USA v. Lawrence et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Adolph Akwe Lawrence,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:22-cr-69
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Adolph Akwe Lawrence is charged with involvement in controlled substance and
money laundering conspiracies, possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, criminal contempt of court, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering.
(Doc. 298). In a second motion to suppress, Lawrence contends warrantless acquisition
and use of evidence obtained from Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) led to a
vehicle search that violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. (Doc. 381). He argues collection and retention of ALPR data violated his
reasonable expectation of privacy and constituted an impermissible dragnet surveillance
program. Further, he asserts the collective knowledge doctrine cannot cure the
constitutional violations. (Doc. 382).
The evidence Lawrence seeks to suppress is a large quantity of fentanyl pills
found in a package in the vehicle Lawrence was driving when he was stopped for a
driving offense. The United States argues Lawrence lacks standing to challenge the
package search, use of ALPR data is not a search within meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and regardless of the constitutionality of use of ALPR data, search of the
package did not offend the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 390).
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The court held an evidentiary hearing on Lawrence’s second motion to suppress
on December 11, 2025, at which Fargo, North Dakota, Police Department Detective
Joshua Heller was the sole witness. No additional exhibits were submitted during the
December 11 hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court gave the parties an
opportunity to submit post-hearing briefs after a hearing transcript was filed, but the
parties later advised the court they agreed submission of post-hearing briefs was not
necessary.
Evidence Presented at First Hearing
Following an evidentiary hearing on Lawrence’s first motion to suppress, this
court filed a Report and Recommendation summarizing the hearing testimony and
record evidence:
1. Investigation Preceding the Traffic Stop
At the time relevant to this motion, Detective Joshua Heller was
assigned to the United States Marshals Service High Plains Fugitive Task
Force. In that capacity, in December 2021, he arrested Malik Chipps on a
probation violation warrant and found Chipps in possession of a quantity of
fentanyl pills and two firearms. When interviewed by law enforcement,
Chipps stated he had obtained the pills and the firearms from Bayo Adrian
Saibu (Bayo)—a codefendant in this case—and identified Bayo’s source as
“a shorter black male with dreadlocks [who] had recently been released
from a California prison.” (Tr. 21).1 Chipps also told Detective Heller the
unidentified black male was known to drive a red Kia with California license
plates. Using that information, Detective Heller identified the black male as
Ennis Fitzgerald Lawrence (Ennis), a brother of defendant Adolph
Lawrence.
Chipps told law enforcement his communications with his source of
supply had been through a female who lived at 3301 16th Avenue South in
Fargo, and law enforcement identified that female as Ethmonia Korlu
Barclay—also a codefendant in this case. Chipps stated he had obtained the
pills at Barclay’s address and described her address as “kind of a gathering
spot” for Ennis and Bayo. Law enforcement corroborated the information
Chipps provided through review of text messages. Id. at 24.
1 Tr. refers to the hearing transcript filed at Docket 364.
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Detective Heller testified law enforcement monitored Ennis’ social
media accounts after receiving the information from Chipps. Ennis’
Instagram account showed a video of Ennis—in what appeared to be an
apartment kitchen—holding a large amount of United States currency and
showed him with “a teeth insert, almost like a mouth guard but with
diamonds.” Id. at 26. On the video, Ennis stated the cash was “a whole
hundred,” which Detective Heller testified he knew to be a reference to a
hundred thousand dollars. Id. at 25.
Detective Heller, while off duty on March 1, 2022, saw Ennis and a
second unidentified “black male with dreadlocks or cornrows” at Scheels All
Sports, a Fargo store. Id. at 26. Detective Heller asked Scheels personnel to
monitor Ennis and his companion via surveillance cameras and to advise
Detective Heller when the two were about to leave the store. While Detective
Heller waited in the Scheels parking lot, Scheels personnel provided
Detective Heller with several screen shots of Ennis and his companion.
When Ennis and his companion left the store, Detective Heller saw them
enter a red Kia with California license plates. Law enforcement officers
followed the red Kia to 3102 3rd Street North, a Fargo apartment building.
Through a Google search, law enforcement found photos of
apartment units in that building and observed the apartment units
appeared to be the same as the one in the Instagram video of Ennis holding
a large amount of cash. [Fargo Police Department (FPD)] license plate
readers confirmed the red Kia had been in the area of 3102 3rd Street North
frequently during February 2022.
On March 8, [2022], Detective Heller and other law enforcement
officers surveilled the 3102 3rd Street North area in an attempt to locate
Ennis regarding a California parole violation warrant. They saw the red Kia
in the building’s parking lot and observed the unidentified black male who
had been with Ennis at Scheels enter the red Kia and drive the vehicle to
Barclay’s 16th Avenue South residence. The black male entered Barclay’s
apartment building and left a short time later, behavior Detective Heller
considered to be consistent with narcotics trafficking. Law enforcement
officers followed the red Kia, and Detective Heller radioed to the FPD patrol
unit, asking any patrol officer who saw the red Kia to attempt a traffic stop
if there was reason to do so. Detective Heller testified the purpose of the
requested traffic stop was to identify the driver of the red Kia.
2. March 8 Traffic Stop and Vehicle Search
[FPD] Officer [Jonathan] Novacek testified Detective Heller relayed
“very, very loose information” about potential drug activity when he asked
officers in the area to stop the red Kia if there was reason to do so. Id. at 62.
Officer Novacek responded to the radio request, advised he had followed
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and located the red Kia, ran the license plate number, and learned the
vehicle’s California license tags had expired several days earlier. Officer
Novacek stopped the vehicle on 19th Avenue North in Fargo, and Detective
Heller parked in a nearby lot to watch the traffic stop. Officer Novacek’s
body camera, the forward-facing camera on his squad car, and the camera
facing the “cage” in the interior of his squad car were all active during the
traffic stop, though audio was turned off on the body camera for a period of
time during the search. (See Video 1, 34:22-37:51).
During the traffic stop, Detective Heller and Officer Novacek
communicated via three phone calls and a text message. Initially, Detective
Heller advised Officer Novacek of an investigation into fentanyl trafficking
without identifying targets of the investigation. (Tr. 33, 62). Officer Novacek
testified the second and third calls were “updates on the traffic stop in
general” and the text message was a screen shot he sent to Detective Heller
showing results of a query of the red Kia driver’s identification information.
Id. at 73.
Officer Novacek approached the red Kia twice before deciding to
search the vehicle for marijuana. He testified he did not smell marijuana
when he approached the vehicle the first two times. Lawrence challenges
the credibility of that testimony. The United States asserts Officer Novacek’s
ability to detect the odor of marijuana was affected by the March 8 weather.
Officer Novacek testified,
It was very, very cold. I’m not sure exactly what the
temperature was outside, below freezing, maybe in the high
20s, which doesn’t sound so bad; however, the wind was a
huge factor that day, blowing somewhat– somewhere in the
nature of 25 to 30 miles an hour, making it very, very difficult
to be outside.
Id. at 65-66. He also testified the area where he conducted the traffic stop
was known to be “particularly windy” and the wind was coming from the
northwest, with the front of the squad car facing due east and the rear of the
squad car facing due west. Id. at 66, 105-06. He described factors that might
have impacted his ability to smell marijuana during his first two approaches
to the red Kia:
Your environment is a – is a huge part of that, so with the wind
being what it was, positioning of the vehicle, the passenger
side approach with the driver’s side window being closed, no
air passing through the vehicle at that time, all of those things
are a factor. Absolutely. The cold weather in and of itself
personally affects me. It’s harder to smell those things when
it’s hard to breathe through your nose.
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Id. at 68.
The first time he approached the vehicle, which he testified was for
“[n]o more than 15 seconds,” Officer Novacek went to the passenger side,
spoke to the driver through the open front passenger window, explained the
reason for the traffic stop, and asked the driver—the sole occupant—for his
license, registration, and insurance information. Id. Officer Novacek invited
the driver to step out of the vehicle to view the expired license plate
registration and because the driver did not have his license with him, Officer
Novacek brought the driver to his squad car, did a pat-down to check for
weapons, and placed the driver in the back seat of the squad car.
The driver identified himself as Adolph Akwe Lawrence and stated
his cousin, Saibu, owned the vehicle. Officer Novacek queried the vehicle’s
license plate through a system that holds each state’s vehicle licensing
records and learned California records showed the vehicle was not
registered to Saibu but was registered to Michell Robles-Guiterrez. (Video
2, 03:22-03:30). Lawrence told Officer Novacek he was staying with one of
his aunts and gave both the 3301 16th Avenue South and 3102 3rd Street
North addresses. (Video 3, 11:29-11:45). Although Officer Novacek initially
received information showing Lawrence’s driver’s license was suspended,
he received more accurate information from dispatch later during the stop
that showed Lawrence’s license was current. (Video 2, 08:40-10:33). Officer
Novacek queried Lawrence’s name, found a photo of Lawrence, and sent a
screenshot of the photo to Detective Heller. At that point, Officer Novacek
warned Lawrence about the need to carry his driver’s license and to get the
vehicle registration figured out but did not issue a citation. (Tr. 76; Video 2,
12:12-13:16).
Officer Novacek testified when he first approached the vehicle, he
stood “slightly behind [the passenger side pillar] and above, just enough
where [he could] see inside the vehicle.” (Tr. 98). He testified he did not
smell marijuana when he was in that position, or when he stood “maybe a
foot” from Lawrence while putting him in the squad car, or when he did the
pat-down of Lawrence, or while Lawrence was in the back seat of the squad
car while Officer Novacek checked Lawrence’s license and registration
information. Id. at 106-07; (see also Video 1, 00:05-00:18; Video 2, 01:06-
01:21).
Since he had not received information confirming vehicle insurance
coverage, Officer Novacek walked back to the red Kia with Lawrence, and
Lawrence opened the front passenger door and handed Officer Novacek
three or four pieces of paper as insurance information. Officer Novacek
testified it was unusual to receive insurance information other than as a
single piece of paper or a small index card. Id. at 77. During his second
approach to the red Kia, Officer Novacek stood “right next to the rear right
side passenger door” while Lawrence retrieved the documents. Id. at 100.
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Again, Officer Novacek did not smell marijuana. (See Video 1, 12:25-13:20;
Video 2, 13:35-14:20).
Because wind speed made it difficult to read them, Officer Novacek
took the papers Lawrence had given him to the squad car, and Lawrence
returned to the red Kia. While he was in the squad car, Officer Novacek ran
a query for Korlu Barclay—the name on a package in the front seat of the
red Kia—but the query yielded no results. Officer Novacek testified he could
not locate insurance coverage dates on the documents Lawrence had given
him, he approached the vehicle for the third time, and he immediately
smelled an odor of marijuana as he reached into the vehicle to return the
insurance documents to Lawrence. (Tr. 79). Officer Novacek testified
reaching into the vehicle to hand the papers back to Lawrence provided a
break from the wind and he could then smell the odor of marijuana. (See
Video 1, 17:32-18:30; Video 2, 18:31-19:33). On cross-examination
regarding his distance from the red Kia during that third approach, Officer
Novacek testified he was further forward than he had been on the first
approach and his body camera’s lens had a “tendency to be kind of a fish-
eye lens, which can distort distances.” (Tr. 120); (see also Video 1, 17:32-
18:30; Video 2, 18:31-19:33).
After he smelled the marijuana odor, Officer Novacek decided there
was probable cause to search the red Kia for marijuana. Officer Novacek
then brought Lawrence back to the squad car, took a cell phone from
Lawrence, and again placed Lawrence in the back seat of the squad car.
(Video 1, 18:40-19:20; Video 2, 19:45-20:20). Officer Novacek testified he
smelled the odor of marijuana when he placed Lawrence in the back seat of
the squad car and Lawrence told him he had no marijuana on him. (See
Video 1, 18:50-19:05). Officer Novacek told Lawrence he had probable cause
to search the whole vehicle, including the package in the front seat of the
vehicle. (Tr. 134; Video 1, 21:37-21:49; Video 2, 22:40-22:50). Lawrence
then “alluded to somebody smoking marijuana recently within the vehicle.”
(Tr. 80). Officer Novacek asked for backup to conduct the search, and
[Fargo Police Department] Officer [Joshua] Marvig arrived on the scene
and assisted with the search. (Video 1, 18:40-19:24).
Officer Novacek located “shake’’—small particles of suspected
marijuana—on the floorboard of the red Kia and also observed a cylindrical
ashtray containing cigarillos. Officer Novacek testified it was common to
remove tobacco from cigarillos and use their flavored wrapping to smoke
marijuana. (Tr. 115). Neither the shake nor the cigarillos were seized as
evidence.
Officer Marvig arrived at the scene four to five minutes after Officer
Novacek began the vehicle search. (Video 2, 27:05). Officer Marvig
described how he assisted in the search of the red Kia, beginning at the
driver’s door. He testified he “noticed and articulated a strong odor of
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marijuana” immediately after opening the door, noticed shake on the
driver’s side floorboard, and saw a portable vacuum and a waste bin filled
with loose-leaf tobacco. He considered the loose-leaf tobacco significant
because of his knowledge that marijuana users sometimes cut open cigars
and use the rolling paper to smoke marijuana. (Tr. 126-27).2
Officer Novacek testified he is trained to recognize the odor of
marijuana, odors of burnt and raw marijuana are very similar, and the odor
he detected could have been from the shake on the floorboards. Officer
Marvig also testified he was trained to recognize marijuana odor.
Between his second and third approaches to the red Kia, Officer
Novacek had relayed the name Korlu Barclay—which was on the package on
the front seat of the vehicle—to Detective Heller, and Detective Heller
recognized it as Ethmonia Barclay’s middle name, used as her first name.
Detective Heller knew Barclay’s nickname was “Auntie,” and Lawrence had
told Officer Novacek he was staying with his aunt. Id. at 35-37, 72. As part
of the vehicle search, Officer Novacek opened the package and found it
contained an inexpensive DVD player. The package had been overnighted
from Sacramento, California, to Fargo, and Officer Novacek found it odd the
package was sent overnight since it contained only the inexpensive DVD
player. Detective Heller testified sending packages via overnight mail was
significant because overnight mail is frequently used for narcotics
trafficking. Id. at 36. When he took the DVD player out of its packaging,
Officer Novacek saw something wrapped in foil was inside what would have
been the DVD port.
After he saw something wrapped in foil in the DVD port, Officer
Novacek took the package back to the squad car, again asked Lawrence
about the name on the package, disassembled the DVD player, and located
individual packages of what he believed to be fentanyl pills, wrapped in foil,
inside the device. (Video 2, 28:50). The Second Superseding Indictment
charges Lawrence “possessed approximately 3,000 pills containing a
mixture and substance containing fentanyl with the intent to distribute” in
Fargo on March 8. (Doc. 297, p. 3).
Officer Novacek then decided to arrest Lawrence and placed him in
handcuffs. (Tr. 83). While placing the handcuffs, Officer Novacek asked
Lawrence if he had been around anyone who had recently smoked
marijuana, and Lawrence confirmed he had been. Officer Novacek testified
Lawrence at no time denied the red Kia smelled like marijuana. While
Lawrence was in the back seat of the squad car, Officer Novacek took a
second cell phone from Lawrence and testified a person having two cell
2 The dash camera video shows three other uniformed personnel arrived after
Office Marvig, but the record includes no evidence about any involvement they may
have had in the traffic stop or in searches of the vehicle or package. (See Video 2, 36:27).
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phones was consistent with drug trafficking activity.3 Officer Novacek
testified he read Miranda rights to Lawrence when detaining him. After
completing the search of the package, Officer Novacek told Lawrence he was
being arrested for possession with intent to deliver and put him in
handcuffs. Officer Novacek asked Lawrence if he wanted to work with him
or tell him anything, and Lawrence gave no response. (Video 2, 39:57-42:18;
Video 3, 39:19-42:15). Lawrence declined Officer Novack’s request that he
provide a password for a cell phone. Officer Novacek transported Lawrence
to the Cass County Jail in Fargo. After the squad car was parked outside the
jail, Officer Novacek again asked Lawrence if he wanted to tell him anything,
and Lawrence again declined to respond. (Video 2, 01:07:20-01:08:33).
3. Ownership of the Red Kia
When cross-examined, Detective Heller testified that, at the time of
the March 8 traffic stop, he knew Saibu owned the red Kia, though on
redirect-examination, he testified he had not known the name of the
registered owner until Officer Novacek told him a name. (Tr. 40, 46).
Officer Novacek testified when he asked Lawrence to step out of the
vehicle to look at the registration date on the license plate, Lawrence made
a statement to the effect of “usually I just renew the registration at the end
of the month, and then it’s good to go.” Id. at 118. Lawrence later told Officer
Novacek his cousin owned the red Kia, but when Officer Novacek said the
name of the person he found listed as the registered owner, Lawrence said
his cousin had recently purchased the vehicle. (Video 2, 02:30-03:35; Video
3, 02:33-03:32).
Three screenshots from Officer Novacek’s body camera are in
evidence. Those exhibits show the documents Lawrence provided as proof
of insurance, and they appear to identify Saibu as a “new owner” of the red
Kia. (Doc. 362-1, Doc. 362-2, Doc. 362-3); (see also Tr. 91-96). Officer
Novacek testified he had paid attention to insurance information in the
documents and not to information in the documents about ownership of the
red Kia. (Tr. 117). Officer Novacek acknowledged there was no report
suggesting the red Kia had been stolen. Id. at 109.
Lawrence presented testimony of his cousin, Saibu. Saibu testified
she purchased the red Kia in California—“somewhere near Sacramento or
something like that”—in 2021 or 2022, paid four to five thousand dollars for
it, did not remember the name of the male from whom she purchased it and
could not describe him, had insurance on the vehicle but did not remember
3 The interior squad car video shows Lawrence using a cellphone while he was in
the back seat of the squad car and Officer Novacek was not present, but it does not
appear Lawrence verbally communicated with anyone else during that time. (See Video
3, 30:50-32:00).
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the name of the insurance company, had no documentation showing
ownership of the red Kia, and was unaware there was no record of her ever
being the registered owner of the vehicle in either North Dakota or
California. Id. at 153-57. Further, Saibu testified she gave Lawrence
permission to use the vehicle on March 8. Id. at 137. She acknowledged she
did not have a driver’s license at the time of the traffic stop, though she
owned a vehicle. Id. at 155.
On cross-examination, the United States questioned Saibu about her
involvement in drug trafficking. She denied involvement in facilitating
shipments of fentanyl to Fargo for Lawrence and his brother, Ennis, denied
she lived with Ethmonia Barclay on 16th Avenue South, denied she accepted
payment for drug transactions on her CashApp account, denied knowing
Barclay told other people to send money to Saibu’s CashApp account for
drug transactions, and did not remember receiving text messages about
drug transactions in February 2022. Saibu testified the package that was in
the red Kia on March 8 had “nothing to do with [her],” denied knowing the
package contained fentanyl pills, acknowledged she had been at Barclay’s
apartment on March 8 but denied knowing Lawrence had stopped at
Barclay’s address shortly before he was pulled over in the red Kia, denied
knowing Lawrence had told police the package in the red Kia was for her,
and denied the package was for her. Id. at 147-50.
Later on March 8, Saibu was with Ennis and Barclay in a vehicle that
was stopped at a Fargo gas station. Saibu denied knowing there was a large
sum of cash, a gun, and a quantity of fentanyl pills in the vehicle that was
stopped. Barclay’s apartment was also searched on March 8, and Saibu
denied knowing there had been drugs and a handgun in Barclay’s
apartment. Id. at 152.
After a period of cross-examination, Saibu refused to answer
additional questions, asserting the prosecutor was trying to confuse her. Id.
at 157. The United States then moved to strike her testimony but withdrew
that motion after calling a rebuttal witness—[Federal Bureau of
Investigation] Special Agent [Caleb] Williamson.
Special Agent Williamson testified about the FBI’s research into
Saibu’s driving history and research into registration records for the red Kia.
He testified queries of California and North Dakota motor vehicle records
showed Saibu was not the registered owner of a vehicle in either state. Id. at
160. During a search of Barclay’s apartment, law enforcement found a Non-
Driver Identification Card issued to Saibu on March 1, 2022. (See Doc. 362-
6). Though Special Agent Williamson identified the document as a license
issued to Saibu on March 22, 2023, the document received in evidence is
actually a North Dakota Driver’s License Division Record Status report
showing her license was suspended as of that date. (See Doc. 362-4).
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Though no report of ATF Special Agent Nicholas Bradt is in the
record, testimony established Special Agent Bradt authored a report stating
Saibu owned the red Kia. (Tr. 89, 162-63). Special Agent Williamson
confirmed a report by Special Agent Bradt identified Saibu as the owner of
the red Kia but testified that appeared to be a “typographical error.” Id. at
163-64. Further, he testified an earlier report by Special Agent Bradt
identified Michell Robles-Gutierrez as owner of the red Kia and Saibu as
owner of a different vehicle. Id. at 164. Special Agent Williamson recognized
Robles-Gutierrez’s Sacramento address on a California motor vehicle
record as an address associated with a codefendant charged in a case joined
with this case. Id. at 165.
Additionally, Special Agent Williamson authenticated a California
vehicle registration card, issued March 28, 2022, but valid from March 2,
2022, to March 2, 2023, showing Jessicah Regina Ann Eckley, of Elk Grove,
California, as the registered owner of the red Kia. (Doc. 362-5). Special
Agent Williamson testified Eckley was “known to be associated” with Ennis.
(Tr. 166). Special Agent Williamson testified he obtained that registration
card from a cooperating witness who had purchased the red Kia and also
testified the cooperating witness had trafficked drugs for the codefendant
charged in a case joined with this case. Id. at 168.
4. Ownership of the Package
While Lawrence was in the back seat of the squad car for the second
time, Officer Novacek asked if he knew anything about the package on the
red Kia’s front seat, and Lawrence told him the package was a gift for his
cousin, Saibu, though the name on the package was that of Korlu Barclay,
and denied the package was for him. (Video 3, 22:17-22:32). After Officer
Novacek opened the package and saw something in the DVD port, he asked
Lawrence if he knew anything about the package, and Lawrence did not
respond. (Tr. 83; Video 2, 29:08-30:00; Video 3, 29:08-30:00).
During a brief period in January 2024, after the court allowed
appointed counsel to withdraw and before the court appointed substitute
counsel, Lawrence filed a pro se motion to suppress, which included several
references to the searched package as “my mail.” (Doc. 264, p. 3). The
motion was denied a few days after it was filed, since substitute counsel had
then been appointed. (Doc. 266). In a footnote, the United States argues the
pro se filing does not change the analysis of Lawrence’s expectation of
privacy but that the United States will offer the filing as evidence Lawrence
knowingly possessed the fentanyl pills found in the package. (Doc. 333, p. 13
n.6).
(Doc. 375, pp. 2-15).
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Evidence Presented at Second Hearing
During the December 11 hearing, Detective Heller testified that in 2022—the time
relevant to this case—every FPD patrol vehicle, with the exception of those assigned to
school resource officers, had a camera pointing toward the hood of the patrol vehicle
and the camera system had a feature that captured license plate information—an ALPR
system.4 The ALPR data is collected through FPD’s Axon system and is routinely
retained in the system for ninety days. Tr. 2 at 13, 22.5 He described the system as
capturing photographs of license plates of vehicles the patrol vehicles meet in public
areas. Those photographs depict the vehicle, a time stamp, and the location at which the
photograph was taken. Further, he testified ALPRs do not capture data that is not
accessible to the public. He gave examples of data the system could access—a license
plate on a vehicle at the end of a private driveway or a vehicle in a parking lot near a
street. The ALPR data is collected without consent from drivers. Id. at 9-11, 23-25, 38.
Generally, FPD uses ALPR data as an “investigative technique to create leads” in
various types of investigations. Id. at 11. Detective Heller described the ALPR data
collected from patrol vehicles as dependent on “a lot of variables . . . based on where that
officer drives throughout their shift.” Id. at 13. As Detective Heller described, any FPD
sworn officer can search the ALPR data, without a warrant, if there is a criminal nexus
giving reason to do so. Id. at 31-32.
Detective Heller testified that, sometime between March 1 and March 8, 2022,
ATF Special Agent Bradt contacted him and asked him to search the red Kia’s license
4 FPD has since installed twenty-one cameras at fixed locations—intersection
light posts or traffic lights; those cameras also link to the ALPR system.
5 Tr. 2 refers to the hearing transcript filed at Docket 399.
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plate number in the FPD’s ALPR system. Detective Heller testified his search showed
the red Kia had been parked “in the 3100 block of Third Street North on the roadway on
the west side of the road” no less than ten times during February 2022. Id. at 14. He
testified none of the ALPR photographs showed the vehicle in the parking lot of the
apartment complex, none showed anyone inside or near the vehicle, and none showed
people visible around the vehicle. ALPR photographs of the red Kia were not maintained
in the Axon system. Detective Heller testified he likely relayed the search results to
Agent Bradt verbally. Detective Heller also searched vehicle registration information
and learned the red Kia was registered to a female from Sacramento, though there is no
evidence of when he searched the registration information. Id. at 13-15, 26-27, 32.
On March 8, the day of the traffic stop, Detective Heller conducted surveillance at
the Third Street North address in an attempt to arrest Ennis on a warrant for a parole
violation. He testified neither he, nor anyone else on the investigative team, looked at
ALPR data to determine whether the red Kia was at the address that day because having
followed the vehicle from Scheels to the address on March 1, “we had a pretty good idea
that’s where we could locate the vehicle.” Id. at 16. Further, he testified there were no
other Fargo locations known to be associated with the red Kia and the only other Fargo
location known to be associated with Ennis was the 16th Avenue South address.
Detective Heller testified that if ALPR data had not existed, he would still have gone to
the Third Street North address to conduct surveillance that day. Detective Heller
testified that because the vehicle had been in the parking lot at the Third Street North
address, the ALPR system captured no photographs that would have shown the red Kia
at the Third Street North address on March 8. Id. at 16-18.
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When he surveilled the Third Street North address on March 8, Detective Heller
saw Lawrence exit the apartment complex, walk to the parking lot where the red Kia was
parked, drive the red Kia to the 16th Avenue South address, go into the apartment
building, “quickly come out[,] and then leave again.” Id. at 18. Because of the route
Lawrence drove, Detective Heller believed Lawrence was returning to his apartment and
believed the red Kia and “whoever was occupying it at that time” was involved in drug
trafficking. Id. at 18.
After he saw the red Kia heading back to the Third Street North address,
Detective Heller radioed for any officers available to make a traffic stop, and Officer
Novacek responded to that request. Detective Heller testified none of his conversations
with Officer Novacek during the traffic stop involved any mention of the ALPR search or
the results of that search. He testified the ALPR data was not important to the
investigation and he could have done “the exact same thing that [he] did without ALPR.”
Id. at 19.
Law and Discussion
The only question raised in the current motion that was not addressed in the first
motion to suppress is whether law enforcement’s use of ALPR data violated Lawrence’s
Fourth Amendment rights. If using ALPR data is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation.
1. Collecting ALPR Data as a Fourth Amendment Search
Lawrence argues law enforcement’s warrantless collection and use of ALPR data
violated his Fourth Amendment rights, asserting he maintains a “reasonable expectation
of privacy in his physical movements even when those movements occur in public
spaces.” (Doc. 382, p. 3). He asserts ALPR technology enables government surveillance
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that was not yet possible when cases like United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012),
and Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), were decided and Fourth
Amendment protections should evolve along with technology, as the Supreme Court
noted in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001). Id. at 4, 14-15.
In Jones, the Supreme Court held the government’s warrantless installation of a
GPS tracking device on a vehicle constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
While the majority relied on a trespass theory, Lawrence argues Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence outlines the privacy implications of GPS location tracking, where she noted
such warrantless tracking creates a “precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements.” 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Lawrence also quotes Justice
Alito’s concurrence, arguing it demonstrates that under the Fourth Amendment,
“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” Id. at 430 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
The Supreme Court expanded the Fourth Amendment protections of Jones in
Carpenter, holding the government’s warrantless acquisition of historical cell-site
records from the defendant’s wireless carrier violated the Fourth Amendment. The court
noted an individual’s cell phone, as compared to a vehicle as in Jones, is almost a
“feature of human anatomy” allowing the government to track nearly exact movements
of its owner. Id. at 311 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). Lawrence
argues that, like GPS tracking in Jones and historical cell-site records in Carpenter,
ALPR systems provide law enforcement with warrantless access to an individual’s
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historical location information that reveals private patterns and associations in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 382 p. 4).
The United States urges the court to
rebuff Lawrence’s invitation to issue a sweeping ruling on the general
constitutionality of ALPR and instead confine its analysis to what happened
here. ALPR did not follow Lawrence everywhere he went. It did not follow
him into a family home, a political meeting, a business, a house of worship,
or someone’s bedroom. It captured a handful of pictures over a month of a
red car not even registered to him sitting empty on a single public street in
front of an apartment complex. That is not a precise, comprehensive record
of a person’s public movements. That is not a wealth of detail about
[Lawrence’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations. That is not secretly monitor[ing] and catalog[ing] every single
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period. That is not almost a
feature of human anatomy that achieves near perfect surveillance, as if [the
government] had attached an ankle monitor.
(Doc. 390, p. 10) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The government asserts “every federal court to consider the question has soundly
rejected the same arguments Lawrence makes now” and Lawrence “fails to cite even one
case finding that collection and use of ALPR data constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search mandating a warrant.” Id. The government then goes on to cite to eleven cases
supporting its position. Id. at 11.
The cases the government cites rely on United States v. Knotts, where the
Supreme Court held “[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” 460
U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). The Court reasoned a person traveling on public roads
voluntarily conveys to anyone who wants to see “the fact that he was traveling over
particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the
fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.” Id.
The Eighth Circuit has concluded that “no person possesses a privacy interest in their
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license plates.” United States v. Sparks, 37 F. App’x 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing
United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 974 (10th Cir. 1989)). Other district courts
have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, No. 23-131, 2025
WL 35035, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2025); United States v. Bowers, No. 2:18-CR-00292-
DWA, 2021 WL 4775977, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2021).
Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit has directly ruled on
the question, other courts have held that law enforcement’s use of ALPR data is not a
search under the Fourth Amendment because ALPR data is distinguishable from other
types of surveillance in that it is significantly less comprehensive. For example, in
United States v. Jiles, the court found accessing an ALPR database is not a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because although “law enforcement can utilize
the ALPR database to receive location information on individual cars over lengthy
periods, the ALPR database is substantially limited relative to a GPS monitor, as in
Jones, or cell-site location information, as in Carpenter.” 2024 WL 891956, at *19
(D. Neb. Feb. 29, 2024). A GPS tracking device, such as was at issue in Jones, tracks a
vehicle’s movement to every location to which it travels. See Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
“By contrast, the ALPR system records a vehicle’s location only when it passes one of the
limited (though expanding) number of ALPRs,” Scholl v. Illinois State Police, 776 F.
Supp. 3d 701, 720-21 (N.D. Ill. 2025), but does not involve a “physical intrusion by the
[g]overnment to any private property.” Jiles, 2024 WL 891956, at *15-19. Unlike
historical cell-site location data, such as that involved in Carpenter, ALPR data does not
create an all-encompassing record of an individual’s whereabouts or create a detailed
log of their precise movements. See United States v. Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1098,
1111-12 (N.D. Ohio 2025); see also Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 311. Some of the cases the
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government cited involved ALPRs mounted on utility poles, which gather significantly
more information than the method of collection employed here, and could thereby invite
further issues under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Jackson, No. 24-cr-
10010, 2025 WL 1530574 (D. Kan. May 29, 2025); United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp.
3d 454 (E.D. Va. 2024).
Courts have declined to categorize use of ALPR data collections as impermissible
dragnet searches. See, e.g., Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. at 1113; United States v. Martin, 753
F. Supp. 3d 454, 472 (E.D. Va. 2024) (noting ALPR systems are not designed to “track
or monitor the entirety of an individual’s movements during a particular car trip, much
less through the activities of their daily life”) (internal quotations omitted); United
States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851, 864 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bea, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting that only if ALPR technology evolves to provide more pervasive and precise
location information akin to that in Carpenter, “then perhaps in the future a warrant
may be required for the government to access the [ALPR] database”); United States v.
Rubin, 556 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1127-29 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (same). Lawrence cites to
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted
that “with enough cameras in enough locations, the historic location data from an ALPR
system . . . would invade a reasonable expectation of privacy and would constitute a
search for constitutional purposes.” (Doc. 382, p. 7) (quoting 142 N.E. 3d 1090, 1104
(Mass. 2020)). While that may prove true in the future, at this time, the method of
ALPR technology FPD employed does not rise to a level invading a reasonable
expectation of privacy constituting a Fourth Amendment search.
Lawrence cites no case law adopting the position he posits. Nor has this court’s
research identified cases doing so. Lawrence has not advanced arguments sufficient to
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lead the court to conclude use of ALPR data should be considered a Fourth Amendment
search. Even if the conclusion were theoretically viable, the evidence shows ALPR data
was not a factor contributing to the traffic stop and the package search that followed.
This court recommends the district judge conclude the use of ALPR data was not a
search under the Fourth Amendment and did not violate Lawrence’s constitutional
rights.
2. Independent Source Doctrine
If, however, the district judge concludes use of the ALPR data violated Lawrence’s
Fourth Amendment rights, the government asserts application of the independent
source doctrine. The government argues, even without the ALPR data, reasonable
suspicion supported investigating the red Kia for drug trafficking on March 8.
Supporting that position, the government cites evidence that law enforcement observed
the red Kia in the Scheels parking lot and followed it from there to Third Street North.
In the government’s view, detective Heller would have “gone to the same place, at the
same time, seen Lawrence make the same short-term trip to Ethmonia Barclay’s
apartment, and made the same radio call resulting in the vehicle being stopped for
expired registration even if he had never looked at the ALPR database.” In the view of
the government, ALPR data “provided an insignificant corroborative detail about the
red Kia that played no role whatsoever in establishing reasonable suspicion to
investigate the vehicle for drug trafficking.” (Doc. 390, p. 12). This court agrees.
The independence source doctrine permits an unlawful search to thwart
suppression “if the evidence both would have been acquired by lawful means had the
unlawful search not occurred and in fact was acquired (or reacquired) by these lawful
means.” United States v. Baez, 983 F.3d 1029, 1037 (8th Cir. 2020). But, if the district
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judge concludes collection and use of ALPR data is not a search that violated Lawrence’s
Fourth Amendment rights, application of the independent source doctrine need be
considered.
3. Issues Previously Decided
Lawrence’s second motion to suppress, (Doc. 381), and the government’s
opposition, (Doc. 390), raise arguments regarding Lawrence’s standing to challenge the
search of the package and about whether the collective knowledge doctrine and the
automobile exception may be applied to cure any constitutional deficiencies in the
acquisition and use of the ALPR data. But, in this court’s opinion, neither party has
shown reason for the court to reconsider any of those issues.
A. Collective Knowledge Doctrine
Lawrence argues the collective knowledge doctrine cannot cure law
enforcement’s underlying Fourth Amendment violation—the warrantless ALPR data
collection. (Doc. 382, pp. 5-6). The collective knowledge doctrine imputes the
knowledge of one law enforcement officer to another so the combined knowledge of
multiple officers can justify the actions taken. United States v. Gillette, 245 F.3d 1032,
1034 (8th Cir. 2001). The United States asserts the court should reject Lawrence’s
arguments regarding collective knowledge as it did in denying the first motion to
suppress. (Doc. 390, p. 9). This court agrees. The district judge adopted this court’s
recommendation rejecting Lawrence’s arguments regarding the collective knowledge
doctrine, (Doc. 386, pp. 3-4), and Lawrence has not shown reason to conclude
otherwise.
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B. Application of Automobile Exception to Package Search
The district judge adopted this court’s recommendation and concluded the
probable cause that existed to search the red Kia extended to containers in the vehicle
that could have contained contraband. (Doc. 386, pp. 5-6). Specifically, this court
recommended the district judge conclude “Officer Novacek’s detection of the odor of
marijuana provided probable cause to search the vehicle and any containers within the
vehicle that could have contained marijuana. Because a package the size of a DVD player
could have contained marijuana, Officer Novacek had probable cause to search the
package.” (Doc. 375, p. 29). The district judge adopted this court’s recommendation and
Lawrence has not shown reason to conclude otherwise.
C. Standing to Challenge the Package Search
The United States argues Lawrence lacks standing to challenge the package
search. In its prior report and recommendation, this court analyzed the question of
Lawrence’s standing to challenge the search of the package and recommended “the
district judge assume, without deciding, that Lawrence has standing to assert his Fourth
Amendment claims concerning the package.” (Doc. 375, pp. 20-22). The district judge
adopted that recommendation. (Doc. 386, p. 2). The United States argues the court
“should now definitively conclude standing for the package is absent.” (Doc. 390, p. 5).
But, given this court’s recommendation regarding use of ALPR, and the minimal use of
ALPR in this case, the United States has not shown reason to again address the question
of standing.
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Recommendation
Under current case law, law enforcement’s use of ALPR data is not a search under
the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Lawrence’s arguments that his Fourth Amendment
rights and reasonable expectation of privacy were violated and that ALPR data collection
amounted to an impermissible dragnet surveillance are unsupported. Moreover,
evidence shows ALPR data was not a factor contributing to the traffic stop or to the
package search that followed.
This court, for the reasons stated herein, RECOMMENDS the district judge
DENY Lawrence’s second motion to suppress evidence.
Dated this 15th day of January, 2026.
/s/ Alice R. Senechal
Alice R. Senechal
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT6
Either party may object to this Report and Recommendation by filing with the
Clerk of Court no later than January 29, 2026, a pleading specifically identifying
those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made and the
basis of any objection. Failure to object or to comply with this procedure may forfeit the
right to seek review in the Court of Appeals.
6 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59; D.N.D. L. Crim. R. 59.1(D)(3).
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