Beaulieu v. NH Department of Corrections, Commissioner et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Christopher Robert Beaulieu,
a/k/a/ Crystal Beaulieu
v. Civil No. 15-cv-012-JD
Craig Orlando et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Christopher “Crystal” Beaulieu, a New Hampshire
State Prison (“NHSP”) inmate, has filed two motions (Doc. Nos.
62, 66) seeking preliminary injunctive relief.1 Both motions
were referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for proposed
findings and recommendations as to disposition. The court held
a hearing on Beaulieu’s motions for injunctive relief on
November 21, 2016 (“November 21 hearing”).
Background
I. Requested Injunction
In this action, Beaulieu has asserted seven claims,
alleging violations of her rights under the Eighth Amendment and
state law against NHSP officials, arising out of events that
1Plaintiff is an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison
who identifies herself as a transsexual female. Her preference
is to be referred to with feminine pronouns, and the court will
honor that preference.
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have occurred during Beaulieu’s incarceration at the NHSP.
Those incidents include: (1) an alleged incident of officers’
use of excessive force against Beaulieu on March 7, 2012; (2)
alleged sexual assaults by another inmate on April 18, 2014 and
April 30, 2014; and 3) the alleged failure of prison officials
to protect Beaulieu from known risks of physical and/or sexual
violence, on April 18, 2014 and April 30, 2014.
In the instant motions for preliminary injunctive relief,
Beaulieu states that she is being improperly and
unconstitutionally housed in a single cell or a dayroom, and
that prison officials have improperly placed a “Keep Away”
directive preventing Beaulieu from having any contact with her
romantic partner, Steven Newcombe, who is also an inmate at the
NHSP. Beaulieu claims that these actions constitution
discrimination against her because she is a transsexual,
retaliation for filing lawsuits and other complaints against
prison officials, and that they violate her First Amendment
right to intimate association. In her motions, and as clarified
at the November 21 hearing and in a written “Closing Statement”
(Doc. No. 91), submitted after the hearing at the court’s
invitation, Beaulieu seeks a court order directing the
defendants: 1) not to house plaintiff in a single cell, and
allow her to be housed with an appropriate cellmate; 2) not to
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house plaintiff in a dayroom; and 3) to remove the “Keep Away”
directive and allow plaintiff to have contact with Steven
Newcombe.
II. Proposed Findings of Fact
Based on the credible evidence presented at the November 21
hearing, the stipulations of the parties entered for the purpose
of resolving the preliminary injunction motions, and the
portions of the record that are undisputed, the undersigned
magistrate judge proposes that the district judge find the
following facts to have been established, for the purpose of
considering Beaulieu’s request for a preliminary injunction:
A. Plaintiff’s Housing in the Special Housing Unit
 Plaintiff Christopher Beaulieu, also known as Crystal
Beaulieu, is a transsexual individual who has been
incarcerated at the NHSP since 2011.
 Beaulieu is housed in the NHSP’s Special Housing Unit
(“SHU”), a “C-5” (maximum security) unit, although
Beaulieu is classified as a C-4 (close custody)
inmate. C-4 inmates at the NHSP are generally housed
in that facility’s Close Custody Unit (“CCU”). At the
time of the November 21 hearing, Beaulieu was housed
in SHU as a protective custody inmate, as Beaulieu has
articulated safety issues concerning other inmates
that prevent her from being housed in the CCU.
 There are ninety-six cells in SHU. Those cells are
divided into twelve separate housing tiers.2 SHU
inmates generally fall into five categories: (1)
maximum security inmates, who are housed in single
2A thirteenth tier in SHU houses inmate workers, called
“trustees,” who do janitorial work in SHU.
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cells; (2) inmates serving disciplinary sanctions in
punitive segregation, who are housed in single cells;
(3) inmates waiting for administrative review,
disciplinary proceedings, or who have been involved in
incidents in which an investigation is pending, who
may be placed alone in a cell until their safety needs
can be determined and/or to protect the integrity of
an investigation; and (4) “protective custody”
inmates, housed in SHU for their own safety, who can
be celled either in single cells, or in a cell with
another protective custody inmate.
 At the time of the November 21 hearing, there were at
least sixty-three “C-5” maximum security inmates, and
approximately sixteen inmates serving time in punitive
segregation in SHU, all of whom had to be housed in
single cells. Accordingly, at that time, there were
no more than seventeen cells available to house all of
the other inmates assigned to SHU.
 In SHU, housing assignments are generally made by the
first shift Officer-in-Charge (“OIC”). Those
decisions include: the tier and cell to which an
inmate is assigned; whether an inmate is single-celled
or double-celled; whether an inmate must be housed in
a dayroom; and cellmate pairings. Five days a week,
the first shift OIC for SHU is Sgt. Gary Lydick.
 In making housing assignments in SHU, Sgt. Lydick
considers a number of factors in determining where an
inmate may be appropriately housed, including: the
reason an inmate is at SHU; an inmate’s custody level;
the tone, population, and behavior on each tier;
whether any “Keep Away” directive concerning another
SHU inmate prevents an inmate’s placement on a
particular tier; and the “Quay level” of an inmate,
i.e., the extent to which an inmate is classified
either as “predator” or “prey” in relation to other
inmates.
 SHU inmates who cannot be housed with a cellmate for
safety and/or security reasons are sometimes
temporarily placed in a SHU dayroom, when there is no
available single cell in the unit.
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 When housed in a SHU dayroom, unlike when housed in a
cell, inmates sleep on a mattress on the floor. There
are no bathroom facilities in SHU dayrooms, and
inmates must be escorted out of the dayroom to use the
bathroom by an officer who is making rounds every
thirty minutes, or if the inmate can otherwise get the
attention of an available officer. SHU dayrooms are
not as private as single cells.
 There is no written policy or memorandum establishing
a so-called “single cell status” at the New Hampshire
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) in general, or at
SHU, beyond the general rule that C-5 inmates and
inmates in punitive segregation are always housed in
single cells, that either mandates or prohibits other
inmates’ placement in a single cell.
 At the time of the hearing in this matter, Beaulieu
was housed in a single cell in SHU.
 In the six-month period beginning May 1, 2016 and
ending October 31, 2016, Beaulieu was housed with nine
different cellmates, for periods of time ranging from
two to eleven days. During that six-month period,
Beaulieu was housed: for fifty-four days in a cell
with a cellmate; for three days in the NHSP Health
Services Center; for twenty-eight days, alone in a
dayroom; and for ninety-five days, alone in a cell.
 New Hampshire Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
Classifications Department officials may issue a “Keep
Away,” which is a directive requiring that two or more
specific inmates be housed and/or supervised in a
manner ensuring that the inmates subject to the “Keep
Away” do not have contact with one another. A prison
official may request that the DOC Classifications
Department issue a “Keep Away” where contact between
particular inmates poses a threat to the safety and
security of either particular inmates or to the
institution generally.
 At the time of the November 21 hearing, “Keep Away”
directives were in place specifically preventing
contact between Beaulieu and approximately ten other
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SHU inmates, significantly limiting the location in
SHU in which Beaulieu could be safely housed.
 In the past, SHU officials have been willing to house
Beaulieu with another inmate if three requirements
were met: 1) Beaulieu is comfortable being housed with
the other inmate; 2) the other inmate is comfortable
being housed with Beaulieu; and 3) prison officials
are confident that the pairing will not pose any
danger to the safety and security of Beaulieu, the
other inmate, or the institution, and that there would
be no sexual contact between the inmates. In the
past, Beaulieu has been housed in SHU with cellmates
when those requirements were met.
 At the time of the November 21 hearing, Sgt. Lydick,
DOC Professional Standards Director Colon Forbes, and
the DOC Prison Rape Elimination Act Advocate Jean
Carroll, had concluded that Beaulieu should be housed
in a single cell for her safety. Those officials’
concern for Beaulieu’s safety was based largely on
Beaulieu having reported, on multiple occasions, being
sexually assaulted by other inmates, causing prison
officials to believe that Beaulieu was at a high risk
of sexual victimization, and the fact that at least
four of Beaulieu’s reports of sexual assault were made
against a cellmate.
 On each occasion when Sgt. Lydick placed Beaulieu in a
SHU dayroom, he did so because there was no available
single cell in SHU in which Beaulieu could be safely
housed, or in which Beaulieu agreed to be housed. On
one occasion, Beaulieu was offered the opportunity to
move from the dayroom to a single cell on a punitive
segregation tier, but refused the offer because she
did not want to live in the conditions associated with
punitive segregation, resulting in Beaulieu having to
spend additional time housed in a dayroom.
 Sgt. Lydick has never placed Beaulieu in a single cell
or in a dayroom in retaliation for Beaulieu having
filed a lawsuit or complaint against anyone at the
prison.
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 Sgt. Lydick has never placed Beaulieu in a single cell
to discriminate against Beaulieu because she is a
transsexual.
B. Policies Concerning Romantic or Sexual Relationships
Between DOC Inmates
 DOC inmates are not allowed to have sexual contact
with one another, consensual or otherwise, during
their incarceration, per DOC policy.
 Sexual contact between inmates poses a potential
threat to the safety and security of inmates and the
institution, as it is difficult or impossible for
prison officials to distinguish between genuinely
consensual sexual contact, and sexual contact which
has been coerced by force or threats of force.
 In the prison context, sexual acts between inmates
that appear consensual can result in extortion or
blackmail, or can be used as payment for goods or
services.
 If a prison official believes that inmates at the DOC
are involved in a romantic and/or sexual relationship
with one another, the official may seek a “Keep Away”
on that basis.
 Inmates involved in a romantic nonsexual relationship
are not allowed to have contact with one another,
because the relationship could result in sexual
contact between the inmates, and because the souring
of a romantic relationship can create tension or other
difficulties within the facility, and create a risk to
the safety and security of the inmates and the
institution.
C. Plaintiff’s Relationship with Steven Newcombe
 At the time Beaulieu filed her requests for
preliminary injunctive relief, she was engaged to be
married to Steven Newcombe, a NHSP inmate. The
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relationship between Beaulieu and Newcombe was
romantic, but not sexual. At the time of the November
21 hearing, Beaulieu and Newcombe had split, but were
attempting to rekindle their romantic relationship.3
 In July 2016, when both Beaulieu and Newcombe were
housed in the NHSP’s Reception and Diagnostic Unit
(“R&D”), R&D Unit Manager Kathleen Anderson came to
believe, based on her own observations and information
from other officers, that Beaulieu and Newcombe were
either in a romantic and/or sexual relationship, or
intended to pursue such a relationship with one
another.
 Unit Manager Anderson, upon becoming aware of a
potential romantic relationship between Beaulieu and
Newcombe, had the DOC Classifications Department issue
a “Keep Away” for Beaulieu and Newcombe.
 At the time of the November 21 hearing, as a result of
the “Keep Away,” Beaulieu and Newcombe were not able
to have any contact with one another.
 The “Keep Away” placed significant strain on
Beaulieu’s relationship with Newcombe.
 Between the filing of the preliminary injunction
motions and the November 21 hearing, Beaulieu became
jealous of Newcombe’s contact with another inmate. In
a “jealous rampage,” Beaulieu falsely accused Newcombe
of sexually assaulting her. Beaulieu has since
admitted that the accusation was false and received
disciplinary consequences for the false allegation.
 Beaulieu and Newcombe, at the time of the November 21
hearing, were attempting to rekindle their romantic
relationship. The “Keep Away” has made that effort
difficult.
3Information that has come before the court since the
hearing in this matter indicates that Beaulieu and Newcombe have
again entered into a romantic relationship. The current status
of their relationship is not material to the court’s recommended
disposition of the motions for preliminary injunction.
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D. Beaulieu’s History of Consensual and Nonconsensual
Sexual Contact at the Prison
 As of the date of the hearing, Beaulieu, by her own
count, had filed thirteen reports alleging that she
had been sexually assaulted at the prison since 2011.
Each of the reported sexual assaults was investigated
by the DOC Investigations Bureau.
 One of the thirteen sexual assaults Beaulieu reported
was deemed to be “unfounded,” or untrue, upon
investigation. The rest of Beaulieu’s sexual assault
allegations were “unsubstantiated,” in that the matter
was investigated, but the investigators could not
determine whether the allegation was true or false.
 During her incarceration, Beaulieu has engaged in
sexual contact with a number of inmates that did not
result in sexual assault allegations. Included in
that sexual contact were, as described by Beaulieu:
mutually consensual sexual encounters; instances of
Beaulieu agreeing to engage in sexual acts in exchange
for canteen items; participation in a “turn out”
group, comprised of Beaulieu and other transsexual
inmates, who would engage in sexual acts with inmates
who claimed to be heterosexual, and would then
identify those inmates to the other members of the
“turn out” group.
Discussion
I. Preliminary Injunction Standard
“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
an injunction is in the public interest.’” Glossip v. Gross,
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736 (2015) (citation omitted); see also
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Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci. Advancements, Inc., 794
F.3d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 2015). “Though each factor is important
. . . ‘the sine qua non of [the] four-part inquiry is likelihood
of success on the merits: if the moving party cannot demonstrate
that he is likely to succeed in his quest, the remaining factors
become matters of idle curiosity.’” Sindicato Puertorriqueño de
Trabajadores, SEIU Local 1996 v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation and alterations omitted). “To
demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits, [a] plaintiff[]
must show more than mere possibility of success – rather, [he]
must establish a strong likelihood that [he] will ultimately
prevail.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18
(1st Cir. 2006) (“if the moving party cannot demonstrate that he
is likely to succeed in his quest,” preliminary injunctive
relief is properly denied without further analysis). The burden
of proof is on the movant. See Esso Std. Oil Co., 445 F.3d at
18.
II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A. Claims Not in this Action
As previously stated, the claims in this case arise out of
alleged violations of Beaulieu’s Eighth Amendment rights, and
related state law claims. Plaintiff’s request for preliminary
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injunctive relief seek redress for claims that are not before
the court in this action. Beaulieu seeks preliminary injunctive
relief to redress claims asserting an equal protection violation
for discrimination based on her transsexuality, retaliation
against her for exercising her First Amendment rights to file
lawsuits and complaints against prison officials, and a
violation of her First Amendment right to intimate association.
As stated above, likelihood of success on the merits is a
necessary showing to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. See
Sindicato Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores, 699 F.3d at 10; Esso
Standard Oil Co., 445 F.3d at 18. Beaulieu cannot demonstrate
that she is likely to succeed on the merits of claims that are
not before the court in this action, and her request for
preliminary injunctive relief is subject to denial on that
basis. Even if the discrimination, retaliation, and intimate
association claims were properly before the court in this
matter, however, Beaulieu’s request for a preliminary injunction
would fare no better, as Beaulieu has failed to demonstrate a
likelihood that she could succeed on the merits of those claims,
for reasons discussed below.
B. Discrimination
“‘The Equal Protection Clause contemplates that similarly
situated persons are to receive substantially similar treatment
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from their government.’” Davis v. Coakley, 802 F.3d 128, 132
(1st Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “To establish an equal
protection claim, a plaintiff needs to allege facts showing that
‘(1) the [plaintiff], compared with others similarly situated,
was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment
was based on impermissible considerations such as race,
religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of
constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to
injure [the plaintiff].’” Id. at 132-33 (citation omitted).
“Proof of . . . discriminatory intent or purpose is required to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977).
Beaulieu asserts here that her placement in a single cell
constitutes unfavorable treatment motivated by discrimination
against her because she is transsexual, as compared to the
treatment received by nontranssexual inmates who are otherwise
similarly situated to her. The evidence at the hearing
demonstrated, however, that to the extent prison officials have
treated Beaulieu differently, in housing placement decisions,
than they have nontranssexual inmates, that difference is based
on the higher risk of sexual victimization to which her identity
as a transsexual places her in SHU. Prison officials’
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conclusions concerning Beaulieu’s heightened risk of sexual
victimization were based on their knowledge that Beaulieu has
reported being sexually assaulted numerous times at the prison.
One prison official testified at the hearing that Beaulieu had
reported being sexually assaulted at the prison more times than
any other inmate of which the official was aware.
No evidence before the court supports Beaulieu’s assertion
that prison officials have made housing decisions to
discriminate against her, or on the basis of any ill will they
may bear for her, due to her transsexuality. Further, the
evidence at the hearing showed that both transsexual and
nontranssexual inmates are placed in single cells, where such
housing is necessary to protect an inmate’s safety.
As to housing in dayrooms, while the lack of privacy an
inmate experiences while housed in a dayroom might be generally
more troubling to a transsexual inmate than a nontranssexual
inmate, the evidence showed that both transsexual and
nontranssexual inmates who prison officials have determined need
to be housed alone for safety reasons, are placed in dayrooms in
SHU when overcrowding issues have resulted in a shortage of
available single cells. The evidence at the hearing showed that
Beaulieu was not treated differently than any other inmate in
that regard, and that on the occasions she was housed in a
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dayroom she was offered placement in a single cell as soon as
one became available.
No evidence before the court demonstrates that any decision
to place Beaulieu in a dayroom was made with discriminatory
purpose or intent. Accordingly, Beaulieu has failed to show
that she would be likely to succeed on a claim that prison
officials violated her equal protection rights by discriminating
against her in housing placement decisions.
C. Retaliation
Beaulieu claims that prison officials placed her in a
single cell to retaliate against her for filing lawsuits and
other complaints against prison officials. To demonstrate
retaliation, Beaulieu must show: (1) that she engaged in conduct
protected by the First Amendment; (2) that she suffered non-de
minimis adverse action at the hands of the prison officials; and
(3) that there was a causal link between the exercise of her
First Amendment rights and the adverse action taken. See Hannon
v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011). An adverse act taken
in response to an inmate’s protected conduct is not de minimis
if it would deter an inmate of ordinary firmness from exercising
First Amendment rights. See Starr v. Dube, 334 F. App’x 341,
342 (1st Cir. 2009).
There is no dispute that, by filing complaints and lawsuits
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against prison officials, Beaulieu engaged in conduct protected
by the First Amendment. Further, it is undisputed that Beaulieu
was placed in a single cell, and separated from Newcombe by a
“Keep Away,” against her wishes, and, in that respect, was thus
subjected to adverse acts. For purposes of considering
Beaulieu’s request for a preliminary injunction, the court will
assume that both the placement in a single cell and the “Keep
Away” were adverse acts that were not de minimis.
Beaulieu has failed, however, to demonstrate facts to
satisfy the third element of a retaliation claim, that it was
her exercise of her First Amendment rights that motivated the
housing decisions Beaulieu now asks the court to enjoin. To the
contrary, the evidence at the hearing demonstrated that
Beaulieu’s placements in a single cell, and occasionally in a
dayroom, were effected for her own safety, as a protective
custody inmate with a history of numerous sexual victimizations
in prison, at least four of which were alleged to have been
committed by cellmates. Further, the evidence shows that the
“Keep Away” concerning Beaulieu and Newcombe was issued in
response to the prison officials’ concerns that their romantic
relationship could pose risks to the security of Beaulieu,
Newcombe, and the institution. No evidence before the court
supports Beaulieu’s assertions that either her placement in a
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single cell or a dayroom, or the issuance of the “Keep Away,”
was retaliatory. Accordingly, the record in this case fails to
show that Beaulieu would be likely to succeed on a retaliation
claim.
D. First Amendment Right of Association
Liberally construed, Beaulieu’s request for preliminary
injunctive relief seeking an order from the court directing
prison officials to vacate the “Keep Away” between her and
Newcombe, arising from an alleged violation of Beaulieu’s First
Amendment right of intimate association.4 The First Amendment
protects “two types of ‘freedom of association’ that merit
constitutional protection: (i) ‘choices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships’ and (ii)
association ‘for the purpose of engaging in those activities
protected by the Frist Amendment.’” URI Student Senate v. Town
of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984)). While
the right to intimate association is not necessarily entirely
eliminated by incarceration, “freedom of association is among
4To the extent Beaulieu has attempted to assert a violation
of Newcombe’s right to intimate association, she cannot do so,
as she is not a lawyer, and thus cannot represent the interests
of anyone other than herself in this court. See 28 U.S.C. §
1654; LR 83.2(d).
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the rights least compatible with incarceration,” and thus,
“[s]ome curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the
prison context.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 1312
(2003); see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 410 n. 9
(1989) (holding that “legitimate penological interests” may
circumscribe the associational rights of both prisoners and
those who seek to associate with them).
The court will uphold a prison regulation or restriction
alleged to have impinged an inmate’s constitutional rights where
the constitutional right in question is “‘inconsistent with
proper incarceration,’” Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510
(2016) (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 131), and the restriction
or regulation bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
penological objective, see Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (citing
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)), provided the
challenged restriction or regulation is not an “‘exaggerated
response’ to such objective[].” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521,
528 (2006) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 87). In evaluating such
restrictions, the court “must accord substantial deference to
the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a
significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of
a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate
means to accomplish them.” Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. The
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burden is on the inmate to disprove the validity of a challenged
prison restriction. See id.
The evidence at the November 21 hearing demonstrated that
the DOC’s policy of prohibiting romantic and sexual involvement
between inmates is designed to prevent tensions, assault,
blackmail, exploitation, and other problems that could
jeopardize the safety and security of inmates or the
institution. Beaulieu does not dispute the legitimacy or
validity of prison officials’ interest in safety and security.
Instead, Beaulieu disputes that the “Keep Away” preventing
contact between herself and Newcombe is reasonably related to
that policy because, as Beaulieu asserts is the case with her
and Newcombe, there have never been any violence, sexual
assault, or other problems between herself and Newcombe that
would create a safety or security risk.
Contrary to her contention, however, Beaulieu testified at
the hearing that when her relationship with Newcombe was
strained, that Beaulieu, in a “jealous rampage,” falsely accused
Newcombe of sexually assaulting her. Although she ultimately
recanted her accusation, and received disciplinary consequences
for her false accusation, the incident demonstrates the
legitimacy of the prison officials’ concern for avoiding such
conflict in the prison setting. In addition, the hearing
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testimony of prison officials concerning the potential problems
associated with romantic and sexual relationships between
inmates within a facility, demonstrated the reasonableness of
such policies in general, and of the specific application of the
policy to Beaulieu and Newcombe.
Because Beaulieu’s contact with Newcombe has been
restricted pursuant to a policy that is reasonably related to a
legitimate penological objective, Beaulieu has not demonstrated
that her right to intimate association has been
unconstitutionally abridged. Accordingly, Beaulieu has not met
her burden to demonstrate that she could likely succeed on the
merits of such a claim to obtain the injunctive relief she
seeks.
III. Other Preliminary Injunction Factors
Beaulieu has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success
as to any of the claims, asserting violations of her rights,
underlying her requests for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the
court need not consider the remaining preliminary injunction
factors.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should find
that Beaulieu has failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that
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she is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief, and should
deny her motions (Doc. Nos. 62, 66) seeking such relief. Any
objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. Failure to file specific written objections to the
Report and Recommendation within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the district court’s order. See Santos-Santos
v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
February 23, 2017
cc: Christopher “Crystal” Beaulieu, pro se
Laura E. B. Lombardi, Esq.
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