Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Henry Paul Paza Iza, by his next friend, Martha C. Iza,
Petitioner,
-v-
Anthony J. Larocco, in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Nassau County; William Joyce, in his official capacity as
District Director of New York for U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE); Kristi Noem, in her official
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security; Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as United
States Attorney General,
Respondents.
2:25-cv-6915
(NJC)
OPINION AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:
On December 16, 2025, Martha C. Iza (“Ms. Iza”) filed an emergency petition for a writ
of habeas corpus (the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as next friend to Henry Paul Paza
Iza (“Mr. Iza”). Proceeding pro se, Ms. Iza is challenging the lawfulness of Mr. Iza’s detention
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and seeking a writ of habeas corpus ordering
Respondents to “release [Mr. Iza] on his own recognizance or under parole, a low bond or
reasonable conditions of supervision.” (Pet. For Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”), ECF No. 1 at
8.) Ms. Iza also seeks Order from the Court “directing Respondents to show cause why the writ
should not be granted within 7–15 days to safeguard [Mr. Iza’s] Procedural Due Process rights.”
(Pet. at 8.) Because Ms. Iza is seeking emergency and time-sensitive relief, the Court construes
the Petition as seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO Motion”) to enjoin Respondents
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from continuing to detain Mr. Iza under potentially unlawful grounds, in addition to seeking a
writ of habeas corpus.1
Respondents are government officials: Anthony J. LaRocco, Nassau County Sheriff;
William Joyce, Deputy Field Office Director in the New York City ICE Field Office; Kristi
Noem, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and Attorney General
Pamela Bondi. Joyce, Noem, and Bondi are collectively referred to as the “Respondents.”2
On December 22, 2025, the Court held a teleconference on Ms. Iza’s TRO Motion. For
the reasons stated on the record and set forth below, the Court grants the TRO Motion and orders
the following relief: ICE must immediately release Henry Paul Paza Iza from detention and
may not re-detain him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”), this Order will remain in effect for the next
fourteen (14) days, until January 5, 2026.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Ms. Iza’s Petition (ECF No. 1); Respondents’
December 17, 2025 Letter to the Court (ECF No. 4 (“Dec. 17 Letter”)); Respondents’ December
1 It is well-established that “Courts should liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by
pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Diaz v.
Kopp, 146 F.4th 301, 305 (2d Cir. 2025). In this case, Ms. Iza’s request for urgent relief indicates
that she is seeking a temporary restraining order. Moreover, at the December 22, 2025
conference in this matter, counsel for Respondents confirmed that Respondents also understand
the Petition to also seek temporary relief pending a final adjudication of the request for a writ of
habeas corpus.
2 LaRocco has not entered an appearance in this action or responded to the Court’s Order to
Show Cause. However, because Mr. Iza is no longer detained in the Nassau County Correctional
Center, it is unclear whether LaRocco remains a proper respondent on the Petition.
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19, 2025 response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 6 (“Dec. 19 Letter ”)); and
Respondents’ December 22, 2025 Letter to the Court (ECF No. 7 (“Dec. 22 Letter”)).
Mr. Iza is an Ecuadorian national who entered the United States on or around December
6, 2022, near El Paso, Texas. (Pet. at 2, 13; Dec. 19 Letter at 1.) Mr. Iza was arrested by Customs
and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers and transported to a nearby facility for processing. (Dec.
19 Letter at 1–2.) On February 7, 2023, Mr. Iza was issued a Form I-94 and was released on
parole as an alternative to continued detention. (Id; Form I-94, ECF No. 7-2.) On November 20,
2023, Mr. Iza—then living in New York—filed an affirmative application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. (Pet. at 2, 22.)
On the morning of December 14, 2025, ICE agents detained Mr. Iza in or near the
parking lot of the Home Depot located at 92-30 168th Street, Jamaica, New York (“Home
Depot”). (Pet. at 1.) Mr. Iza was transported to Central Islip Processing center in Central Islip,
New York, where he was served with a Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest. (Dec. 19 Letter at 2.)
Later that day, Mr. Iza was transported to the Nassau County Correctional Facility. (Id.)
On December 16, 2025, ICE served Mr. Iza with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), Form I-
862, and charged him as inadmissible pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as a noncitizen present in the United
States without parole, or a noncitizen who arrived in the United States at a place or time other
than as designated by the Attorney General. (Id.) The NTA further ordered Mr. Iza to appear in
Immigration Court on January 2, 2026. (Id. at Exhibit 2.)
On December 17, 2025, Mr. Iza was transferred from Nassau County Correctional Center
to a hold room in 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York, before subsequently being transferred
to the ICE Contract Detention Facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, later that day. (Id.)
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In the Petition, Ms. Iza’s argues that Mr. Iza’s detention violates his Fifth Amendment
right to procedural due process because he was stopped and detained by ICE in the parking lot of
the Home Depot at 92-30 168th Street in Jamaica, New York without any “notice, an opportunity
to respond, or an individualized determination that he posed a flight risk or danger to the
community” before he was detained. (Pet. at 2). Ms. Iza also contends that Mr. Iza’s procedural
due process rights were violated because he is being denied access to contact counsel. (Id.) Ms.
Iza also contends that Mr. Iza’s detention violates his rights to substantive due process. (Id. at 7.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 16, 2025, Mr. Iza’s mother, Ms. Martha C. Iza, filed a petition seeking a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as Mr. Iza’s next friend. (ECF No. 1). Later that
day, on December 16, 2025, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring Respondents to
show why the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. (ECF No. 3.) The Court
issued an additional Order requiring Respondents to file a letter on the Court’s docket confirming
where Mr. Iza was being detained and that he had not been transferred out of this Court’s
jurisdiction in violation of the plain terms of the Order to Show Cause. (Elec. Order, Dec. 16,
2025.) On December 17, 2025, Respondents filed a letter confirming that, as of the date and time
of that submission, Mr. Iza was being detained in the Nassau County Correctional Center in East
Meadow, New York. (ECF No. 4.)
On December 19, 2025, Respondents filed a Response to the Court’s Order to Show
Cause (ECF No. 6), in which they reported that on December 17, 2025, Petitioner was
transferred to a hold room at 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York, and then subsequently
transferred to an ICE facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey. (Id.) Additionally, Respondents’
December 19, 2025 letter stated that:
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in lieu of a formal responsive memorandum to conserve judicial and party resources and
to expedite the Court’s consideration of this case, in light of the Court’s decision on the
principal legal issues in Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 25-cv-6065, 2025 WL
3314430 (E.D.N.Y., Nov.28, 2025).
Id.
On that basis, Respondents “acknowledge[d] that the Court’s decision [in Rodriguez-
Acurio] would control the results in this case” because the facts concerning the detention of
Rodriguez-Acurio and Mr. Iza are “materially indistinguishable.” (Dec. 19 Letter at 2.) As a
result, Respondents “incorporate[d] by reference the legal arguments [they] presented in
Rodriguez-Acurio and respectfully submit[ted] that the Court can decide this matter without
further briefing.” (Id.)
On December 20, 2025, the Court filed an additional Order noting that the Response to
the Court’s Order to Show Cause failed to identify the specific statutory basis for Mr. Iza’s
detention: 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); and/or some other
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (Elec. Order, Dec. 20, 2025.) Nor did the
Response confirm that all documents material to Respondents’ asserted statutory basis for
detaining Mr. Iza had been included in the December 19, 2025 submission. (Id.) The Court
ordered Respondents to file a supplemental submission by Monday, December 22, 2025 at
11:00 am identifying the specific provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act asserted as
the basis for Mr. Iza’s detention, and all documents from the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) demonstrating why
such a statutory basis applies. (Id.)
On Monday, December 22, 2025, Respondents filed a letter stating that Mr. Iza is
detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2) (Dec. 22 Letter), along with the following: (1) a
Declaration from Mincheol So, a Deportation Officer with ICE (ECF No. 7-1, Exhibit A); (2)
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Mr. Iza’s Form I-94 (ECF No. 7-2, Exhibit B); (3) Mr. Iza’s Form I-830 (ECF No. 7-3, Exhibit
C); (4) Mr. Iza’s Form I-213 (ECF No. 7-4, Exhibit D); (5) Mr. Iza’s Form I-385 (ECF No. 7-5,
Exhibit E); and (6) Mr. Iza’s Form G-56 (ECF No. 7-5, Exhibit F).
On December 22, 2025, the Court scheduled a telephone conference for 3:30 PM that
same day. (Elec. Order, Dec. 22, 2025.) During the conference, and for reasons set forth on the
record and explained in detail below, the Court granted the TRO Motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Second Circuit has established that a party seeking a temporary restraining order
must show three things: (1) irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction pending resolution
of the action; (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits OR both serious questions on the
merits and a balance of hardships decidedly favoring the moving party; and (3) that the
emergency relief is in the public interest. See National American Soccer League, LLC v. U.S.
Soccer Federation, 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Fed. Defs. of New York, Inc. on
behalf of Metro. Det. Ctr. - Brooklyn v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 416 F. Supp. 3d 249, 251
(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The standards for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
are identical.”).
A prohibitory temporary restraining order “typically requires the non-movant to refrain
from taking some action” to preserve the status quo ante—“that is, the last actual, peaceable[,]
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” Daileader v. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyds London Syndicate 1861, 96 F.4th 351, 365 (2d Cir. 2024). By contrast, a mandatory
temporary restraining order requires the non-movant to take some action to alter the status quo
ante. Id. When seeking a mandatory temporary restraining order, “the likelihood-of-success and
irreparable-harm requirements become more demanding still, requiring that the plaintiff show a
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clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits and make a strong showing of irreparable
harm.” Id. (citing New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d Cir.
2015)) (emphasis in original).
Here, the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status that preceded the dispute between the
parties was immediately prior to ICE’s arrest of Mr. Iza in or near a Home Depot parking lot on
December 14, 2025. Accordingly, the TRO Motion requests temporary relief in the form of an
injunction ordering Mr. Iza’s release from ICE custody, which would require the issuance of a
prohibitory injunction requiring Respondents to release Mr. Iza from ICE detention.
Accordingly, to prevail on the Petition, Mr. Iza most demonstrate: (1) irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction pending resolution of the action; (2) either a likelihood of success on the
merits OR both serious questions on the merits and a balance of hardships decidedly favoring the
moving party; and (3) that the emergency relief is in the public interest. Nevertheless, even
should the higher standard apply it is met; there is a clear or substantial likelihood of success on
the merits and a strong showing of irreparable harm.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Iza seeks a temporary restraining order enjoining Respondents from continuing to
detain Mr. Iza under circumstances that Ms. Iza argues violate his procedural due process rights
under the Fifth Amendment. (Pet. at 7.) For the reasons set forth below, Ms. Iza has
demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits of her claim, a strong showing that Mr.
Iza will experience irreparable harm if he remains detained, and that the public interest weighs in
favor of granting the requested temporary restraining order.
I. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
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Ms. Iza has made a clear showing that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claim
that Mr. Iza’s detention violated his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment
when he was detained by ICE in the parking lot of Home Depot without “any notice, an
opportunity to respond, or an individualized determination that he posed a flight risk or danger to
the community” before he was detained. (Pet. at 2.)
Ms. Iza has shown that she is likely to succeed—and even that she is clearly likely to
succeed on the merits—of her claim that Respondents violated Mr. Iza’s Fifth Amendment rights
by detaining him under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (“Section 1226(a)”). (Pet. ¶ 7.) Under Section
1226(a), a DHS officer must make an individualized determination that Mr. Iza is a danger to the
community or poses a flight risk before detaining him. Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 2025
WL 3314420, at *28 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) (“Moreover, the regulations implementing
Section 1226(a) delegate to DHS officers the authority to grant bond or conditional parole, and
pursuant to such authority, a DHS officer must make an individualized determination as to
whether detention is appropriate based on two factors—whether the noncitizen is (1) a ‘danger
to property or persons’ and (2) is ‘likely to appear for any future proceeding.’” (citing 8 C.F.R. §
1236.1(c)(8)) (emphasis added).
Respondents argue that the proper statutory basis for Mr. Iza’s detention is 8 U.S.C.
1225(b)(2)(A) (“Section 1225(b)”). (Dec. 22 Letter at 1.) For the reasons that follow, Ms. Iza is
likely to show that Mr. Iza is detained under Section 1226a.
a. 	Section 1225(b)
Section 1225(b)(2) provides that:
in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
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proceeding under section 1229a.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). As this Court previously set out in Rodriguez-
Acurio, according to its plain text, to be subject to mandatory detention under this statute, the
noncitizen must be: (1) an applicant for admission; (2) seeking admission; and (3) not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
28, 2025). There is no dispute that Mr. Iza is an applicant for admission” and he is “not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” as set forth in Section 1225(b).
In Rodriguez-Acurio, Respondents argued that because the petitioner in that case was an
“applicant for admission,” she was also inherently and necessarily seeking admission and
thereby satisfied all three criteria required for mandatory detention under 1225(b)(2). 2025 WL
3314420, at *22–*23 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025). In the December 19, 2025 letter, Respondents
put forth the same argument with respect to Mr. Iza. (Dec. 19 Letter at 2.) Based on the current
record, there is a clear likelihood of success on the claim that Mr. Iza is not detained under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) for the reasons set out in Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *22–
*24.
As set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), an “applicant for admission” is a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.”
And admission is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection
and authorization by the immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). As explained in
Rodriguez-Acurio, as a result, “[t]he term ‘applicant for admission’ is . . . something of a
misnomer. It doesn’t require an application of any sort. All that’s needed is presence without
admission—in other words, it applies to the great number of undocumented immigrants who
currently live in this country.” Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *10 (quoting Huamani
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v. Francis, No. 25-cv-8110, 2025 WL 3079014, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025)). By contrast, the
term, “‘seeking admission’ is meant to refer to those who are presenting themselves at the
border, or who were recently apprehended just after entering.” Id. at *22.
Mr. Iza is not seeking admission because he has been living in the United States since
December 2022. Respondents do not identify any active process of seeking admission
attributable to Mr. Iza. (See generally Dec. 17 Letter, Dec. 19 Letter, Dec. 22 Letter)
Respondents note that they “respectfully disagree[] with the Court’s decision in Rodriguez-
Acurio” but do not advance any additional arguments other than what they previously set forth in
Rodriguez-Acurio and incorporated by reference in the December 19, 2025 letter response to the
Petition in this action. (Dec. 19 Letter at 2.) Respondents’ arguments are unpersuasive for the
reasons already set forth in Rodriguez-Acurio.
As this Court explained in Rodriguez-Acurio, an “overwhelming, lopsided majority” of
district courts have rejected Respondents’ argument concerning Section 1225(b)(2). 2025 WL
3314420, at *23 (quoting Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-cv-6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)). Indeed, Respondents’ position that all noncitizens who have come
into the United States without authorization, but have been living in the United States must be
detained “has been challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts” and the challengers
“have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of those cases decided by over 160
different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the United States.” Rodriguez-
Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *23 (quoting Barco Mercado v. Francis, 2025 WL 3295903, at
*4). Such decisions are not binding, and the Court has independently considered Respondents’
arguments. Nonetheless, they reflect the novelty of Respondents’ arguments and demonstrate
“that the law still means what it always has meant.” Id.
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Accordingly, Mr. Iza was detained while present in the United States but not while
actively seeking admission into the United States. Therefore, Respondents’ detention of him,
which commenced on December 14, 2025, is not carried out pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2).
b. 	Section 1226(a)
“Sections 1225 and 1226 are “mutually exclusive—a noncitizen cannot be subject to both
mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary detention under § 1226.” Rodriguez-Acurio,
2025 WL 3314420, at *24. Ms. Iza argues that Mr. Iza is detained under Section 1226(a). (Pet. ¶
7.) Respondents acknowledge Ms. Iza’s position but do not contest it in any way, other than
referencing its positions in Rodriguez-Acurio. (Dec. 19 Letter at 2). However, as explained
above, Mr. Iza is not being detained under Section 1225(b)(2). Accordingly, this Court finds that
Mr. Iza’s detention is governed by Section 1226(a).
As other courts have held, Section 1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens who are
arrested on a warrant while present in the United States. Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-11981,
2025 WL 2607924, at *8 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025). The conclusion that Mr. Iza’s detention is
governed by Section 1226(a) is supported by the fact that Mr. Iza was arrested on a U.S.
Department of Homeland Security Warrant for Arrest that was issued pursuant to Section
1226(a). (Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest (“Warrant”), ECF No. 6-1.) The face of the warrant
states that the immigration officer who issued the warrant did so “pursuant to sections 236 and
287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act” and part 287 of the title 8 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. (Id.); see Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *24 (finding that Sections 236
and 287 of the Immigration and National Act and part 287 of title 8 of the Code of Federal
Regulations correspond to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1357 and 8 C.F.R. 287.1–287.12.); see also Lopez
Benite v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding that Petitioner’s Notice of
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Custody Determination and warrants for arrest, all pursuant to 1226, “unequivocally
establish[ed]” that he was detained pursuant to Section 1226).
Thus, based on the current record, Mr. Iza’s detention is governed by Section 1226(a).
Section 1226(a) provides that, “pending a decision on whether [an] alien is to be removed from
the United States,” the Attorney General “may . . . detain” the noncitizen or “may release” the
noncitizen on “bond” or “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The regulations implementing
§ 1226(a) delegate to DHS officers the authority make an individualized bond determination.
Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2025 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8)). The
broader statutory and regulatory scheme provides for an opportunity to appeal a detention
decision by DHS to an immigration judge who then conducts their own assessment of the
noncitizens’ flight risk and dangerousness, among other factors.” See Lopez Benitez, 795 F.
Supp. 3d at 493 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)). Accordingly, noncitizens detained are not subject
to mandatory detention and are afforded opportunities to present and appeal their detention.
c. 	Procedural Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “covers noncitizens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d
842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020). In Rodriguez-Acurio, Respondents cited several cases, including
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020), to argue that the
petitioner in that case did not have a right to any additional process than what the Section 1225
mandatory detention scheme affords. Respondents’ December 19, 2025 letter incorporates by
reference the arguments made by respondents in Rodriguez-Acurio (Dec. 19 Letter at 2), which I
understand to mean that Respondents make that same argument in the present action.
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However, as I found in Rodriguez-Acurio, Respondents’ argument misstates the law. See
Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *25–*27. Section 1226(a) vests DHS with “broad
authority to arrest and detain noncitizens, but due process must account for the wide discretion
that Section 1226(a) vests in the Government to arrest any person in the United States suspected
of being removable.” See Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 492. The Second Circuit applies the
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), balancing test “when determining the adequacy of
process in the context of civil immigration confinement.” Munoz Materano v. Artera, No. 25-cv-
6137, 2025 WL 2630826, at *12 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 12, 2025). Under that test, determination of
what procedures are required under the Fifth Amendment requires consideration of: (1) the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of
that interest through the procedures used; and (3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail. Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335.
Applying that test, Mr. Iza’s Fifth Amendment Procedural Due Process rights have been
violated.
i. 	Private Interest
On Mr. Iza’s behalf, Ms. Iza invokes “the most significant liberty interest there is—the
interest in being free from imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir.
2020). As a result, Mr. Iza’s private interest in his liberty is significant. The weight of this
interest is underscored by the fact that although Mr. Iza was served with a Notice to Appear on
December 16, 2025—just two days after he was detained by ICE—he has been in living in the
United States since 2022. (Pet. at 2.) Further, Mr. Iza’s next hearing before an immigration judge
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is scheduled for January 2, 2026. Mr. Iza has a significant private interest in being free from
imprisonment while his removal proceedings are pending. (Form I-862, ECF No. 6-2).
ii. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
There is also a high risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used here.
Respondents provided Mr. Iza no notice or opportunity to be heard prior to detaining him on
December 14, 2025. There is a high risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty in detaining Mr. Iza
without any notice or opportunity to be heard.
iii. 	Government’s Interest
The Attorney General may have a legitimate government interest in ensuring the
appearance of noncitizens at immigration proceedings and preventing danger to the community.
See Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 496. However, there is nothing in the record suggesting
that Mr. Iza is a flight risk or a danger to his community. By contrast, shortly after Mr. Iza’s
entry into the United States on or around December 6, 2022, Respondents released Mr. Iza on
parole, permitting him to move to the interior of the United States.
Here, considering all three of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, leads to the conclusion
that Respondents’ ongoing detention of Mr. Iza without notice and an opportunity to be heard
violates his due process rights. Accordingly, Ms. Iza has shown a strong likelihood of success on
the merits of her claim.
iv. 	Irreparable Harm
Ms. Iza has made a strong showing that Mr. Iza will suffer irreparable harm absent a
temporary restraining order. “[T]here is no question that detention causes irreparable harm:
indeed, every minute that someone is unlawfully denied freedom results in an injury that really
can never be remedied.” Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden, 2025 WL 3085032, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
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2025). Moreover, because Ms. Iza has asserted that Mr. Iza’s constitutional rights are being
violated, a presumption of irreparable harm attaches. Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir.
1996); see also Connecticut Dep't of Env't Prot. v. O.S.H.A., 356 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that “violations of constitutional rights are presumed irreparable.”) (citation omitted).
v. 	Emergency Relief is in the Public Interest
Freedom from unlawful detention is undoubtedly within the public’s interest.
Accordingly, Ms. Iza has sufficiently demonstrated issuing a temporary restraining order to
enjoin what is more than likely the unlawful detention of Mr. Iza is in the public’s interest.
vi. 	Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
Here, Ms. Iza has demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits and a strong
showing that Mr. Iza will be irreparably harmed absent a temporary restraining order, and that
granting Mr. Iza a temporary restraining order is in the public’s interest.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that ICE must immediately release Henry Paul Paza
Iza from detention, effective immediately, and shall not redetain Mr. Iza under Section
1225(b)(2). Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this Order will
remain in effect for the next fourteen (14) days, until January 5, 2026.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
December 22, 2025
/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY
United States District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-06915-NJC Document 8 Filed 12/22/25 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:
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