KASHYAP et al v. Jolly

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________________
IN RE:
Chapter 7
JACQUELINE KAMAU JOLLY, 	No. 25-10659-1-PGR
Debtor.
__________________________________________
SUMEET & ANJALI KASHYAP
Plaintiffs, 	Adv. Pr. No. 25-90024-1-pgr
v.
JACQUELINE KAMAU JOLLY
Defendant.
__________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
JACQUELINE KAMAU JOLLY 	PRO SE
SMELYANSKY LAW 	MAX SMELYANSKY, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
602 Central Avenue, Suite 102
Albany, NY 12206
Signed this 20 day of August, 2026.
Patrick G. Radel
_______________________________
United States Bankruptcy Judge
So Ordered.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFAULT
JUDGMENT
1. 	Jacqueline Kamau Jolly (“Debtor”) filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter
7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (25-10659, Docket No. 1) pro se on
June 9, 2025.
2. 	On September 15, 2025, Sumeet Kashyap and Anjali Kashyap (“Plaintiffs”)
filed this Adversary Proceeding against Debtor. (Docket No. 1).
3. 	In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert two causes of action – that the debt owed
by Debtor to the Plaintiffs with respect to a certain lease agreement dated
May 20, 2024, in an amount to be determine by a New York State Court, is
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) & (a)(6). Id.
4. 	On December 4, 2025, Plaintiffs requested a Clerk’s Entry of Default due to
Debtor’s failure to answer, appear, or otherwise defend the action. (Docket
No. 7).
5. 	The Clerk’s Entry of Default was entered on December 5, 2025. (Docket No.
8).
6. 	On April 1, 2026, Plaintiffs moved for default judgment. (Docket No. 14). The
Debtor did not respond to the motion. (Docket No. 34).
7. 	The Court held a hearing and heard argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Default Judgment on June 18, 2026.1
1 At the June 18, 2026 hearing, this Court called together three other related adversary proceedings
concerning Lanford Leroy Jolly (25-90021-1-pgr & 25-90023-1-pgr) and Jacqueline Kamau Jolly (25-
90022-1-pgr). A Motion for Default Judgment was filed by Max Smelyansky, Esq. on behalf of each
Plaintiff(s) in each of the referenced adversary proceedings. The arguments the Jollys put forth at
the hearing and referenced herein pertain to each adversary proceeding.
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8. 	Max Smelyansky, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs and Debtor
appeared pro se.
9. 	After the hearing, the matter was deemed submitted and the Court reserved
decision.
10. For the reasons outlined below, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment
(Docket No. 14) is granted.
Motion for Default Judgment
11. At the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, Lanford Jolly and
Jacqueline Jolly proffered many arguments – that they filed a Motion to
Disqualify Counsel (which they believed constituted an answer to the
Complaint), that the Plaintiffs’ delay in moving for default indicates a lack of
prejudice, and that there were many issues and injustices involved in the
related state court actions. (Docket No. 19).
12. When asked why the Jollys did not file an answer after the order denying the
motion to disqualify counsel was entered, the Jollys stated they were waiting
for the Court and they were not properly informed regarding the case. Id.
13. Debtors then requested the Court vacate the default and allow them to
respond to the Complaint. Id.
14. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, as made applicable by
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055, “[t]he court may set aside an
entry of default for good cause.”
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15. In order to determine whether good cause exists, courts in the Second Circuit
look at the following factors: (1) the willfulness of default, (2) the existence of
any meritorious defenses, and (3) prejudice to the non-defaulting party.
Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Loc. 2, Albany, N.Y. Pension Fund v.
Moulton Masontry & Contru., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2015).
16. Willfulness refers to conduct that is more than merely negligent or careless
but is instead egregious and not satisfactorily explained. Id. at 187.
17. Here, the Debtor failed to move for an order to set aside the default entered
on December 5, 2025, and failed to put forth a sufficient reason why they
never responded. Therefore, this Court finds willfulness in the Debtor’s
failure to answer the Complaint to this date. See Grp. One Ltd. v. GTE
GmbH, 625 F. Supp. 3d 28, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[W]here a defendant
provides no justification for the failure to respond or deliberately fails to
respond to the complaint, the defendant’s default may be considered
egregious and not satisfactorily explained.” (cleaned up)).
18. Additionally, a Motion to Disqualify does not constitute a proper response to
a complaint. See Burgess v. United States, 874 F.3d 1292, 1304 n.3 (11th Cir.
2017) (Carnes, J., concurring) (“Under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,
upon service of the complaint, the defendant is required either to file an
answer (Rule 12(a)(1)(A)), a motion to dismiss (Rule 12(b)), or a motion for a
more definite statement (Rule 12[e])).”). Moreover, the Motions to Disqualify
were only filed in related adversary proceedings 25-90023-1-pgr (Kashyap v.
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Lanford Jolly) and 25-90022-1-pgr (Koeva v. Jacquline Jolly). The Court did
not deem the Motions to Disqualify Counsel submitted in this adversary
proceeding, 25-90024-1-pgr, nor in 25-90021-1-pgr (Koeva v. Lanford Jolly).
19. Regardless of whether the Jollys filed a Motion to Disqualify Counsel in these
related adversary proceedings, an answer or motion to dismiss was due on
November 24, 2025 and never filed.
20. For a defendant to establish a meritorious defense, “the defendant must
present evidence of facts that, if proven at trial, would constitute a complete
defense.” Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 142 (2d Cir. 2010).
21. The Jollys did not articulate a sufficient meritorious defense(s). They
provided no evidence that, if proven at trial, would constitute a complete
defense. Id.
22. To the extent the Jollys argue there were issues in the state court action, this
Court is precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state court
judgments. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
23. Lastly, given that nearly six months have passed between the entry of default
and the hearing on the Motion for Default Judgment, the Court finds that the
Plaintiff has been prejudiced. See Teamster Pension Fund of Phila. & Vicinity
v. Am. Helper, Inc., 2011 WL 479023, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2011) (finding that
the plaintiff was prejudiced when the defendant failed to contact the court or
defend the case and it was over six months since the defendant was served)
24. Thus, the Debtor has not demonstrated good cause to set aside the default.
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For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment is
GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court is requested to transmit a copy of this Order to the
Debtor by first class mail, postage prepaid.
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