Mac Truong

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------x 	NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In re: 	:
: 	Chapter 13
:
MAC TRUONG, 	: 	Case No. 09-11047
:
:
Debtor. 	:
---------------------------------------------------------------x
OPINION DISMISSING CHAPTER 13 CASE AND ENJOINING THE DEBTOR,
HIS WIFE, AND ANY ENTITY ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, FROM FILING,
WITHOUT PRIOR COURT APPROVAL, (I) ANY MATTERS AGAINST
CERTAIN PARTIES, AND (II) ANY FUTURE BANKRUPTCY PETITION
A P P E A R A N C E S:
Mac Truong
Debtor
325 Broadway, Apt. 200
New York, NY 10007
Pro Se
Jeffrey L. Sapir
Chapter 13 Trustee
399 Knollwood Road
Suite 102
White Plains, NY 10603
By: 	Jody S. Kava, Esq.
Mellinger, Sanders & Kartzman, LLC
Attorneys for the Chapter 7 Trustee
101 Gibralter Drive
Suite 2F
Morris Plains, NJ 07950
By: 	Steven P. Kartzman
Adam G. Brief
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MARTIN GLENN
United States Bankruptcy Judge
INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Code exists to assist the class of “honest but unfortunate” 1
individuals who fall on hard times and require the “breathing space” 2 the Code’s
protections afford. Most individual debtors who seek bankruptcy protection are in that
class and file for bankruptcy in the good-faith hope of emerging with a clean slate. There
are exceptions, however. Occasionally, individuals file for bankruptcy for the wrong
reasons and their cases may be dismissed as a result of bad-faith conduct. Even rarer is
the “serial filer,” the individual who files petition after petition in the hopes of
forestalling an inevitable eviction or foreclosure, with successive petitions also dismissed
for bad faith conduct, sometimes with sanctions against the debtor to deter future
misconduct. This Court has never before considered barring any individual from seeking
the protections of the Bankruptcy Code in the future. But the Court has never seen
misconduct as egregious as that of Mac Truong (the “Debtor” or “Truong”), the chapter
13 debtor in this case. Stretching back for over a decade, Truong has serially and
continually abused the judicial system in state and federal courts through his misleading,
inappropriate, litigious and vexatious conduct. Indeed, Truong is currently a debtor in a
chapter 7 bankruptcy case filed in the District of New Jersey, pending before Judge
Norah Winfield. (Case No. 03-40283 (NLW).) Judge Winfield previously issued a so-
called “filing injunction,” barring Truong from filing a broad range of pleadings or new
cases without her prior consent. (ECF Doc. #25, at Ex. F.) As explained further below,
1 	See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374 (2007).
2 	See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 532 (1984).
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in seeking the relief requested in the current chapter 13 case in this court, Truong has
violated the filing injunction entered by Judge Winfield. Also while the New Jersey
chapter 7 case has been pending, Truong or a company he controls filed two separate
bankruptcy cases in this court, both of which were dismissed by my colleague Judge
James Peck. (Case No. 07-10696 (JMP), at ECF Doc. #32; Case No. 07-12194 (JMP), at
ECF Doc. #22.) In dismissing the second case, Judge Peck also issued a filing injunction,
but limited it to a one-year period. In filing the current case, Truong has persisted with
the same type of bad faith conduct that led Judges Winfried and Peck to enter filing
injunctions.
As explained in further detail below, the current chapter 13 case will be dismissed
and an Injunction Order will be entered contemporaneously herewith. The Court hereby:
1. 	DISMISSES the Debtor’s current chapter 13 petition;
2. 	ENJOINS the Debtor, his wife Maryse Mac-Truong, and any entity acting on their
behalf or under their control, from filing any petition, motion or pleading in this
court without this Court’s prior approval, for a period of five years from the entry
of the Injunction Order;
3. 	ENJOINS the Debtor, his wife Maryse Mac-Truong, and any entity acting on their
behalf or under their control, from filing any complaint, motion or pleading
against the standing chapter 13 trustee, Jeffrey L. Sapir, and his representatives or
counsel, including specifically Jody S. Kava, Esq., in any court or tribunal, state
or federal (or any state or federal administrative agency), without first seeking
leave of this Court for a period of five years from the entry of the Injunction
Order;
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4. 	ENJOINS the Debtor, his wife Maryse Mac-Truong, and any entity acting on their
behalf or under their control, from filing any complaint, motion or pleading
against Steven P. Kartzman, and his representatives or counsel, in any court or
tribunal, state or federal (or any state or federal administrative agency), without
first seeking leave of Judge Norah Winfield, for a period of five years from the
entry of the Order for a period of five years from the Entry of the Injunction
Order; and
5. 	ENJOINS the Debtor, his wife Maryse Mac-Truong, and any entity acting on their
behalf or under their control from filing any future bankruptcy petition, under any
chapter, in any bankruptcy court without first obtaining leave of Judge Norah
Winfield, until such time as Case No. 03-40283 in the files and records of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey is closed.
BACKGROUND
The long and tortuous background of this Debtor’s various bankruptcies and
disputes has been detailed numerous times in opinions by Judge Winfield, my colleague
Judge Peck, and many others. 3 The Court repeats the facts of this case solely to the
extent necessary for the purpose of rendering this opinion.
3 	A search of the Debtor’s name in Westlaw yielded over 70 written judicial opinions related to his
various lawsuits and bankruptcies. See, e.g., 2009 WL 1803268 (3d Cir. 2009); 2009 WL 1803269 (3d Cir.
2009); 2009 WL 1269588 (2d Cir. 2009); 312 F. App’x 377 (2d Cir. 2009); 285 F. App’x 837 (3d Cir.
2008); 513 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2008); 2009 WL 2177324 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2009); 2009 WL 1562608
(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009); 388 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); 2008 WL 58874 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2008); 2007 WL
1959259 (D.N.J. July 5, 2007); 2007 WL 1816048 (D.N.J. June 22, 2007); 2006 WL 3408573 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 22, 2006); 2006 WL 2786878 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2006); 2003 WL 1345229 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2003);
2000 WL 1239081 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000); 2009 WL 1024586 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2009); 2009 WL
1024259 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009); 2008 WL 1776227 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008); 2008 WL
442292 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2008); 2008 WL 199462 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2008); 2007 WL 708874
(Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2007); 2006 WL 4452984 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 3, 2006); 259 B.R. 264 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 2001).
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Mac Truong and his wife filed a chapter 7 petition in New Jersey in 2003. 4 The
case was assigned to Judge Winfield; Steven Kartzman was appointed as the chapter 7
trustee of his estate. Among the assets of that estate was the Debtor’s home, located in
Teaneck, New Jersey (the “Property”). At the time Kartzman was appointed, he
substituted himself as plaintiff in an adversary proceeding commenced by Broadwhite
Associates, a judgment creditor of the Debtor, against the Debtor and his family to set
aside a series of fraudulent transfers of the Property to revest title of the Property in the
estate. After years of litigation, Kartzman obtained a series of summary judgment orders
unwinding the transfers and revesting title to the Property in the estate. Kartzman then
obtained an order evicting the Debtor, and authorizing a sale of the Property. Judge
Winfield ruled repeatedly that the Property is an asset of the chapter 7 bankruptcy estate
in New Jersey.
During the course of the adversary proceeding, in an effort to stall his inevitable
eviction, the Debtor engaged in a stunning pattern of vexatious, frivolous, and abusive
litigation, refusing to comply with numerous court orders and prompting numerous filing
injunctions. Among the dilatory tactics employed between 2004 and early 2006: five
motions to dismiss the adversary proceeding filed over a 15-month period (all denied);
three motions to vacate orders entered in the adversary proceeding (two denied, one
pending since 2005); a motion for a stay of the adversary proceeding (denied); a motion
to vacate an order in the main bankruptcy proceeding (denied); three motions to remove
or sanction Kartzman (one denied, two pending since 2006); one motion to dismiss the
bankruptcy (denied); one motion in district court to sanction Kartzman (pending since
4 	That was the Debtor’s earliest bankruptcy for purposes of this opinion and order. He had filed an
earlier chapter 11 case in New Jersey in 2000.
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2005); three motions to reopen or reconsider prior orders (all denied); a motion to
sanction Kartzman in the Third Circuit (denied); and a motion to reconsider a Third
Circuit order (denied).5 (ECF Doc. #25, at Ex. A.) The result of all of this was a filing
injunction entered by Judge Winfield in March 2006 prohibiting the Debtor and his wife
from filing any pleading in the main bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding without
first obtaining leave of the court.
Thereafter, in another effort to delay eviction, the Debtor and his wife filed a
motion to convert their case to a case under chapter 13. Judge Winfield denied that
motion as well, holding that the “bad faith conduct makes the Truongs ineligible for the
benefits of chapter 13.” In re Truong, 2007 WL 708874, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 5,
2007) (citing Maramma, 549 U.S. at 374). In the meantime, the Debtor caused a wholly-
owned entity, To-Viet-Dao (“TVD”) to file a chapter 13 case in this district. That case
was assigned to Judge Peck. TVD—a shell corporation owned by the Debtor— is in the
chain of title of the Property in what Judge Winfield found to be a series of fraudulent
conveyances. After Judge Peck entered an order to show cause why the automatic stay
5 	The Debtor’s conduct has inspired strong language from other federal and state judges: “[W]e
note that Truong has consistently spurned court orders. And the bulk of his voluminous filings appear to be
no more than attempts to re-litigate issues already decided against him as a tactical move to prolong his
bankruptcy proceedings seemingly ad infinitum.” In re Mactruong, slip copy, 2009 WL 1803269, at *2 (3d
Cir. June 25, 2009) (per curiam); “Mac Truong is a vexatious litigant who has continued to file numerous
repetitive, meritless and frivolous actions despite past warnings by several courts.” Vishipco Line v.
Charles Schwav & Co., 2003 WL 1345229, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2003) (Stein, J.); “There has been an
unfortunate history of repetitive, vexatious and frivolous litigation by the Truongs in various courts,
including this one.” In re Truong, 2009 WL 1024586 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2009) (Winfield, J.); “[Y]ou
[Truong] are not a member of the class of honest but unfortunate debtors that bankruptcy laws were enacted
to protect. You are, sir, as far as I can tell, a schemer; somebody who is trying to use the system for your
own advantage. I will not tolerate it . . . .” In re Truong, No. 07-12194, Doc. #22 at 45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
July 24, 2007) (Peck, J.); “[Truong] is undeterred in frivolous and contemptuous conduct. Disbarment is
the appropriate sanction.” In re Truong, 800 N.Y.S.2d 12, 16 (1st Dep’t 2005) (per curiam); “The record
clearly establishes [Truong]’s continual disrespect for the courts and his adversaries, and that his
unprofessional, vexatious behavior is undeterred by monetary sanctions or by court-ordered injunctions.
After a careful review of the record, we find that [Truong]’s contemptuous behavior poses an immediate
threat to the public interest.” In re Truong, 768 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (1st Dep’t 2003) (per curiam).
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applied to the Property (and after the case’s conversion to chapter 11, since only an
individual is eligible to file a chapter 13 case), the Debtor voluntarily dismissed the TVD
bankruptcy and agreed to a one-year nationwide filing ban on TVD bankruptcy cases.
Judge Peck concluded that he had been misled by the Debtor and that the case was as
“clear a case of bankruptcy abuse” as he had ever seen. (Case No. 07-10696, ECF Doc.
#32, at 18.)
The very next day the Debtor filed a personal chapter 13 bankruptcy in this
jurisdiction. The case was again assigned to Judge Peck. Judge Peck immediately
scheduled a status conference and ordered the Debtor to testify as to why the filing was
not in bad faith. After hearing the Debtor’s testimony, Judge Peck concluded that the
Debtor filed the chapter 13 case in bad faith. Judge Peck dismissed the case and enjoined
the Debtor from future filings without prior permission of the Court for one year. (Case
No. 07-12194, ECF Doc. #22, at 45-46.) Judge Peck also refused to allow the Debtor to
evade Judge Winfield’s rulings in New Jersey, holding that issues surrounding the
Property, which had already been fully litigated before Judge Winfield, should remain
before her.6 Id.
Following Judge Peck’s ruling, Kartzman requested an expansion of the 2006
filing injunction from Judge Winfield. In February 2008, Judge Winfield granted the
request in a careful and detailed opinion, issuing a nationwide permanent injunction
against the Debtor, his wife, and any entity acting on their behalf, from filing anything in
any court against the chapter 7 trustee (Kartzman) or his professionals without further
6 	The Debtor’s maneuvering following Judge Peck’s ruling is illustrative of his behavior over the
past six years. The Debtor appealed the dismissal, had his appeal dismissed, moved to vacate the dismissal,
and subsequently appealed Judge Peck’s denial of his motion to vacate the dismissal. That appeal—two
years after the initial dismissal—is still pending.
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leave of the court. (ECF Doc. #25, at Ex. F.) About that time, pursuant to Judge
Winfield’s order, Kartzman sold the Property, generating substantial proceeds after the
satisfaction of liens. According to Kartzman, the Debtor’s litigious conduct, combined
with satisfying the Debtor’s other claimants, has eliminated any possibility of a recovery
for the Debtor.7
The Debtor filed the instant chapter 13 petition here on March 9, 2009. Since the
Debtor still had a pending chapter 7 open in New Jersey, the Court held a hearing to
determine whether the Debtor was eligible to file another bankruptcy petition here. After
a hearing on the matter and a request by the Court for further briefing, the chapter 13
trustee moved to dismiss the case as a bad faith filing, arguing also that the new case
violates the “single-estate” rule. The chapter 13 trustee also sought to enjoin the Debtor
from filing any further motions, pleadings or actions against the chapter 13 trustee or the
professionals representing him, without prior permission from the Court. The Debtor
meanwhile moved and then cross-moved for the following declaratory relief: 8
(1) a declaration that the chapter 13 trustee acted in concert with Kartzman
to convert the proceeds of the sale of the Debtor’s home;
(2) removal of the chapter 13 trustee’s attorney, Jody Kava, for
misconduct;
(3) a declaration that Kartzman acted in concert with the chapter 13 trustee
to convert the proceeds of the sale of the Debtor’s home;9
7 	The Debtor challenges that conclusion, arguing without any proof that Kartzman’s contention is
false, and that Kartzman conspired with the chapter 13 trustee here to convert the proceeds of the sale of his
home for their own benefit. Truong’s current chapter 13 case was clearly filed in an effort to get this Court,
rather than Judge Winfield where the matter clearly belongs, to determine whether the supposed surplus
from the sale of the Property remains property of the New Jersey chapter 7 estate.
8 	The Debtor actually had two motions for declaratory relief. For brevity’s sake, the Court
combines the various requests for relief into one exhaustive list.
9 	Yes, this appears to be the same relief as request for relief (1). The Court merely repeats the
Debtor’s requests for relief as they appear in his motion papers.
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(4) a declaration that all assets of his chapter 7 estate are assets of his
chapter 13 estate;
(5) a declaration that Kartzman violated his fiduciary duty to fully disclose
and report the full amount of his assets held by him as chapter 7 trustee;
(6) a declaration that Kartzman violated his duty of promptly turning over
the chapter 7 assets to the chapter 13 estate;
(7) a declaration that Kartzman can file a proof of claim against the
chapter 13 estate for any fees for the administration of the chapter 7 estate;
(8) denying the motion to dismiss;
(9) a declaration that his chapter 7 case was voluntarily abandoned or
withdrawn;
(10) converting his chapter 7 case to one under chapter 13;
(11) granting leave nunc pro tunc to the Debtor to convert his chapter 7
case to a chapter 13 case; and
(12) other relief as the Court deems just.
Kartzman filed a letter-brief in response to the Debtor’s motions and joined in the
chapter 13 trustee’s motion to dismiss.
In response to Kartzman’s letter-brief, the Debtor filed another flurry of papers
with the Court. The Debtor supplied the Court with a letter he sent to the chapter 13
trustee in which the Debtor “suggests” to the chapter 13 trustee that he withdraw his
motion to dismiss this chapter 13 case or else the Debtor will tie him up in appeals and
litigation for years. The same letter threatens action against the chapter 13 trustee’s
counsel in this case. 10
10 	Truong’s threats against the chapter 13 trustee and his counsel border on extortion. His previous
scorched-earth tactics against the chapter 7 trustee—including multiple criminal complaints, all
dismissed—demonstrate that Truong’s threats must be taken seriously. Therefore, the relief granted by this
Court includes an injunction barring Truong from taking any action against the chapter 13 trustee or his
counsel without prior permission from this Court.
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Truong also initiated an adversary proceeding in this Court against the same
defendants he had previously filed adversary proceedings against in New Jersey and who
he had also previously sued in state and federal courts in New York. (Adv. Proc. 09-
01427.) 11 He then filed another motion requesting that the Court hold the motion to
dismiss the chapter 13 case in abeyance until the adversary proceeding is adjudicated.12
The Debtor argued that because the adversary proceeding seeks $4.5 million in damages,
approximately eight times the amount of the sale proceeds of his former home to which
he believes he is entitled, he is therefore eight times more interested in the adversary
proceeding. The Court denied the request for an adjournment of the motion to dismiss in
a written order. The Debtor then filed yet another brief reiterating the same arguments he
had made before.
The Court held a hearing on August 19, 2009. The Debtor, Kartzman, and the
chapter 13 trustee, by his counsel, appeared. The Court permitted all parties to argue
their motions and submit whatever evidence they believed supported their positions. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under submission. After the
hearing, the Debtor then filed yet another brief, largely reiterating the same points he had
made on numerous earlier occasions.
11 	It appears that the adversary proceeding is barred by prior filing injunctions entered by the state
and federal courts, res judicata and collateral estoppel, and possibly applicable statutes of limitation. The
Court is dismissing the main case as a bad faith filing. As a result, the adversary proceeding will be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court therefore does not reach whether the Debtor violated any
other injunctions by initiating it, or whether any other defenses would apply.
12 	He also reiterated the declaratory relief requests described above.
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DISCUSSION
A. 	Dismissal of the Chapter 13 Petition
Section 1325(a)(7) provides that the court shall confirm a plan if proposed in
good faith. Section 1307(c) provides that a court may dismiss a case if a plan is not
confirmed. Courts have also held that while the Code does not define “bad faith,” courts
have the power to dismiss chapter 13 cases that were filed in bad faith. See Marrama v.
Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 373 (2007) (“Bankruptcy courts nevertheless
routinely treat dismissal for prepetition bad-faith conduct as implicitly authorized by the
words ‘for cause,’” in § 1307(c)); In re Casse, 198 F.3d 327, 341-42 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss chapter 13 petition as void ab
initio when it was filed in bad faith); In re Shankman, 382 B.R. 591 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2008).
The Debtor argues that there is no evidence of his bad faith in filing the petition.
The Court disagrees. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court may take judicial
notice of public filings. See Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“[W]e can take judicial notice of this Court’s files as well as those of the district court.”).
Specifically, the Court notes the plethora of unnecessary filings in this case and the
Debtor’s history for vexatious and abusive conduct towards Kartzman and the Debtor’s
other adversaries in the numerous other cases spawned by the Debtor’s litigious behavior.
The Debtor was disbarred as an attorney licensed to practice in New York for the same
type of behavior. Numerous other courts have entered filing injunctions against the
Debtor in an apparently futile effort to curb his abuses. The Debtor’s penchant for re-
litigating issues over and over again further supports a finding of bad faith. It is clear
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from the very long record that the Debtor filed the instant chapter 13 petition in an effort
to skirt the New Jersey bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction once again and to abuse the
bankruptcy system for his own advantage. As explained below, in seeking relief against
Kartzman in this Court, Truong has also violated the nationwide filing injunction entered
by Judge Winfield.
But even if there was no evidence of bad faith in the very filing of the petition,
case law indicates that the Debtor may not maintain two pending bankruptcies at the
same time in these circumstances pursuant to the “single-estate” rule. See Shankman,
382 B.R. at 595 (“[T]he majority of courts, including courts in this district, have held that
a debtor may only have one case pending at any given time.”). Even those courts that
have not adopted the “single-estate” rule only permit simultaneous bankruptcies with
respect to different assets and different debts. Id. (“Even under the minority view,
however, a Chapter 13 case may not be filed to obtain control of an asset which is
simultaneously being administered in a chapter 7 case.”) (citing In re Kosenka, 104 B.R.
40 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989)). Here, the Debtor conceded that Judge Winfield ruled that
the Property was property of the chapter 7 estate. The sale proceeds from the Property
are therefore undoubtedly property of the New Jersey estate as well. See 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(6) (property of the estate includes “[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits
of or from property of the estate . . . .”). Nonetheless, the Debtor seeks to have this Court
determine that the sale proceeds are assets of the chapter 13 estate. Consistent with
Shankman and the cases it relies upon, the Debtor may not maintain this case while his
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still-open chapter 7 case in New Jersey is still pending. 13 Therefore, the chapter 13
petition must be dismissed.
B. 	The Court Lacks Authority to Convert a Chapter 7 Case Pending in
Another Jurisdiction to a Chapter 13 Case Here
The Debtor requests that rather than dismissing his chapter 13 petition, this Court
should convert his chapter 7 case in New Jersey to one under chapter 13 here, or, in the
alternative, deem his chapter 7 case in New Jersey voluntarily withdrawn or abandoned
and maintain the chapter 13 petition here. This request is denied for lack of jurisdiction
and for bad faith. First, this Court cannot convert a case commenced in another
jurisdiction, because it does not have jurisdiction over the chapter 7 case in New Jersey.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (granting the district court in which a bankruptcy case is
commenced jurisdiction over “all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of
the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate”). Since the case that was
commenced in 2003 is still pending in bankruptcy court in New Jersey, and since the
Property and the sale proceeds are part of that estate subject to that court’s jurisdiction,
this Court has no authority to convert that case or to in any way administer the Property.
Second, the Supreme Court has held that conversion under § 706(a) is not
absolute, especially where there is evidence that the Debtor is seeking to convert his case
in bad faith. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007). There, the court
held that even though § 706(a) is couched in terms of a mandatory right of conversion, if
a debtor would not qualify for chapter 13 for bad-faith conduct—if he “is not a member
13 	The Debtor also tries to argue that because he received his discharge in 2004, he can maintain two
simultaneous bankruptcies. But the purpose of the single-estate rule is the efficient administration of estate
assets, something that continues even after a discharge until a case is formally closed. The Debtor offers no
authority why the single-estate rule does not apply with equal force to a post-discharge, pre-dismissal
debtor. In any event, as discussed above, this chapter 13 filing was clearly done in bad faith, so the Debtor
cannot maintain this case in any event.
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of the class of honest but unfortunate debtors”—he is not entitled to conversion. Id. at
374. For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the chapter 13 case, the Court would
deny the Debtor’s request to convert his existing chapter 7 case to a chapter 13 case even
if it had jurisdiction to do so, which it does not.
In any event, this is precisely the relief Judges Winfield and Peck already denied
in prior opinions and orders. Those orders are entitled to preclusive effect. The Court
DENIES the Debtor’s requests to have his chapter 7 petition either converted to chapter
13 or have his chapter 7 petition be deemed withdrawn or abandoned.
C. 	The Debtor’s Other Requests for Relief Are Meritless
The Debtor’s other sundry requests for declaratory relief either are similarly
meritless or blatantly violate Judge Winfield’s filing injunction. Judge Winfield’s
injunction prohibited the Debtor from filing any motion or pleading against Kartzman, or
any professionals representing him, without her prior approval. All of the declaratory
relief the Debtor requests against Kartzman—that he violated his fiduciary obligations,
that he be required to file a proof of claim in this action, that he be found to have
converted the Debtor’s funds—violate that injunction. The Court will not even consider
a motion that is brought in violation of a federal court order.
In any event, the Debtor does not raise a scintilla of evidence supporting his
allegation that Kartzman and the chapter 13 trustee are in cahoots to convert the proceeds
from the court-authorized sale of the Property. Rather, as described above, the proceeds
of that sale are property of the chapter 7 estate, subject to Kartzman’s administration and
oversight by Judge Winfield. The Court also lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the
allegation that Kartzman violated his fiduciary obligations to the chapter 7 estate. As
with the Debtor’s other allegations concerning the handling of the chapter 7 estate, any
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arguments concerning that estate should properly be raised with Judge Winfield. The
Court has considered all of the Debtor’s other arguments and found them similarly
meritless.
D. 	Enjoining Future Motion Practice and Bankruptcy Filings
A federal court has well-recognized authority to restrict the activity of abusive
litigants. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332-33 (3d Cir. 1990); Tripati v.
Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262
(2d Cir. 1984). In deciding whether to issue a filing injunction, a court must determine
“whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse
the judicial process and harass other parties.” Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24
(2d Cir. 1986).
When Judge Peck issued a filing injunction against the Debtor for a period of one
year, he noted that the Debtor’s “consistency is apparent. [He] will stop at nothing to
game the bankruptcy system. It’s stopping here and now.” (Case No. 07-12194, ECF
Doc. #22, at 43.) That was two years ago. Since then, the Debtor has engaged in
numerous additional and frivolous appeals, litigation, motions to vacate, motions to
reconsider, sanctions motions, attempted criminal prosecutions, and countless other
abusive legal maneuverings, including the current chapter 13 case and the adversary
proceeding filed in this Court. Since Judge Peck commented that Truong will stop at
nothing to game the bankruptcy system, Truong has had additional filing injunctions
entered against him. Truong’s three bankruptcy petitions in this Court show that he will
go to great lengths to avoid the jurisdiction of the New Jersey bankruptcy court that
continues to have jurisdiction over his still-open chapter 7 case. As a result, the filing
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injunction the Court is entering in this case (as described in the Injunction Order being
entered contemporaneously with this Opinion) requires, for a period of five years from
the date of the Order, (a) prior approval of this Court with respect to (i) any future filings
in this Court, or (ii) any pleadings, actions, suits, proceedings, complaints
(administrative, civil or criminal), in any state or federal court, against the chapter 13
trustee or his representative or counsel in this case. Additionally, until such time as the
New Jersey chapter 7 case is closed by that court, Truong must obtain prior approval of
Judge Winfield before (1) filing any paper or pleading in any state or federal court
seeking relief against the chapter 7 trustee or property of the chapter 7 estate, or (2) filing
any new bankruptcy case in any bankruptcy court in any district.
CONCLUSION
The Court wishes it could say with respect to Truong’s conduct that “it’s stopping
here and now,” but Truong’s history shows that there is only so much any court can do.
The Court fully expects that the Debtor will appeal this result, as is his right and his wont.
Nevertheless, the Court enters this Opinion and the contemporaneous Injunction Order in
the perhaps-futile hope that it will curb Truong’s future misconduct. If Truong violates
the injunction, and the matter is properly brought before me, the Court will deal with
Truong in an appropriate manner to the fullest extent permitted by law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	September 3, 2009
New York, New York
_____/s/Martin Glenn____________
MARTIN GLENN
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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