Lucas v. Mecklenburg County Child Support Enforcement et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-00277-KDB-DCK
EBONY SHERISSE LUCAS,
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MECKLENBURG COUNTY
CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, ET AL.,
Defendants.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
(“IFP”) (Doc. No. 2). The Court has carefully considered this motion and Plaintiff’s sworn
Application, which details her financial circumstances. Based on that examination, the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s reasonable expected expenses exceed her expected income, and she does not
otherwise have sufficient assets with which to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will
GRANT the Motion for the limited purpose of conducting an initial review but DISMISS
Plaintiff’s Complaint after conducting that review.
I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP
“The federal in forma pauperis statute, enacted in 1892 and presently codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
335 U.S. 331, 342-43 (1948)). To achieve its goal, the IFP statute “allows a litigant to commence
a civil or criminal action in federal court in forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit
stating … that he is unable to pay the costs of a lawsuit.” Id. In her IFP motion, Plaintiff states that
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she currently has no job and her expenses exceed the inconsistent child support and disability
payments she receives for her minor child. Further, the Court finds that she does not have assets
that would otherwise allow her to pay for these proceedings. See Doc. No. 2.
Based on these representations, the Court will conditionally grant the motion and permit
Plaintiff to proceed IFP solely for the limited purposes of this initial review.
II. Initial Review
Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court must review the Complaint to determine
whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its frivolity review, this Court
must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded
upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 327-28. Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district
court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in the Complaint which set forth a claim that is
cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Here, Plaintiff has sued Mecklenburg County Child Support Enforcement (“CSE”), two
attorneys who represented CSE and the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services
seeking to recover past due child support owed by Bernard Minger, the father of her minor child.
See Doc. No. 1 at p. 5-6. Plaintiff also seeks damages allegedly related to Defendants’ failure to
obtain timely child support from Mr. Minger, improper disclosure of information and “malfeasant
scheduling.” Id. at 5-7. Plaintiff lists claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794;
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.; Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but does not explain how any of
those statutes or the constitution are violated by the facts she alleges.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails a frivolity review and must be dismissed
because the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this action. The federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and may exercise only that jurisdiction which Congress has prescribed. Chris v. Tenet,
221 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994)). Therefore, whether the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
must be considered before addressing its merits. Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d
417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction
exists. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th
Cir. 1991); Hemphill v. Bernard, No. 3:24-CV-00286-KDB-SCR, 2024 WL 3761274, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 2024).
Unless a matter involves one of the few areas over which federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction, a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case only where the matter
involves a federal question arising “under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,”
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“federal question jurisdiction”), or if “the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between citizens of different
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (“diversity jurisdiction”). See Piedmont Roofing Servs., LLC v.
Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 522CV00154KDBDSC, 2023 WL 196461, at *2 (W.D.N.C.
Jan. 17, 2023).
Plaintiff alleges that the Court has jurisdiction under its “federal question” jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1331, based on her listing of various federal statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution as being “at issue” in the case. However, the non-payment of state court
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ordered child support and the enforcement of such orders does not raise a federal claim, even
putting aside obvious issues of immunity for government entities and government officers.
Therefore, there is no viable federal claim against these Defendants on which to base “federal
question” jurisdiction, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims.1
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s IFP motion (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED for purposes of this Order;
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice; and
3. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
1 Plaintiff has now filed seven separate legal actions in this Court since October 2025 (and an
eighth in November 2023). While the Court stands ready to adjudicate any valid claims over which
it has jurisdiction, it cannot help but to observe that it would appear to be in Plaintiff’s best interest
to use her obvious abilities more productively than constantly pursuing dubious litigation.
Signed: April 10, 2026
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