DeLima v. YouTube, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Natasha DeLima
v. 	Civil No. 17-cv-733-PB
YouTube, LLC et al. 1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court for preliminary review is plaintiff
Natasha DeLima’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 131) and documents
the court deems to be addenda to the amended complaint (Doc.
Nos. 72, 87, 130, 130-1, 130-2, 130-3). 	See LR 4.3(d)(2); Aug.
17, 2018 Order (referring amended complaint to magistrate judge
for preliminary review). 	Also before the court for
consideration and a report and recommendation are the
plaintiff’s motions seeking preliminary injunctive relief (Doc.
Nos. 3, 5-8, 11, 17, 28, 29).
Pending Appeals
As an initial matter, the court notes that DeLima has filed
four notices of appeal (Doc. Nos. 115, 126, 132, 138) that have
been forwarded to the First Circuit.
[T]he Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction of appeals
from final decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, a defined
group of interlocutory decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1292,
and a “small class [of decisions] which finally
1The defendants in this case are: Google LLC; Twitter, Inc.;
YouTube, LLC; Patreon, Inc.; Facebook, Inc.; GoFundMe, Inc.; and
Blogspot.com.
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 1 of 20

2
determine claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too
important to be denied review and too independent of
the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.”
Perry v. Tinkham, No. 2:15-CV-00310-JCN, 2018 WL 2376090, at *1
n.3, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87069, at *2 n.3 (D. Me. May 24,
2018) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 546 (1949)), appeal filed sub nom. Perry v. Alexander, No.
18-1572 (1st Cir., filed June 18, 2018). 	The order, and lack of
orders, challenged in DeLima’s notices of appeal are neither
final orders under § 1291 nor subject to interlocutory appeal
under § 1292. 	DeLima’s filing of notices of appeal have not
divested this court of jurisdiction over this matter. 	The court
finds, therefore, that it retains jurisdiction over all of the
matters presently before the court in this case.
Preliminary Review
I. 	Standard
In determining whether a pro se pleading states a claim,
the court construes the pleading liberally. 	See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 	To survive preliminary review,
the complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief.’” 	See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). 	Disregarding
conclusory allegations and legal conclusions, the court treats
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 2 of 20

3
as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and construes
reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. 	See Hernandez-
Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). 	The court may dismiss claims
asserted in a complaint if the court lacks jurisdiction, a
defendant is immune from the relief sought, the complaint fails
to state a claim, or the action is frivolous or malicious. 	See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); LR 4.3(d)(2).
II. 	Background
DeLima’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 131) contains no clear
narrative and is difficult to understand. 	Many of DeLima’s
assertions are legal conclusions that are not supported by any
specific facts. 	Liberally construed, the amended complaint
appears to allege the following facts and claims.
In her amended complaint (Doc. No. 131) and addenda thereto
(Doc. Nos. 72, 87, 130, 130-1, 130-2, 130-3) (collectively
“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”), DeLima asserts claims
against defendants Google LLC (“Google”); Twitter, Inc.
(“Twitter”); YouTube, LLC (“YouTube”); Facebook, Inc.
(“Facebook”); Patreon, Inc. (“Patreon”); GoFundme, Inc.
(“GoFundMe”); and Blogspot.com. 	DeLima’s claims arise out of
her assertions that her rights were violated in connection with
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 3 of 20

4
her use of the defendants’ websites. 	DeLima alleges that she
has created one or more accounts on YouTube, Google, Facebook
Twitter, Blogspot.com, Patreon, or GoFundMe, and that she is a
member of a group of Facebook users who contribute to a Facebook
account entitled “Stop Bullying Protect All Children.” 	Using
those accounts, DeLima posts videos and other content. 	Other
users of the defendants’ websites follow DeLima’s accounts as
subscribers, or view her videos and other content without
subscribing.
DeLima asserts that the number of people who view and
subscribe to her accounts on the defendants’ websites entitles
her to certain advertising revenue earned by YouTube and
possibly other defendants, and that those defendants have
embezzled such revenue from her. 	DeLima further asserts that on
two of the websites, Patreon and GoFundMe, she has established
fundraising websites, but that Patreon and GoFundMe have
embezzled money donated or pledged to her through those
websites. 	DeLima claims the defendants have engaged in various
tactics to receive money to which she is entitled, including
manipulating data concerning the number of people who subscribe
to and view her videos, and otherwise tampering with her
accounts.
Although DeLima concedes that she “does not actually know
how much is paid [by YouTube/Google] per ad, per view and per
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 4 of 20

5
option of advertising,” FAC at 5, she states in the FAC that the
defendants are embezzling 90% or 100% of the money she has
earned on defendants’ internet platforms. 	DeLima acknowledges
that she has received payments from Google for revenue earned by
her YouTube channel, as Google owns YouTube, but that the amount
paid to her was a small percentage of what it should have been,
and was reduced by the defendants’ “illicit acts.”
DeLima further claims that the defendants, motivated by
political bias, based on the views she expresses in her videos
and other postings, have locked her out of her various accounts;
closed her accounts; denied her the ability to post some or all
content; deleted subscribers, comments, and view-counts relating
to her accounts; placed false strikes on her accounts; stole or
otherwise denied DeLima access to her “virtual property,”2 and
otherwise harassed her.
DeLima additionally states that at one time she had a blog
on Blogspot.com with the domain name
http://natashanothingbuttruth.blogspot.com. 	At some point she
stopped using that domain. 	DeLima alleges that although she
purchased that domain, and that she holds a copyright in the
2The FAC does not explain what “virtual property” is, but
refers the court to Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34
(S.D.N.Y. 2017), which DeLima describes as “[t]he ruling case
for all of the virtual property rights.” 	That case does not
contain the phrase “virtual property” or otherwise make clear
what DeLima intends to identify as her virtual property in this
case.
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 5 of 20

6
domain name, defendants Blogspot.com and Google have allowed
someone else to use that domain name to post content, some of
which she alleges is defamatory and harms DeLima and/or her
audience.
Generously construing the assertions in the FAC, the court
finds that DeLima asserts the following claims in this action:
1. 	All of the defendants have violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (“FLSA”), by failing
to pay DeLima minimum wage.
2. 	All of the defendants have embezzled money earned by
DeLima on the defendants’ internet platforms and engaged in
other criminal activity with regard to DeLima’s use of
those platforms.
3. 	All of the defendants have violated DeLima’s First
Amendment right to free speech, and engaged in viewpoint
discrimination, by: a) censoring the content she posts on
the defendants’ internet platforms; b) denying DeLima
access to the defendants’ internet platforms; and c)
requiring that DeLima agree to “Terms of Service” which
allow the defendants to curtail her free speech rights.
4. 	Blogspot.com and Google have violated DeLima’s civil
rights and engaged in the “crime of cyberbullying” by
allowing someone to reuse a domain name DeLima purchased,
but had ceased to use, to (a) harass, bully, demean,
ridicule, lie about, defame, libel, and slander DeLima, and
(b) infringe upon DeLima’s copyright in the domain name.
5. 	Facebook has violated Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) rules concerning the protection of
privacy and protection from recorded phone calls.
6. 	Facebook targeted DeLima because she was trying to
expose and prevent sex trafficking, in violation of: (a)
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq.
(“CFAA”); (b) the Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation
Act of 2015, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (“SAVE Act”); and the
combined Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act and Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act
(“FOSTA-SESTA”).
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 6 of 20

7
7. 	Facebook has sold DeLima’s personal data to
advertisers, in violation of her right to privacy in that
information.
8. 	All of the defendants have improperly forced DeLima to
consent to “Terms of Service,” and changes to those Terms
of Service of which users are not given notice, which
“violate the Constitution, Federal laws, and civil rights,
as well as virtual property rights . . . [are]
discriminatory, and allow for the theft and ‘virtual
closing’ of sites . . . and [] virtual laws, that they make
up” in order to utilize each of the defendants’ internet
platforms or services.
9. 	All of the defendants have haunted, chased, spied on,
targeted, demeaned, attempted to ambush plaintiff; placed
false strikes on plaintiff’s accounts; closed or shut down
plaintiff’s accounts; locked plaintiff out of her accounts;
tried to use United Kingdom law or “Sharia law” in the
United States to avoid complying with federal law; denied
plaintiff the use of and access to her “virtual property”;
placed warnings on DeLima’s website; tried to stop people
from accessing DeLima’s accounts; prevented DeLima’s
accounts from being viewed on cell phones; stolen DeLima’s
intellectual and “virtual” property; engaged in
“shadowbanning” and cyberbullying; manipulated data
relating to DeLima’s accounts on the defendants’ platforms;
failed to “monetize” DeLima’s accounts, and violated
“internet rules.”
10. 	All of the defendants have harmed DeLima’s audience
members and other users of their internet platforms,
including Isaac Green, Julian Assange, and Melania Trump.
11. 	Defendants have violated Donald Trump’s December 2017
Executive Order.
III. Discussion
A. 	FLSA – Claim 1
Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated FLSA by failing
to pay DeLima minimum wage. 	To state a FLSA claim, a plaintiff
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 7 of 20

8
must assert: “(1) that he was employed by the defendants; (2)
his work involved interstate activity; and (3) he performed work
for which he was under-compensated.” 	Chen v. C & R Rock Inc.,
No. 14-cv-114-AJ, 2016 WL 1117416, at *3, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36951, at *7 (D.N.H. Mar. 22, 2016). 	DeLima does not allege, or
state facts to suggest, that she was ever employed by any of the
defendants. 	Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss this
claim, identified in this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) as
Claim 1.
B. 	Criminal Acts – Claim 2
DeLima alleges that all of the defendants have engaged in
criminal conduct. 	DeLima does not have a protected interest or
right to have alleged wrongdoers investigated or criminally
prosecuted. 	Cf. Nieves-Ramos v. Gonzalez-De-Rodriguez, 737 F.
Supp. 727, 728 (D.P.R. 1990) (citing Linda R. S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another”)). 	Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss
DeLima’s claim seeking relief on the basis that the defendants
engaged in criminal conduct, identified in this R&R as Claim 2.
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 8 of 20

9
C. 	First Amendment – Claim 3
DeLima asserts that the defendants have discriminated
against her based on her political views, and censored her
expression of those views on the defendants’ internet platfroms,
in violation of her First Amendment rights. 	“[T]he
constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only
against abridgment by government, federal or state.” 	Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976). 	“[O]nly the government can
violate First Amendment rights: every First Amendment claim thus
requires state action in some sense.” 	McGuire v. Reilly, 386
F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2004).
DeLima alleges that by censoring and deleting content she
has posted on the defendants’ internet platforms, and otherwise
inhibiting her ability to express herself, the defendants have
violated her right to free speech and engaged in viewpoint
discrimination. 	Defendants are all private companies. 	DeLima
has failed to allege any state action giving rise to the alleged
violations of her First Amendment rights, and the district judge
should dismiss DeLima’s First Amendment claims, identified in
this R&R as Claim 3.
D. 	Domain Name
DeLima asserts that she bought a domain name from
Blogspot.com, a blog hosting service owned by Google. 	She says
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 9 of 20

10
that she later shortened the name of her personal blog and
stopped using the longer name, but that she retains the
copyright in the longer domain name. 	DeLima alleges that, when
she ceased to use the longer domain name, Google and
Blogspot.com allowed it to be used by a third party, identified
by DeLima as “Bruce Bot,” the moniker used by the blog’s present
author. 	DeLima state that Bruce Bot has cyberbullied her, used
her virtual property, harassed, defamed, libeled and slandered
her, and infringed upon her copyright in the domain name.
DeLima states that by allowing her domain name to be “recycled,”
rather than placing it in “internet trash,” Blogspot.com and
Google are liable for the harm she alleges has been caused, both
to DeLima and her audience, as a result of Bruce Bot’s use of
that domain.
1. 	Liability for Blogspot.com Content – Claim 4(a)
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1) (“CDA”) provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.” 	Id. (emphasis added).
Section 230 defines an “interactive computer service”
(“ICS”) as “any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server.”
Subsection 230(f)(3) then defines an “information
content provider” (“ICP”) as “any person or entity that
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 10 of 20

11
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service.”
Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 873 F.3d 313, 318
(1st Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 	“[T]o avail itself of the
immunity set forth in § 230(c)(1),” a defendant “must be a
provider or user of an [ICS]”; defending a claim “based on
information provided by another [ICP]”; and the claim at issue
must “treat [the ICS] as the publisher or speaker of that
information.” 	Small Justice LLC, 873 F.3d at 318.
Google is an ICS, see Weerahandi v. Shelesh, No. 3:16-CV-
06131-BRM-TJB, 2017 WL 4330365, at *6, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
163910, at *19 (D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2017), and Blogspot.com, which
is owned by Google and serves as an online venue for Google’s
interactive computer services, and is thus also an ICS. 	Both of
those defendants are therefore afforded immunity under the CDA
“for the publication of defamatory content prepared or posted by
others.” 	Pagan v. Google Corp., No. 16-cv-401-JD, 2016 WL
7187645, at *1, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170738, at *2 (D.N.H. Nov.
15, 2016). 	The fact that Bruce Bot may have been improperly
using a domain name that belongs to DeLima does not serve as a
basis to hold Google or Blogspot liable for the content posted
by Bruce Bot using that domain name. 	Accordingly, the district
judge should dismiss DeLima’s claim, identified in this R&R as
Claim 4(a).
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 11 of 20

12
2. 	Copyright Infringement – Claim 4(b)
DeLima claims that the content placed on Blogspot.com by
Bruce Bot in connection with DeLima’s former domain name
amounted to copyright infringement by Google and Blogspot.com.
Assuming, without deciding, that the CDA does not immunize the
defendants from such a claim, the court considers whether DeLima
has asserted sufficient facts to state a copyright infringement
claim upon which relief might be granted.
“To establish copyright infringement, the plaintiff must
prove two elements: ‘(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2)
copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.’”
Latin Am. Music Co. v. Media Power Grp., Inc., 705 F.3d 34, 38
(1st Cir. 2013). 	“Registration of a copyright is a precondition
to filing a copyright infringement claim.” 	Id. at 42-43. 	To
satisfy the “ownership of a valid copyright” element, DeLima
must, at a minimum, demonstrate that she has registered a
copyright in the domain name she alleges has been infringed.
DeLima has failed to do so, and her bald assertion that the
domain name is “copyrighted,” without more, is insufficient to
state a copyright infringement claim. 	Accordingly, the district
judge should dismiss DeLima’s copyright infringement claim,
identified as Claim 4(b) in this R&R.
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 12 of 20

13
E. 	FCC Rules – Claim 5
DeLima alleges, without elaboration, that defendants
engaged in conduct that violated FCC Rules concerning protection
of privacy and protection from recorded phone calls. 	DeLima has
provided a link to a page on the FCC website, but does not cite
to any law giving rise to a private right of action for her
claim, and she does not state any factual allegations to support
any claim that this court can identify, upon which relief can be
granted. 	Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss
DeLima’s claim that defendants violated FCC rules, identified in
this R&R as Claim 5.
F. 	CFAA, SAVE Act & FOSTA-SESTA – Claim 6
DeLima asserts that Facebook “targeted” her because she was
trying to expose and prevent sex trafficking on Facebook.
DeLima claims that Facebook is subject to civil and/or criminal
liability for violations of the CFAA, the SAVE Act, and FOFSTA-
SESTA. 	As discussed above, DeLima does not have standing to
prosecute another criminally.
Civil liability is available under the CFAA when an
individual “‘intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains
information from any protected computer,’” resulting in damages
exceeding $5000. 	Wentworth-Douglass Hosp. v. Young & Novis
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 13 of 20

14
Prof’l Ass’n, No. 10-cv-120-SM, 2012 WL 2522963, at *1-2, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90446, at *2 (D.N.H. June 29, 2012) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c)) (emphasis omitted). 	DeLima has not
asserted any facts indicating that Facebook has accessed her
computer, or otherwise caused damage actionable under the CFAA.
The SAVE Act allows for a private right of action for a
victim of sex trafficking suing an interactive computer service
that ran an advertisement that facilitated sex trafficking with
regard to that victim. 	See 18 U.S.C. § 1595. 	DeLima has not
asserted that she has been a victim of sex trafficking, and thus
has not stated any basis to maintain a civil action against
Facebook under the SAVE Act.
The FOSTA-SESTA amends the CDA to remove immunity from suit
for interactive computer services under limited circumstances,
concerning sex trafficking, that are irrelevant to this action,
or to any assertion by DeLima.3 	DeLima cannot, therefore, state
a claim based on FOSTA-SESTA.
3FOSTA-SESTA amends the Communications Act of 1934, the
original law on which the 1996 CDA was built, to clarify
that:
Section 230 does not limit: (1) a federal civil
claim for conduct that constitutes sex
trafficking, (2) a federal criminal charge for
conduct that constitutes sex trafficking, or (3)
a state criminal charge for conduct that promotes
or facilitates prostitution in violation of this
bill . . . . 	Currently, it a crime to knowingly
benefit from participation in a venture that
engages in sex trafficking. 	This bill defines
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 14 of 20

15
DeLima has failed to state facts which give rise to a
private cause of action under the CFAA, SAVE Act, or FOSTA-
SESTA. 	Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss these
claims, identified collectively in this R&R as Claim 6.
G. 	Facebook’s Sale of Personal Data – Claim 7
DeLima asserts that Facebook sold her “personal data” to
advertisers. 	Although not explicitly asserted, DeLima appears
to intend to assert a violation of her right to privacy in the
information she describes as “personal data.” 	Without further
allegations that Facebook engaged in tortious conduct or
breached a contract in doing so, DeLima has failed to state a
claim based on the alleged sale of her personal data by
Facebook, and the district judge should dismiss this claim,
identified in this R&R as Claim 7.
“participation in a venture” to mean knowingly
assisting, supporting, or facilitating a sex
trafficking violation.
This clarification that the CDA does not grant broad
immunity for Web sites knowingly participating in, and
supporting, the facilitation of sex trafficking or
prostitution, is further advanced by provisions to
allow survivors to recover damages through civil
actions.
Haley Halverson, Ending Immunity of Internet-Facilitated
Commercial Sexual Exploitation Through Amending the
Communications Decency Act, 21 J. Internet L. 3, 12–13 (2018)
(footnote omitted).
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 15 of 20

16
H. 	Terms of Service Agreements – Claim 8
DeLima objects to the defendants’ policies that require her
to consent to “Terms of Service,” “Terms of Use,” “Terms and
Conditions,” or similar agreements, prior to using defendants’
internet platforms. 	DeLima cites as the bases for her claim
that the agreements defendants required her to sign violate the
law or otherwise violate her rights, and that defendants
sometimes change the agreements without notice. 	DeLima’s
assertions in this regard are entirely conclusory, and fail to
state any specific term of any agreement that violates any right
accruing to DeLima or otherwise gives rise to a cause of action.
Delima has thus failed to state any cognizable claim in this
matter based on the requirement of agreeing to “Terms of
Service,” or similar documents, to use a website. 	Accordingly,
the district judge should dismiss this claim, identified in this
R&R as Claim 8.
I. 	Other Assertions – Claim 9
In Claim 10, as identified in this R&R, DeLima has asserted
a laundry list of wrongs to which, she alleges, the defendants
have subjected her, causing her harm. 	These allegations all
describe conduct that constitutes the “exercise of a publisher’s
traditional editorial functions – such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content,” for which the CDA
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 16 of 20

17
immunizes the defendant interactive computer service providers.
Hiam v HomeAway.com, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 338, 346 (D. Mass.
2017), aff’d, 887 F.3d 542 (1st Cir. 2018).
The allegations listed in Claim 10 are insufficient to
state a cause of action upon which relief might be granted.
Accordingly, the district judge should dismiss the claims
identified collectively in this R&R as Claim 9.
J. 	Claims Asserted on Behalf of Others – Claim 10
In the FAC, DeLima has asserted claims based on allegations
that the defendants have violated the rights of individuals
other than herself. 	DeLima cannot assert a violation of
another’s persons rights in this case, as she is not a lawyer,
and thus cannot represent the interests of anyone other than
herself in this court. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; LR 83.2(d).
Accordingly, to the extent DeLima has asserted claims on behalf
of any other individual, the district judge should dismiss those
claims, identified collectively in this R&R as Claim 10.
K. 	Executive Order – Claim 11
DeLima asserts, without explanation or support, that
defendants have violated a December 2017 Executive Order issued
by Donald Trump. 	This claim, identified in this R&R as Claim
14, is an unsupported conclusory statement. 	Nothing before the
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 17 of 20

18
court suggests that any executive order gives rise to a right
that a private party may enforce against another private party,
or that DeLima otherwise has a private right of action. 	The
district judge should dismiss Claim 11 for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Preliminary Injunction Motions
I. 	Injunctive Relief Sought
DeLima has moved for preliminary injunctive relief (Doc.
Nos. 3, 5-8, 11, 17, 29). 	“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.’” 	Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736 (2015)
(citation omitted); see also Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v.
MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011).
Demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits is a
prerequisite to obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. 	See
Esso Std. Oil Co. v. Monroig–Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir.
2006) (“if the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely
to succeed in his quest,” preliminary injunctive relief is
properly denied without further analysis). 	The burden of proof
is on the movant. 	See id.
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 18 of 20

19
For reasons explained in this R&R, DeLima has not stated
any claim upon which relief might be granted in the FAC.
Accordingly, DeLima cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits of any claim in this action, and the district
judge should deny DeLima’s motions for preliminary injunctive
relief (Doc. Nos. 3, 5-8, 11, 17, 29) on that basis.
Pending Motions to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Stay Proceedings
The court has taken under advisement motions to dismiss
and/or for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 27, 28, 56, 60, 95, 96,
123) which defendants have filed in this case. 	Defendants have
also filed a motion to stay proceedings (Doc. No. 97) in this
case pending resolution of the defendants’ motions to dismiss
and/or for summary judgment. 	Upon approval of this R&R, the
court should deny each of those motions as moot.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss the FAC (Doc. No. 131) in its entirety, deny DeLima’s
requests for preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. Nos. 1, 3, 5-8,
11, 17, 29), and deny as moot defendants’ motions to dismiss
and/or for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 27, 28, 56, 60, 95, 96,
123) and to stay proceedings (Doc. No. 97). Any objections to
this R&R must be filed within fourteen days of receipt of this
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 19 of 20

20
notice. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period
may be extended upon motion. 	Failure to file specific written
objections to the R&R within the specified time waives the right
to appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos v.
Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
August 30, 2018
cc: 	Natasha DeLima, pro se
Timothy John McLaughlin, Esq.
Matan Schacham, Esq.
Travis Silva, Esq.
Joseph H. Aronson, Esq.
Stephen J. Soule, Esq.
Nolan C. Burkhouse, Esq.
Case 1:17-cv-00733-PB Document 144 Filed 08/30/18 Page 20 of 20