ALLRED v. BISIGNANO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BRADLEY N.A., )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) 1:25CV21
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, )
Commissioner of Social )
Security, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Bradley N.A. (“Bradley”)
brought this action to obtain review of
a final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security denying his claim
for social security disability insurance
benefits and a period of disability.1
The Court has considered the certified
administrative record and dispositive
briefing from the parties. Because
substantial evidence supports the
determination of the Administrative
Law Judge, the Court will deny
Bradley’s request for remand, as set
forth below.
1 Transcript citations refer to the
Administrative Transcript of Record filed
manually with the Commissioner’s
Answer. See Docket Entry 6. By Order of
Reference, this matter was referred to the
Undersigned to conduct all proceedings
in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Bradley filed an application for
disability insurance benefits and a
period of disability in July of 2021,
alleging a disability onset date of April
15, 2021. (Tr. 160-61.) The
applications were denied initially and
upon reconsideration. (Tr. 81-84, 87-
91.) After a hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
determined on November 8, 2023
that Bradley was not disabled under
the Act. (Tr. 17-56.) The Appeals
Council denied a request for review,
making the ALJ’s decision the final
decision for review. (Tr. 1-6.)
636(c). Docket Entry 10. Frank
Bisignano became the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration on
May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 25(d), Frank Bisignano is
automatically substituted as the
defendant in this suit.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
While Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the
United States Code “authorizes
judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social
security benefits,” see Hines v.
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir.
2006), the scope of that review is
specific and narrow, see Smith v.
Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th
Cir. 1986). Specifically, review is
limited to determining if there is
substantial evidence in the record to
support the Commissioner’s decision.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hunter v.
Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir.
1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In
reviewing for substantial evidence,
the Court does not re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute its
judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76
F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Put
simply: the issue before the Court is
not whether Bradley is disabled but
whether the finding that he is not
disabled is supported by substantial
evidence and based upon a correct
application of the relevant law. Id.
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ followed the correct process,
set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, to
determine disability. See Albright v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d
473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).
“The Commissioner uses a five-step
process to evaluate disability claims.”
Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470,
472-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4),
404.1520(a)(4)).
Under this process, the
Commissioner asks, in
sequence, whether the
claimant: (1) worked during the
alleged period of disability; (2)
had a severe impairment; (3)
had an impairment that met or
equaled the requirements of a
listed impairment; (4) could
return to her [or his] past
relevant work; and (5) if not,
could perform any other work
in the national economy.
Id. at 472. A finding adverse to the
claimant at any of several points in
this five-step sequence forecloses a
disability designation and ends the
inquiry. Id. at 473. “Through the
fourth step, the burden of production
and proof is on the claimant. If the
claimant reaches step five, the burden
shifts to the Secretary to produce
evidence that other jobs exist in the
national economy that the claimant
can perform considering his age,
education, and work experience.”
Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal
citations omitted).
The ALJ determined at step one that
Bradley had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the
alleged onset date of April 15, 2021.
(Tr. 19.) The ALJ next found the
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following severe impairments at step
two: insulin dependent diabetes
mellitus type I; major depressive
disorder; and generalized anxiety
disorder. (Tr. 19.) At step three, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have
an impairment or combination of
impairments listed in, or medically
equal to one listed in, Appendix 1. (Tr.
21.)
The ALJ next set forth Bradley’s
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)
and determined that he could perform
a reduced range of light work as
follows:
lift and/or carry 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently, stand and/or walk 6
hours total in an 8-hour
workday and sit 6 hours total in
an 8-hour workday. He is able
to understand, remember, and
carry out instructions for 95 to
100% of an 8-hour workday.
The claimant is able to
occasionally interact with the
public, coworkers and
supervisors. He is able to
concentrate and persist for
simple tasks. The claimant is
able to adapt to changes in a
simple work setting.
(Tr. 22.) At the fourth step, the ALJ
determined that Bradley was unable
to perform his past relevant work.
(Tr. 25.) Last, at step five, the ALJ
concluded that there were other jobs
in the national economy that Bradley
could perform. (Tr. 26.)
IV. DISCUSSION
In his appeal, Bradley asserts only
that “[t]he ALJ erred by failing to
explain the basis for the RFC
conclusion that [he] ‘is able to
understand, remember, and carry out
instructions for 95 to 100% of an 8-
hour workday,’ a conclusion that is
arbitrary absent further explanation,
preventing substantial evidence from
supporting the ALJ’s decision.”
Docket Entry 9 at 3. The record
demonstrates otherwise, as set forth
below.
A. The RFC Determination.
The RFC measures the most a
claimant can do in a work setting
despite the physical and mental
limitations of his or her impairments
and any related symptoms (e.g., pain).
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); see
also Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x
264, 272 (4th Cir. 2015)
(unpublished) (claimant’s RFC is “[a]
medical assessment of what an
individual can do in a work setting in
spite of the functional limitations and
environmental restrictions imposed
by all of his or her medically
determinable impairment(s)”)
(internal citation omitted); Hines,
453 F.3d at 562. The RFC includes
both a “physical exertional or strength
limitation” that assesses the
claimant’s “ability to do sedentary,
light, medium, heavy, or very heavy
work,” as well as “nonexertional
limitations (mental, sensory or skin
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impairments).” Hall v. Harris, 658
F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981).
“Social Security Ruling 96-8p
explains that the RFC assessment
must include a narrative discussion
describing how the evidence supports
each conclusion, citing specific
medical facts (e.g., laboratory
findings) and nonmedical evidence
(e.g., daily activities, observations).”
Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189
(4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations
omitted). An ALJ need not discuss
every piece of evidence in making an
RFC determination. See Reid v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861,
865 (4th Cir. 2014). Yet, the ALJ
“must build an accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to [the]
conclusion.” Brown v. Commissioner,
873 F.3d 251, 269 (4th Cir. 2017).
“The RFC assessment must first
identify the individual’s functional
limitations or restrictions and assess
his or her work-related abilities on a
function-by-function basis . . . . Only
[then] may RFC be expressed in terms
of the exertional levels of work,
sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and
very heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL
374184, at *1.
The Fourth Circuit has held that
“meaningful review is frustrated when
an ALJ goes straight from listing the
evidence to stating a conclusion.”
Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307,
311 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “a
proper RFC analysis has three
components: (1) evidence, (2) logical
explanation, and (3) conclusion”). As
noted earlier, the ALJ “must both
identify evidence that supports his
conclusion and ‘build an accurate and
logical bridge from [that] evidence to
his conclusion.’” Woods v. Berryhill,
888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018)
(alteration in original) (quoting
Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). Failure to
do so constitutes reversible error. See
Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868
(4th Cir. 2017). Where an ALJ’s
“analysis is incomplete and precludes
meaningful review,” remand is
appropriate. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 191.
Moreover, “[a]n ALJ assesses the
credibility of a claimant’s subjective
statements about his condition as part
of the RFC assessment,” Ladda v.
Berryhill, 749 F. App’x 166, 170 (4th
Cir. 2018) (unpublished), using a two-
part test: “First, there must be
objective medical evidence showing
‘the existence of a medical
impairment(s) which results from
anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities and
which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged,’” Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b),
404.1529(b)).
If such an impairment exists, the ALJ
must then consider, as the second
prong of the test, all available
evidence, including the claimant’s
statements about pain, to determine
whether the claimant is disabled. Id.
at 595-96. In so doing, the ALJ need
not credit them if they conflict with
the objective medical evidence or if
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the underlying impairment could not
reasonably be expected to cause the
symptoms alleged. Id. Where the ALJ
has considered the relevant factors,
see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), and
heard the claimant’s testimony and
observed his or her demeanor, the
Court will defer to the ALJ’s
determination regarding those
subjective complaints. Shively v.
Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir.
1984).
Those relevant factors include:
(i) [Plaintiff’s] daily
activities;
(ii) The location, duration,
frequency, and intensity
of [Plaintiff’s] pain or
other symptoms;
(iii) Precipitating and
aggravating factors;
(iv) The type, dosage,
effectiveness, and side
effects of any medication
[Plaintiff] take[s] or
[has] taken to alleviate
his pain or other
symptoms;
(v) Treatment, other than
medication, [Plaintiff]
receive[s] or [has]
received for relief of his
pain or other symptoms;
(vi) Any measures [Plaintiff]
use[s] or [has] used to
relieve his pain or other
symptoms (e.g., lying flat
on [her] back, standing
for 15 to 20 minutes
every hour, sleeping on a
board, etc.); and
(vii) Other factors concerning
[Plaintiff’s] functional
limitations and
restrictions due to pain
or other symptoms.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
B. The ALJ’s Off Task Finding Was
Proper.
Here, Bradley’s assertion that the
Court should remand this case for the
ALJ to better explain her finding that
he is able to understand, remember,
and carry out instructions for 95 to
100% of an 8-hour workday is not
persuasive.
First, absent a binding rule rejecting
the use of a numerical off-task-time
figure, it would be improper to
remand here what is in essence a
numerical off-task-time figure on that
ground alone. See England v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-12818,
2016 WL 8114219, at *14-15 (E.D.
Mich. July 11, 2016) (“[S]ome courts
reject the use of percentages to
describe [concentration, persistence,
and pace] deficiencies wholesale,
other courts look to whether the ALJ
presented sufficient justification for
the percentage chosen, and yet others
reject challenges to the chosen
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percentage unless the claimant can
show that the ALJ’s favored
percentage is inaccurate. There is no
precedent in this circuit precluding
the use of a numerical off-task-time
figure to represent qualitative deficits
in [concentration, persistence, and
pace]; rejecting the ALJ’s use of the
eight percent figure out of hand would
be inappropriate.”).
There is no such binding precedent in
the Fourth Circuit, and, in fact,
unpublished Fourth Circuit case law
suggests quite the opposite, as it has
upheld an off-task time figure like the
one at issue here. See Rebecca J. v.
Kijakazi, No. 22-1531, 2023 WL
3970022, at *3 (4th Cir. June 13,
2023) (concluding that the ALJ built a
logical bridge between the
administrative record and her finding
that plaintiff would be off task no
more than 7% of the workday).
Second, the ALJ did not determine
Bradley’s limitations solely by
concluding that he was able to
understand, remember, and carry out
instructions for 95 to 100% of an 8-
hour workday. That limitation was
only one part of the ALJ’s overall
comprehensive efforts to account for
Bradley’s limitations. To that end, the
ALJ also limited Bradley to simple
tasks in a simple work setting with
2 Bradley has therefore waived ALJ
findings he has not challenged. See
Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856
F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party
waives an argument by failing to present
only occasional interaction with
others. (Tr. 22.) The ALJ thus
disqualified Bradley from performing
any complex tasks or having frequent
or constant exposure to others and,
despite this, could still identify other
jobs in the national economy that
Bradley could perform. (Tr. 26.) And
Bradley only challenges what is, in
essence, the ALJ’s numerical off-task
finding.2
The question then is whether the ALJ
built a logical bridge here between the
record evidence and her conclusion
that Bradley could understand,
remember, and carry out instructions
for 95 to 100% of the time. Logically,
the inverse of this is true as well:
whether the ALJ built a logical bridge
between the record evidence and her
conclusion that Plaintiff was unable to
understand, remember, and carry out
instructions for (at most) 5% of the
time. Although the ALJ did not
explain or set forth a formula as to
why she chose a five percent off task
finding instead of two percent or six
percent, that lack of precision is not a
reason to reverse the decision.
Because: the ALJ did not find
evidence showing that Bradley’s
ability to understand, remember, and
carry out instructions was so
compromised that he could not work.
See Jordan v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No.
it in its opening brief or by failing to
‘develop [the] argument’—even if [the]
brief takes a passing shot at the issue.”)
(quoting Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d
895, 923 (4th Cir. 2015)).
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CV 17-CV-03032-JMC, 2018 WL
4354196, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 12,
2018).
In other words, the ALJ found that his
symptoms caused some time off task,
but not a disabling amount of it. See
Shaw v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20CV581,
2021 WL 3079905, at *9 (M.D.N.C.
July 21, 2021) (finding no error where
the ALJ found that the plaintiff
“would be off task no more than ten
percent of the time in an eight-hour
workday” because “the ALJ found that
[the p]laintiff’s depressive disorder
caused some limitation in [his] ability
to remain on-task but not disabling
limitations,” given the vocational
expert’s testimony that time off-task
up to ten percent was not work
preclusive) (emphasis added and
quotation marks omitted), report and
recommendation adopted, No.
1:20CV581, 2021 WL 6202788
3 Dr. Hatfield also found that Bradley had
moderate impairments in the following
domains: completing a normal workday
without disruption from psychologically-
based symptoms, performing at a
consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods,
interacting appropriately with the public
and form working relationships with
supervisors and coworkers, and
tolerating the normal stress and
pressures of a competitive workplace.
(Tr. 664.) Dr. Hatfield did not otherwise
define the term “moderate[ ]
impairment”; however, under agency
regulations, a claimant has a “moderate”
limitation if his “functioning . . .
independently, appropriately, effectively,
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2021). Because
the ALJ’s finding is supported by a
logical bridge between the off task
finding and the evidence in the
record, there is no basis for remand.
More specifically, the ALJ identified
more than substantial evidence in her
decision explaining why Bradley
could understand, remember, and
carry out instructions for at least 95%
of an 8-hour workday and would be
off task for, at most, 5% of the
workday. (Tr. 22.) For example, a
state agency consultant (Dr. Phillip
Hatfield) examined Bradley and
concluded that he had no deficits in
his ability to understand, remember,
and carry out simple instructions. (Tr.
664.) The ALJ noted Dr. Hatfield’s
conclusion and found it generally
persuasive, along with the rest of his
medical opinion,3 as follows: “Dr.
Hatfield, a consultative examiner,
and on a sustained basis is fair” whereas
a “marked” limitation reflects a “serious
limit[ation].” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,
app. E, § 12.00F.2.c-d (emphasis added);
see Joseph D. W. v. O’Malley, No. 1:23-
cv-863, 2024 WL 3822724, at *6
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2024) (“Plaintiff
erroneously equates the
consultants’ moderate limitation on
Plaintiff’s ability to accept instructions
and respond appropriately to criticism
from supervisors as an ‘inability’ to do
so.”). The ALJ addressed these moderate
impairments by adopting an RFC
limiting Bradley’s interactions with
others, performing only simple tasks, in
a simple work setting, and being off task
no more than five percent of the time.
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opined the claimant’s ability to
understand, retain, and follow brief,
simple, concrete instructions without
frequent repetition or reminders is
unimpaired.” (Tr. 25). Given that the
ALJ also limited Bradley to simple
tasks (Tr. 22), this opinion constitutes
substantial evidence supporting the
ALJ’s conclusion that Bradley could
understand, remember, and carry out
instructions for at least 95% of a
workday.
Nevertheless, the ALJ also pointed to
evidence of Bradley’s wide array of
daily activities to support her on task
finding, such as playing bass guitar in
a band, visiting friends, doing
household chores (i.e., mopping,
vacuuming, dusting, and occasional
yardwork), performing his full range
of personal care, spending time with
his minor children, and occasionally
going to church with his mother. (Tr.
21, 23, 45-46, 180, 183, 196-99, 662.)
The ALJ also noted that Bradley
drove, shopped for groceries, and
prepared simple meals. (Tr. 23, 40,
46, 181-82, 197-98.) At no point does
Bradley contest the ALJ’s reliance on
this evidence, which supports the
overall proposition that Bradley could
understand, remember, and carry out
instructions for at least 95% of a
workday.
(Tr. 22.) Beyond challenging the off-task
five percent limitation, Bradley does not
challenge any of these additional findings
or the ALJ’s analysis of the same.
In fact, the performance of these
activities requires understanding,
remembering, carrying out
instructions, and remaining on task.
See Medina v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
831 F. App’x 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2020)
(unpublished) (affirming that
activities such as driving, cleaning,
doing laundry, cooking, and shopping
tended to support a finding that the
claimant was capable of concentrating
and staying on task sufficiently to
perform work activities).
C. The ALJ Accounted for Bradley’s
Mental and Physical Limitations in
Her Finding.
Regarding Bradley’s mental
impairments of depression and
anxiety, the ALJ also accurately
pointed out that he had not been
hospitalized for a mental impairment
during the relevant period and that
his depression improved with
treatment. (Tr. 21, 23-25, 43
(testifying that taking sertraline for
depression helped).) Additionally,
Bradley’s mental status exams did not
document significant difficulties with
memory or concentration; he was able
to answer questions about his work
and medical history, and he was
cooperative at his consultative and
medical appointments.4 (Tr. 21, 23-
25, 39-50, 187-202, 387, 443, 464,
4 For example, the ALJ pointed out that
findings from a September 2021 mental
status exam indicated that his mood was
mildly anxious. (Tr. 23, 482.) His
behavior was cooperative and pleasant.
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468, 470, 472, 474, 476, 479, 482,
484, 530-32, 660-61, 787, 789, 792,
811, 817, 821, 828, 833, 837-38.)
Again, this demonstrates that Bradley
could understand, remember, and
carry out instructions for at least 95%
of a workday.
Regarding Bradley’s diabetes, the ALJ
recognized that he had some periods
of elevated blood sugar, but his
symptoms stabilized with treatment.
(Tr. 23-24.) For example, Bradley
sought emergency treatment for
muscle aches and dizziness in
December 2020 (before the alleged
onset of disability), at which point his
blood sugar was very high, in the
300s. (Tr. 23, 280-81) (describing
symptoms and noting that Bradley
“fe[lt] much better after [receiving]
fluids,” and requested to be
discharged).) And he had elevated
blood sugar in May 2022, but that was
because his insulin pump was kinked.
(Tr. 23, 522 (“4 days go found his
pump was kinked after feeling
poorly,” then fixed it and sugars are
(Tr. 23, 482.) His affect was appropriate.
(Tr. 23, 482.) He was fully oriented. (Tr.
23, 482.) His thought process, thought
content, perception, and insight were
within normal limits. (Tr. 23, 482.) He
denied suicidal ideation. (Tr. 23, 482.)
The ALJ further pointed out that during
an October 2022 consultative evaluation
with Dr. Hatfield, Bradley’s intellectual
functioning was average to low average,
his affect was mildly dysthymic, his mood
was “fairly good,” and he denied suicidal
ideation. (Tr. 24, 663-64.) Findings from
running “a little high”), 524).) In
September 2022, the ALJ further
observed, Bradley was hospitalized
for two days for diabetes
complications. (Tr. 23, 780
(indicating that Bradley unhooked his
insulin pump after getting COVID,
after which blood sugar went up).)
Overall, however, the ALJ concluded
that the evidence showed that
Bradley’s symptoms were “stable with
treatment” (Tr. 24), a finding that he
has not challenged and one consistent
with his testimony that he thought he
would be “able to keep [his diabetes]
under control” (Tr. 41). Examinations
in April 2021 and August 2022 also
reflected no neurological deficits (Tr.
23, 24, 441-43, 532), which is
inconsistent with complaints of nerve
pain and weakness (Tr. 23). For all of
these reasons, the record does not
support Bradley’s challenge to the
ALJ’s off task finding, a finding which
is legally correct, supported by
substantial evidence, and susceptible
to judicial review.5
an August 2023 psychiatric exam were
unremarkable. (Tr. 24, 786-87.)
5 Bradley does not challenge the ALJ’s
assessment of his subjective complaints.
However, even if he had, the challenge
would fail. The ALJ completed the two-
step Craig analysis. To begin, the ALJ
stated that she had carefully considered
the evidence and found that Bradley’s
“medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause
the alleged symptoms.” (Tr. 24.) The ALJ
therefore discharged her duty under the
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Bradley’s objections to the contrary
are not persuasive. First, contrary to
his assertions, Docket Entry 9 at 13,
the law does not require the ALJ to
support an off-task limitation with a
mathematical formula, a medical
opinion, or to provide greater
specificity than otherwise required to
support the rest of the RFC
assessment. See Welch v. Saul, No.
1:19-CV-189-DCK, 2020 WL
4586882, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 10,
2020) (citing cases).
Second, Bradley does not point to any
other evidence that would compel
greater limitations than those that the
first step of the Craig analysis. Then, at
step two, the ALJ decided that Bradley’s
“statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely consistent
with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record for the reasons
explained in this decision.” (Tr. 24.) The
ALJ then gave numerous good reasons,
supported by substantial evidence and
susceptible to judicial review, in support
of this conclusion.
6 In fact, in support of his objection,
Bradley points to evidence the ALJ
considered, but then discounted, without
directly challenging it. See, e.g., Docket
Entry 9 at 8-9. For example, the ALJ
considered medical opinions submitted
by Paul Gulley, M.D., Bradley’s
endocrinologist. (Tr. 24.) Among other
findings, Dr. Gulley opined that Bradley
could only work four hours per day until
August 2021 and previously found he was
unable to work on certain days and was
ALJ found.6 See Stitely v. Colvin, No.
14-2302, 2015 WL 4621292, at *1 (4th
Cir. Aug. 4, 2015) (“[The claimant]
points to no ‘overlooked’ evidence,
aside from his own allegations, which
the court found not entirely credible,
that would substantially aid his
case.”). Instead, Bradley contends
that the evidence he summarizes in
his brief “could reasonably lead to the
conclusion that [he] would be off-task
10% or more of the workday.” Docket
Entry 9 at 13. But even assuming that
to be the case, “[t]he substantial
evidence standard ‘presupposes . . . a
zone of choice within which the
decisionmakers can go either way,
without interference by the courts. An
unemployable. (Tr. 24 (citing Tr. 333,
370-73, 377, 783).) The ALJ explained
that Dr. Gulley’s opinions were
unpersuasive, given evidence that
Bradley’s symptoms were “stable with
treatment” and that he was “independent
with daily activities,” and was able to do
chores, spend time with friends and his
children, and play bass guitar in a band.
(Tr. 25.) Bradley also points to an August
2021 letter from his therapist stating that
he is disabled in light of his mental and
physical health issues. Docket Entry 9 at
19, citing Tr. 455. However, the issue of
disability is reserved to the
Commissioner and such statements are
“inherently neither valuable nor
persuasive to the issue of whether [a
claimant is] disabled” and do not require
“any analysis . . . in [the] determination
or decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c).
Bradley does not challenge the manner in
which the ALJ treated any opinions and
has thus waived an objection as to them.
See Grayson O Co., 856 F.3d at 316.
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administrative decision is not subject
to reversal merely because substantial
evidence would have supported an
opposite decision.” Dunn v. Colvin,
607 F. App’x 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2015)
(unpublished) (internal quotation
and citation omitted). Here, the ALJ
pointed to more than substantial
evidence showing why Bradley did not
suffer disabling limitations in
understanding, remembering,
following instructions, or staying on
task. No more is required.
Third, Bradley identifies numerous
unpublished out of district cases that
have remanded decisions where an
ALJ included a numerical off task
estimation in the RFC. Docket Entry 9
7 See April A. J. v. Bisignano, No.
1:24CV672, 2025 WL 2784211, at *4-7
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2025) (upholding
five percent off task limitation); Dana D.
v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20CV673, Slip Op. at
14-15 (Oct. 26, 2021) (same)
recommendation adopted by Slip Op.
(Nov. 15, 2021); Shaw, 2021 WL
3079905, at *8-10 (upholding ten-
percent off task limitation in RFC
determination), report and
recommendation adopted, 2021 WL
6202788; Link v. Saul, No. 1:19CV662,
2020 WL 5044038, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Aug.
26, 2020) (holding that ALJ’s findings at
step two, analysis of the plaintiff’s
subjective symptom reporting, and
evaluation of objective evidence
“adequately explained the RFC’s
allowance for [the p]laintiff to remain
off-task for up to 10 percent of the
workday in addition to normal breaks”),
recommendation adopted, slip op.
at 4-5, 12-17 and Docket Entry 13 at 2
(collecting cases). However, all of the
cases Bradley cites in his favor
predate the Fourth Circuit’s decision
in Rebecca J., 2023 WL 3970022, at
*3 (concluding that the ALJ built a
logical bridge between the
administrative record and her finding
that plaintiff would be off task no
more than 7% of the workday).
And, regardless of this, both before
and after the Fourth Circuit’s holding
in Rebecca J., judges within this
district have supported such findings
where—as here—it was supported by
substantial evidence and susceptible
to judicial review.7
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 10, 2020); Megan M. v.
Berryhill, No. 17cv1125, Slip Op. at 16-20
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 13, 2018) (affirming ALJ
decision with 5% off task limitation),
recommendation adopted by Slip. Op.
(Jan. 4. 2019); see also Horner v. Acting
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 9:17-
CV-00894-RBH, 2018 WL 4203675, at
*7 (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2018) (“Plaintiff states
that the ALJ never explained why he
decided to include within the RFC a
limitation that Plaintiff would be ‘off
task’ up to five percent of the workday
beyond normal breaks. Plaintiff argues it
is ‘impossible’ to discern the basis of this
limitation. To the contrary, the ALJ
explained that, based upon the claimant’s
allegations concerning her headache
pain and its effects on her cognitive
functioning, the ALJ was including
mental limitations. The ALJ then
specifically cited to activities Plaintiff is
able to perform, as well as the
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Bradley’s efforts to distinguish
Rebecca J. are unpersuasive. Docket
Entry 13 at 3. The claimant’s challenge
in Rebecca J. was unsuccessful
because the record was “devoid of
sufficient evidence, including
opinions and treatment notes,
demonstrating that Plaintiff would be
off task more than seven percent of
the day . . . .” Rebecca J., 2023 WL
3970022, at *3 (citation, quotation
omitted). Bradley asserts that this is
not the case here, noting opinions
issued by Dr. Paul Gulley (his
endocrinologist) and Ms. Stacie
Adams (his therapist) and suggesting
that they show “he would be off-task
in excess of the ALJ’s findings,
rendering the ALJ’s decision
unsupported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ failed to explain how
the ALJ arrived at the specific off-task
conclusions in the RFC.” Docket Entry
13 at 3-4 referencing Tr. 333, 408-09,
402, 455, 783.
However, the ALJ in this case
adequately supported her up to 5% off
task finding by pointing to multiple
lines of evidence (including objective
medical evidence, treatment history,
and daily activities), addressed the
relevant medical opinions to the
extent the law required (see supra n.
3 and 6), and left no material evidence
unreconciled or unaddressed. Again,
consultative psychological examination
to find this specific limitation as it relates
to her headaches.”), aff’d sub nom.
Horner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
809 F. App’x 165 (4th Cir. 2020)
Bradley has failed to challenge any of
the ALJ’s findings in this case other
than the up to 5% off task finding and
has failed to point to evidence that
would compel a different outcome.
Thus, here, as in Rebecca J., the ALJ
identified evidence supporting her
conclusion on an off task limitation
and built a logical bridge from it to her
conclusion that the claimant was not
disabled. See Rebecca J., 2023 WL
3970022, at *3.
Finally, the vocational expert testified
at the administrative hearing that an
inability to stay on task “10% or more
of the workday” was work preclusive.
(Tr. 55.) An individual could therefore
be off task up to ten percent of the
workday and still maintain
employment. (Tr. 54-55.) That the
ALJ appears to have given Plaintiff
the benefit of the doubt in concluding
that his physical and mental
limitations could result in off-task
behavior at most up to 5% of the
workday—rather than zero percent or
some other lesser amount—does not
provide a basis to remand given that
such an estimate of off-task behavior
is not work preclusive. For all of these
reasons, the Commissioner’s decision
is affirmed.
(unpublished) (“The ALJ applied the
correct legal standards in evaluating
Horner’s claims for benefits, and the
ALJ’s factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
After careful consideration of the
evidence of record, the Court finds
that the Commissioner’s decision is
legally correct, supported by
substantial evidence, and susceptible
to judicial review. Accordingly, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the final
decision of the Commissioner is
upheld.
____________________
JoAnna Gibson McFadden
United States Magistrate Judge
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