Wilson v. Northern Correctional Facility, Warden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jarrell Wilson
v. 	Civil No. 19-cv-127-PB
New Hampshire State Prison Warden1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, Jarrell Wilson, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking release from the
C-4 Close Custody Unit (“CCU”) at the Northern New Hampshire
Correctional Facility (“NCF”) and placement in the general
prison population. 	The matter is before the court to determine
whether the petition is facially valid and may proceed. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 2243; Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
(“§ 2254 Rules”); see also § 2254 Rule 1(b) (authorizing court
to apply § 2254 Rules to § 2241 petitions); LR 4.3(d)(4).
Background
Petitioner claims that the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) upgraded his security classification without
providing him with the procedural protections the DOC
classification guidelines, handbook, and manuals indicate he
1Wilson’s current custodian, and the proper respondent in
this case, is the New Hampshire State Prison Warden. 	The
clerk’s office is directed to update the docket accordingly.
Case 1:19-cv-00127-PB Document 13 Filed 05/14/19 Page 1 of 7

2
must receive. 	The exhibits attached to the petition indicate
that on October 25, 2018, Wilson received notice that he was
being transferred to the NCF reception unit, pending his
reclassification, for the “safety and security of the
Institution.” 	Doc. No. 1-1, at 2. 	At a reclassification board
proceeding on October 29, 2018, NCF Capt. Smith explained to
Wilson that the “security threat” at issue involved Wilson’s
name coming up in the protective custody (“PC”) applications of
other inmates four times. 	Doc. No. 1-1, at 12. 	Capt. Smith and
other prison officials denied Wilson’s requests for written
evidence of such other inmates naming Wilson in their PC
proceedings. 	Wilson was then reclassified to C-4 custody status
and transferred to the CCU on October 29, 2018. 	Exhibits
attached to the petition indicate that a C-4/CCU placement is
not the most restrictive classification or placement in the
prison system in New Hampshire; disciplinary segregation in the
Special Housing Unit is more restrictive, and such inmates are
classified as C-5. 	Petitioner asserts, however, that upon his
reclassification and transfer to the CCU, he lost his kitchen
job and became ineligible for the educational programs that he
was enrolled in as a C-3 general population inmate.
Wilson appealed the reclassification decision within the
prison administrative system. 	Those appeals were unsuccessful.
Wilson’s transfer and reclassification were scheduled for
Case 1:19-cv-00127-PB Document 13 Filed 05/14/19 Page 2 of 7

3
reconsideration after six months, ending on or about April 29,
2019. 	On March 8, 2019, petitioner notified this court that he
had been transferred from NCF to the New Hampshire State Prison
(“NHSP”); petitioner has not filed any record suggesting that
his CCU placement has been extended at the NHSP.
Liberally construed, the petition asserts violations of
Wilson’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 	Wilson claims
prison officials reclassified him and transferred him to the CCU
for six months in October 2018, in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process, by failing to provide him with
written evidence regarding the threat that prison officials have
asserted he presents. 	Petitioner seeks an order that would
transfer him back to the general prison population.
Discussion
I. 	Mootness
Petitioner’s C-4 reclassification was scheduled for
termination or reconsideration on April 29, 2019, a date that
has since passed. 	The instant petition would appear to be moot.
The district judge should dismiss Wilson’s petition as moot, to
the extent he is no longer confined in the CCU pursuant to the
reclassification decision at issue in the instant petition. 	Cf.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8, 18 (1998) (“We are not in the
business of pronouncing that past actions which have no
Case 1:19-cv-00127-PB Document 13 Filed 05/14/19 Page 3 of 7

4
demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong.”).
II. 	Merits
Even if the relief Wilson seeks (release to the prison’s
general population) could be granted at this time, the petition
would still be properly dismissed, pursuant to § 2254 Rule 4, as
it plainly appears that Wilson is not entitled to relief on his
due process claims. 	The procedural protections of the Due
Process Clause are triggered only if there is a deprivation of a
protected interest in life, liberty, or property. 	See Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 	“A liberty interest may
arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees
implicit in the word ‘liberty.’” 	Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.
209, 221 (2005) (citations omitted). 	As a general principle,
inmates do not have a right or protected interest in any
particular institutional classification, placement, or
eligibility for rehabilitative programming. 	Riley v. O’Brien,
No. 16-11064-LTS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120039, at *17-*18, 2016
WL 8679258, at *6 (D. Mass. Sept. 6, 2016); see also Moody v.
Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 224-25 (1976) (Due Process Clause does not limit inter-
prison transfer even when the new institution is substantially
less agreeable); Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978, 980 (1st
Cir. 1974) (absent unusual circumstances, inmates do not have
Case 1:19-cv-00127-PB Document 13 Filed 05/14/19 Page 4 of 7

5
constitutional right to any particular security classification).
The Due Process Clause itself does not provide a basis for
Wilson to ground any protected liberty interest in challenging
his C-4 reclassification and transfer to the CCU.
Where the prison disciplinary restrictions at issue impose
an “‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life,’” courts may find a
protected liberty interest arising under state prison policies
or regulations. 	Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (quoting Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). 	Neither the loss of a prison
job, nor the lack of access to educational programming, nor loss
of a favorable security classification, nor transfer to a more
restrictive housing unit for six months, however, presents an
atypical and significant hardship relative to the ordinary
incidents of prison life upon which a viable claim could be
based here. 	See, e.g., Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 744
(7th Cir. 2013) (six-month confinement in segregation, without
more, was not atypical and significant hardship); Smith v. King,
No. 4:18CV219-DAS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14019, at *3, 2019 WL
361132, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 29, 2019) (six-month loss of
privileges, prison job, and “favorable custody level” is not
atypical and significant hardship); Waldron v. Gaetz, No. 11-cv-
242-JPG-PMF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112965, at *6, 2013 WL
4051703, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2013) (six month segregation
Case 1:19-cv-00127-PB Document 13 Filed 05/14/19 Page 5 of 7

6
with “no eligibility for a prison job” was not atypical and
significant hardship); see also Hodge v. Santiesteban, No. 1:19-
cv-00341-LJO-SAB (PC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77970, at *16, 2019
WL 2026503, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2019) (recommending
dismissal of due process claim, as allegations of removal from
educational course and six months in administrative segregation
did not amount to atypical and significant hardship); Graham v.
Fortier, No. 10-CV-332-JL, 2010 WL 11404450, at *9, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 126814, at *26 (D.N.H. Nov. 15, 2010) (“New
Hampshire law ‘does not give [an inmate] a right to any
particular custody status[,] and a change in custody status is
not the type of ‘atypical and significant hardship’ from which a
prisoner is entitled to protection under the due process
clause’” (citations omitted)), R&R approved, 2011 WL 1237668,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36869 (D.N.H. Apr. 4, 2011). 	As Wilson’s
petition pleads facts demonstrating that he lacked a protected
liberty interest under the circumstances, the district judge
should dismiss Wilson’s petition, pursuant to its authority
under § 2254 Rule 4 and LR 4.3(d)(4).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss Wilson’s petition. 	Any objections to this R&R must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed.
Case 1:19-cv-00127-PB Document 13 Filed 05/14/19 Page 6 of 7

7
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. 	Failure to file objections within the specified
time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
May 14, 2019
cc: 	Jarrell Wilson, pro se
Case 1:19-cv-00127-PB Document 13 Filed 05/14/19 Page 7 of 7