Stile v. Dubois et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
James Stile
v. 	Civil No. 17-cv-406-JD
David G. Dubois, Strafford
County Sheriff, et al.1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is plaintiff James Stile’s complaint (Doc.
No. 1) asserting claims against a number of employees and
officers of Strafford County, New Hampshire; the Strafford
County Department of Corrections (“SCDC”); the Strafford County
Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”); and the U.S. Marshals Service
(“USMS”), relating to events alleged to have occurred on
September 5, 2014, while Stile was a federal pretrial detainee
housed at the SCDC. 	The matter is here for preliminary review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and LR 4.3(d)(1).
1Defendants named in the Complaint (Doc. No. 1), in addition
to Strafford County, are Strafford County Administrator Raymond
Bower; Strafford County Sheriff David G. Dubois; Strafford
County Sheriff’s Office Deputies Kerrie Lee Clement and Ronald
Dossett; (former) Strafford County Department of Corrections
(“SCDC”) Superintendent Bruce Pelkie; SCDC Cpl. Robert Farrell;
SCDC Sgt. Hayden; and Alex Patnode, Dean Knightly, and Randy
Ossinger, U.S. Marshals Service, District of Maine, all named in
their individual and official capacities.
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Preliminary Review Standard
The court conducts a preliminary review of prisoner
complaints filed in forma pauperis. 	See LR 4.3(d)(1); see also
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. 	In conducting its preliminary
review, the court construes pro se complaints liberally. 	See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
Stripped of legal conclusions, and with all reasonable
inferences construed in plaintiff’s favor, the complaint must
contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief.’” 	See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citation omitted). 	Claims may be dismissed if, among
other things, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 	See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A(b)(1); LR 4.3(d)(1)(A).
Background
In September 2014, Stile was in pretrial detention at the
SCDC, awaiting a trial in a federal criminal case then pending
in the District of Maine. 	The SCDC had custody over Stile
pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement between Strafford
County and the USMS regarding the care and custody of federal
pretrial detainees.
On September 5, 2014, Stile alleges, defendants SCDC Cpl.
Robert Farrell and SCDC Sgt. Hayden handcuffed and shackled
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Stile, and then dragged him to the SCDC garage sallyport, where
officers were waiting to put Stile into a van for transport to a
hearing in his criminal case in Maine. 	Stile asserts that ten
unnamed SCDC corrections officers (“COs”) “assaulted and
battered” him in the sallyport as they put him into the van.
Stile further asserts that he suffered injuries including
permanent scarring of his wrists and ankles as a result of being
handcuffed, shackled, and forcefully placed in the van.
Stile alleges that the van at issue was an SCSO van, not
properly outfitted for passenger transport, which was operated
by SCSO Deputies Kerrie Lee Clement and Ronald Dossett. 	Stile
asserts that the van had bench seats without padding and lacked
handholds and seatbelts. 	Stile further asserts that Clement or
Dossett, while driving the van, hit the gas and brake pedal
alternately and swerved left and right, with the intent to harm
him. 	The officer’s driving and the van’s lack of safety
features, Stile asserts, caused him to bounce against the walls
of the van. 	As a result, Stile alleges, he suffered cuts,
abrasions, contusions, lumbar spinal injuries (exceeding the
scope of his existing injuries), and scarring. 	In addition,
Stile asserts, defendants Clement and Dossett did not give Stile
two doses of pain medication that he was scheduled to receive on
the van rides to and from the Maine courthouse.
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Stile states that upon his arrival at the courthouse, the
USMS took custody of him without any defendant having ensured he
received medical treatment for his injuries. 	Stile asserts that
USMS agents wheeled him into the courtroom “covered in blood.”
Stile further asserts that his injuries were not treated “for
days.”
Claims
Stile asserts the following claims for damages here:
1. 	SCDC corrections officers Farrell and Hayden used
excessive force against Stile, in that Farrell and Hayden
shackled and handcuffed Stile, and then dragged him to the
SCDC garage sallyport on September 5, 2014:
a. 	rendering Farrell and Hayden liable to Stile for
violating Stile’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
b. 	rendering Farrell and Hayden liable to Stile for
the intentional torts of assault and battery, under
state law; and
c. 	rendering Strafford County vicariously liable to
Stile under state law for the SCDC officers’ tortious
conduct.
2. 	Defendants SCSO Deputies Clement and Dossett used
excessive force against Stile, in that they operated the
van on September 5, 2014 in a manner intending to make
Stile (while handcuffed and shackled) bounce against the
van walls, causing Stile to suffer pain and physical
injuries:
a. 	rendering Clement and Dossett liable to Stile
under for violating Stile’s Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
b. 	rendering Clement and Dossett liable to Stile for
(i) negligence; or (ii) the intentional torts of
assault and battery, under state law; and
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c. 	rendering Strafford County vicariously liable to
Stile under state law for the SCSO deputies’ tortious
conduct.
3. 	Defendants SCSO Deputies Clement and Dossett twice
failed to give Stile his pain medication on the van ride
between the SCDC and the Maine courthouse:
a. 	rendering Clement and Dossett liable to Stile for
violating Stile’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
b. 	rendering Clement and Dossett liable to Stile for
negligence, under state law; and
c. 	rendering Strafford County vicariously liable to
Stile under state law for their tortious conduct.
4. 	SCSO Deputies Clement and Dossett allowed USMS agents
to take custody of Stile without first securing medical
attention for his wounds on September 5, 2014:
a. 	rendering Clement and Dossett liable to Stile
under for violating Stile’s Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
b. 	rendering Clement and Dossett liable to Stile for
negligence, under state law; and
c. 	rendering Strafford County vicariously liable to
Stile under state law for their tortious conduct.
5. 	Stile’s September 5, 2014 wounds were not treated for
days after those injuries were sustained:
a. 	rendering defendants liable to Stile for
violating Stile’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
b. 	rendering defendants liable to Stile for
negligence under state law; and
c. 	rendering Strafford County vicariously liable to
Stile under state law for the individual defendants’
tortious conduct.
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6. 	SCDC Superintendent Pelkie (i.) authorized Farrell and
Hayden to shackle, handcuff, and then drag Stile to the
SCDC sallyport on September 5, 2014, and (ii.) failed to
train Farrell and Hayden relating to the use of shackles
and handcuffs:
a. 	rendering Pelkie liable to Stile for violating
Stile’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983;
b. 	rendering Strafford County liable to Stile for
violating Stile’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
c. 	rendering Pelkie liable to Stile for negligence,
under state law; and
d. 	rendering Strafford County vicariously liable to
Stile under state law for Pelkie’s tortious conduct.
7. 	Strafford County Sheriff David Dubois (i.) maintained
a fleet of unsafe transport vans; and (ii.) failed to train
defendants Clement and Dossett relating to the safe
transport of detainees in the SCDC vans:
a. 	rendering Dubois liable to Stile for violating
Stile’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983;
b. 	rendering Strafford County liable to Stile for
violating Stile’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
c. 	rendering Dubois liable to Stile for negligence
under state law; and
d. 	rendering Strafford County vicariously liable to
Stile under state law for Dubois’s tortious conduct.
8. 	Defendants are liable to Stile for providing him with
substandard care and unsafe transport, in light of their
consent to the terms of the intergovernmental agreement
between the USMS and Strafford County for the care,
custody, and transport of federal pretrial detainees.
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Discussion
I. 	Claims to Be Served
The court finds that plaintiff has asserted sufficient
facts to warrant service of the claims identified in this Report
and Recommendation as Claims 1(a)-(c), 2(a)-(c), 6(a)-(d), and
7(a)-(d). 	In the Order issued on this date, the court has
directed service of those claims against the defendants
identified therein.
II. 	Denial of Medication (Claim 3(a))
In Claim 3(a), Stile has alleged that SCSO Deputies Clement
and Dossett did not provide him with two doses of medication in
the course of driving him to and from the federal courthouse in
Bangor, Maine, a three-hour trip each way. 	The Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits conditions of
confinement, including cases of inadequate medical care, that
amount to pretrial punishment. 	See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535 (1979). 	A claim of punitive conditions of pretrial
confinement relating to medical care requires a showing of a
“serious medical need.” 	Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Davila, 813
F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2016). 	A serious medical need is “one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment,
or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” 	Id.
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In addition to pleading facts relating to a serious
medical need, an inmate alleging that defendant officers
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care must
plead facts regarding the officers’ mens rea. 	“‘[L]iability for
negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
threshold of constitutional due process.’” 	Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015) (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original). 	The facts alleged regarding the
officers’ failure to provide Stile with two doses of prescribed
medication over the course of six hours, without more, fails to
state a claim of more than negligently inflicted harm.
Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss Claim 3(a),
without prejudice, as insufficiently pleaded.
III. Other Delayed Treatment (Claims 4(a), 5(a))
Stile has asserted additional claims (Claims 4(a), 5(a))
alleging that defendants failed to take steps to ensure that
injuries he received on September 5, 2014 were treated promptly.
Stile has not pleaded any facts, however, showing that the
officers at issue knew that Stile had a serious medical need for
treatment relating to those injuries. 	Stile’s assertions,
without more, may state a claim of negligently inflicted harm,
but do not state a Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim.
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Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss Claims 4(a) and
5(a), without prejudice, as insufficiently pleaded.
IV. 	State Claims 3(b)-(c), 4(b)-(c), 5(b)-(c)
To prove defendants are liable for damages on the state
tort claims relating to alleged delays in treating Stile’s
medical conditions, identified in this Report and Recommendation
as Claims 3(b), 3(c), 4(b), 4(c), 5(b), and 5(c), would likely
require the introduction of expert testimony and other evidence
that would not be relevant as to any of the federal claims that
this court has allowed to proceed. 	The litigation of those
state law tort claims would be likely to substantially
predominate over the claims that are within this court’s
original jurisdiction. 	Accordingly, the district judge should
dismiss Claims 3(b), 3(c), 4(b), 4(c), 5(b), and 5(c), without
prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).
V. 	Claims Based on Intergovernmental Agreement (Claim 8)
Stile has asserted that defendants, including Strafford
County and the individual signatories to the intergovernmental
agreement between the USMS and Strafford County (namely,
defendants Bower, Knightly, Patnode, and Ossinger), are liable
to him for executing the agreement, which resulted in the uses
of force that Stile claims caused him injuries. 	Stile’s claim,
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styled as a tort claim, is based on speculation regarding what
might or might not have happened if a contract between the USMS
and Strafford County had not existed. 	That claim is not legally
cognizable, and the individual signatories to the agreement are
not properly named as defendants to any claim in this action.
The district judge should thus dismiss Claim 8, and Bower,
Knightly, Patnode, and Ossinger should be dropped as defendants.2
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss Claims 3, 4, 5, and 8, including subparts, without
2The dismissal of Claim 8 would be without prejudice to
Stile’s ability to move to amend the Complaint to plead a breach
of contract claim arising from Strafford County’s alleged
nonperformance of duties under specific provisions of the
intergovernmental agreement, relating to Claims 1, 2, 6, and 7.
See Zikianda v. Cty. of Albany, No. 1:12-CV-1194, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 122363, at *107-*108, 2015 WL 5510956, at *37
(N.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2015) (immigration detainee was intended
beneficiary of intergovernmental agreement between U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and county for
provision of medical care to ICE detainees in county’s custody);
see also Melvin v. Cty. of Westchester, No. 14-CV-2995 (KMK),
2016 WL 1254394, at *22, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41120, at *74-*75
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016) (citing cases). 	This court, lacking
access to the specific agreement at issue, expresses no opinion
at this time as to whether a proposed complaint amendment,
including such a third party beneficiary contract claim, would
survive the court’s preliminary review. 	Cf. Brooks v. Trustees
of Dartmouth Coll., 161 N.H. 685, 698, 20 A.3d 890, 900 (2011)
(unless contract shows “‘that the parties considered the third
party’s legal status and intended to confer upon him a right to
sue,’” third party is deemed to be “incidental beneficiary”
lacking standing to sue (citation omitted)).
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prejudice. 	The district judge should also direct that
defendants Raymond Bower, Alex Patnode, Dean Knightly, and Randy
Ossinger be dropped as parties, as no cognizable claims are
pending against them in this case.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen day period may be extended
upon motion. 	Failure to file objections within the specified
time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016).
______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
April 12, 2018
cc: 	James Stile, pro se
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