Lissade v. Equifax

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JAMES CARL LISSADE,
Plaintiff,
v.
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
26-CV-01958 (HG)
HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff James Carl Lissade, proceeding pro se, commenced this action against
Defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC by filing a complaint in state court. See ECF
No. 1-1 (Complaint; “Compl.”).1 Defendant then filed a notice of removal on April 2, 2026,
bringing the action in front of the Court. See ECF No. 1 (Notice of Removal). Plaintiff brings
claims arising from a purported agreement between the parties, which Plaintiff alleges Defendant
breached. See Compl. at 3–4. Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
claim. See ECF No. 7 (Motion to Dismiss; “Mot.”). For the reasons set forth below,
Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff is a frequent filer of actions in this Court. Including the instant action, Plaintiff
has filed five complaints since the beginning of 2024. Three have been dismissed. See Lissade
1 	Unless otherwise indicated, when quoting cases and the parties’ papers, the Court omits
all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations. The Court
refers to the pages assigned by the Electronic Case Files system (“ECF”).
2 	The Court “recite[s] the substance of the allegations as if they represented true facts, with
the understanding that these are not findings of the [C]ourt, as [I] have no way of knowing at this
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v. Hill et al, No. 24-cv-1182 (E.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 12, 2024); Lissade v. Cross et al, No. 25-cv-
5821 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 16, 2025); Lissade v. Closs et al, No. 25-cv-6767 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec.
5, 2025). One is still pending. See Lissade v. Closs et al, No. 26-cv-1966 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr.
2, 2026). The last is the instant action. The Court has previously issued a warning to Plaintiff
concerning his frivolous filings. See Lissade v. Hill, No. 24-cv-1182 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2026)
(Text Order) (“Plaintiff is hereby warned that if he continues to make additional frivolous,
vexatious, and inappropriate filings, he will be required to obtain leave of the Court before filing
any additional documents on the docket as a sanction.”).
Plaintiff appears to adhere to the sovereign citizen movement. Throughout the
Complaint, Plaintiff refers to himself as “King Semaj of Lissade Estate,” Compl. at 6–8, and on
the invoice sent to Defendant, Plaintiff listed the return address as “FROM THE OFFICE OF
HOUSE OF LISSADE[;] THE POA/EXECUTOR/TRUSTEE/FIDUCIARY[;] KING SEMAJ
OF LISSADE ESTATE: OBO JAMES CARL LISSADE,” id. at 7. Such titles are indicative of
participation in the movement. See Kelly v. Barclays Cap., Inc., No. 26-cv-4105, 2026 WL
1745788, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2026) (collecting cases discussing sovereign citizens’ use of a
fictional person called the “strawman”). Here, however, the allegations in the Complaint appear
divorced from sovereign citizen theories.
stage what are the true facts.” In re Hain Celestial Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 20 F.4th 131, 133 (2d
Cir. 2021). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will consider the documents
attached to his Complaint: the “Tacit Agreement,” invoice, and notice of suit. See Barkai v.
Mendez, 629 F. Supp. 3d 166, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); Compl. at 6–8. And although the general
rule is that a plaintiff may not raise new allegations in his opposition to a motion to dismiss,
because Plaintiff is representing himself, the Court will grant him some leeway by considering
the allegations in the Complaint, opposition, and sur-reply, in deciding the motion. See Walker
v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A district court deciding a motion to dismiss
may consider factual allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the motion.”).
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In this action, Plaintiff alleges that he and Defendant are parties to a December 18, 2025,
contract, which Defendant allegedly breached, resulting in the following damages: “$299,000.00
for breach of consent [sic]. plus interest an [sic] penalties of 200 times equals $45,800,000.00
according to the terms and services agreement.” Compl. at 3 ¶ 3. Plaintiff delivered to
Defendant a series of invoices, a “Tacit Agreement,” and a notice of suit for “deformation [sic]
of corrector [sic] [and] breach of contract,” in which he laid out these purported charges and
demanded compensation. See id. at 6–8. He argues that Defendant failed to pay the charges
stated, which had “been received by the defendant via mail and through tacit agreement of
terms” and that Defendant therefore “breached the contract and slandered the Name.” See id.
at 4. The purported contract is not included in the Complaint, despite Plaintiff attaching the
“Tacit Agreement,” “invoice,” and “Notice of Suit.” See id. at 6–8.
On February 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against Defendant in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County. See generally Compl. Defendant then
removed the case to federal court on April 2, 2026. See ECF No. 1. On May 22, 2026,
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. See Mot. About two weeks later, Plaintiff filed his
opposition. See ECF No. 9 (Plaintiff’s Opposition; “Opp.”). Defendant then filed its reply on
July 10, 2026. See ECF No. 10 (Defendant’s Reply; “Rep.”). And, one week later, Plaintiff filed
a sur-reply. See ECF No. 11 (Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply; “Sur-Reply”).3
The Complaint appears to allege breach of contract and slander. See Compl. at 4. The
Opposition clarifies these claims, stating that “the Complaint plainly references” defamation and
3 	Although Plaintiff’s filing of the Sur-Reply without leave of court was procedurally
improper, in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status the Court nevertheless considers the allegations and
arguments raised therein. See Montero v. City of New York, No. 25-cv-2482, 2026 WL 866851,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026).
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reputational injury; financial harm; failure to investigate disputed matters; reliance upon
Defendant’s reporting conduct; and damages resulting therefrom. See Opp. at 2. The Sur-Reply
further adds claims based on “Defendant’s failure to cease and desist, [or] correct deformation
[sic] disputed information after receiving notice.” Sur-Reply at 3.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Sacerdote
v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). “A claim is plausibly alleged ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Matzell v. Annucci, 64 F.4th 425, 433 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In making
this assessment, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations set out in plaintiff’s
complaint, draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and
construe the complaint liberally.” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 510 (2d Cir. 2007). The
Court must, however, disregard “conclusory allegations, such as formulaic recitals of the
elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that “tenders naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id.
A pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Court’s obligation “to
construe a pro se complaint liberally” continues to apply “[e]ven after Twombly” established the
plausibility standard for assessing pleadings. Newsome v. Bogan, 795 Fed. App’x 72, 72 (2d Cir.
2020). “A pro se litigant, however, is not exempt ‘from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law.’” Ramos-Nunez v. United States, No. 14-cr-102, 2019 WL
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1300811, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2019) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
1983)). This includes Rule 8. See Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2019).
Rule 8 “merely requires that any complaint be simple, direct and concise.” Turner v.
Cnty. of Suffolk, 955 F. Supp. 175, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). At a minimum, the complaint must
“disclose sufficient information to permit the defendant to have a fair understanding of what the
plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v.
Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000). Although “detailed factual allegations are not
required,” Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 678, “[i]t is not enough to say that the defendant harmed me; the
claim must include factual details that, if true, would show that the defendant broke the law” and
is responsible for the harm to the plaintiff, Ramjas v. Wilknowski, No. 25-cv-3289, 2025 WL
1787168, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2025) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Complaint Fails to State a Claim
Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that it is a “shotgun pleading”
which is “so conclusory and vague that [Defendant] is unable to adequately respond” and
therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Mot. at 2–3. Specifically,
Defendant argues that “no facts are pled by which [Defendant] can determine any connection
between [its] purported conduct and Plaintiff’s alleged harm.” Id. Such a pleading is subject to
dismissal. See Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed. App’x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).
Initially, the Complaint appears to assert defamation and breach of contract claims in
which Plaintiff alleges that “[D]efendant failed to pay the charges stated in the contract which
were for . . . slander . . . non removal & change . . . Trading standards . . . [and] Failure to
perform.” Compl. at 4 ¶ 5; see also id. at 8 (“This notice is to inform you that we shall be filing
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a suit agent [sic] you EQUIFAX for deformation [sic] of corrector [sic] [and] breach of
contract[.]”). In the Opposition, however, Plaintiff clarifies that “the Complaint plainly
references” claims for “defamation and reputational injury; financial harm; failure to investigate
disputed matters; reliance upon Defendant’s reporting conduct; and damages resulting
therefrom.” Id. at 1–2. Despite pleading some recognizable claims in the Opposition, Plaintiff
still fails to state a claim.
As to defamation and reputational injury, Plaintiff’s claim fails because he has not
pleaded any actual defamatory statement attributable to Defendant. See Unlimited Cellular, Inc.
v. Red Points Sols. SL, 677 F. Supp. 3d 186, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Next, to the extent that
Plaintiff’s allegation of “financial harm” is intended as its own claim, it too fails because “the
bare existence of an abstract injury is not enough to confer standing.” Matter of Appointment of
Indep. Counsel, 766 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1985). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “fail[ed]
to investigate disputed matters” and that he “rel[ied] upon Defendant’s reporting conduct.” Opp.
at 2. Defendant interprets these liberally as Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) claims, which it
argues must be dismissed because the Opposition “fails to present any argument that [the]
Complaint demonstrates [Defendant]’s use of unreasonable procedures resulted in the reporting
of inaccurate information and does not even allege what tradeline in his report was false or which
Disputes Defendant[] failed to investigate.” Rep. at 2–3 (citing Gross v. Priv. Nat’l Mortg.
Acceptance Co., LLC, 512 F. Supp. 3d 423, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)).4 The Court agrees.
Plaintiff’s claims are devoid of any facts as to what the disputed information is let alone that it is
4 	Defendant properly raised new arguments in the Reply because those arguments respond
to the Opposition. See Williams v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-01353, 2021 WL 1178118,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021) (“A court generally will consider arguments raised for the first
time in reply if they are responses to the other party’s opposition.”).
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inaccurate. See Gross, 512 F. Supp. 3d at 426 (“To state a claim under either § 1681e(b) or
§ 1681i [of the FCRA], a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the disputed information was
inaccurate.”). The same is true with respect to the allegation that Defendant failed to “correct
deformation [sic] disputed information after receiving notice.” Sur-Reply at 3; Gross, 512 F.
Supp. 3d at 426. And with respect to his allegation that he “rel[ied] upon Defendant’s reporting
conduct,” this also fails because Plaintiff does not identify the specific misrepresentations on
which he relied. See Cohen v. Nutricost, 747 F. Supp. 3d 467, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). Plaintiff’s
Complaint, Opposition, and Sur-Reply, when read together, fail to allege a cognizable cause of
action.5
II. 	Leave to Amend
“A court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires, but it may, in its
discretion, deny leave to amend for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or
undue prejudice to the opposing party.” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Hereford Ins. Co.,
66 F.4th 77, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2023) (affirming denial of leave to amend). When a pro se
complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court generally “should not dismiss without
granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any
indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.
2000). “However, leave to amend should be denied if it would be futile.” Thompson v. Racette,
519 Fed. App’x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2013). Although Plaintiff seeks leave to amend, see Opp. at 3,
this request is denied as futile.
5 	The Sur-Reply rehashes much of the same points Plaintiff makes in the Complaint and
Opposition, including that Defendant had notice of Plaintiff’s disputes and that Defendant
mischaracterizes the claims. See Sur-Reply at 3.
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Plaintiff has already had several opportunities to amend the Complaint. In April, the
Court directed Plaintiff to state whether he “believes the complaint can be amended to address
the issues raised in Defendant’s [pre-motion] letter.” April 10, 2026, Text Order. Plaintiff did
not seek to amend the Complaint at that time. See ECF No. 6; April 27, 2026, Text Order. The
Court then provided Plaintiff with guidance concerning potentially amending his Complaint. See
April 27, 2026, Text Order. This included (1) directions to file a letter and proposed amended
complaint before May 7, 2026, see id., and (2) a warning that “if Plaintiff attempts to request
leave to amend in Plaintiff’s opposition brief, without proposing any specific amendments, the
Court will not be inclined to grant leave to amend because ‘denial of leave to amend is proper
where the request gives no clue as to how the complaint’s defects would be cured,’” id. (quoting
Noto v. 22nd Century Grp., Inc., 35 F.4th 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2022) (affirming denial of leave to
amend)). Plaintiff failed to file a letter by the specified date and his request for leave to amend in
the Opposition did not comply with the Court’s instructions. Moreover, the Court treats
allegations raised in the Opposition and Sur-Reply as though they were part of the formal
pleadings.6 See McKeever v. Singas, No. 17-cv-4996, 2022 WL 5430426, at *2, *15 (E.D.N.Y.
June 16, 2022) (considering allegations raised for first time in pro se plaintiff’s opposition when
deciding motion to dismiss and denying leave to amend), report and recommendation adopted as
modified, 2022 WL 4095558 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2022). Therefore, “leave to amend would be
futile because [P]laintiff ha[s] already had [several] bites at the apple and they have proven
fruitless.” Harris v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., No. 08-cv-1128, 2011 WL 2637429, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2011).
6 	Plaintiff raises new claims, seemingly under the FCRA, in the Opposition. See Opp. at 2.
Nowhere in the Complaint did Plaintiff mention the FCRA or allege that Defendant failed to
investigate disputed matters.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF
No. 7, and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, in its entirety with prejudice
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Although Plaintiff did not pay a filing fee because this action was
removed to federal court, and he has not been granted in forma pauperis status by this Court, the
Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would not be
taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to enter judgment consistent with this Order, close this case, mail a copy of this Order to
pro se Plaintiff, and note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Hector Gonzalez
HECTOR GONZALEZ
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
October 16, 2026
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