MONROE v. ADAMS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DEVONTA J. MONROE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24cv770
)
JAMIE ADAMS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on the “Motion to Dismiss”
(Docket Entry 13) (the “Motion”) filed by District Attorney Jamie
Adams (the “Defendant”). For the reasons that follow, the Court
should deny the Motion.
BACKGROUND
Following his arrest in 2022 (see Docket Entry 2 (the
“Complaint”) at 7), Devonta J. Monroe (the “Plaintiff”) sued	1
Defendant (among others) for injuries arising from the allegedly
wrongful release of Plaintiff’s video-taped police interrogation
(see id. at 7-20; see also Docket Entry 3 at 3-5 (summarizing
Complaint’s allegations)). According to the Complaint, Defendant
“handled [Plaintiff’s criminal] case” (Docket Entry 2 at 8), “had
direct access to the [interrogation] video” (id. at 15 (internal
quotation marks omitted)), and “revealed [it] . . . to the public”
1 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s
pagination.
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(id. at 10), causing others to assault and threaten Plaintiff for
“‘snitching’” (id.). Additionally, the Complaint alleges that “Lt.
Det. J. White” (id. at 9), who “interrogated [Plaintiff]” (id. at
7) and later knew of the interrogation video’s location (see id. at
8), “implied [to Plaintiff] that [Defendant] leaked the video” (id.
at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court (per the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge)
reviewed the Complaint (see Docket Entry 3) and allowed Plaintiff’s
claims for conspiracy (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)) and due
process (under the state-created danger doctrine) to proceed	2
against Defendant (see Docket Entry 5 at 1 (adopting Docket Entry
3)). Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”). (See Docket Entry 14 (supporting
memorandum) at 10; accord Docket Entry 13 at 1.) Specifically,
Defendant maintains that “Plaintiff cannot establish standing
because he fails to show that his alleged injuries are traceable to
any conduct by [Defendant].” (Docket Entry 14 at 2.)3
2 “[T]he state-created danger doctrine[ ] is an exception to
the general rule that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require governmental actors to affirmatively
protect life, liberty, or property against intrusion by private
third parties . . . [and] applies only when the state affirmatively
acts to create or increase the risk that resulted in the victim’s
injury.” Burns-Fisher v. Romero-Lehrer, 57 F.4th 421, 424-25 (4th
Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
3 Although Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion (see
(continued...)
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DISCUSSION
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may assert that a court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s complaint, including
by challenging a plaintiff’s standing. See, e.g., White Tail Park,
Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2005). “When a Rule
12(b)(1) motion challenge is raised to the factual basis for
subject matter jurisdiction, the burden of proving subject matter
jurisdiction is on the plaintiff,” Richmond, Fredericksburg &
Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.
1991), and “the district court may consider evidence outside the
pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary
judgment,” White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 459 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
explained that, “when a defendant asserts that the complaint fails
to allege sufficient facts to support subject matter jurisdiction,
the trial court must apply a standard patterned on Rule 12(b)(6)
and assume the truthfulness of the facts alleged.” Kerns v. United
States, 585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). “On the other hand,
when the defendant challenges the veracity of the facts
3(...continued)
Docket Entries dated June 13, 2025, to present), the Court
“nevertheless has an obligation to review the [M]otion[] to ensure
that dismissal is proper,” Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, 743
F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2014).
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underpinning subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court may go
beyond the complaint, conduct evidentiary proceedings, and resolve
the disputed jurisdictional facts.” Id. However, “when the
jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with those
central to the merits, the court should resolve the relevant
factual disputes only after appropriate discovery, unless the
jurisdictional allegations are clearly immaterial or wholly
unsubstantial and frivolous.” Id.
B. Standing
“[T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975). “This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on
federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its
exercise.” Id. “In both dimensions it is founded in concern about
the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a
democratic society.” Id. With respect to the constitutional
limitations, the standing analysis addresses justiciability, i.e.,
“whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between
himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art[icle]
III.” Id.
The United States Supreme Court has identified three elements
to establish the constitutional minimum of standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in
fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which
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is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of — the injury has to be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not the result of the independent action of some third
party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(internal quotation marks, citations, brackets, and ellipses
omitted). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing these elements.” Id. at 561.
The second element, in particular — traceability — does not
require that the plaintiff “show that a particular defendant is the
only cause of the[] injury,” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1992), or “prove to an
absolute certainty that the defendant’s actions caused . . .
injury; rather the plaintiff[] need only show that there is a
substantial likelihood that [the] defendant’s conduct caused [him]
harm,” NC RSOL v. Boone, 402 F. Supp. 3d 240, 250 (M.D.N.C. 2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
C. Analysis
Contending that Plaintiff lacks standing, Defendant “presents
a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1)” (Docket Entry 14 at 2) and asks the Court to consider
“supplemental facts” (id. at 4 (all-cap font omitted)) which prove,
in her view, (1) “that [Defendant] was not involved in Plaintiff’s
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prosecution” (id. at 4) and (2) that “[the] interrogation video was
disclosed as evidence in the [North Carolina Department of
Justice’s] prosecution of [other] individuals” (id. at 5). In
support of the first conclusion, Defendant cites “[state c]ourt
records . . . [listing another attorney in Defendant’s office as
t]he prosecutor of record in Plaintiff’s criminal case” (id. at 4)
and contends that “[Defendant’s] name does not appear in the court
file associated with [Plaintiff’s] prosecution” (id.; see also
Docket Entry 14-1 at 1-59). As for the second conclusion,
Defendant submits discovery disclosures (see Docket Entries 14-2
through 14-4) which purportedly indicate that “[t]he
[interrogation] video was lawfully disclosed as discovery in [the
prosecution of] three [separate] criminal defendant[s]” (Docket
Entry 14 at 8).
These supplemental facts, in Defendant’s view, undermine
“Plaintiff’s allegations of traceability[, which] rest on two key
factual assertions: (1) that [Defendant] personally prosecuted
[Plaintiff ] and (2) that only the police or the district
attorney’s office could have had access to the interrogation video
. . . .” (Id.) Moreover, Defendant posits that evidence of the
video’s lawful disclosure in a separate prosecution “supports a far
more plausible inference[] that one of th[ose] defendants or
someone associated with them recorded and released the video
. . . after its discovery disclosure.” (Id. at 9.) In sum,
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Defendant urges the Court to accept her assertion that
“[t]he[ supplemental] facts break the . . . causal chain” (id.)
between Defendant’s actions and Plaintiff’s injuries and to dismiss
the Complaint for lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (see
id. at 8-10).
As noted above, the Complaint alleges that “Lt. Det. J. White
[ ] implied that [Defendant] leaked the video.” (Docket Entry 2 at
9 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Because that allegation (i)
goes undisputed in Defendant’s jurisdictional challenge and (ii)
sufficiently establishes Plaintiff’s standing to sue Defendant for
injuries traceable to her alleged conduct, the Court should deny
the Motion.
“Where, as here, a defendant has not provided evidence to
dispute the veracity of the jurisdictional allegations in the
[C]omplaint, the [C]ourt accepts facts alleged . . . as true just
as it would under Rule 12(b)(6).” National All. for Accessibility,
Inc. v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., No. 1:11cv941, 2012 WL 1440226, at
*3 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 26, 2012) (citing Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192-93); see
also Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e
accept as true [ ] allegations for which there is sufficient
factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Although Defendant offers
evidence to dispute “two [other] factual assertions [in the
Complaint]” (Docket Entry 14 at 8; see also id. at 4-5), she does
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not dispute the Complaint’s allegation that “Lt. Det. J. White [ ]
implied that [Defendant] leaked the video” (Docket Entry 2 at 9
(internal quotation marks omitted)). That allegation, which
purportedly repeats a statement from an officer who personally
“interrogated [Plaintiff]” (id. at 7) and later knew of the
interrogation video’s whereabouts (see id. at 8), directly
implicates Defendant in the video’s publication. As such, “the
Complaint[ ] sufficient[ly] alleg[es] that [Defendant] was a
plausible source of [ ] Plaintiff[’s leaked interrogation video and
therefore] . . . contain[s] sufficient factual matter to render
Plaintiff[’s] allegations plausible on their face with respect to
traceability.” Hutton v. National Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry,
Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Accepted as true at this stage of the proceedings, see
National All. for Accessibility, Inc., 2012 WL 1440226, at *3, the
allegation that “Lt. Det. J. White [ ] implied that [Defendant]
leaked the video” (Docket Entry 2 at 9 (internal quotation marks
omitted)) establishes Plaintiff’s standing. Standing requires a
plaintiff to sufficiently allege that he “(1) suffered an injury in
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338
(2016). “Because . . . traceability [is] the only standing
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element[] challenged by [Defendant], [the Court] focus[es only] on
th[at ] element[],” Hutton, 892 F.3d at 621, which requires “a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
Here, Defendant contends that “Plaintiff cannot establish
standing because he fails to show that his alleged injuries are
traceable to any conduct by [Defendant].” (Docket Entry 14 at 2.)
That argument fails, however, because Plaintiff’s allegation that
“Lt. Det. J. White [ ] implied that [Defendant] leaked the video”
(Docket Entry 2 at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted)) adequately
“demonstrate[s] that the alleged harm was caused by [ D]efendant,
as opposed to . . . some third party not before the [C]ourt,”
Disability Rights of S.C. v. McMaster, 24 F.4th 893, 901 (4th Cir.
2022) (internal quotation marks omitted), thereby fulfilling the
causal requirement at standing. See NC RSOL, 402 F. Supp. 3d at
250 (“[P]laintiff[] need only show that there is a substantial
likelihood that [D]efendant’s conduct caused [him] harm.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Morever, despite Defendant’s speculation that “someone
associated with the[ separate prosecutions] recorded and released
the video” (Docket Entry 14 at 9), the traceability requirement
does not require Plaintiff to “show that . . . [D]efendant is the
only cause of [his] injury,” Watkins, 954 F.2d at 980; see also
American Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 520 (4th
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Cir. 2003) (finding traceability despite the existence of “third
parties [who] could also have contributed to the alleged
injuries”). Instead, Plaintiff need only demonstrate “a causal
connection between [his] injury and [ D]efendant’s conduct,” Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560, and has done so here.
Alternatively, by contending “that [Defendant] was not
involved in Plaintiff’s prosecution . . . [and that the]
interrogation video was disclosed as evidence in [a separate]
prosecution” (Docket Entry 14 at 4-5), Defendant presents issues
“inextricably intertwined with those central to the merits,” Kerns,
585 F.3d at 193, namely, the factual issue of whether and to what
extent Defendant accessed the interrogation video or played a role
in its release. That issue bears directly on the merits of
Plaintiff’s claims, specifically on whether Defendant (i)
“affirmatively act[ed, as required under the state-created danger
doctrine,] to create or increase the risk that resulted in
[Plaintiff’s] injury,” Burns-Fisher v. Romero-Lehrer, 57 F.4th 421,
425 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted), or (ii)
participated in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his civil
rights, see 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “Because the dispute over the
cause [ ] of [Plaintiff’s] injuries is inextricably intertwined
with the merits . . ., the entire factual dispute is appropriately
resolved only by a proceeding on the merits.” Carter v. United
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States, 694 F. App’x 918, 925 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Further, the supplemental facts do not render Plaintiff’s
jurisdictional allegations “clearly immaterial or wholly
unsubstantial and frivolous,” Kerns, 585 F.3d at 193, so as to
warrant dismissal at this stage of the proceedings. See 24th
Senatorial Dist. Republican Comm. v. Alcorn, 820 F.3d 624, 629 (4th
Cir. 2016) (deeming dismissal for lack of standing pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) premature unless “the issue before the court is purely a
legal question that can be readily resolved in the absence of
discovery” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Whatever bearing
the supplemental facts have on Plaintiff’s standing, they
unavoidably implicate the Complaint’s core factual allegations
against Defendant, such as whether Defendant “had direct access to
the [interrogation] video” (Docket Entry 2 at 15) or “revealed [it]
. . . to the public” (id. at 10). Therefore, given “the
significant overlap between the jurisdictional issues and the
merits of Plaintiff[’s] allegations, th[e C]ourt . . . should [ ]
afford[ Plaintiff] the opportunity to conduct discovery before
ruling on subject matter jurisdiction.” Garnick v. Wake Forest
Univ. Baptist Med. Ctr., 629 F. Supp. 3d 352, 362 (M.D.N.C. 2022).
CONCLUSION
Defendant failed to dispute a plausible factual allegation
which, accepted as true, provides a basis for Plaintiff’s standing.
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In the alternative, the supplemental facts tendered by Defendant
create a dispute intertwined with the ultimate merits of
Plaintiff’s claim, such that the Court should not dismiss the
action prior to discovery.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 13)
be denied.
This 9 day of February, 2026.	th
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
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