CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, OHIO et al v. THE BLOOD TRIBE et al

[ECF No. 1]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
IN RE SUBPOENA TO:
BRUCE SHARP 	Case No. 26-3408 (KMW/EAP)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Movant Bruce Sharp has filed the present Motion seeking to quash subpoenas served by
Petitioners City of Springfield, Ohio; Rob Rue; David Estrop; Krystal Brown; Tracey Tackett;
Taylor Flora; Casey Rollins; Jessica Shafer; and Randall Comer. 	ECF No. 1-3 (Mov.’s Br.).
Petitioners have filed opposition to the Motion, ECF No. 5 (Pets.’ Opp.), and Movant filed a reply,
ECF No. 8 (Mov.’s Reply). 	The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and decides this
matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil
Rule 78.1.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioners have filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio against the Blood Tribe, an organization the Complaint describes as a white
supremacist group; its alleged founder and leader, Christopher Pohlhaus; another alleged leader,
Drake Berentz; and seven unidentified individuals alleged to be associates of the group
(collectively, “Respondents”). 	City of Springfield, Ohio v. The Blood Tribe, Civ. A. No. 25-33
(“Ohio Action”). 	Petitioners allege that Respondents engaged in and encouraged threats,
harassment, and intimidation directed at city officials and residents because of their support for
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Springfield’s Haitian community. 	Mov.’s Br., Ex. B (Compl.) at 1.1 	Based on that alleged
conduct, Petitioners assert federal civil rights claims and related Ohio statutory and common law
claims. See id. ¶¶ 132-204.
In connection with that lawsuit, on or about February 7, 2026, Petitioners caused a
subpoena ad testificandum and a subpoena duces tecum to be delivered to Movant Bruce Sharp’s
home in Ocean City, New Jersey. See ECF No. 1-1 (Declaration of Bruce Sharp (“Sharp Decl.”))
¶¶ 1, 4; see also Mov.’s Br. ¶ 5. 	The subpoenas command Movant to appear for an in-person
videotaped deposition and to produce documents at the offices of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison LLP in Wilmington, Delaware. ECF No. 5-1 (Declaration of Mark Weiner (“Weiner
Decl.”)), Ex. 1 at 3-5 (subpoena ad testificandum), 7-9 (subpoena duces tecum). The subpoenas
seek testimony and documents concerning the parties and events alleged in the Ohio Action.2
Mov.’s Br. at 1; see also id. at 11-15.
On February 17, 2026, and February 19, 2026, Movant served written objections to the
subpoenas on Petitioners’ counsel. Mov.’s Br. ¶¶ 8, 9.
On March 31, 2026, Movant filed the present Motion in this Court, asking the Court to
quash the subpoenas because (1) Petitioners have not established a reasonable basis to believe that
he possesses information relevant to the underlying action; (2) Petitioners can obtain the
1 	Movant’s brief identifies the Complaint as Exhibit A. Mov.’s Br. at 4; see also ECF
No. 1-2 (Declaration of Patrick Trainor (“Trainor Decl.”)) ¶ 3. 	The Complaint, however, is
attached to Movant’s filing as Exhibit B. 	For clarity of reference, the Court will refer to the
Complaint as Exhibit B.
2 	Movant’s brief identifies April 1, 2026, and April 15, 2026, as the compliance dates for
the subpoenas. 	See Mov.’s Br. ¶ 10. 	The subpoenas submitted as exhibits by both parties,
however, specify compliance dates in March 2026. 	See Weiner Decl., Ex. 1 at 3-5, 7-9. 	The
submitted materials do not explain the discrepancy or establish whether the April dates reflect
amended subpoenas or an agreed rescheduling. 	The Court need not resolve that discrepancy
because its disposition rests on the Wilmington, Delaware place of compliance specified in the
subpoenas supplied to the Court.
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information from the parties to the litigation; and (3) the subpoenas are overbroad, unduly
burdensome, and disproportionate to the needs of the case. 	Mov.’s Br. at 1-2, 9. 	In response,
Petitioners ask the Court to deny the Motion because (1) the subpoenas seek discovery that is
relevant to Petitioners’ claims and is proportional to the needs of the case; (2) Movant has failed
to articulate how the subpoenas are burdensome; and (3) Petitioners are entitled to discovery from
Movant regardless of Movant’s nonparty status. 	See generally Pets.’ Opp. 	In the alternative,
Petitioners ask the Court to transfer the Motion to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(f). Pets.’ Opp. at 16-17. In reply,
Movant reiterates his objections. See generally Mov.’s Reply.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs subpoenas, including those directed to
nonparties. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. 	Rule 45(a)(2) provides that “[a] subpoena must issue from the
court where the action is pending.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(2). 	A motion to quash or modify a
subpoena, however, must be filed in “the court for the district where compliance is required.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). “When a subpoena requires compliance in a different district than where
the underlying litigation is pending, only the compliance district is empowered to adjudicate a
motion to quash that subpoena.” Everlast Roofing, Inc. v. Wilson, No. 23-828, 2024 WL 5629643,
at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 15, 2024).
Although courts differ in how they define “the court for the district where compliance is
required,” courts within the Third Circuit generally identify that district by reference to the place
of compliance specified in the subpoena. See, e.g., Rardon v. Falcon Safety Prods., Inc., Nos. 23-
1594, 23-1596, 2023 WL 5347298, at *1 n.4 (3d Cir. Aug. 21, 2023) (“The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had jurisdiction over the motions to quash the
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subpoenas pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 because compliance with the subpoena
was required . . . in Horsham, Pennsylvania”); Everlast, 2024 WL 5629643, at *6 (finding that
compliance districts were defined by the subpoenas as “the location where the documents are to
be produced”); Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Caremark RX, LLC, No. 23-111, 2023 WL 6201363, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2023) (“[T]he place named in the subpoena . . . is the place where compliance
is required.” (quoting CSS, Inc. v. Herrington, 354 F. Supp. 3d 702, 709-10 (N.D. Tex. 2017)
(cleaned up))); Orthobond Corp. v. Burel, No. 22-217, 2023 WL 3867245, at *4 (D.N.J. June 7,
2023) (denying nonparty’s motion to quash a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45(d)(3) because “[w]hile
this is the Court where the underlying matter is proceeding, the place of compliance for the
Subpoena—i.e., where the deposition is to take place—is located in New York, New York”).
Here, both subpoenas expressly command Movant to comply in Wilmington, Delaware.
Weiner Decl., Ex. 1 at 3-5, 7-9. Accordingly, the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware, rather than this Court, is “the court for the district where compliance is required” under
Rule 45(d)(3)(A). Thus, the Court finds that the present Motion to Quash is not properly before
this Court.
The Court’s conclusion effectively forecloses the alternative relief that Petitioners seek:
transfer of the Motion to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio pursuant
to Rule 45(f). Pets.’ Opp. at 16-17. Rule 45(f) provides that “[w]hen the court where compliance
is required did not issue the subpoena, it may transfer a motion under this rule to the issuing court
if the person subject to the subpoena consents or if the court finds exceptional circumstances.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f) (emphasis added). 	Because, as set forth above, this Court is not the court
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where compliance is required, Rule 45(f) does not authorize this Court to transfer Movant’s Motion
to the Southern District of Ohio.3
THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown:
IT IS this 8th day of October 2026,
ORDERED that Nonparty Movant Bruce Sharp’s Motion to Quash 	is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE subject to refiling in the appropriate District Court.
s/Elizabeth A. Pascal
ELIZABETH A. PASCAL
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Hon. Karen M. Williams, U.S.D.J.
3 	In support of their request to transfer the Motion to Quash, Petitioners rely, in part, on
a decision in which the Western District of Wisconsin transferred a nonparty’s motion to quash
subpoenas issued in connection with the Ohio Action to the Southern District of Ohio. See Pets.’
Opp. at 8, 16-17; Weiner Decl., Ex. 4 (Opinion and Order transferring Jordan Schlosser’s Motion
to Quash). In that case, however, the transferor court was the court where compliance was required
and therefore had the authority to transfer the motion pursuant to Rule 45(f). See In re Subpoenas
Served on Jordan Schlosser, No. 26-mc-1, 2026 WL 788800, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2026)
(noting that “[t]he subpoenas commanded Schlosser to produce documents and to sit for a
deposition in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, also within the district”).
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