Stile v. US Marshals Service, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
James Stile
v. Civil No. 15-cv-494-SM
United States Marshals
Service, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is a complaint, Document No. 1, filed by
James Stile against 32 defendants.1 Stile is appearing pro se
and in forma pauperis. At all times relevant to his claims,
Stile was a federal pretrial detainee held at the Strafford
County House of Corrections (“SCHC”). Stile’s complaint is
1In addition to the U.S. Marshals Service, Stile has named
the following defendants: the Strafford County House of
Corrections (“SCHC”); Strafford County; the Strafford County
Sheriff; Strafford County Commissioners George Maglaras and
Robert Watson; County Administrator Raymond Bower; five health-
care providers (Dr. Dirksmeier, Christopher Schwieger, Dr.
Timothy Donnelly, Dr. Christopher Braga, and Jason Doran); three
medical practices (Seacoast Orthopedics & Sports Medicine,
American Institutional Medical Group, and Resources Re-Entry
Associates), 11 corrections officers (“CO”) (Lt. Weisgarber, Lt.
Donna Roy, Lt. Lee, CO Metcalf, Cpl. Rivera, Cpl. Nadeau, CO
Goutier, Cpl. Robert Farrell, Sgt. Hayden, Sgt. Noseworthy, Lt.
Brackett); three SCHC administrators (Superintendent Bruce
Pelkie, Assistant Superintendent Jake Collins, and Medical
Administrator Tracey Warren), and three providers of mental-
health care (Robert Lang, Patti Place, and Patricia Lilly). As
to the non-institutional defendants, Stile does not indicate
whether he is suing them in their individual capacities, their
official capacities, or both.
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before the court for preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A and LR 4.3(d)(1).
Preliminary Review Standard
Under the statutes that govern preliminary review in this
case, the court must dismiss the complaint, or any part thereof,
if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also id. § 1915A(b)(1). A
claim on which relief may be granted is one in which the
plaintiff’s “allegations ‘taken as true, . . . state a
plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for relief.”
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2013)
(quoting Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ., 628 F.3d 25, 29
(1st Cir. 2010)). Finally, because Stile is appearing pro se,
the court must construe his complaint liberally. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Discussion
I. Events Prior to July 2013 (Compl. ¶¶ 35-38, 41)
A. Background
On January 15, 2013, as a federal pretrial detainee, Stile
was admitted into the SCHC. Upon his arrival, he was placed in
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“D-Pod,” the jail’s maximum security, disciplinary/punitive
segregation unit. He did not receive a hearing or any other
form of process before he was placed in D-Pod. When Stile asked
SCHC officials why he had been placed in that unit, Sgt.
Noseworthy, Lt. Brackett, and Superintendent Pelkie all told him
that his placement was dictated by the United States Marshals
Service. Stile remained in D-pod until he was moved into the
general population on February 25, 2013. For some time after he
arrived at the SCHC, Stile was not provided with Advair, a
prescription medication that he had received in the Somerset
County Jail, where he had been held before his transfer to the
SCHC. On February 11, 2013, while Stile was still housed in D-
Pod, the unit was flooded with toilet water. After Stile was
placed in the general population, he began to hold Narcotics
Anonymous (“NA”) meetings, with jail officials’ approval. On
March 25, Lt. Donna Roy ended Stile’s NA meetings. On May 22,
2013, Stile asked to see a mental-health care provider. The
appointment he received was “not expedient,” and he did not
receive Valium on the days he was scheduled to go to court.
B. Initial Placement in D-Pod without Due Process
Plaintiff claims that his initial 42-day placement in D-Pod
was carried out in violation of his constitutional rights
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because he was not given a hearing or any other form of process
before he was placed in that unit. The placement of a pretrial
detainee in administrative segregation may violate that person’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights to both substantive and procedural
due process. See, e.g., Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling,
No. 3:11cv668(WIG), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45081, 2016 WL
1311997, at *7-*12 (D. Conn. Apr. 4, 2016).
Plaintiff has named defendants Noseworthy, Brackett, and
Pelkie as defendants who may be liable to him on this claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not, however, named any
individual officers of the U.S. Marshals Service who might
similarly be potentially liable for damages. Plaintiff cannot
state a claim for damages directly against the U.S. Marshals
Service, as federal agencies cannot be held liable for damages
under Bivens. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1994)
(citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narc. Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971)). Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss
plaintiff’s claims against the U.S. Marshals Service and should
also drop that agency as a defendant.
In the Order issued this date, the court directs service of
Stile’s claim for damages for violations of his due process
rights as to SCHC defendants Noseworthy, Brackett, and Pelkie.
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The court has also granted plaintiff leave to file a complaint
amendment identifying any federal agents who may be responsible
for Stile’s initial placement in D-Pod, and stating all relevant
factual allegations concerning what those federal agents did
that could render them potentially liable under Bivens.
C. Denial of Religious Services
1. First Amendment
Plaintiff claims that his rights under the First Amendment
were violated by Cpl. Farrell, Lt. Brackett, Assistant
Superintendent Collins, and Superintendent Pelkie when he was
denied the opportunity to participate in weekly religious
services while he was being housed on D-Pod, in a manner
plaintiff asserts was consistent with jail policy. Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient to state a claim under the First
Amendment against those defendants and the county. Accordingly,
in the Order issued this date, the court has served the
complaint with respect to a First Amendment free exercise
claims, as to defendants Farrell, Brackett, Collins, and Pelkie,
in their individual and official capacities, and against
Strafford County’s agency, the SCHC.
2. RLUIPA
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his lack of access to
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weekly religious services while in D-Pod may state a claim for
relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Although there is
no binding precedent in the First Circuit, the majority of
courts that have addressed the issue have held that RLUIPA does
not authorize claims for damages asserted against defendants
sued in their individual capacities. See Howard v. Skolnik, 599
F. App’x 323, 323 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Cryer v. Spencer,
934 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333 (D. Mass. 2013) (collecting Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit cases).
Following the well-reasoned authority of those courts, the
district judge should dismiss Stile’s personal capacity RLUIPA
claims.
In the order issued this date, the court directs service of
the RLUIPA claim for damages, with respect to defendants
Farrell, Brackett, Collins, and Pelkie, in their official
capacities only, and against Strafford County’s agency, the
SCHC. This court reserves for future consideration in this
court, upon proper motion, the question of whether a RLUIPA
claim for damages may be asserted against those defendants.
See, e.g., Kelley Bey v. Keen, No. 3:13-CV-1942, 2014 WL
3563475, at *13, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97649, at *34 (M.D. Pa.
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May 29, 2014) (noting, in dicta, that official capacity RLUIPA
claims for damages against county officials may be cognizable),
R&R approved, No. 3:13-CV-1942, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101265,
2014 WL 3563475 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2014).
D. Flooding in D-Pod
Plaintiff claims that as a result of the February 11 flood
on D-Pod, he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. He
bases his claim on allegations that while he warned “[n]umerous
defendants including defendant Lt. Brackett,” Compl. ¶ 35, of
the physical harm to which he was exposed as a result of the
flood, none of them “answered any of [his] many many grievances
about the toilet water flooding,” id. The conditions about
which plaintiff complains are these: (1) ankle-deep toilet water
in his cell that was left standing for several hours before
inmates were directed to use a wet-dry vacuum to collect it and
dispose of it in the unit’s shower area; and (2) sludge, scum,
and debris in the shower area, including feces and toilet paper,
that were not cleaned up for several days. The harms plaintiff
claims to have suffered as a result of the flood are: (1)
breathing dirty humid air; (2) fearing possible infection; (3)
going without a shower for several days; and (4) being provided
with only eight ounces of bottled drinking water per day.
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If plaintiff’s claim is that one or more defendants are
liable for failing to respond to his grievances, that claim
fails because “there is ‘no inherent constitutional right to an
effective prison grievance procedure.’” Leonard v. Moore, Nos.
2:10-CV-347 & 2:10-CV-951, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164004, at *16,
2012 WL 5830251, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 2012) (citations
omitted), R. & R. adopted by 2012 WL 6139001, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 175170 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 11, 2012).
On the other hand, pretrial detainees do have a protected
liberty interest, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to avoid
conditions of confinement that amount to punishment. See Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Surprenant v. Rivas, 424
F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (pretrial detainees have a right to
avoid conditions that manifest cruel and unusual punishment).2
2First Circuit cases equating the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendment standards for conditions of confinement claims,
predate the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). “After Kingsley, it is unclear whether
courts should continue to use the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate-
indifference standard” to analyze claims brought by pretrial
detainees pursuant to the Due Process Clause, “or whether an
objective reasonableness standard should apply.” Johnson v.
Clafton, No. 13-14922, 2015 WL 5729080, at *4, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 132318, at *11-*12 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2015) (discussing
pretrial detainee medical care claims). Cf. Colbert v.
Gumusdere, No. 15CV1537-LTS-DCF, 2016 WL 1181726, at *4 n.4, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39178, at *11 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2016)
(“The Kingsley holding has not yet, however, been applied beyond
the context of excessive force cases.”). Resolution of this
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As the First Circuit has explained:
In order to establish a constitutional violation, a
plaintiff’s claim must meet both objective and
subjective criteria. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994). First, the plaintiff must establish that,
from an objective standpoint, the conditions of his
confinement deny him the minimal measure of
necessities required for civilized living. Id.
Second, the plaintiff must show that, from a
subjective standpoint, the defendant was deliberately
indifferent to inmate health or safety. Id.
Deliberate indifference, in this sense, is a mental
state akin to criminal recklessness. Id. at 836–37.
Surprenant, 424 F.3d at 18-19 (footnote and parallel citations
omitted). Even when plaintiff’s complaint is construed
liberally, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in his favor, Stile’s complaint fails to
allege facts sufficient to meet the objective criteria necessary
to establish a constitutional violation based upon the
conditions created by the February 11 flooding in D-Pod.
There is no doubt that “the necessities required for
civilized living include sanitation.” Cole v. Fluery, No. 13-
cv-274-LM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20472, 2015 WL 736364, at *5,
(D.N.H. Feb. 20, 2015). However:
With regard to the allegedly inhumane conditions
in this case [i.e., flooding in a cell resulting from
toilet overflow], one court has explained that “[t]he
issue is reserved for a later stage of the case, after
defendants appear, and the issue is fully briefed upon a motion
necessitating the court’s decision on this issue.
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Eighth Amendment is generally not violated . . . where
unsanitary conditions are temporary.” To the
contrary, only a “[s]ubstantial deprivation[ ] of
. . . sanitation over an extended time [is]
sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective
component of an Eighth Amendment claim.”
Cole, 2015 WL 736364, at *6 (citations omitted). As Judge
McCafferty further explained:
Moreover, assuming that Cole had alleged that his
cell was flooded with water containing human waste,
that alone would be insufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief. It is, of course, beyond reasonable
dispute that exposure to human waste is both offensive
and unhealthy. Even so, mere exposure to human waste
is not enough to establish the objective component of
an inhumane-conditions claim; the court must still
examine the duration and intensity of the exposure.
Id., 2015 WL 736364, at *7 (citations omitted).
Here, Stile’s allegations that the flood water remained in
his cell for several hours and that detritus from the flood
remained in the shower area for several days do not describe
exposure to hazardous conditions of a duration and intensity
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g.,
Bagwell v. Brewington–Carr, No. CIV.A. 97–321–GMS, 2000 WL
1728148, at *19, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21276, at *59 (D. Del.
Apr. 27, 2000) (corrections officer did not violate Eighth
Amendment by confining prisoner for “at most, a few days in a
cell where water coated the floor”); Spears v. Ferguson, Civil
No. 08–5203, 2010 WL 909202, at *6, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22378,
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at *14 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 12, 2010) (objective component not
satisfied when inmate spent 19 hours in cell with residue from
toilet flooding), R&R approved by No. 08-5203, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22381, 2010 WL 909202 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 11, 2010).
The foregoing analysis covers Stile’s claims that he was
harmed by several hours of exposure to flood water, humidity,
and human waste from an overflowing toilet. Similarly
insufficient is his claim to have been harmed by a lack of
showers for several days. See, e.g., Richmond v. Settles, 450
F. App’x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (six days without a shower and
personal hygiene items not actionable); see also Hightower v.
Vose, 95 F.3d 1146, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24041, at *6, 1996 WL
516123, at *2 (1st Cir. Sept. 12, 1996) (unpublished table
decision) (“single instance of being denied a shower for eight
days, without more,” does not states due process violation).
Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss those claims of
Fourteenth Amendment violations.
E. Deprivation of Drinking Water
The only factual allegation in paragraph 35 of plaintiff’s
complaint that remains is his allegation that “[f]or two days,
[he] was without clean drinking water [because he] was supplied
only one 8 oz. container of bottled water for each day.” Compl.
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¶ 35. Inadequate provision of drinking water for several days
can state a claim for relief. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,
257 F.3d 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2011) (three day deprivation of
drinking water stated claim for relief); see also Chavarriaga v.
N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 228 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We are
satisfied that appellant’s allegation that she was deprived of
potable water for three consecutive days . . . did set forth [an
Eighth Amendment] claim [and] [w]e reach the same conclusion
with respect to the denial of potable water during her [two-day]
confinement”). Based upon the foregoing, it is not possible
reject plaintiff’s drinking-water claim out of hand.
Plaintiff’s failure to identify the defendant or defendants
who were responsible for the alleged deprivation makes it
impossible for the court to order service of this claim on any
particular individual. Given the possibility that plaintiff has
suffered a deprivation of constitutional dimensions, in the
Order issued this date, the court gives plaintiff leave to amend
his complaint to adequately allege a conditions-of-confinement
claim against specific defendants, based upon the alleged
deprivation of drinking water in February 2013.
F. Denial of Out-of-Cell Time
Plaintiff claims that one or more unnamed defendants denied
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him “his mandatory one hour of out of cell time,” Compl. ¶ 36,
and a shower, on February 13, 2013. He does not allege any
physical injury, or risk of harm, resulting from those
deprivations. As a matter of law, those allegations are
insufficient to satisfy the objective component of an inhumane
conditions-of-confinement claim. See, e.g., Oliver v. Dep’t of
Corr., No. 3:13CV-P820-H, 2014 WL 321215, at * 3, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10627 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 28, 2014) (denial of one hour
of out-of-cell time on each of nine occasions did not state
constitutional claim where inmate plaintiff did not allege
physical injury or substantial risk of serious harm resulting
from deprivation). Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.
G. Discontinuance of Narcotics Anonymous Meetings
Plaintiff claims that by discontinuing the NA meetings he
had held for several weeks, Lt. Roy violated his “1st Amendment
freedom of speech rights, freedom to assemble and freedom of
education and 5th and 14th Amendment Constitutional rights of
due process and equal protection of the law.” Compl. ¶ 38.
According to plaintiff, Lt. Roy’s action “deprived [him] of
liberty interests and more importantly his right to participate
in a program of recovery that makes it possible for [him] to
sustain life and freedom from active addiction.” Id. However,
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inmates have no federal constitutional right to participate in
rehabilitative programs while incarcerated. Fiallo v. De
Batista, 666 F.2d 729, 730 (1st Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has not
alleged facts sufficient to state any First Amendment claim, due
process claim, or equal protection claim. Accordingly, the
district judge should dismiss any claims arising out of the
cancellation of the Narcotics Anonymous meetings.
H. Medical Care Claims
1. Delayed Provision of Advair
Plaintiff claims that Pelkie and medical administrator
Tracey Warren are liable to him for acting with deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need when they took some
unidentified amount of time to prescribe and dispense Advair, a
medication he had received in his previous correctional
facility, before his transfer to the SCHC.3 The right of a
pretrial detainee to adequate medical care arises under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Surprenant, 424
F.3d at 18. For the purpose of preliminary review, allegations
that Warren and Pelkie denied Stile Advair are sufficient to
3Regarding the amount of time he was without Advair,
plaintiff says this: “Medical records of the [SCHC] will show
how long the Plaintiff had to suffer before he was prescribed
and dispensed the correct breathing medicine.” Compl. ¶ 40.
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state a claim for relief. Accordingly, in the Order issued this
date, the court has directed service on defendants Warren and
Pelkie, with respect to this claim.
2. Untimely Mental Health Care & Denial of Valium
Plaintiff next claims that “Defendants (Mental Health
Provider), failed to provide for [his] mental health needs
beginning on May 22, 2013,” Compl. ¶ 41, because the appointment
they gave him “was not expedient,” id. The facts alleged as to
the inexpediency of that appointment do not suggest that the
appointment at issue was punitive, and the allegations relating
to mental health care do not otherwise state a claim for relief
for a violation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In particular, with respect to the provision of Valium,
plaintiff further alleges:
Plaintiff requested medicine on an “as needed basis,”
for the days he was going to Court such as a Valium,
which [he] knew to work for him from previous
experience. Defendants refused to dispense such
medicine stating it is addictive and their policy of
Strafford County House of Corrections being a non
narcotic facility and compelled [him] to experiment
with other medicines to no avail, which just
compounded [his] mental health problems.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
Pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right to
conditions of confinement, including medical care, that does not
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amount to punishment. To state an analogous Eighth Amendment
claim arising from the denial of medical care, an inmate must
allege that the defendant committed “acts or omissions . . .
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.” Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 645
F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate
indifference, however, does not exist when an incarcerated
plaintiff merely disputes the choice of a certain course of
treatment rather than the complete lack of treatment. See
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 92 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015). Nothing alleged by
plaintiff suggests that health care provider decisions to
prescribe other medications for plaintiff and not Valium
amounted to punishment, or that those providers’ decisions
manifested deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.
I. Municipal and Supervisory Liability
Defendants cannot be held liable under a theory of
respondeat superior under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). A plaintiff asserting a claim
that a supervisor is liable must show that the “supervisor’s
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conduct (whether action or inaction) constitute[d] ‘supervisory
encouragement, condonation or acquiescence[,] or gross
negligence of the supervisor amounting to deliberate
indifference.’” Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 47
(1st Cir. 2012). Similarly, a “plaintiff who brings a section
1983 action against a municipality . . . must identify a
municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury.”
Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir. 2011)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Except as to
the claims alleging plaintiff’s lack of access to religious
services while in D-Pod, plaintiff has failed to state a claim
that any constitutional violations he suffered while at SCHC
prior to July 2013 resulted from a county policy, practice, or
custom.
II. Mail Claims (Compl. ¶ 39)
Plaintiff alleges facts in ¶ 39 of the Complaint which he
asserts give rise to claims of violations of his First Amendment
right to receive mail while incarcerated, and his right of
access to the courts. Stile alleges that on occasions in 2013,
while he was attending out-of-state proceedings, the U.S.
Marshals Service moved him temporarily to other facilities. The
SCHC mailroom did not honor Stile’s requests that his incoming
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mail be held during those temporary absences, despite SCHC
officials’ knowledge that he would be transferred back to the
SCHC, causing some of Stile’s incoming mail to be returned to
sender and/or delivered late to him. The allegations here, in
Complaint ¶ 39, relating to delayed mail delivery, stripped of
legal conclusions about their impact on plaintiff’s legal
matters, do not state claims of violations of Stile’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights relating to conditions of confinement, right of
access to the courts, or any other federal constitutional right.
To the extent Stile seeks to assert such claims, the district
judge should dismiss them.
Plaintiffs’ allegations in Complaint ¶ 39 resemble similar
allegations he made in Stile v. Pelkie, Case No. 13-fp-466
(D.N.H.). In that case, the court in November 2013 granted
Stile leave to file an amended complaint adding facts relating
to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that defendants at SCHC had
interfered with his mail, in violation of his rights under the
First Amendment. See id., Nov. 6, 2013, Order (ECF No. 6).
Stile voluntarily dismissed that case, without prejudice, before
his deadline for amending that complaint expired. Consistent
with the court’s November 2013 Order to amend in Stile v.
Pelkie, this court has also granted Stile leave to add pertinent
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facts regarding the identity of SCHC officials who he alleges
mishandled his incoming mail, and regarding what those officials
knew about Stile’s temporary transfers and what steps they took
with Stile’s mail, for the purpose of stating a First Amendment
claim relating to his incoming mail.
III. Dismissal of Remaining Claims, without Prejudice
Stile’s complaint is 142 pages long. A section labeled
“Facts” includes 136 paragraphs, covers nearly 90 pages, and in
some places resembles a diary of plaintiff’s detention. See
Compl. (Doc. No. 1) 95 (“Today is February 11, 2015 and it has
been three days now that I have been trying to coordinate filing
legal papers that are required by law.”).4 The Facts section is
4The diary-like quality of plaintiff’s factual recitation
leads to self-contradictory passages such as this one:
The Plaintiff has made two written requests for the
results of [his] MRI, meaning a copy of the report.
One was a letter . . . dated January 19, 2015 and
another [was] in a medical grievance which remain[s]
unanswered. It is now January 24, 2015, and the
Plaintiff still does not have an MRI report. The MRI
report was not provided until February 10, 2015. . . .
The plaintiff quite constantly thinks back to November
21, 2014 when the pain was so bad that the Plaintiff
attempted to take his life and gets disgusted that
still has not received a report of the MRI or a plan
for treatment.
Compl. 89 (emphasis in the original). Plaintiff either has, or
has not, received a report on his MRI, but the complaint does
not make that issue clear.
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followed by sections devoted to each of ten legal theories or
causes of action.5 Under those ten headings, plaintiff asserts
approximately 635 separate claims. Each claim is asserted in a
single sentence such as this one: “See details in # 42 of
Facts.” Compl. 97. The complaint continues with a section
entitled “Claims For Relief” which includes 74 paragraphs such
as this one:
The actions of defendants in using physical force
against the plaintiff without need or provocation, or
in failing to intervene to prevent the misuse of force
were done maliciously and sadistically and constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 14th
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 126.
The complaint in this case has much in common with the
complaint the court dismissed in Chase v. Chafee, No. CA 11-
586ML, 2011 WL 6826504, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149061 (D.R.I.
Dec. 9, 2011), R&R adopted by 2011 WL 6826629, 2011 U.S. Dist.
5These include: “Slander of the Plaintiffs’ good name,”
Compl. 97; “Misuse of Force or Power,” id.; “Denial of Due
Process,” id. at 99; “Cruel & Unusual Punishment,” id. at 105;
“Failure to Report to Superiors or Others,” id. at 109; “Denial
of Medical Care,” id. at 110; “Denial of Freedom of Speech &
Religion,” id. at 112; “Denial of Access to Courts and
Attorney’s & 6th Amendment,” id. at 116; “Denial of right to
confront witnesses and to Cross-examine witnesses,” id. at 118;
and “Violation of the 5th Amendment of the United States
Constitution,” id. at 119.
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LEXIS 149063 (D.R.I. Dec. 28, 2011). The complaint in Chase
consisted of 600 paragraphs, 246 pages, and 76 discrete claims.
See id., 2011 WL 6826504, at *1. Substantively, the plaintiff
in Chase brought “seventy-six claims against forty-eight
defendants on a variety of topics.” Id., 2011 WL 6826504, at
*3. On preliminary review, the Magistrate Judge in Chase
determined that the complaint was procedurally defective because
it plainly violated both: (1) “Rule 8’s admonitions that
pleadings should contain a ‘short and plain statement of the
claim’ and be “simple, concise, and direct,’” id., 2011 WL
6826504, at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); and (2) “the joinder
principles of Rules 18 and 20,” id., 2011 WL 6826504, at *4
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 & 20). The Magistrate Judge in Chase
continued:
Plaintiff seeks to join forty-eight defendants and
pursue seventy-six distinct claims against them in a
single suit. Also, Plaintiff is not asserting all
seventy-six claims against all forty-eight defendants.
Rather, each claim is brought only against one or
several particular defendants. The [Federal] Rules
[of Civil Procedure] simply do not allow “the joinder
of unrelated claims against different defendants.”
. . . Here, my review of Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly
establishes that Plaintiff’s claims against the forty-
eight defendants do not factually arise from a common
“transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences” and will not involve universally common
questions of law or fact. Since this Court would not
accept this type of “omnibus” pleading of unrelated
claims from a lawyer or non-prisoner pro se litigant,
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it should not be accepted from this prisoner litigant.
Thus, I recommend that Plaintiff’s Complaint be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Chase, 2011 WL 6826504, at *4 (citations omitted). See also
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated
claims against different defendants belong in different suits,
not only to prevent the sort of morass that this 50–claim, 24–
defendant suit produced but also to ensure that prisoners pay
the required filing fees — for the Prison Litigation Reform Act
limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any
prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees.”).
Similarly, in Askew v. Davis, No. 11-cv-0902-MJR, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 113019, 2012 WL 3308639 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2012), a
case in which the plaintiff asserted a more focused set of
claims than Stile asserts here, the court stated the following
in its order on preliminary review:
In George, [507 F.3d at 605,] the Seventh Circuit
emphasized that unrelated claims against different
defendants must be filed in (or severed into) separate
lawsuits, to prevent the “morass” produced by multi-
claim, multi-defendant suits and “also to ensure that
prisoners pay the required filing fees” under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (i.e., filing fees are
required for every lawsuit, and inmates cannot skirt
that responsibility by lumping multiple unrelated
claims together in a single suit).
[T]he Seventh Circuit [has since] . . . reiterated
that when a complaint clumsily joins unrelated
defendants and claims, representing “the archetype of
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unwieldy prisoner litigation,” the district court on
1915A review should either dismiss the improperly
joined defendants or carve the case into separate
lawsuits. Opting for the former approach in this
particular situation, the Court dismisses from this
action (without prejudice to re-filing in separate
suits, supported by separately paid filing fees) all
claims based on Askew’s medical treatment prior to his
arrival at PCC.
Askew, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113019, at *7, 2012 WL 3308639, at
*2-*3 (citations omitted).
Here, Stile has sued 32 different defendants, asserting
claims under at least ten different legal theories, arising from
what appear to be a dozen or more different transactions or
occurrences that took place over the course of more than two
years. Stile’s claims arising from allegedly inadequate medical
care for dental problems, for example, are not properly joined
in the same lawsuit with claims against different defendants,
arising from an alleged denial of the right to engage in
religious activities. In short, the reasoning of Chase, Askew,
and George is persuasive. Therefore, the district judge should
dismiss all claims asserted in the complaint, which arise out of
incidents occurring during or after July 2013, without prejudice
to Stile’s ability to file separate lawsuits based on those
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incidents, in accordance with Rules 8, 18, and 20 and the
principles discussed here and in Chase, Askew, and George.6
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the magistrate judge recommends
that:
1. The district judge should dismiss all claims
based upon the factual allegations in paragraphs 36-
38 and 41 of the Complaint, for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted, and all claims
based on the factual allegations in paragraphs 35,
except insofar as this court has granted Stile an
opportunity to amend a conditions of confinement claim
relating to the lack of drinking water, in the Order
issued this date;
2. The district judge should dismiss all claims
based on the factual allegations in paragraph 39 of
the Complaint, relating to the handling of Stile’s
incoming mail at SCHC, for failure to state a claim,
except insofar as this court has granted Stile an
opportunity to amend a First Amendment claim relating
to those allegations, in the Order issued this date.
6To avoid unnecessarily generating statute of limitations
issues with respect to Stile’s claims dismissed from this case
without prejudice, arising on or after July 2013, and in the
interest of justice given plaintiff’s pro se status, this Report
and Recommendation addresses the merits of plaintiff’s claims
relating to incidents occurring before July 2013 in Part I,
above and the merits of claims relating to the handling of
Stile’s mail, in Part II above. In limiting the merits-based
review of Stile’s claims, this court does not express any
opinion with respect to whether there are viable claims in the
remaining parts of the Complaint.
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3. The district judge should dismiss all claims
based upon the factual allegations in paragraphs 42-
169 of the Complaint, concerning events occurring in
July 2013 or thereafter, without prejudice to
plaintiff’s ability to file separate actions that
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 19,
and 20, and the principles articulated in Part III of
this Report and Recommendation;
4. The district judge should dismiss all claims
asserted against all of the individual defendants
other than Noseworthy, Farrell, Brackett, Collins,
Warren, and Pelkie (upon whom service is directed in
the Order issued this date);
5. The district judge should dismiss all official
capacity claims, all claims against the U.S. Marshals
Service, and all claims asserted against Strafford
County, its officers, and its agencies, except for the
First Amendment and RLUIPA claims against the SCHC, an
agency of Strafford County, and defendants Farrell,
Brackett, Collins, and Pelkie, in their official
capacities as SCHC officers and officials;
6. The district judge should dismiss all claims
against the Strafford County Sheriff, Seacoast
Orthopedics & Sports Medicine, American Institutional
Medical Group, and Resources Re-Entry Associates,
because none of plaintiff’s surviving claims allege
conduct by those defendants; and
7. The district judge should cause the following
defendants to be dropped from this action, by
approving this Report and Recommendation, as no claim
remains against them in this action: the U.S.
Marshals Service; the Strafford County Sheriff;
Strafford County Commissioners George Maglaras and
Robert Watson; County Administrator Raymond Bower; Dr.
Dirksmeier, Christopher Schwieger, Dr. Timothy
Donnelly, Dr. Christopher Braga, and Jason Doran;
Seacoast Orthopedics & Sports Medicine; American
Institutional Medical Group; and Resources Re-Entry
Associates; SCHC Lt. Weisgarber, Lt. Donna Roy, Lt.
Lee, Corrections Officer (“CO”) Metcalf, Cpl. Rivera,
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Cpl. Nadeau, CO Goutier, Cpl. Robert Farrell, and Sgt.
Hayden; and Robert Lang, Patti Place, and Patricia
Lilly.
Any objection to this report and recommendation must be
filed within 14 days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file an objection within the
specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s
order. See Garayalde-Rijos v. Muni. of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15-
21-22 (1st Cir. 2014).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
May 9, 2016
cc: James Stile, pro se
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