Lochard et al v. Daniels Moving & Storage, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Patrice Lochard, et al.
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-310-LM-AJ
Daniels Moving & Storage LLC
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the court is plaintiffs’ motion to
reconsider the court’s recommended damages award, which imposed
a statutory cap. 	Upon reconsideration, the court revisits its
recommendation without the limitation of a damages cap and
recommends an award of $50,000 in compensatory damages and
$50,000 in punitive damages to each plaintiff for the reasons
set forth below.
The court issued a report recommending the district judge
grant plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment and award certain
damages. 	See R&R (Doc. No. 17). 	Plaintiffs partially objected
to the report and recommendation, arguing that the court
wrongfully imposed a cap on compensatory and punitive damages
for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 	See Obj. (Doc. No.
18). 	The district judge treated the objection as a motion to
reconsider and remanded the issue for review of plaintiffs’
damages award. 	Order, October 9, 2025; L.R. 7.2(d) (providing
Case 1:24-cv-00310-LM-AJ Document 19 Filed 02/04/26 Page 1 of 8

2
that a motion to reconsider “shall demonstrate that the order
was based on a manifest error of fact or law”).
In its report and recommendation, the court applied a
$50,000 cap on compensatory and punitive damages per party,
citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). 	Upon review of the evidence
presented during the damages hearing and in plaintiffs’
supplemental brief, the court recommended an award of $25,000 in
compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages to each
plaintiff. 	Plaintiffs argue that the compensatory and punitive
damages cap applicable to Title VII claims does not limit
potential awards under Section 1981. 	Accordingly, they seek
damages in excess of those recommended by the court; in
particular, $50,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in
punitive damages, each.
The court first addresses whether the Section 1981a damages
cap limits plaintiffs’ potential award. 	Plaintiffs brought this
action for racial harassment, discrimination, and retaliation
under Title VII and Section 1981. 	See Compl. (Doc. No. 1).
While the First Circuit has not addressed the issue, other
courts have concluded that damages awards for claims brought
under Section 1981 are not bound by the limitations imposed on
Title VII claims per 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). 	See Hampton v.
Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1117 (10th Cir. 2001)
(“Section 1981 does not have a statutory cap that limits
Case 1:24-cv-00310-LM-AJ Document 19 Filed 02/04/26 Page 2 of 8

3
punitive damages as does Title VII.”); Kim v. Nash Finch Co.,
123 F.3d 1046, 1062 (8th Cir. 1997); Vernon v. Port Auth. Of
N.Y. and N.H., 220 F. Supp. 2d 223, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 	The
language of the statute conforms with those interpretations.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4) (“Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit the scope of, or relief available under,
section 1981 of this title.”). 	Upon reconsideration, the court
revisits its recommended compensatory and punitive damages
awards without the limitation of a damages cap.
All three plaintiffs testified credibly to their
experiences with emotional distress and mental anguish resulting
from defendant’s discriminatory conduct. 	See R&R (Doc. No. 17)
at 16. 	Mr. Lochard testified to a lack of sleep and nightmares
as well as difficulties living in a predominantly white
community. 	He also stated that the emotional impacts have
affected his relationship with his child and the child’s mother.
Mr. Williams testified to a change in the way he views white
people and impacts to sleep and his ability to trust others.
Mr. Campbell testified to a loss of trust in white people, a
fear of police, anxiety, cold sweats at night, and anger issues.
He testified that he had recently sought counseling. 	Mr.
Campbell also testified to having to put expenses on credit
cards to support his and his wife’s children. 	All three
plaintiffs testified to difficulties obtaining medical treatment
Case 1:24-cv-00310-LM-AJ Document 19 Filed 02/04/26 Page 3 of 8

4
or counseling due to a lack of health insurance following their
separation from employment with defendant.
Upon reconsideration of an appropriate compensatory damages
award without consideration of a damages cap, the court finds
plaintiffs’ requested $50,000 each in compensatory damages an
appropriate figure. 	While the court originally relied on
decisions from other courts where plaintiffs testified to
similar harm from race discrimination, id. at 16–17 (citing
Miller v. Metro One Loss Preventions Servs. Grp., No. 1:23-cv-
1729, 2024 WL 3871758, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2024) (awarding
$20,000 in compensatory damages); Breazell v. Permian Trucking &
Hot Shot, LLC, No. 7:15-cv-199-XR, 2017 WL 3037432, at *6 (W.D.
Tex. July 18, 2017) (awarding $25,000 in compensatory damages)),
those decisions are distinct for two reasons: both relied on the
Title VII statutory damages cap and featured plaintiffs with
preexisting mental health struggles. 	See Miller, 2024 WL
3871758, at *6 (awarding $20,000, noting that plaintiff’s
trauma, anxiety, and depression were “exacerbatedas opposed to
inducedby her troubling experiences at [defendant]”); Breazell,
2017 WL 3037432, at *6 (noting that plaintiff’s mental anguish
was caused by an event other than defendant’s discriminatory
actions).
Other contemporary decisions, however, support plaintiffs’
requested award. 	Scott v. Olives, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-01555-RFB-
Case 1:24-cv-00310-LM-AJ Document 19 Filed 02/04/26 Page 4 of 8

5
DJA, 2025 WL 1577908, at *9 (D. Nev. June 3, 2025) (awarding
$100,000 in compensatory damages where plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress, including embarrassment, humiliation, and
mental and emotional pain and suffering where defendant employer
did not remediate other employees racially derogatory jokes
including the use of the n-word and referring to him as a
monkey); Collins v. Andrews, No. 1:20-cv-296-ECM, 2022 WL
4537875, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2022) (awarding $50,000 in
compensatory damages on plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim where she
sought treatment for anxiety and depression); E.E.O.C. v.
Aviation Port Servs., LLC, No. 18-10909-FDS, 2020 WL 1550564, at
*9 (D. Mass. April 1, 2020) (awarding $75,000 in compensatory
damages to each plaintiff, distinguishing the case from those
where higher damages were awarded because the plaintiffs did not
suffer from the inability to sleep or disordered eating, receive
medical treatment or counseling, suffer from depression,
anxiety, or panic attacks, suffer economic consequence, or
suffer long-term damage to relationships).
Upon reconsideration, plaintiffs’ testimony describing the
emotional and psychological harm they suffered as a result of
defendant’s conduct, in conjunction with the court’s review of
other contemporary and comparative decisions, supports an award
of $50,000 in compensatory damages to each plaintiff.
Case 1:24-cv-00310-LM-AJ Document 19 Filed 02/04/26 Page 5 of 8

6
Turning to punitive damages, the court originally
recommended an award equal to the award of compensatory damages.
See R&R (Doc. No. 17). 	Plaintiffs request $500,000 in punitive
damages each. 	Upon reconsideration of the recommended award
without the limitation of the statutory damages cap, the court
maintains its recommendation of an award of punitive damages
equal to its recommendation for compensatory damages: now,
$50,000.
The United States Supreme Court articulated three
“guideposts” in reviewing punitive damages: “(1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the
disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” 	State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003);
see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996)
(“[E]xemplary damages must bear a ‘reasonable relationship’ to
compensatory damages.”). 	There is no bright line ratio in
determining an award of punitive damages. 	See Campbell, 538
U.S. at 425. 	The court utilizes the guideposts to determine an
appropriate punitive damages award on this record.
Upon application of the guideposts, a one-to-one ratio
between compensatory and punitive damages is appropriate.
Case 1:24-cv-00310-LM-AJ Document 19 Filed 02/04/26 Page 6 of 8

7
Defendant’s misconduct was indisputably reprehensible, causing
not only the loss of plaintiffs’ employment but a
disillusionment with white members of their community. 	However,
while the recommended compensatory damages award is not
substantial, it compensates plaintiffs for the mental distress
defendant inflicted. 	See Mendez-Matos v. Mun. of Guanynabo, 557
F.3d 36, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (determining that, while the
plaintiff’s compensatory damages award “was not excessive, it
did amply compensate him for the mental distress” caused by the
defendant, and, thus, a one-to-one ratio between the
compensatory and punitive damages awards was supported).
Further, courts have awarded a one-to-one ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages in comparable cases. 	See Miller, 2024 WL
3871758, at *6; Riley v. Kohan Retail Invest. Grp., No. 1:23-cv-
1834, 2024 WL 3597109, at *6 (M.D. Penn. July 30, 2024); Bugg v.
Just Wing It, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-02399, 2020 WL 1675953, at *7
(M.D. Penn. April 6, 2020). 	This award achieves the goals of
punitive damages: punishment and deterrence of unlawful conduct.
See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007).
Upon reconsideration, the court recommends an award of
$50,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages
to each plaintiff. 	The district judge should adopt the legal
analysis and conclusions in the court’s first report and
recommendation with the amended damages award recommended
Case 1:24-cv-00310-LM-AJ Document 19 Filed 02/04/26 Page 7 of 8

8
herein. 	Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be
extended upon motion. 	Failure to file specific written
objections to the report and recommendation within the specified
time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See
Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir.
2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
February 4, 2026
cc: 	Counsel of Record
Daniels Moving & Storage LLC
Case 1:24-cv-00310-LM-AJ Document 19 Filed 02/04/26 Page 8 of 8