Powers v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John Powers
v. Civil No. 23-cv-173-JL
Federal Bureau of Prisons
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
When a federal prisoner’s term of imprisonment expires,
federal law requires the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to furnish
the prisoner with, among other things, “transportation to the
place of the prisoner's conviction, to the prisoner's bona fide
residence within the United States, or to such other place
within the United States as may be authorized by the Director
[of the BOP].” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(d)(3).
Plaintiff John Powers sued the BOP, seeking reimbursement
of $1000 for travel expenses from New Hampshire to California
following his release from BOP custody. Presently before the
court are the BOP’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment (Doc. No. 21) and Mr. Powers’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 24), both of which have been referred
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a report and
recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); LR 72.1. For the
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reasons that follow, BOP’s motion for summary judgment should be
granted.
BACKGROUND
On May 4, 2021, after a lengthy term of incarceration
stemming from convictions in several federal jurisdictions,1 and
nearing the end of his sentence, Mr. Powers was transferred from
BOP custody in the United States Penitentiary in Allenwood,
Pennsylvania (“USP Allenwood”) to Hampshire House Residential
Reentry Center (“Hampshire House”) in Manchester, New Hampshire.
Def. Mem., Ex. A (Doc. No. 21-2) ¶ 1. When Plaintiff was
transferred to Hampshire House, plaintiff’s approved Supervision
Release Plan (“Vermont release plan”) called for him to live
with his mother in Springfield, Vermont. Id. at 21.2 Plaintiff’s
release date was September 30, 2021.
Mr. Powers alleges that the Vermont release plan “became
null and void,” as a result of “unforeseen circumstances,”
though Mr. Powers includes neither the date of, nor a
description, of the “events” in his filings. Pltf. Decl. (Doc.
No. 24-2) ¶ 2. On August 3, 2021, Mr. Powers indicated to
Hampshire House personnel a potential release plan to Mountain
1 See generally, Powers v. Stancil, 794 F. App’x 736 (10th
Cir. 2019).
2 Although Mr. Powers describes the Vermont release plan as
“tentative,” see Pltf. Mot. (Doc. No. 24) ¶ 2, there is nothing
in the record that supports this description.
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View, California (“the California release plan”). Release Plan
(Doc. No. 24-1) at 1. However, a United States Probation Officer
rejected that plan on September 9, 2021, because plaintiff
refused to sign a waiver of hearing to modify his conditions of
supervised release to include a search condition and mental
health treatment. Id.
On September 10, 2021, Powers was terminated from Hampshire
House and returned to custody at Strafford County House of
Corrections (“SCHOC”). Id. He asserts that he was sent to SCHOC
“due to the USPO’s refusal to accept supervision in the District
of Vermont.” Pltf. Mot. (Doc. No. 24) DN 24 at 2. The summary
judgment record, however, contains no such refusal. Moreover, in
a lawsuit filed in this court against, the entity contracted to
operate Hampshire House, Mr. Powers claimed that he had been
terminated from the program on September 10, 2021, in
retaliation for filing grievances related to confiscation of
items that program staff considered contraband. See Powers v.
Cmty. Res. For Justice, Inc., No. 21-cv-775-SE, Complaint (Doc.
No. 1) at 5-7.3
3 Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, the court takes judicial
notice of documents filed in other courts, including Mr. Powers
prior complaint and orders related to his convictions in various
jurisdictions. See Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 305 (1st
Cir. 1990) (“It is well-accepted that federal courts may take
judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if those
proceedings have relevance to the matters at hand.”).
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As previously noted, Mr. Powers’s incarceration was the
result of convictions in more than one jurisdiction, somewhat
complicating his post-release supervision plans. On September
25, 2021, while still in custody at SCHOC, plaintiff commenced
the process of trying to change the primary jurisdiction over
his supervised release from the Middle District of Florida to
the Northern District of California. See Req. to Transfer
Supervised Release, Def. Mem., Exh. A. (Doc. No. 25-2). The
Florida court docketed Mr. Powers’s request on September 30,
2021, construing it as a motion to transfer supervision. See
United States v. Powers, No. 8:89-cr-60-JDW-TGW (M.D. Fla.)
(“Florida case”) Doc. No. 245. On October 6, 2021, the court
denied the transfer motion as moot. Id. Although the Florida
court provided no additional reasoning, on the same date, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California accepted jurisdiction over the term of supervised
release imposed in Mr. Powers’s conviction from the District of
New Jersey, which ordered the transfer the same day. See Harris
v. Powers, No. 5:21-cr-391-EJD (Doc. No. 1).
On October 3, 2021, while his first transfer motion was
still pending, Mr. Powers filed a second, more formal, motion in
the Middle District of Florida seeking the same relief –
transfer of supervision to California. Florida case, Mot. For
Misc. Relief (Doc. No. 248). That motion was supported by
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documentation indicating that Mr. Powers was already in Mountain
View, CA, and included a California Marriage License dated
October 1, 2021. Def. Obj., Exh. C. (Doc. No. 25-3). The Florida
court granted the motion on October 27, 2021. Def. Obj. (Doc.
No. 25-1) at 4.
On November 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed an administrative
claim with the BOP alleging that on September 30, 2021, he was
released from SCHOC in Dover, New Hampshire, and provided no
travel expenses to California. Pltf. Mem., Ex. A (Doc. No. 21-2)
at 15. He sought reimbursement for a property loss of $1,000,
his out-of-pocket travel expenses. Id. On May 6, 2022, Regional
Counsel for the BOP sent Plaintiff a letter denying his claim on
the basis that evidence did not support his claim and informing
him that judicial review was not available for his claim. Id.
On September 15, 2022, Mr. Powers filed the instant
complaint, claiming that the BOP had released him from his
federal sentence on September 30, 2021, without funds, clothing,
or transportation. Compl. (Doc. No. 1).4 He sought a $500
statutory “gratuity,” and $1,000 reimbursement for his expenses
to travel from Dover, New Hampshire to Mountain View,
California. The court dismissed the gratuity claim. See June 29,
4 Mr. Powers filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California. That court ordered the
case transferred to this court on January 20, 2023. Order of
Transfer (Doc. No. 7).
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2023, Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 12), approved, July
21, 2023 (Doc. No. 15). Thus, only his claim for reimbursement
of the $1,000 in travel expenses remains.
Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss – Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), BOP first argues that
this case should be dismissed because the statute governing the
relief he seeks precludes judicial review, thus depriving the
court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court disagrees.
Under the BOP’s theory, Mr. Powers’s claim for
reimbursement falls within the 31 U.S.C. 3723, which allows an
agency to “settle a claim for not more than $1,000 for . . .
loss of[] privately owned property . . . caused by the
negligence of an officer or employee of the United States
Government acting within the scope of employment.” The
administrative remedy provided by 31 U.S.C. § 3723 is the only
relief authorized by Congress for prisoners whose property is
wrongfully detained. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S.
214, 228 (2008). An agency’s decision under section 3723,
however, is not subject to judicial review. See Edkins v. United
States, No. 13–cv–14421, 2015 WL 871587, at *14 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
27, 2015) (collecting cases); Hoskins v. Craig, No. 11–296–GPM,
2013 WL 675734, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2013).
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Based on the language of the statute, the court is not
persuaded that Mr. Powers’s claim for reimbursement of travel
expenses is based on the “loss of privately owned property . . .
caused by negligence.” The court’s view is reinforced by the
lack of authority supporting BOP’s position. It is true, as BOP
points out, that courts interpret this provision “broadly,” to
include “all injuries associated in any way with the
‘detention.’” D.A. v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 3d 715, 731
(W.D. Tex. 2023). But even this “broad construction” has been
limited, in practice, to claims of “detention of goods that is
“unauthorized, tortious, or wrongful.” Id. (emphasis added).
Reported cases construing section 3723 are limited to the
alleged physical loss of tangible property. See, e.g., id. at
742 (alleging that officers “confiscated all of [plaintiff’s]
belongings, including her identification card, birth
certificates, and 80 Mexican pesos. These belongings were never
returned to [her].”); Feaster v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 366 F.
App’x 322, 322 (3d Cir. 2010) (plaintiff alleged that “items
from his personal property” were lost during prison transfer);
Railey v. Ebbert, 407 F. Supp. 3d 510, 522 (M.D. Pa. 2019)
(destruction of mail); Williams v. Hanson, No. 4:16CV155, 2016
WL 8674653, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2016) (denying judicial
review where plaintiff alleged that in the course of
transferring to a different prion, “he was missing . . . 3-4
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magazines, two books with plastic spines, two bowls, Ambi Cream,
a bowl with a lid, multi-vitamins, two containers of antifungal
cream, seven envelopes and four books.”) (internal quotes
omitted).
In the absence of authority supporting BOP’s argument that
reimbursement for travel expenses constitutes a claim for “loss
of property” or the “detention of any goods,” the court cannot
find that section 3723 applies to this case. Therefore, BOP’s
motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction
should be denied.
B. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment5
Summary judgment is required when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of
material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
Materiality depends on the substantive law, and only factual
5 Although Mr. Powers did not specifically object to BOP’s
motion, he filed a cross motion for summary judgment, which,
along with the court’s Notice Regarding Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 22), satisfies the court that plaintiff understands
defendants to be requesting summary judgment. In deference to
his pro se status, the court construes Mr. Powers’s motion as
both seeking affirmative relief and as an objection to the
defendant’s motion.
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disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit can preclude
summary judgment. Id. In reviewing the evidence, the court must
“draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000).
Where, as here, the court is considering cross-motions for
summary judgment, it must “consider each motion separately,
drawing all inferences in favor of each non-moving party in
turn.” AJC Int'l, Inc. v. Triple–S Propiedad, 790 F.3d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 2015) (quoting D & H Therapy Assocs., LLC v. Bos. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 640 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2011)). “Cross-motions for
summary judgment do not alter the summary judgment standard, but
instead simply ‘require [the Court] to determine whether either
of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts
that are not disputed.’” Wells Real Estate Inv. Tr. II, Inc. v.
Chardón/Hato Rey P'ship, 615 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2010)
(quoting Adria Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Ferré Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d
103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Here, the undisputed facts of record show that, at the time
of Mr. Powers’s release on September 30, 2021, his district of
conviction was New Jersey, his district of supervision was
Vermont and that his proposal to transfer supervision to
California had been rejected. Plaintiff’s supervision was not
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officially transferred to the Northern District of California
until, at the earliest, October 6, 2021 – that is, roughly a
week after he was released from custody -- when that
jurisdiction accepted plaintiff’s supervision relative to his
New Jersey conviction. Transfer relative to his Florida and
Indiana convictions was not finalized until January 2022. Def.
Mem. (Doc. No 25-1) at 4 n. 3.
Under these undisputed factual circumstances, the plaintiff
cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate that, at the time of his
release, Mountain View, California was the “place of his
conviction,” his bona fide residence within the United States,”
or “such other place . . . authorized by the Director” as
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3624. The BOP is therefore entitled to
summary judgment.6
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the district judge should grant the
BOP’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
6 The court also notes that plaintiff has not accounted for
the expense of $1,000 for travel from New Hampshire to
California. See Smith v. Wrigley, No. 106CV0886AWIWMWHC, 2008
WL 2490438, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2008), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:06CV0886AWIWMWHC, 2008 WL 2941162
(E.D. Cal. July 28, 2008) (noting, while rejecting released
inmate’s claim for reimbursement for air travel from California
to New York, but approving offer of bus ticket, that “there is
nothing in Section 3624(d)(3) that requires the provided
transportation to be by air.”)
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judgment (Doc. No. 21) and deny Mr. Powers’s counter-motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 24).
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to
this Report and Recommendation are subject to review in the
district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co.,
617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by
such objection(s) are precluded on appeal. See id. Failure to
file any objections within the specified time waives the right
to appeal the district court's Order. See Santos-Santos v.
Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
August 8, 2024
cc: John Powers, pro se
Anna Dronzek, AUSA
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