Grigg v. 19th Judicial District, Montana

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Peter Grigg, 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	) 	ORDER
)
vs. 	)
)
19th Judicial District, Montana, 	) 	Case No. 1:25-cv-274
)
Defendant. 	)
This matter is presently before the undersigned for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, this matter is dismissed without prejudice.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a resident of Noonan, North Dakota. (Doc. No. 4). He initiated the above-
captioned action pro se and in forma pauperis with the submission of a “form complaint” on
December 8, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 1 and 4). He names the 19th Judicial District, Montana, as the
defendant in the both the caption and body of his complaint and then goes on to state under the
heading “Basis for Jurisdiction” that he is suing federal and state or local officials for “violations
of: US & Montana Constitution, Civil Rights, US Judicial Canons, Declaration of Indepence
[sic] - lack of jurisdiction, abuse of power, bias discrimination.” (Id.). Next, under the heading
“Statement of Claim,” he alleges:
Judge Matthew Cuffe recused himself 2 days prior to my summons yet proceed
further in cause (lack of jurisdiction) with: - bias, discrimination, defamation,
extreme 	prejudice, 	excessive 	punishment, 	retaliation, 	retribution 	& 	extreme
persecution. Continued violations by Montana Judicial, Executive & Legislative
Branches.
(Id. at p. 4). Finally, under the heading “Relief,” he makes the following request:
Uphold Plaintiff Civil & Constitutional Rights. Overturn Judgement in DR-20-79
and all cases, retaliation cases by Judges Cuffe and Jennifer Lint. Overturn all cases,
biased against Plaintiff, and return Plaintiff to normal filing status. Take legal action
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against those that have discriminated against Plaintiff & Renumerate Plaintiff for All
Rights Violations. Written Apology to be published, regarding Defendant abuse of
power and abuse of system.
(Id. at p. 5).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1915(e)(2) provides that, notwithstanding
financial eligibility, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . .
the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). A complaint is frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a claim for relief contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” To meet this standard, a
complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Robinson v. Bridgeport Pub. Sch.,
No. 8:16CV177, 2016 WL 3920167, at *3 (D. Neb. July 15, 2016) (requiring plaintiffs to set forth
enough factual allegations to nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible). In
applying the standard, the court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. Braden v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009)). In applying the standard, the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as
true and make reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. 	Id.; Jones v. Douglas Cty. Sheriff's
Dep't, 915 F.3d 498, 499 (8th Cir. 2019); Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). On
the other hand, the court “will not supply additional facts, nor . . . construct a legal theory for
plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded” and "is free to ignore legal conclusions,
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unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form
of factual allegations.” Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002); see also
Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817-18 (8th Cir. 2010) (“A pleading that merely pleads labels and
conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions
devoid of factual enhancement will not suffice.”
Pro se complaints must be liberally construed. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.
2004). 	“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is
obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged, and it would be futile to give
him an opportunity to amend.” 	Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint is plagued with multiple issue. First, the allegations it contains are
conclusory. Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to, among other things, discrimination and
retaliation. However, he does not clearly indicate when or how he was allegedly discriminated or
retaliated against. Rather, he makes vague allegations regarding Judge Cuffe, Jennifer Lind, and
three branches of the state government in Montana. 	Such vague, conclusory allegations do not
constitute the basis for cognizable claims.
Second, insofar as Plaintiff is endeavoring to sue an entire judicial district in the State of
Montana, his complaint is frivolous on its face.
Third, and most significantly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 	One thing that
the complaint is clear about is Plaintiff’s disagreement with and desire to overturn adverse
judgments in cases presumably adjudicated in Montana state courts, orders unfavorable to him that
were presumably issued by state court judges in Montana, and apparent restrictions on his ability
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to file in Montana state courts. Montana appellate courts and perhaps the United States Supreme
Court are the appropriate venues for challenging Montana state court decisions. Such challenges
in this court are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which the court can raise sua sponte.
See Johnson v. City of Shorewood, Minnesota, 360 F.3d 810, 818 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and may therefore be raised sua sponte); Lewis v.
Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 771 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional in
nature, and thus it may be raised at any time for the parties and by the court sua sponte.... Because
of the jurisdictional nature of the doctrine, we must assure ourselves that it does not bar the suit
before we turn to the merits.” (internal citation omitted)); Gentner v. Shulman, 55 F.3d 87, 89 (2d
Cir. 1996) (same).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions,
lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments and
state court proceedings. See Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005); Dodson v. Univ.
of Ark. for Med. Scis., 601 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The basic theory of the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine is that only the United States Supreme Court has been given jurisdiction to
review a state-court decision, so federal district courts generally lack subject-matter jurisdiction
over ‘attempted appeals from a state-court judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (“The doctrine applies only in ‘limited circumstances,’
... where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower
federal court. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-
court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity
with a party to the judgment.”). Specifically, the doctrine “bars federal courts from hearing cases
brought by the losing parties in state court proceedings alleging ‘injury caused by the state-court
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judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.’” Mosby, 418 F.3d at 931 (quoting
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)); see also Bruce v. City &
Cnty. of Denver, 57 F.4th 738, 746 (10th Cir. 2023) ( “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes
a jurisdictional bar on lower federal courts’ review of claims where (1) the plaintiff lost in state
court, (2) the state court judgment caused the plaintiff's injuries, (3) the state court rendered
judgment before the plaintiff filed the federal claim, and (4) the plaintiff is asking the district court
to review and reject the state court judgment.”). This jurisdictional bar extends to “challenges to
state-court decisions ... even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was
unconstitutional.” D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983; see also Ballinger v.
Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548-49 (8th Cir. 2003) (dismissing claims under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine where the relief requested in the complaint would effectively reverse or undermine the
state court decision or void its ruling and noting that “[f]ederal district courts thus may not
‘exercis[e] jurisdiction over general constitutional claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with
specific claims already adjudicated in state court’” (citation omitted)). Put simply, a federal district
court does not possess authority in a civil rights case to review or alter a final judgment of a state
court judicial proceeding. See West v. Crnkovich, No. 8:12CV273, 2013 WL 2295461, at *3 (D.
Neb. May 24, 2013); see also Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to Section 1983 actions as well as claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief).
As Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any cognizable claims, is frivolous on its face, and
that subject matter jurisdiction is otherwise lacking, the court need not address the issues of
personal jurisdiction, see Smith v. HSS, No. 1:20-CV-021, 2020 WL 1809670, at *2 (D.N.D. Feb.
27, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-CV-00021, 2020 WL 1802929 (D.N.D.
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Apr. 8, 2020) (“[W]hen an indigent plaintiff does not include any allegations supporting personal
jurisdiction, the court may properly conclude, sua sponte, that the action should be summarily
dismissed.”), or judicial immunity from suit, see e.g., Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th
Cir. 1994) (“Judges performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability.”).
Although it is this court’s usual practice to grant pro se litigants leave to file an amended
complaint to address pleading deficiencies identified during the initial review, the court is not so
inclined in this instance as amendment would be futile. See e.g., Dulcio v. Arcadis U.S., Inc., No.
9:22-CV-81908, 2023 WL 7181609, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2023) (“A court need not allow
amendment when (1) there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or a repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by previously allowed amendments; (2) allowing amendment would cause
undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) amendment would be futile.”). 	Regardless of
Plaintiff’s ability to elaborate on the nature and bases for his claims, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
remains a bar to this court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, it would be futile to give Plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his complaint.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The above-captioned action is DISMISSED in its entirety without prejudice for the reasons
articulated above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 19th day of December, 2025.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
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