Walck v. Heinert et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Mitchell Lee Walck, 	)
) 	ORDER RE: § 1915A
Plaintiff, 	) 	SCREENING
)
vs. 	)
)
Mr. Pat Heinert, et al., 	)
) 	Case No.: 1:16-cv-331
Defendants. 	)
_____________________________________________________________________________
I. 	BACKGROUND.
Before the Court is Walck’s Complaint (Doc. No. 6). The Court now conducts an initial
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
II. 	STANDARDS GOVERNING INITIAL REVIEW.
Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) to address the
burden imposed by prisoner suits that are too often frivolous and without merit. Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 203-04 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). 	One of the reforms
enacted as part of the PLRA for cases in which prisoners are seeking to sue a governmental
entity, officer, or employee requires courts to conduct an early screening to weed out claims that
clearly lack merit. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	In conducting the screening, the court is required to
identify any cognizable claims and to dismiss the Complaint, or any part of it, that is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. Id.
In screening a pro se prisoner Complaint, the court is obligated to construe it liberally and
hold it to a less stringent standard than what normally would be required of attorneys. 	Id.; see
also Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008); 	Solomon v. Petray, 795
F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (“When we say that a pro se complaint should be given liberal
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construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court
should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	This does not mean that the
court must accept everything or anything that is filed by a prisoner proceeding pro se, however.
In enacting the screening requirement, Congress obviously expected it to be more than an a
ritualistic exercise and that courts would only allow to go forward 	those claims that are
cognizable, that seek relief from a non-immune party, and that are not obviously frivolous or
malicious.
To meet the minimal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) for stating a cognizable
claim, something more is required than simply expressing a desire for relief and declaring an
entitlement to it. 	See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.3 (2007)
(“Twombly”). The complaint must state enough to “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . .
. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	Also, it must state enough to satisfy the “plausibility
standard” for stating a cognizable claim as established in Twombly and further amplified by the
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-84 (2009) (“Iqbal”). And, even though a
pro 	se 	prisoner 	Complaint 	is 	entitled 	to 	a 	liberal 	construction, 	these 	minimal 	pleading
requirements must still be satisfied. 	E.g., Story v. Foote, 782 F.3d 968, 969 (“To state a claim, .
. . [the pro se prisoner’s] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”) (internal quotation marks omitted and citing
Twombly and Iqbal). 	Complaints that offer nothing more than labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements are not sufficient. 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 680-81. 	Frivolous claims are those that are clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, or
delusional. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-34 (1992).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must normally allege a violation of a
right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state law. 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Walker v. Reed, 104 F.3d 156, 157 (8th Cir. 1997). 	Even under liberal pleading
standards, a pro se litigant, at the very least, must invoke rights under the Constitution or federal
law in order to plead a § 1983 claim. Walker v. Reed, 104 F.3d at 157-58. Also, the pleading
must allege a sufficient causal link between the alleged violation and the basis upon which the
particular defendant is to be held responsible, keeping in mind that persons sued in their
individual capacities must be personally involved or directly responsible since § 1983 does not
impose respondeat superior liability. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d
1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1999).
III. 	ANALYSIS.
Upon review of Walck’s complaint, his primary contention seems to be that during his
incarceration at Burleigh County Detention Center in 2012-2013, defendants violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment by their deliberate
disregard of his special dietary and/or medical needs. Walck apparently suffers from celiac
disease, which requires a gluten-free diet. (Doc. No. 6, at 5-6). He contends that he was subject
to “food contamination,” causing severe fatigue, constipation, chronic anemia, and mental
anguish. Id. He also contends that a member of the nursing staff failed to administer a laxative as
required. Id. at 6.
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As a threshold matter, Walck has brought his claims in such a way that requires the Court
to immediately dismiss several of them as duplicative. He brings the suit against five separate
defendants and groups of defendants. All of the defendants are associated with Burleigh County:
they include Pat Heinert, the Burleigh County Sheriff at the time; Lisa Wicks, a captain at the
Burleigh County Sheriff’s Department; Tara Canright, who appears to be a registered nurse at
the Burleigh County Detention Center; “Jane and John Doe Burleigh County Commissioners;”
and, lastly, “Jane and John Doe Burleigh Co. Detention Employees, Dept. Heads, Cpl’s, Sgts.,
Lt’s. and Correctional Staff.” (Doc. No. 6, at 3-4).
As is clear from the face of the complaint, all the individual defendants are employees of
Burleigh County. Furthermore, Walck states explicitly that he is suing each defendant in his or
her official capacity, and not in his or her individual capacity. (Id. at ¶ C., D., E., F., G). Suits
against a public official in his official capacity are actually suits against the entity for which the
official is an agent. Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006), citing Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).
As such, Walck is actually suing Burleigh County five times over. He seems to recognize
as much in the text of at least one of his claims, writing, “City and county governments can be
held liable…” See Doc. No. 6, ¶ D. As such, Court will construe these claims as claims against
Burleigh County, and dismiss the claims against the defendants in their official capacity as
redundant. See, Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010) (district
court correctly dismissed claim against city police officer in his official capacity as redundant to
claim against city).
While municipalities and other local government entities are suable persons under §
1983, plaintiffs who seek to impose such liability must show that “action pursuant to official
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municipal policy caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–61, 131 S. Ct.
1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011). Liability exists only where the municipality itself causes
the violation. Perkins v. Hastings, 915 F.3d 512, 520 (8th Cir. 2019). As such,
A plaintiff thus must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the
plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct.
1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). “[A]n act performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that
has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly
subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so
widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. at 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382. The plaintiff
also must show a direct causal link between the custom and the deprivation of
rights, i.e., that “the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury
alleged.” Id.
Perkins v. Hastings, 915 F.3d at 521 (8th Cir. 2019).
Here, Walck alleges that the County and/or its employees exhibited a “failure to train
staff and promulgate a policy to accommodate men with severe food intolerance and allergies,”
claiming negligence, gross negligence, medical malpractice, and deliberate indifference. (Doc.
No. 6 at ¶ D). At first glance, he seems to be levying the accusation that Burleigh County has no
policy for accommodating food allergies in male prisoners, which might state a cognizable claim
for injury due to a municipal policy. Yet later in the complaint, Walck writes,
At Burleigh Jail, Correctional Officers are certainly versed on special diet needs
because the C.O.’s and sometimes Dept. Heads, Supervisors such that I certainly
witnessed served trayed meals (3) times daily. The breakfast, lunch and dinner
trays are all marked for disbetes, allergies ect. That didn’t stop the tray mix-ups.
As such, Walck seems to concede the existence of a policy allowing for trays to be
marked for diabetes and food allergies, and even that the employees are familiar with special
dietary needs. His claim appears to assert that this policy was incompetently executed, resulting
in tray mix-ups.
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Overall, the thrust of Walck’s complaint is that he had unpleasant symptoms, and
therefore, due to tray mix-ups or otherwise, the prison employees must have failed to assure that
his food was free of gluten. But these facts, while perhaps consistent with a claim for individual
negligence, fail to state a claim for municipal liability. The occurrence of “tray mix-ups,” absent
any allegation that these mix-ups occurred pursuant to a county-wide custom, does not show that
Burleigh County was a moving force behind Walck’s alleged injury. Even on the individual
level, his claims are suspect; the closest he comes to alleging concrete causation against any
defendant is by claiming that the facility nurse “did not take the repercussions of gradual food
contamination allergies seriously,” which he takes as evidence of her “malice and sadistic
intent.” (Doc. No. 6, ¶ C). He also accuses her of failing to administer Miralax as prescribed by
his doctor. Yet Walck fails to cite any link between the nurse’s actions and the culpability of
Burleigh County in general.
As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint, as it is now drafted, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted against Burleigh County, and is such does not pass the
initial § 1915A screening. He is hereby given until March 5, 2020, to submit an amended
pleading with additional factual assertions establishing liability of the County itself. Failure to do
so may result in the claim being dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 20th day of February, 2020.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter
United States Magistrate Judge
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