League of Women Voters of New Hampshire et al v. Kramer et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
v. Civil No. 24-cv-073-SM-TSM
STEVE KRAMER, ET AL.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case arose from prerecorded telephone messages, robocalls, falsified through the use
of artificial intelligence to sound like President Biden, that were sent to thousands of New
Hampshire potential voters on January 21, 2024, just before the New Hampshire Primary.
Plaintiffs, the League of Women Voters of New Hampshire, the League of Women Voters of the
United States, and three New Hampshire voters who received the robocalls, brought suit against
Steve Kramer, who devised the hoax and commissioned the creation of the robocalls, and Voice
Broadcasting Corporation, Life Broadcasting Corporation, and Lingo Telecom, LLC, who
provided services to distribute the robocalls, alleging violations of federal and state law. Plaintiffs
move for a nationwide preliminary injunction (doc. no. 71) to bar defendants from distributing
falsified communications and from distributing all mass communications that do not comply with
state and federal law.
Plaintiffs initiated this action in March 2024, alleging claims that defendants violated the
Voting Rights Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and New Hampshire Elections Laws,
NH RSA 664:14-a and 644:14-b. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint (doc. no. 65)
in which they added Voice Broadcasting as a defendant. Default was entered against Kramer on
August 29, 2024. Doc. no. 92.
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Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction1 and then filed an amended motion (doc. nos.
47 and 71), and defendants (other than Kramer) moved to dismiss the lawsuit (doc. no. 79). The
United States filed a “Statement of Interest,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, specifically addressing
the interpretation of Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b). Doc. no. 86.
The Coolidge-Reagan Foundation filed a motion to file an amicus brief in support of the motion
to dismiss. Doc. no. 97.
Only plaintiffs’ amended motion for a preliminary injunction (doc. no. 71) is referred and
currently before the undersigned magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B); LR 72.1. The court held a hearing on the motion on July 31, 2024. Before the
hearing, the parties filed a stipulation of facts along with documents in support of and in opposition
to the motion for a preliminary injunction. Doc. no. 87. For the reasons that follow, the district
judge should deny the motion for a preliminary injunction.
BACKGROUND
Robocalls
Steve Kramer is a political consultant who provided services, including automated calls, to
political campaigns. Kramer previously worked with Paul Carpenter to create false audio
recordings through artificial intelligence (“AI”). In November 2023, Kramer asked if Carpenter
could create an AI-generated voice recording of President Biden, and Carpenter said that he could.
On January 19, 2024, just days before the New Hampshire Primary, Kramer provided a script to
Carpenter, and Carpenter created an AI generated recording, mimicking President Biden’s voice,
of the following message:
1 At the July 31, 2024 hearing, Plaintiffs orally withdrew the original motion for a preliminary
injunction (doc. no. 47), which should be terminated.
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This coming Tuesday is the New Hampshire Presidential Preference Primary.
Republicans have been trying to push nonpartisan and Democratic voters to
participate in their primary. What a bunch of malarkey. We know the value of
voting Democratic when our votes count. It’s important that you save your vote for
the November election. We’ll need your help in electing Democrats up and down
the ticket. Voting this Tuesday only enables the Republicans in their quest to elect
Donald Trump again. Your vote makes a difference in November, not this Tuesday.
Doc. no. 71-3, at 3 (“Fake Message”).
Kramer needed a caller identification (“ID”) number for the Fake Message to distribute it
to New Hampshire voters, and he wanted to use the New Hampshire area code, 603, to make it
more likely that the call would be answered. He decided to use the telephone number of Kathy
Sullivan, who was associated with President Biden’s campaign in New Hampshire, without her
permission. He then contacted Voice Broadcasting on January 20 to set up a robocall, using the
Fake Message, to be distributed to 25,000 numbers the next evening, Sunday, January 21, just two
days before the New Hampshire Primary. Id. at 7. Kramer instructed Voice Broadcasting to use
Kathy Sullivan’s telephone number as the caller ID for the Fake Message, and at Voice
Broadcasting’s suggestion, agreed to add a last sentence to the Fake Message, by a different voice:
“If you would like to be removed from future calls, please press two now. Call [personal cell phone
of Kathy Sullivan] to be removed from future calls.” Doc. no. 71-2, at 2.
Voice Broadcasting and Life Corporation are affiliated companies. Voice Broadcasting
used Life Corporation’s services and equipment to initiate thousands of robocalls to telephone
numbers in New Hampshire. Life Corporation also routed calls to Lingo Telecom, which
originated several thousand calls. New Hampshire voters received 9,581 robocalls with the Fake
Message.2 Doc. no. 71-11, at 6.
2 In the FCC’s “Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture” against Lingo Telecom, the FCC
attributes 9,581 robocalls with the Fake Message to the defendants. Plaintiffs assert that Lingo
Telecom originated and provided A-level attestation to 13,235 robocalls, which is apparently based
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Impact of Robocalls on Plaintiffs
The three individual plaintiffs in this case, Nancy Marashio, James Fieseher, and Patricia
Gingrich, are registered voters in New Hampshire. They each received the Fake Message robocall
on January 21, 2024. Each individual plaintiff realized that the message was not from President
Biden or his campaign and that the message was false. Each individual plaintiff voted in the
Primary despite having received the Fake Message robocall.
The organizational plaintiffs are the League of Women Voters of the United States and the
League of Women Voters of New Hampshire. They refer to themselves collectively as “the
League,” and, to the extent necessary, with suffixes of “US” and “NH”. Doc. no. 71-1, at 17-18.
The League asserts that its mission is “to encourage informed and active participation in the
government, increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influence public policy
through education and advocacy.” Doc. 71-1, at 17. The League also has a mission “to encourage
citizens to register to vote, participate in elections, and engage with the civil process.” Id.
The League-US states that in response to the Fake Message robocalls it changed its website
and created a new alert to inform voters about robocalls, which required diversion of staff to make
those changes. The League-US also changed its “internal threat matrix” for inauthentic robocalls
to the second-highest ranking on the threat scale. Id. at 17-18. The League-US states generally that
it “has expended, and continues to expend, resources providing additional guidance and training
to staff to track inauthentic or deepfake robocalls.” Id. at 18. The League-NH states that it is
planning to implement changes that will cost several hundred dollars and require more volunteer
on Lingo Telecom’s response to an FCC subpoena, but was not verified by the FCC. Doc.no. 71-
11, at 9, n.59.
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hours. Notably, however, the League does not assert that the robocalls thwarted or otherwise
interfered with the organization’s mission.
Consequences of Robocalls for Defendants
The Fake Message robocalls caused a significant amount of media coverage. Kramer
acknowledged on February 25, 2024, that he orchestrated and sent the Fake Message robocalls. In
May, Kramer was indicted in four New Hampshire counties on 13 charges of felony voter
suppression and 13 charges of misdemeanor impersonating a candidate.
At the same time, the FCC investigated the Fake Message robocalls. On May 23, 2024, the
FCC issued a “Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture” to Lingo Telecom that proposed a
penalty of $2,000,000 for violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.6301(a). Doc. no. 71-11, at 2. The next day,
the FCC issued a “Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture” to Kramer that proposed a
$6,000,000 penalty “for perpetrating an illegal robocall campaign targeting potential New
Hampshire voters two days before the state’s 2024 Democratic Presidential Primary Election
(Primary Election) in apparent violation of the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, which is codified
at section 227(e) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Communications Act), and [47
C.F.R.] § 64.1604 of our rules.” Doc. no. 71-3, at 2. The FCC later entered a Consent Decree with
Lingo Telecom that requires Lingo Telecom to pay a $1,000,000 civil penalty and “to implement
a robust compliance plan.” Doc. no. 91-1, at 2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary’ equitable remedy that is ‘never awarded as
of right.’” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 144 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (2024) (quoting Winter v. Natural
Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). The court will grant a motion for a preliminary
injunction only if the moving parties “make a clear showing that ‘[they are] likely to succeed on
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the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Id.
(quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). Ordinarily, a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable
harm are the most important factors. District 4 Lodge of the Int’l Assoc. of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers Loc. Lodge 207 v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2022).
In addition, a preliminary injunction must be sufficiently specific and detailed to be
enforceable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d); Axia NetMedia Corp v. Mass. Tech. Park Corp., 889 F.3d 1,
12-13 (1st Cir. 2018). “Although there is no bar against nationwide relief in federal district court
or circuit court, such broad relief must be necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which
they are entitled.” California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 582 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Roe v. Dep’t of
Defense, 947 F.3d 207, 232 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding district courts have equitable power to issue
nationwide injunctions “extending relief to those who are similarly situated to the litigants”).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek a nationwide preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from
producing, generating, and distributing AI-generated robocalls impersonating any person without
that person’s consent or permission and from distributing mass communications in violation of
federal or state law. Defendants Voice Broadcasting, Life Corporation, and Lingo Telecom all
object to plaintiffs’ motion. Defendants challenge plaintiffs’ standing and their showing of the
elements necessary for a preliminary injunction. Lingo Telecom also challenges the scope of the
proposed preliminary injunction.
I. Standing for Injunctive Relief
Defendants contend that plaintiffs lack standing to seek preliminary injunctive relief. In
support, they note that the individual plaintiffs realized that the Fake Message robocalls were false
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and voted in the Primary despite receiving the calls. For that reason, defendants contend that the
individual plaintiffs suffered no harm. They also contend that the League suffered no harm because
the organizations acted in response to the Fake Message robocalls based on their mission. Lingo
Telecom also contends that plaintiffs have not shown that their proposed injunction would redress
any alleged injury.
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts only have jurisdiction
over “‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’— concrete disputes with consequences for the parties
involved.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2257 (2024). A case or controversy
exists, for purposes of standing, when at least one plaintiff establishes that he, she, or it “has
suffered, or will suffer, an injury that is ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’” Murthy v. Missouri,
144 S. Ct. 1972, 1985–86 (2024) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409
(2013)). “[W]hen a plaintiff seeks prospective relief such as an injunction, the plaintiff must
establish a sufficient likelihood of future injury.” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic
Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024). “By requiring the plaintiff to show an injury in fact, Article III
standing screens out plaintiffs who might have only a general legal, moral, ideological, or policy
objection.” Id.
A. Individual Plaintiffs
The individual plaintiffs assert, for purposes of the motion for a preliminary injunction,
that the Fake Message robocalls injured them because “[t]he loss of a vote is an actual, imminent,
and severe injury.”3 Doc. no. 83, at 8. They state that “[t]he manipulation and intimidation alleged
3 Although the individual plaintiffs are three different people, they do not distinguish among
themselves for purposes of showing standing.
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due to the Defendants’ own actions interfered with the exercise of people’s right to vote in the
New Hampshire Primary.” Id. The individual plaintiffs further state that they “were harmed by
receiving threatening, intimidating, and coercive robocalls – an injury plainly particular enough to
confer standing.” Id. at 9.
With respect to a likelihood of future injury to support injunctive relief, the individual
plaintiffs argue that because defendants have produced, generated, and distributed robocalls in the
past, they are likely to continue that activity in the future. They point to evidence that Kramer has
worked with Life Corporation on robocalls since 2010 and that Lingo Telecom has not stopped
illegal robocalls in the past, despite citations. The circumstances, however, have materially
changed since defendants produced, generated, and distributed the Fake Message robocalls. The
new circumstances undermine plaintiffs’ reliance on past actions to show the likelihood that
defendants will injure them in the future.
Kramer is under indictment in four counties in New Hampshire for the Fake Message
robocalls. He is also the subject of an FCC “Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture” with a
civil penalty of $6,000,000. Life Corporation ended its relationship with Kramer, and plaintiffs
provided no evidence that Life Corporation will again accept contract work from Kramer,
particularly in light of his indictments and FCC liability. Lingo Telecom was the subject of an FCC
“Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture” with a civil penalty of $2,000,000 that was resolved
through a consent decree that requires payment of $1,000,000 and requires Lingo Telecom to
comply with laws relating to distributing robocalls. In addition, a primary election was held in
New Hampshire on September 10, 2024, for state offices. Plaintiffs have not supplemented their
motion with evidence that defendants produced, generated, or distributed false messaging through
robocalls related to that election. The court is not aware of any such activity in the context of the
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recent primary election. Given the current circumstances, plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood
that the defendants will produce, generate, and distribute false information through robocalls in
the future.
More importantly, the individual plaintiffs have not shown that they would be injured, even
if defendants did produce, generate, and distribute false information through robocalls. The
individual plaintiffs recognized that the Fake Message robocalls were false, and they voted despite
receiving the calls. Plaintiffs have not shown that they would likely be injured by a false message
from defendants in the future, given their demonstrated ability to discern the falsity of the previous
message and the plaintiffs’ awareness of the possibility of false messaging robocalls in the future.
Despite their concern about the right to vote, the individual plaintiffs have not established
a likelihood that defendants will injure them in the future by interfering with their ability to vote.
Therefore, the individual plaintiffs have not established standing to pursue injunctive relief in this
case.
B. League - Organizational Standing
“Like an individual, an organization may not establish standing simply based on the
‘intensity of the litigant’s interest’ or because of strong opposition to the [defendants’] conduct, .
. . no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization. . . .’”
Alliance, 602 U.S. at 394 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Am. United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 717, 739
(1972)). In addition, when the defendant has not caused a concrete injury, an organization cannot
establish standing based on its reaction to the defendant’s actions, that is, an organization “cannot
spend its way into standing simply by expending money to gather information and advocate against
the defendant’s action.” Id. Further, a diversion of organizational resources does not confer
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organizational standing. Id. Instead, the defendant’s actions must have “directly affected and
interfered with [the plaintiff’s] core business activities.” Id. at 395.
The League contends that defendants’ Fake Message robocalls caused harm because the
calls directly affected and interfered with the League’s core business “to encourage informed and
active participation in the government” and because the League “has been forced to divert human
and other resources that would have gone into voter registration.” Doc. no. 83, at 10. As to future
injury, the League asserts that it “will be forced to continue these costly diversions to combat future
illegal robocall campaigns.” Id. Thus, the League asserts that it suffered and will continue to suffer
harm because defendants caused and will continue to cause the League to divert resources to
respond to false and misleading robocalls.
The Supreme Court, however, has held that harm arising from actions or costs incurred to
oppose the defendants’ actions does not support standing. Alliance, 602 U.S. at 394 (holding that
medical associations did not have standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s
approval of a drug, mifepristone, because their harm was “incurring costs to oppose FDA’s
actions”); see also Lawson v. Hargett, No. 24-cv-538, 2024 WL 3867526, at *17-*18 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 19, 2024) (holding that the League of Women Voters of Tennessee lacked standing under
Alliance to challenge Tennessee voting laws based on harm that the vagueness of the laws made
it more difficult to advise members and the public “how to participate in the democratic process”);
Citizens Project v. City of Colorado Springs, No. 22-cv-2365-SKC-MDB, 2024 WL 3345229, at
*5-*6 (D. Colo. July 9, 2024) (holding that nonprofit advocacy organizations, including League
of Women Voters of the Pikes Peak Region, lacked standing to challenge the timing of local
elections, in part, because they were continuing to provide the same educational and outreach
services rather than new services). In contrast, actions that directly affect and interfere with an
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organization’s core business and impair the organization’s ability to provide its services, such as
when the defendant disseminates material misinformation to the organization that results in the
organization not being able to accurately advise its customers, is harm that supports standing.
Alliance, 602 U.S. at 395 (discussing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)); see
also Get Loud Ark. v. Thurston, No. 24-cv-5121, 2024 WL 4142754, at *13 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 9,
2024) (holding that the “Wet Signature Rule” for voter registration injured the organization’s
ability to register voters, such as through online registration, which went beyond “indirect
pocketbook harm”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. LaRose, No. 23-cv-02414, --- F. Supp.
3d ---, 2024 WL 3495332, at *5 (N.D. Ohio July 22, 2024) (holding League had standing to
challenge state law that prohibited assistance to disabled voters). Because the League failed to
show that defendants’ actions interfered with its core mission, it has not demonstrated that it
suffered the type of injury necessary to confer standing. Further, for the reasons discussed above
in the context of the individual plaintiffs, the League has not shown a likelihood that it will be
harmed in the future because of defendants’ actions.
Accordingly, the district judge should deny the motion for a preliminary injunction because
plaintiffs all lack standing to seek prospective injunctive relief in this case. Even if standing could
be established, however, plaintiffs have not shown that they will suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of injunctive relief, and plaintiffs have not proposed a preliminary injunction that meets
the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Therefore, the district judge should deny
the motion on these bases as well.
II. Irreparable Harm
The second requirement for a preliminary injunction is that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of the proposed injunction. Starbucks, 144 S. Ct. at 1576 . If plaintiffs “cannot
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demonstrate irreparable harm, [the court] need not discuss the other factors.” Together Employees
v. Mass. Gen. Brigham Inc., 19 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021). When “[m]oney damages would
adequately resolve all of the alleged harms,” plaintiffs cannot show irreparable harm, even if
plaintiffs did not allege and are not seeking money damages in the complaint. Id., at 9 & n.4.
Plaintiffs assert that “the Individual Plaintiffs have already been harmed by being subjected
to Defendants’ attempted threats, intimidation, and coercion.” Doc. no. 71-1, at 29. In their reply,
they state that the “irreparable harm threatened here is the fundamental right to vote.” Doc. no. 83,
at 22. Moreover, plaintiffs contend that the League will suffer irreparable harm “by being forced
to divert resources away from its mission to defend against Defendants’ false and malicious
tactics.” Doc. no. 71-1, at 30.
To the extent plaintiffs assert that defendants will cause them harm in the future in the
absence of injunctive relief, which is questionable under the current circumstances, they have not
shown that any such harm would constitute irreparable harm. The individual plaintiffs did not lose
their fundamental right to vote and have not shown any likelihood that such a loss would happen
in the future. They also have not shown that merely receiving the Fake Message robocalls
otherwise harmed them. To the extent the League would be forced to divert resources or incur
costs to counter the Fake Message robocalls, they have not shown those losses could not be
compensated with money damages.4 Further, as discussed above in the context of standing, they
have not shown a likelihood that the defendants will cause them harm in the future due to changes
in defendants’ circumstances in the aftermath of the robocalls.
4 If the League contends that its efforts to counter false messaging from defendants will harm
others because the League will be unable to put the required resources into its voter education
mission, that harm is to third parties, not the League.
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Because plaintiffs have not demonstrated irreparable harm absent an injunction, the district
judge should deny the motion for a preliminary injunction on that additional ground.
III. Scope of Proposed Injunctive Relief
Lingo Telecom contends that plaintiffs’ proposed preliminary injunction cannot issue for
the additional reasons that it is overbroad and vague. Every injunction must, among other things,
“[s]tate its terms specifically” and “describe in reasonable detail – and not by referring to the
complaint or other document – the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B)
& (C). The requirements that an injunction be specific and include reasonable detail were
“designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders,
and to avoid the possible founding of a contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.”
Schmidt v Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974). In the instant case, plaintiffs’ proposed relief does
not fall within these parameters.
Plaintiffs propose a preliminary injunction with the following terms:
1. Defendants are enjoined until further order of this Court from producing,
generating, or distributing AI-generated robocalls impersonating any person,
without that person’s express, prior written consent.
2. Defendants are enjoined until further order of this Court from distributing
spoofed telephone calls, text messages, or any other form of spoofed
communication, without the express, prior written consent of the individual or
entity upon whose half the communication is being sent.
3. Defendants are enjoined until further order of this Court from distributing
telephone calls, text messages, or other mass communications that do not fully
comply with all applicable state and federal laws or that are made for an
unlawful purpose.
Doc. no. 71-31, at 1-2. The proposed injunction does not include definitions of the terms used,
some of which appear to be unclear or ambiguous, such as “AI-generated,” “spoofed,” “applicable
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state and federal laws,” and “unlawful purpose.” The lack of definitions renders the proposed
injunction too vague to comply with Rule 65(d)(1).
In addition, paragraph 2 precludes distribution “without the express, prior written consent
of the individual or entity upon whose half the communication is being sent.” Even assuming
“half” is a typographical error and means behalf, paragraph 2 does not explain who that person
might be. It could be the person falsely portrayed in the communication, or it could be the person
or entity who paid for the communication. Because the paragraph is not sufficiently specific or
detailed, it does not meet the requirements of Rule 65(d)(1).
Paragraph 3 simply requires the defendants to obey the law, without specifying what law
or what requirements are mandated. As such, paragraph 3 also does not meet the specificity and
detail requirements of Rule 65(d)(1). Further, “obey the law” injunctions, even when the particular
laws are specified, are problematic because of their broad scope. See, e.g., Brown v. Trs. of Boston
Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 361 (1st Cir. 1989); S.E.C. v. McLellan, No. 16-cv-10874, --- F. Supp. 3d --
-, 2024 WL 3030421, at *5 (D. Mass. June 17, 2024); see also Am. Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., 60 F.4th 16, 22 (2d Cir. 2023);
Prison Legal News v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868, 883, n.22 (10th Cir. 2019); Walker
v. City of Calhoun, Ga., 682 F. App’x 721, 724-25 (11th Cir. 2017); Perez v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co.,
655 F. App’x 404, 410–11 (6th Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs do not list the laws they intend to have
defendants obey, and as proposed, the injunction is not sufficiently specific to meet the
requirements of Rule 65(d)(1).
IV. Summary
Plaintiffs have not established standing to seek the prospective injunctive relief they seek,
which precludes the proposed preliminary injunction. Additionally, plaintiffs have not established
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that they would suffer future irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. Further, the plaintiffs’
proposed preliminary injunction does not meet the specificity and detail requirements of Rule
65(d)(1).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should deny plaintiffs’ amended motion for a
preliminary injunction. Doc. no. 71. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day
period may be extended upon motion. Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to this Report
and Recommendation are subject to review in the district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United
Nat’l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by such objection(s)
are precluded on appeal. See id. Failure to file any objections within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the district court’s Order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168
(1st Cir. 2016).
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
September 19, 2024
cc: Counsel of record.
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