out against Plaintiff and their
mishandling and mistreatment of homeowners at Piper Village. 	Id.
¶ 	28. 	On 	April 	26, 	2023, 	Mrs. 	Bryant 	made 	a 	Facebook 	post
advertising 	a 	rally 	planned 	for 	April 	29, 	2023, 	calling 	on
activists, pastors, evangelists and other leaders in Trinity N.C.,
to 	“stand 	against 	mistreatment 	mishandling, 	abuse 	of 	power 	and
prejudice!” 	Id. ¶ 29. 	The post included images of two signs one
reading “WE DESERVE BETTER,” and another titled “BUYER’S BEWARE.”
Id.
On 	April 	27, 	2023, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	complaint 	along 	with 	a
motion 	for 	temporary 	restraining 	order 	against 	Defendants 	for
tortious interference with contract, interference with prospective
economic advantage, defamation, breach of contract, and unfair and
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deceptive 	trade 	practices 	in 	the 	North 	Carolina 	Court 	of 	General
Justice (the “State Court”). 	Id. ¶ 31; see also ECF No. 3, Ex. A
(the 	“State 	Lawsuit”). 	On 	May 	19, 	2023, 	Defendants, 	proceeding
pro 	se, 	filed 	an 	answer 	and 	counterclaims, 	alleging 	breach 	of
contract, 	negligence, 	defamation, 	and 	unfair 	and 	deceptive 	trade
practices. 	ECF No. 3, ¶ 32. 	In the interim, Defendants initiated
their 	own 	suit 	in 	the 	District 	Court 	for 	the 	Middle 	District 	of
North Carolina. 	See James L. Bryant, Jr. and Sharon R. Bryant v.
Plaintiff 	Construction, 	LLC 	d/b/a 	Plaintiff 	Homes, 	1:23 	cv 	637
(the “Federal Lawsuit”); ECF No. 3, ¶ 34. 	Plaintiff filed a Motion
to Dismiss Defendants’ counterclaims in the State Lawsuit, and on
November 22, 2023, the State Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion and
dismissed 	Defendants’ 	counterclaims 	for 	negligence, 	defamation,
and 	unfair 	and 	deceptive 	trade 	practices 	with 	prejudice 	leaving
only 	Defendants’ 	breach 	of 	contract 	counterclaim. 	ECF 	No. 	3, 	¶
33.
On December 28 and 29, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendants entered
and 	signed 	a 	Settlement 	Agreement 	intended 	to 	resolve 	both 	State
and 	Federal 	Lawsuits. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	35, 	36. 	The 	Settlement 	Agreement
included a “Release by Eastwood” and a “No Admission of Liability”
clause. 	ECF No. 28, at 33-36.3 	Under the terms of that agreement,
3 The “Release by Eastwood,” Clause reads as follows:
Other 	than 	with 	respect 	to 	any 	rights 	it 	may 	have 	under 	this
Agreement, 	[Plaintiff], 	for 	itself, 	and 	for 	its 	respective
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Defendants 	executed 	a 	Confession 	of 	Judgment, 	in 	the 	amount 	of
$150,000.00, 	to 	remain 	confidential 	and 	in 	the 	care 	of 	Plaintiff
in 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	default 	by 	Defendants 	under 	the 	Settlement
Agreement 	and 	agreed 	to 	dismiss 	their 	counterclaims 	against
Plaintiff in the State Lawsuit as well as the Federal Lawsuit; in
return, 	Plaintiff 	paid 	Defendants 	$7,500.00. 	Id. 	¶ 	39; 	ECF 	No.
28, at 31.
On 	December 	29, 	2023, 	after 	receiving 	Plaintiff’s 	payment,
Defendants filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of their remaining
counterclaim 	for 	breach 	of 	contract 	in 	the 	State 	Lawsuit, id. 	¶
trustees, insurers, agents, assigns, servants, employees, officers,
directors, members, representatives, . . . does hereby relinquish,
remise, 	release, 	and 	forever 	discharge 	the 	Defendants 	and 	their
respective representatives, trustees, assigns, heirs, and all other
persons, parties or corporations . . . from all liabilities, costs
claims, demands, damages, losses, causes of action and suits which
[Plaintiff] may now have or claim to have, or might hereafter have
or claim to have, whether same is known or not known at this time,
from the beginning of time to the date of the execution of this
Agreement arising out of or related to the allegations that were or
could have been set forth in the Lawsuits, such that all claims
that are or might be in controversy among the Parties in or related
to 	the 	Lawsuits 	are 	forever 	put 	to 	rest, 	it 	being 	the 	clear
intention of the Parties to forever discharge and release all past,
present and future claims against one another for any and all acts
or omissions alleged in the Lawsuits or that could have been alleged
in the Lawsuits and all consequences or claims potentially resulting
therefrom. 	ECF No. 28, at 33 (the “Eastwood Release”).
The “No Admission of Liability” Clause reads as follows:
Each 	Party 	understands 	and 	agrees 	that 	this 	Agreement 	is 	a
compromise and settlement of disputed claims, disputed accounting
records and interpretations, and disputed debt; that the provision
and 	acceptance 	of 	any 	benefits 	pursuant 	to 	this 	Agreement 	is
intended 	merely 	to 	avoid 	future 	cost 	of 	litigation 	among 	the
Parties. 	No 	provision 	of 	this 	Agreement 	shall 	be 	considered 	as
admissions by any Party of any liability or wrongdoing. 	ECF No.
28, at 35-36 (the “No Admission of Liability Clause”).
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36, 	but did 	not 	dismiss 	the 	Federal 	lawsuit. 	Id. 	¶ 	41. 	Thus,
Plaintiff 	did 	not 	dismiss 	the 	State 	Lawsuit, 	and 	Plaintiff 	moved
to 	enforce 	the 	Settlement 	Agreement, 	asking 	the 	State 	Court: 	(1)
to 	order 	Defendants 	to 	dismiss 	the 	Federal 	Lawsuit; 	(2) 	to 	award
costs 	and 	fees 	to 	Plaintiff; 	and 	(3) 	to 	permit 	Plaintiff 	to 	file
the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment. 	Id. 	¶ 	42. 	The 	State 	Court 	granted
Plaintiff’s 	motion and 	ordered 	Defendants 	to 	dismiss 	the 	Federal
Lawsuit, pay $12,465.00 in attorneys’ fees and $116.48 in costs to
Plaintiff. 	Id. 	¶ 	43; 	ECF 	No. 	3, 	Ex. 	B. 	The 	State 	Court 	also
directed 	Plaintiff 	to 	file 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment, 	and
Plaintiff 	thereafter 	did 	so. 	ECF 	No. 	3, 	Ex. 	C. 	Almost 	a 	year
after 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment, 	Defendants 	filed
a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of title 11 on March 13, 2025.
In 	this 	proceeding, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Defendants
deliberately, 	intentionally, 	and 	wrongfully 	interfered 	with
Plaintiff’s business by initiating a malicious and unlawful smear
campaign 	and 	harassing 	its 	owners, 	employees, 	and 	customers 	with
no 	purpose 	other 	than 	to 	damage 	Plaintiff’s 	business 	and
reputation. 	ECF 	No. 	3, 	¶ 	46. 	Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	the 	debt
represented 	by 	the 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	is 	non-dischargeable
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
Defendants 	argue 	that 	this 	adversary 	proceeding 	should 	be
dismissed because: (1) the general release clause in the parties’
Settlement 	Agreement 	prohibits 	the 	adversary 	proceeding; 	(2) 	the
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Settlement 	Agreement’s 	no 	admission 	of 	liability 	clause
demonstrates the intent to fully resolve the dispute and prohibits
the 	adversary 	proceeding; 	(3) 	res 	judicata, 	collateral 	estoppel,
and 	judicial 	estoppel 	prevent 	the 	dischargeability 	claim 	from
being 	relitigated 	by 	this 	Court 	because 	the 	Settlement 	Agreement
was 	ruled 	enforceable 	by 	the 	State 	Court; 	(4) 	the 	Confession 	of
Judgement underlying Plaintiff’s debt is a nullity because certain
property 	(“Specified 	Property”), 	which 	was 	allegedly 	not 	sold 	on
account 	of 	Defendants’ 	interference, 	later 	was 	sold 	in 	September
2024 	for 	$495,000.00, 	thereby 	fully 	mitigating 	Plaintiff’s
damages; and (5) the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 	ECF No. 16; ECF No. 30.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Civil 	Procedure 	Rule 	12(b)(6), 	made 	applicable 	to 	this
proceeding 	by 	Bankruptcy 	Rule 	7012, 	requires 	dismissal 	of 	all 	or
part 	of 	a 	complaint 	if 	it 	“fail[s] 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which
relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 	7012. 	A 	complaint 	will 	survive 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	if 	it
states, “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a
claim 	to 	relief 	that 	is 	plausible 	on 	its 	face.’” 	Ashcroft 	v.
Iqbal, 	556 	U.S. 	662, 	678 	(2009) (quoting 	Bell 	Atl. 	Corp. 	v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] plaintiff is not required to plead facts that constitute
a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss” but is
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simply required to make allegations sufficient “enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” 	Coleman v. Md. Ct.
of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30
(2012) 	(citing 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	at 	555). 	“[L]egal 	conclusions,
elements 	of 	a 	cause 	of 	action, 	and 	bare 	assertions 	devoid 	of
further 	factual 	enhancement” 	do 	not 	constitute 	well-plead 	facts
and 	are 	therefore 	disregarded. 	Nemet 	Chevrolet, 	Ltd. 	v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
Ordinarily the merits of an affirmative defense are not determined
at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
But 	in 	the 	relatively 	rare 	circumstances 	where 	facts
sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged
in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion
to 	dismiss 	filed 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6). 	This 	principle
only 	applies, 	however, 	if 	all 	facts 	necessary 	to 	the
affirmative defense “clearly appear[] on the face of the
complaint.”
Goodman 	v. 	Praxair, 	Inc., 	494 	F.3d 	458, 	464 	(4th 	Cir. 	2007)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.
Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993)).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Neither 	the 	Settlement 	Agreement, 	nor 	the 	Eastwood 	Release
preclude Plaintiff’s claims in this adversary proceeding.
Defendants argue that the Settlement Agreement, coupled with
the 	broad 	language 	of 	the 	Eastwood 	Release, 	completely 	addresses
and releases all claims, including the nondischargeability action
brought 	by 	Plaintiff. 	ECF 	No. 	28, 	at 	33-36; 	ECF 	No. 	30, 	at
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00:04:00-00:05:15. 	In 	other 	words, 	the 	debt 	owed 	was 	not 	the
result of “willful and malicious injury,” it was merely the result
of 	a 	breach 	of 	the 	contractual 	settlement 	arrangement, 	using 	the
broadest possible language to release one another from “all past,
present and future claims . . . for any and all acts or omissions
alleged 	in 	the 	Lawsuit 	or 	that 	could 	have 	been 	alleged 	in 	the
Lawsuits 	and 	all 	consequences 	or 	claims 	potentially 	resulting
therefrom.” 	Id. 	Defendants 	further 	contend 	that 	the 	Settlement
Agreement 	and 	its 	full 	release 	and 	no 	admission 	of 	liability
clauses 	preclude 	the 	dischargeability 	claim 	raised 	in 	this
adversary proceeding.
Neither 	the 	Settlement 	Agreement, 	nor 	the 	release 	therein,
bars 	further 	inquiry 	into 	the 	underlying 	debt 	for 	purposes 	of
dischargeability. 	See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003).
In 	Archer, 	the 	United 	States 	Supreme 	Court 	addressed 	whether 	§
523(a)(2)(A), which bars the discharge of a debt in bankruptcy “to
the 	extent” 	it 	is 	“for 	money 	. 	. 	. 	obtained 	by 	. 	. 	. 	false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,” applies when
a fraud claim is settled and memorialized in a settlement agreement
containing 	a 	full 	release. 	The 	Archer 	case 	arose 	out 	of 	this
Court. 	No. 96-10373C-7G; A.P. 97-2003, ECF No. 92. 	Although this
Court recognized a split among the cases on this issue, id. at 6-
7, 	this 	Court 	agreed 	with 	virtually 	identical 	arguments 	to 	those
raised 	by 	Defendants 	in 	this 	case. 	Finding 	that 	it 	was
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“significant” 	that 	the 	broad 	language 	of 	the 	release 	in 	the
settlement agreement included claims “which the plaintiffs ‘might
otherwise 	hereafter 	have’ 	against 	the 	defendants,” 	id. 	at 	9,
“th[is] 	[C]ourt 	conclude[d] 	that 	the 	plaintiffs 	effectively
released 	and 	extinguished 	the 	dischargeability 	claim 	which 	they
now 	seek 	to 	assert 	. 	. 	. 	.” 	Id. 	at 	10. 	This 	Court 	therefore
dismissed 	the 	dischargeability 	action. 	Both 	the 	district 	court,
No. 	1:99CV00924 	(M.D.N.C. 	Sept. 	27, 	2000), 	and 	the 	United 	States
Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	affirmed. 	283 	F.3d 	230
(4th Cir. 2002).
The 	Supreme 	Court 	reversed, 	holding 	that 	a 	bankruptcy 	court
is not limited to the four corners of the settlement agreement to
determine 	dischargeability 	despite 	an 	included 	broad 	release.
Instead, 	Congress 	intended 	the 	dischargeability 	determination 	to
take 	place 	in 	the 	bankruptcy 	court, 	“not 	to 	force 	it 	to 	occur
earlier in state court at a time when nondischargeability concerns
‘are not directly in issue and neither party has a full incentive
to litigate them.” 	538 U.S. at 321 (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442
U.S. 	127, 	134 	(1979)). 	This 	is 	because 	a 	pre-suit 	settlement
resolving 	a 	non-dischargeable 	claim 	arises 	no 	less 	out 	of 	the
underlying tort than a debt memorialized in a post suit settlement;
what 	matters 	is 	the 	“true 	nature” 	of 	the 	underlying 	debt. 	Id.
(citing Brown, 442 U.S. at 138.
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More 	recently 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	considered 	the 	effect 	of
Archer on debts “arising from” willful and malicious injuries and
extended the Supreme Court’s holding to cover putative claims under
this additional exception to discharge. 	See In re Hilgartner, 91
F.4th 186 (4th Cir. 2024). 	In Hilgartner, the Court held that for
purposes 	of 	§ 	523(a)(6), 	even 	if 	a 	potentially 	non-dischargeable
debt for “willful and malicious injury may have been reduced to a
settlement agreement . . . that does not change the nature of the
debt 	for 	dischargeability 	purposes.” 	Id. 	at 	192 	(citation
modified).
Archer and Hilgartner resolve the question presented in this
case and this Court is bound by those decisions. 	As in this case,
the 	broad 	language 	in 	the 	settlement 	agreement 	in 	Archer 	that
purportedly released any claims which the parties “might otherwise
hereafter 	have” 	against 	the 	defendant 	did 	not 	prevent 	the 	Court
from 	later 	determining 	whether 	the 	debt 	should 	be 	excepted 	from
discharge. 	Archer, 	538 	U.S. 	at 	317. 	The 	same 	is 	true 	here.
Although 	the 	Eastwood 	Release 	may 	be 	broad, 	its 	breadth 	does 	not
limit 	the 	ability 	of 	the 	Court 	to 	consider 	whether 	the 	debt
embodied in the Settlement Agreement, and underlying Confession of
Judgment is for willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).
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II. 	The No Admission of Liability Clause does not preclude this
litigation 	and 	fails 	for 	the 	same 	reason 	as 	the 	General
Release.
Defendants 	argue 	that 	the 	No 	Admission 	of 	Liability 	Clause
“automatically 	renders 	[Plaintiff’s] 	claim 	for 	willful 	and
malicious 	injury 	void,” 	because 	it 	represents 	the 	parties’
intention to fully resolve their dispute. 	ECF No. 30, at 00:20:40-
00:21:12. 	To the extent that this argument was intended to provide
another 	avenue 	to 	dispute 	the 	Court’s 	ability 	to 	evaluate 	the
nature of the underlying alleged tort, i.e., – that the debt owed
was not the result of “willful and malicious injury,” it was merely
the 	result 	of 	a 	breach 	of 	the 	contractual 	arrangement 	to 	which
both parties agreed – this argument fails for the same reasons as
the 	release 	provision. 	This 	Court 	is 	not 	prohibited 	from
considering the nature of the underlying debt. 	It is the purview
of 	the 	Court 	to 	determine 	whether 	the 	debt 	embodied 	in 	the
Settlement Agreement, and underlying Confession of Judgment is for
willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6).4
III. The 	Plaintiff’s 	action 	is 	not 	barred 	by 	Res 	Judicata,
Collateral Estoppel, or Judicial Estoppel.
Defendants 	assert 	that 	a 	dischargeability 	claim 	for 	willful
and malicious injury cannot be raised in this adversary proceeding
4 In any event, the No Admission of Liability Clause is merely that—a provision
that prohibited the Settlement Agreement itself from constituting an admission
of liability by either party for the underlying resolved claims. 	It was not a
determination that no liability existed.
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because 	such 	a 	claim 	is 	barred 	by 	res 	judicata, 	collateral
estoppel, or judicial estoppel. 	ECF No. 30, at 00:04:00-00:05:15.
Defendants 	argue 	that 	these 	doctrines 	prevent 	the 	litigation 	of
dischargeability 	which 	could 	have 	been 	litigated 	in 	state 	court.
While 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	concluded 	that 	principles 	of 	res
judicata 	and 	collateral 	estoppel 	apply 	in 	dischargeability
proceedings in bankruptcy, see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284
(1991) 	(finding 	that 	a 	bankruptcy 	court 	may 	use 	a 	prior 	decision
by another court as the basis for a finding of nondischargeability
of debt so long as the standard of proof in the prior case was by
a 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence 	or 	higher), 	these 	principles 	do
not 	preclude 	the 	litigation 	to 	determine 	dischargeability 	of 	the
affected debt, as explained by Brown, Archer, and Hilgartner. 	The
dischargeability claim could not have been litigated in the state
court. 	It is a federal cause of action that arises in bankruptcy
and 	therefore 	did 	not 	exist 	prior 	to 	Defendants’ 	chapter 	7 	case.
11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	523(a)(6); 	see 	also 	In 	re 	Hight, 	No. 	94-12323C-7D,
2001 	WL 	1699694, 	at 	*1 	(Bankr. 	M.D.N.C. 	Feb. 	26, 	2001) 	(noting
that 	the 	effect 	of 	§ 	523(c) 	“is 	that 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of . . .
debts for willful and malicious injury or damage by the debtor [§
523(a)(6)]”); In re McDonald, No. 13-10663, 2014 WL 6839451, at *2
(Bankr. 	M.D.N.C. 	Dec. 	3, 	2014) 	(holding 	that 	a 	dischargeability
defendant’s reliance on res judicata and full faith and credit was
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misplaced “[b]ecause nondischargeability of a debt is an entirely
separate 	determination 	with 	its 	own 	elements 	under 	§ 	523 	which
require 	more 	than 	the 	establishment 	of 	liability, 	principles 	of
res 	judicata 	do 	not 	apply 	(i.e., 	no 	determination 	of
dischargeability was made”) (quoting In re Berr, 172 B.R. 299, 305
n.4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)). 	Therefore, although the existence of
the debt is not a claim that can be re-adjudicated by this Court,
see In re Heckert, 272 F.3d 253, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2001), the issue
of 	dischargeability 	remains 	and 	must 	be 	litigated. 	That 	claim
could 	not 	have 	been 	litigated 	in 	the 	State 	Lawsuit. 	As 	with
settlement 	agreements, 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	is 	permitted 	to
determine 	the 	dischargeability 	of 	a 	debt 	represented 	by 	a
prepetition 	state 	court 	judgment. 	See, 	e.g., 	Brown, 	442 	U.S. 	at
128; Heckert, 272 F.3d at 257 (“when a prior state court judgment
is 	the 	debt 	at 	issue, 	. 	. 	. 	[a]ll 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	is 	called
upon, or authorized to do, is to determine whether or not the state
judgment is dischargeable”).
IV. 	This Court may not relitigate the amount established in
the State Court.
Next, 	Defendants 	seek 	a 	determination 	that 	the 	underlying
Confession 	of 	Judgment 	lacks 	merit 	because 	certain 	Specified
Property, 	which 	was 	allegedly 	not 	sold 	on 	account 	of 	the
Defendants’ 	interference, 	was 	sold 	in 	September 	2024 	for
$495,000.00, 	and 	therefore 	the 	damages 	underlying 	the 	Confession
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of 	Judgment 	should 	be 	disregarded. 	ECF 	No. 	16. 	Thus, 	the 	issue
Defendants 	next 	raise 	is 	whether 	this 	Court 	is 	required 	to 	give
full faith and credit to the state determination as to the amount
of the debt.
The 	amount 	of 	the 	claim 	is 	res 	judicata 	as 	to 	the 	debt 	in
controversy. 	Heckert, 	272 	F.3d 	at 	257-58 	(holding 	that 	the
bankruptcy court may not enter its own monetary judgment where the
state 	court 	has 	done 	so 	prior 	to 	the 	bankruptcy; 	the 	bankruptcy
court is bound by res judicata as a matter of full faith and credit
with respect to the amount and validity of the debt). 	State court
judgments 	receive 	the 	full 	faith 	and 	credit 	promised 	by 	the
Constitution 	and 	therefore 	preclude 	relitigating 	the 	judgment 	in
federal 	court 	under 	Constitution, 	art. 	IV, 	§ 	1 	and 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1738, safeguards of efficiency and finality of litigation. 	See In
re 	Adams, 	151 	F.4th 	144, 	152 	(3d 	Cir. 	2025) 	(as 	to 	the
constitutional 	protection). 	To 	assess 	the 	extent 	of 	preclusion,
federal 	courts 	“apply 	the 	[judgment] 	state’s 	law 	of 	collateral
estoppel.” 	See 	In 	re 	Caswell, 	605 	B.R. 	401, 	410-11 	(Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 	2019) 	(citation 	modified). 	N.C. 	Rule 	68.1(e) 	provides
that 	a 	valid 	confession 	of 	judgment 	has 	the 	same 	effect 	as 	other
judgments and therefore may be enforced in the same manner. 	N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, R. 68.1(e). 	However, no judgment of confession
shall 	be 	held 	to 	be 	issue 	preclusive 	as 	to 	any 	fact 	in 	any 	civil
action 	except 	in 	an 	action 	on 	the 	judgement 	to 	confess. 	Id.
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Although 	a 	confession 	of 	judgment 	is 	not 	determinative 	of 	any
particular 	fact 	in 	a 	subsequent 	action, 	it 	is 	preclusive 	with
respect 	to 	the 	liability 	on 	the 	claim. 	See 	Thomas 	M. 	McInnis 	&
Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428 (1986). 	In other words,
while factual issues may be disputed, the amount of a judgment, as
a 	matter 	of 	law, 	is 	precluded 	from 	relitigation 	by 	the 	existence
of a valid confession of judgment. 	Cf. Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d
284 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that default judgments do not have
collateral estoppel effect under North Carolina law, but do possess
res 	judicata 	effect); 	and 	Heckert, 	272 	F.3d, 	at 	257 	(“bankruptcy
court’s entry of its own money judgment to replace the state court
judgment is barred by res judicata . . . as a matter of full faith
and credit, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738”).
Here, Defendants attempt to challenge the amount of the debt
owed 	to 	Plaintiff, 	but 	the 	establishment 	of 	the 	debt 	by 	the
Confession of Judgment must be accorded full faith and Credit under
N.C. 	Gen. 	Stat. 	§ 	1A-1, 	R. 	68.1(e) 	and 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1738.
Defendants’ 	argument 	is 	specifically 	precluded, 	and 	they 	cannot
re-litigate the amount of the debt in this Court.
The 	inquiry 	nevertheless 	does 	not 	end 	there, 	even 	if 	the
Confession of Judgment must be afforded full faith and credit, it
is 	the 	responsibility 	of 	this 	Court 	to 	determine 	whether
Defendants’ 	actions 	were 	willful 	and 	malicious 	as 	contemplated
under federal law and whether and to what extent the damages were
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caused 	by 	the 	willful 	and 	malicious 	injury 	as 	contemplated 	by 	11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
V. 	Plaintiff states a plausible claim under § 523(a)(6).
The Amended Complaint contains sufficient allegations, taken
as 	true 	and 	construed 	in 	a 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	Plaintiff 	as
the 	non-moving 	party, 	to 	state 	a 	plausible 	claim 	for 	willful 	and
malicious 	injury 	as 	contemplated 	by 	§ 	523(a)(6). 	Section
523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts resulting from “willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property
of 	another 	entity.” 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	523(a)(6). 	The 	party 	raising 	a
§ 523(a)(6) challenge must show “(1) the debtor caused an injury;
(2) 	the 	debtor’s 	actions 	were 	willful; 	and 	(3) 	that 	the 	debtor’s
actions were malicious.” 	In re Wooten, 423 B.R. 108, 128 (Bankr.
E.D. 	Va. 	2010) 	(quoting 	In 	re 	Sparrow, 	306 	B.R. 	812, 	834 	(Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Choi
v. 	Hyon, 	No. 	22-2240, 	2023 	WL 	7381547, 	at 	*1 	(4th 	Cir. 	Nov. 	8,
2023).
Section 523(a)(6) applies only to “acts done with the actual
intent 	to 	cause 	injury.” 	In 	re 	Duncan, 	448 	F.3d 	725, 	729 	(4th
Cir. 	2006) 	(citation 	modified). 	“Debt 	arising 	from 	an 	injury
attributable to mere negligent or reckless conduct fails to satisfy
the ‘willful and malicious requirement of (a)(6),’” as they do not
satisfy 	the 	necessary 	scienter 	requirement. 	In 	re 	Holmes, 	610
B.R. 	541, 	548 	(Bankr. 	D.S.C. 	Jan. 	7, 	2020) 	(quoting 	In 	re 	Muhs,
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21
923 F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 2019)). 	“[T]he mere fact that a debtor
engaged 	in 	an 	intentional 	act 	does 	not 	necessarily 	mean 	that 	he
acted willfully and maliciously for purposes of § 523(a)(6).” 	In
re 	Duncan, 	448 	F.3d 	725, 	729 	(4th 	Cir. 	2006). 	“[T]o 	qualify 	as
willful 	for 	purposes 	of 	section 	523(a)(6), 	the 	debtor 	must: 	1)
commit an intentional tort, not a negligent or reckless tort, and
2) 	the 	intentional 	tort 	must 	be 	conduct 	substantially 	certain 	to
result 	in 	injury 	or 	be 	motivated 	by 	a 	desire 	to 	inflict 	injury.”
In re Eppard, 502 B.R. 458, 464 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2012).
Plaintiff 	must 	also 	plausibly 	allege 	malice. 	The 	Fourth
Circuit 	has 	explained 	that 	malice, 	rather 	than 	requiring 	the
defendant 	to 	act 	with 	subjective 	ill 	will, 	may 	be 	“shown 	by 	the
acts and conduct of the debtor in the context of their surrounding
circumstances . . . .” 	In re McNallen, 62 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir.
1995). 	Furthermore, “it is the debtor's subjective state of mind
that is relevant,” and malice can be found implicitly through the
“acts and conduct of the debtor in the context of [the] surrounding
circumstances.” 	In 	re 	Stanley, 	66 	F.3d 	664, 	668 	(4th 	Cir. 	1995)
(citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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a. Plaintiff 	has 	sufficiently 	alleged 	that 	the 	injury 	was
willful.
Construed 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	Plaintiff, 	the
Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads willful injury.5 	Plaintiff
alleges specific actions that Defendants took with intent to cause
harm and “to damage Plaintiff’s business and reputation.” 	ECF No.
3, ¶ 44. 	Plaintiff alleged that Defendants’ campaign relied upon
making, 	and, 	importantly, 	publishing 	defamatory 	statements 	about
Plaintiff 	on 	signs 	posted 	in 	front 	of 	their 	house, 	id. 	¶ 	15, 	on
social 	media 	posts, 	id. 	¶¶ 	20, 	28-29, 	at 	a 	rally, 	id. 	¶¶ 	23-24,
and critically, to customers and potential customers visiting the
neighborhood 	with 	their 	realtors. 	Id. 	¶ 	19. 	Plaintiff 	argues
that 	Defendants’ 	statements 	were 	intended 	to: 	(1) 	associate
Plaintiff 	with 	discriminatory 	and 	racist 	conduct; 	(2) 	falsely
accuse 	Plaintiff 	of 	violating 	laws; 	(3) 	falsely 	accuse 	Plaintiff
of 	mistreating 	homeowners; 	(4) 	falsely 	accuse 	Plaintiff 	of
harassing 	Defendants; 	and 	(5) 	blame 	Plaintiff 	for 	issues 	in 	the
neighborhood 	not 	within 	Plaintiff’s 	control. 	ECF 	No. 	27, 	at 	8.
These 	allegations, 	taken 	as 	true, 	are 	more 	than 	mere 	recitations
of 	the 	elements 	of 	a 	cause 	of 	action. 	Taken 	in 	a 	light 	most
favorable to Plaintiff, these actions indicate Defendants’ intent
5 	As 	discussed 	above 	the 	underlying 	confession 	of 	judgment 	holds 	preclusive
effect to matters of law, not questions of fact, and so the Court will not
analyze 	whether 	the 	causes 	of 	action 	underlying 	the 	confession 	of 	judgment
themselves state a claim under § 523(a)(6).
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to 	interfere 	with 	Plaintiff’s 	business. 	Plaintiff 	also 	alleges
that 	those 	statements 	directly 	resulted 	in 	the 	loss 	of 	at 	least
one 	sale, 	where 	an 	individual 	allegedly 	“pulled 	her 	contract” 	on
account of Defendants. 	ECF No. 3, ¶ 19. 	Moreover, in Ms. Bryant's
April 22, 2023, email, she explicitly stated that “we are winning
the fight! 	One potential buyer has already cancelled her contract
to build and another is strongly considering the same!” 	Id. ¶ 24.
These specific allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege that
Defendants 	took 	each 	of 	these 	acts 	to 	harm 	Plaintiff 	rather 	than
merely 	acting 	intentionally 	and 	incidentally 	harming
Plaintiff.6 	Despite 	Defendants’ 	assertion 	that 	no 	facts 	alleged
support 	a 	finding 	of 	Defendants’ 	intent 	to 	injure 	Plaintiff,
Defendants’ 	Confession 	of 	Judgment 	states 	that 	Defendants’
campaign 	directed 	against 	Plaintiff 	was 	intended 	to 	damage
Plaintiff’s 	business. 	ECF 	No. 	3, 	¶ 	44; 	id. 	at 	20.7 	These
allegations 	taken 	as 	true 	arise 	to 	more 	than 	a 	mere 	probability
that 	Plaintiff’s 	injury 	was 	intentional 	and 	survives 	Defendants’
12(b)(6) Motion.
6 At the hearing, Mrs. Bryant spoke passionately as to her true intent. 	ECF
No. 30, at 00:47:20-00:53:25. 	At this stage of the process, however, the Court
must construe the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff and cannot
make factual determinations. 	It is rare that intent can be determined as a
matter of law at the pleading stage. 	Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 745 F. Supp. 3d 288, 311 (E.D. Va. 2024) (explaining that it is rare
to have direct evidence of deceptive intent at the pleading stage).
7 Nothing herein shall be construed to accept the statements in the Confession
of 	Judgment 	as 	determinative 	in 	this 	proceeding 	or 	entitled 	to 	preclusive
effect.
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b. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged malice.
The 	Amended 	Complaint 	sufficiently 	alleges 	facts 	to 	support
that Defendants acted with malice. 	A debtor's injurious act done
“deliberately and intentionally in knowing disregard of the rights
of 	another,” 	is 	sufficiently 	willful 	and 	malicious, 	to 	prevent
discharge of a debt. 	Stanley, 66 F.3d at 667 (citation modified).
A 	debtor’s 	state 	of 	mind 	may 	be 	relevant 	for 	the 	second 	half 	of
the 	inquiry 	but, 	malice 	is 	typically 	inferred 	through 	a 	debtor’s
acts and conduct in the context of the surrounding circumstances.
Id. at 667-68. 	Defendants argue that the alleged conduct was not
sufficiently malicious, and instead that Defendants’ actions were
intended only to “voice concerns about the deplorable neighborhood
conditions 	and 	poor-quality 	housing 	issues.” 	ECF 	No. 	16, 	at 	2.
Defendants allege that their conduct was instead intended to “bring
awareness to their concerns.” 	Id. 	In other words, that Defendants
had just cause to take the actions alleged.
Citing In re Adams, 478 B.R. 476, 485 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012),
Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	the 	sum 	total 	of 	Defendants’ 	alleged
actions demonstrates malice. 	ECF No. 27, at 9. 	In Adams, albeit
in 	the 	context 	of 	§ 	1328(a)(4),8 	the 	Court 	determined 	the 	volume
8 “Malicious” for purposes of § 1328(a)(4) means “‘wrongful and without just
cause or excessive even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will.’”
In re Jennings, 670 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Walker, 48
F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 1995)). 	To establish malice, “a showing of specific
intent to harm another is not necessary.” 	In re Ikner, 883 F.2d 986, 991 (11th
Cir. 1989).
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and severity of the defendant’s conduct supported an inference of
malice. 	Adams, 478 B.R. at 485. 	There, the defendant repeatedly
contacted the plaintiff’s coworkers falsely accusing the plaintiff
of 	abusive 	behavior 	and 	financial 	fraud, 	threatened 	to 	kill 	the
plaintiff, and made false reports that resulted in the successful
sabotage 	of 	a 	business 	deal 	between 	the 	parties 	by 	defaming 	the
defendant. 	Id. 	at 	481. 	Defendants’ 	actions 	as 	alleged 	in 	the
Amended 	Complaint 	evidence 	a 	similar 	persistence, 	and 	Plaintiff
sufficiently 	alleges 	that 	the 	false 	statements, 	and 	incendiary
actions 	made 	by 	Defendants 	were 	intended 	to 	cause 	Plaintiff 	to
lose revenue. 	ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 18-24. 	Although Defendants may have
intended 	their 	actions 	to 	merely 	“bring 	awareness 	to 	their
concerns,” 	ECF 	No. 	16, 	at 	2, 	to 	meet 	the 	plausibility 	standard,
Plaintiff 	is 	not 	required 	“to 	also 	rebut 	other 	possible
explanations for the conduct alleged.” 	2 Moore's Federal Practice
§ 12.34(1)(b) (2019); see also Stanley, 66 F.3d at 668 (explaining
that the focus of the inquiry is whether or not the debtor intended
the consequences of their actions, not whether their intentions in
acting unlawfully were good). 	Taken in a light most favorable to
the 	non-moving 	party, 	the 	Amended 	Complaint 	sufficiently 	alleges
that 	Defendants 	engaged 	in 	a 	pattern 	of 	intentional 	interference
with 	Plaintiff’s 	business 	and 	these 	allegations 	support 	a
plausible showing of malice under § 523(a)(6).
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Thus, 	Plaintiff 	has 	successfully 	stated 	a 	claim 	that
Defendants’ 	actions 	constitute 	a 	willful 	and 	malicious 	injury
under § 523(a)(6) and the Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss.
NOW, 	THEREFORE, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY 	ORDERED, 	ADJUDGED, 	and 	DECREED
that the Motion to Dismiss is denied.
[END OF DOCUMENT]
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Parties to be Served
25-02009
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr.
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
Sharon Renea Bryant
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
John Paul Hughes Cournoyer
U.S. Bankruptcy Administrator 	VIA CM/ECF
Jamey M. Lowdermilk
Katarina Kyung Oak Wong 	VIA CM/ECF
Counsel for Plaintiff
Case 25-02009 Doc 36 Filed 11/18/25 Page 27 of 27