Eastwood Construction Partners, LLC v. Bryant, Jr. et al

2:25-ap-02009Ncmb13 de jan. de 2026

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION
In re: 	)
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	) 	Chapter 7
) 	Case No. 25-10147
)
Debtors. 	)
______________________________________ )
Eastwood Construction Partners, 	)
LLC dba Eastwood Homes, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Adv. No. 25-02009
)
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
______________________________________ )
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr., 	)
Sharon Renea Bryant, 	)
)
Third-party Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Adv. No. 25-02009
)
Clark Stewart, Allen Nason, 	)
James C. Adams, II, Clint Mores, 	)
Jamey Lowdermilk, & Katarina K. Wong, 	)
)
Third-party Defendants. 	)
______________________________________)
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 13th day of January, 2026.
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ORDER ON DOCUMENT TITLED “MOTION TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL COUNSEL
CONFLICTS AND TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING RESOLUTION”
This adversary proceeding is before the Court on the document
titled “Motion to Address Potential Counsel Conflicts and to Stay
Proceedings 	Pending 	Resolution” 	filed 	by 	James 	Lawrence 	Bryant,
Jr. 	and 	Sharon 	Renea 	Bryant 	(“Defendants”) 	on 	January 	2, 	2026.
ECF 	No. 	74. 	Defendants 	are 	proceeding 	pro 	se.1 	For 	the 	reasons
stated 	herein, 	the 	Court 	will 	deny 	all 	relief 	requested 	in 	this
document.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendants filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of title
11 	on 	March 	13, 	2025. 	Case 	No. 	25-10147, 	ECF 	No. 	1.
Eastwood Construction, 	LLC 	d/b/a 	Eastwood 	Homes 	(“Plaintiff”)
commenced 	this 	adversary 	proceeding 	on 	June 	5, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	1.
On June 9, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint as of
right 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	15(a)(1)(B), 	made 	applicable 	by 	Fed.
R. 	Bankr. 	P. 	7015. 	ECF 	No. 	3. 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	a 	declaration 	of
exception to discharge for a debt owed to Plaintiff by Defendants
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 	Id. ¶ 47.
On December 1, 2025, Defendants filed an answer to the amended
complaint. 	ECF 	No. 	45. 	Thereafter, 	on 	December 	4, 	2025,
Defendants filed a document titled “Counterclaims of Defendants,”
1 The Court must construe filings by pro se litigants liberally. 	See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
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ECF No. 47, which the Court liberally construed as an amendment as
of 	right 	to 	Defendants’ 	answer 	to 	the 	amended 	complaint 	to 	add
counterclaims 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	15(a)(1)(A) 	and 	as 	a 	third-
party 	complaint 	against 	the 	additional 	named 	entities 	under 	Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	14.2 	ECF 	No. 	54. 	In 	the 	amended 	answer 	and 	third-
party 	complaint, 	Defendants 	assert 	15 	counterclaims 	and 	third-
party 	claims 	against 	six 	additional 	entities, 	including
Plaintiff’s 	counsel. 	See 	ECF 	No. 	47. 	Defendants 	also 	filed 	a
Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff’s Counsel. 	ECF No. 49.
On 	December 	17, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	and 	third-party 	defendants
filed an Emergency Motion for Protective Order. 	ECF No. 59. 	That
same 	day, 	Defendants 	withdrew 	their 	Motion 	to 	Disqualify
Plaintiff’s Counsel. 	ECF No. 60. 	On December 31, 2025, Plaintiff
and 	third-party 	defendants 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	sanctions 	against
Defendants or alternatively, to dismiss Defendants’ counterclaims
and third-party complaint. 	ECF No. 72.3
On 	January 	2, 	2026, 	Defendants 	filed 	the 	document 	currently
before the Court. 	ECF No. 74. 	The Court has liberally construed
this 	document 	as 	a 	motion 	to 	disqualify 	Plaintiff’s 	counsel 	and
stay 	further 	proceedings 	on 	the 	Emergency 	Motion 	for 	Protective
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, 14 and 15 are made applicable to this adversary proceeding
by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007, 7014, and 7015, respectively.
3 This motion is scheduled to come before the Court for hearing on January 21,
2026. 	ECF No. 73.
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Order 	as 	well 	as 	the 	motion 	for 	sanctions. 	Id. 	at 	3. 	The 	Court
held 	a 	hearing 	on 	the 	Emergency 	Motion 	for 	Protective 	Order 	on
January 6, 2026, at which time the Court orally granted Plaintiff’s
motion in part.
DISCUSSION
The 	Court 	has 	authority 	to 	disqualify 	an 	attorney 	from
representation in a particular case, but such action is not taken
absent 	a 	strong 	showing. 	Stanwood 	Corp. 	v. 	Barnum, 	575 	F. 	Supp.
1250, 1251 (W.D.N.C. 1983); Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d
142, 146 (4th Cir. 1992) (“The drastic nature of disqualification
requires 	that 	courts 	avoid 	overly-mechanical 	adherence 	to
disciplinary canons at the expense of litigants' rights freely to
choose 	their 	counsel; 	and 	that 	they 	always 	remain 	mindful 	of 	the
opposing 	possibility 	of 	misuse 	of 	disqualification 	motions 	for
strategic reasons.”). 	“Motions to disqualify counsel are subject
to 	particularly 	strict 	scrutiny 	because 	of 	their 	potential 	for
abuse as a tactical device.” 	Muniz v. Re Spec Corp., 230 F. Supp.
3d 	147, 	152 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2017) 	(further 	observing 	that 	such 	motions
are 	“disfavored”) 	(quotations 	omitted). 	The 	burden 	falls 	on 	the
movant 	to 	prove 	that 	disqualification 	is 	indicated. 	Stanwood
Corp., 	575 	F. 	Supp. 	at 	1251 	(citing 	Bhd. 	Ry. 	Carmen 	of 	U.S. 	&
Canada 	v. 	Delpro 	Co., 	549 	F. 	Supp. 	780 	(D. 	Del. 	1982)). 	Due 	to
the 	“possibility 	of 	misuse 	of 	disqualification 	motions 	for
strategic 	reasons,” 	motions 	to 	disqualify 	“cannot 	be 	based 	on
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imagined 	scenarios 	of 	conflict.” 	Finley 	Grp., 	Liquidating 	Agent
For RedF Mktg., LLC v. Roselli, No. AP 17-03063, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS
3311, at *18 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Oct. 21, 2019) (quotations omitted).
Where 	a 	party 	is 	not 	a 	current 	or 	former 	client 	of 	opposing
counsel, 	the 	party 	must 	establish 	that 	there 	is 	“a 	violation 	of
the 	rules 	which 	is 	sufficiently 	severe 	to 	call 	in 	question 	the
fair and efficient administration of justice.” 	Kleiman v. Wright,
662 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1247, 	1256 	(S.D. 	Fla. 	2023) 	(denying 	a 	motion 	to
disqualify 	where 	there 	was 	no 	evidence 	that 	there 	was 	a
“substantial” 	risk 	that 	the 	firm’s 	representation 	would 	be
“materially” 	limited 	by 	their 	personal 	interests 	(emphasis 	in
original)) (quotations omitted).
Having filed counterclaims against Plaintiff and third-party
claims 	against 	Plaintiff’s 	counsel 	allegedly 	based 	on 	conduct 	in
prosecuting 	the 	bankruptcy 	case 	and 	the 	adversary 	proceeding,4
Defendants 	argue 	that 	counsel 	is 	disqualified 	because 	they 	are 	a
party 	to 	the 	action.5 	Counsel 	for 	Plaintiff 	responded 	to 	the
counterclaims 	and 	third-party 	complaint 	by 	filing 	a 	motion 	for
4 On January 9, 2026, Defendants filed a document that the Court has interpreted
as an amendment to their answer to withdraw the counterclaims, and a voluntary
dismissal of the third-party complaint. 	ECF Nos. 77 & 78. 	The Court has given
Defendants 	7 	days 	to 	file 	a 	statement 	indicating 	whether 	the 	Court 	has
misinterpreted the filing and has stayed any deadlines for any party to respond
to those claims pending further order of the Court. 	ECF No. 78.
5 Defendants previously filed a motion for sanctions against counsel for the
same conduct. 	Case No. 25-10147, ECF Nos. 103, 128, 161 & 162. 	The Court
denied that motion, admonishing Defendants again for raising frivolous arguments
and claims. 	Case No. 25-10147, ECF No. 166, at 10 n.8.
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sanctions 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Bankr. 	P. 	9011. 	ECF 	No. 	72. 	Defendants
contend that Plaintiff’s counsels’ representation of Plaintiff and
third-party defendants in response to the counterclaims and third-
party 	complaint 	violates 	North 	Carolina 	Rules 	of 	Professional
Conduct6 1.7 and 3.7.7
Defendants have not established the existence of an attorney-
client 	relationship 	between 	themselves 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	counsel.
Defendants are therefore not entitled to seek disqualification of
Plaintiff’s 	counsel 	under 	Rule 	1.7. 	Rule 	1.7 	provides 	that 	a
lawyer 	shall 	not 	represent 	a 	client 	where 	the 	representation
involves 	a 	concurrent 	conflict 	of 	interest 	unless 	certain
conditions 	are 	met. 	N.C. 	R. 	Prof. 	C. 	1.7. 	The 	party 	seeking
disqualification 	must 	generally 	establish 	an 	attorney-client
relationship 	with 	the 	attorney 	in 	question. 	Finley 	Grp., 	2019
Bankr. LEXIS 3311, at *20; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law
6 This Court has adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct of the North Carolina
State Bar as adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina and amended from
time 	to 	time 	except 	as 	otherwise 	provided 	by 	a 	specific 	rule 	of 	the 	Court.
Local 	Rule 	2090-2. 	Although 	the 	Rules 	of 	Professional 	Conduct 	“establish
appropriate guidelines for the professional conduct of attorneys, a violation
of those Rules does not automatically result in disqualification of counsel.”
Advanced Training Grp. Worldwide, Inc. v. Proactive Techs. Inc., 436 F. Supp.
3d 870, 874 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2020) (citing Cent. Milk Producers Co-op. v. Sentry
Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 1978)). 	Regardless, neither
Defendants’ allegations, nor the record indicates any violation of the rules in
this case.
7 Defendants also cite Rule 1.13 which provides that a lawyer employed by an
organization 	represents 	the 	organization 	acting 	through 	its 	duly 	authorized
constituents. 	N.C. R. Prof. C. 1.13. 	Plaintiff’s counsel are not employees of
Plaintiff for purposes of this Rule and Defendants’ reliance on this Rule is
without merit.
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Governing 	Lawyers 	§ 	6 	(2000) 	(“standing 	to seek disqualification
ordinarily [is] limited to present or former clients”).
Defendants 	also 	fail 	to 	establish 	a 	basis 	for
disqualification under Rule 3.7. 	Rule 3.7 provides that generally
a 	lawyer 	shall 	not 	act 	as 	an 	advocate 	at 	a 	trial 	in 	which 	the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness. 	N.C. R. Prof. C. 3.7.
The 	opposing 	party 	has 	a 	proper 	objection 	under 	this 	Rule 	“where
the combination of roles may prejudice that party’s rights in the
litigation.” 	N.C. R. Prof. C. 3.7, Comment 2.
Defendants 	make 	merely 	conclusory 	statements 	that 	are
insufficient to carry Defendants burden on disqualification. 	Even
if 	the 	Court 	had 	not 	previously 	denied 	Defendants’ 	requests 	for
sanctions 	based 	largely 	on 	the 	same 	allegations 	asserted 	in 	the
counterclaims 	and 	third-party 	complaint, 	and 	even 	if 	Defendants
had not in fact withdrawn the claims, Defendants may not disqualify
opposing 	counsel 	based 	on 	a 	hypothetical 	need 	for 	counsel 	to
testify 	at 	trial. 	See, 	e.g., 	Powers 	Reinforcing 	Fabricators,
L.L.C. v. Contes in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 473 P.3d 714, 721-22
(Ct. 	App. 	2020) 	(affirming 	trial 	court’s 	refusal 	to 	disqualify
counsel 	against 	whom 	a 	third-party 	claim 	had 	been 	asserted 	for
failure to establish that the lawyer would be called as a witness,
that the evidence was unobtainable elsewhere, and that the lawyer’s
testimony would be prejudicial to his client). 	Nor can Defendants
disqualify 	opposing 	counsel 	merely 	because 	they 	intend 	to 	call
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opposing 	counsel 	as 	a 	witness. 	Stanwood 	Corp. 	v. 	Barnum, 	575 	F.
Supp. 	1250, 	151-52 	(W.D.N.C. 	1983) 	(“Such 	a 	rule, 	taken 	to 	its
logical conclusion, would allow any party to deprive his adversary
of the counsel of his choice simply by announcing an intention to
question 	the 	adversary's attorney 	in 	open 	court.”). 	Therefore,
the Court will deny Defendants’ motion.
NOW, 	THEREFORE, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY 	ORDERED, 	ADJUDGED, 	and 	DECREED
that Defendants’ motion, ECF No. 74, is denied.
[END OF DOCUMENT]
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Parties to be Served
25-02009
John Paul Hughes Cournoyer
U.S. Bankruptcy Administrator 	Via CM/ECF
Jamey M. Lowdermilk
Katarina Kyung Oak Wong
Counsel for Plaintiff/Third Party Defendants 	Via CM/ECF
James Lawrence Bryant, Jr.
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
Sharon Renea Bryant
5629 Siler Str
Trinity, NC 27370
Allen Nason
2857 Westport Road
Charlotte, NC 28208
James Adams, II
Brooks Pierce McLendon Humphrey Leonard
230 n. Elm St., Ste 2000
Renaissance Plaza
Greensboro, NC 27401
Clint Morse
Brooks Pierce McLendon Humphry & Leonard
230 N. Elm St, Ste. 2000,
Renaissance Plaza
Greensboro, NC 27401
Clark Stewart
2857 Westport Road
Charlotte, NC 28208
Case 25-02009 Doc 81 Filed 01/13/26 Page 9 of 9

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