Sealink Funding Limited v. Deutsche Bank AG et al

1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
In re:
RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC,
Debtor.
FOR PUBLICATION
Case No. 12-12020 (MG)
SEALINK FUNDING, LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, et al.,
Defendants.
Adv. Proc. No. 12-02051 (MG)
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND
A P P E A R A N C E S:
BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP
Counsel for Plaintiff
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019
By: 	David L. Wales, Esq.
Lauren A. McMillen, Esq.
Rebecca E. Boon, Esq.
Katherine A. Stefanou , Esq.
SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP
Counsel for Defendants
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10017
By: 	David J. Woll, Esq.
Isaac M. Rethy, Esq.
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MARTIN GLENN
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
This case is one of many similar cases originally filed in state court alleging exclusively
state law fraud claims arising from the sale of residential mortgage backed securities (“RMBS”).
Many similar RMBS cases, some following remand from federal courts, are currently pending in
the Commercial Division of the New York Supreme Court in Manhattan. That court is
experienced in handling complex civil cases such as this one. Like other similar cases, this case
was removed by defendants from state court based on bankruptcy “related to” subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Such jurisdiction exists because there are pending
bankruptcy proceedings for certain mortgage originators (that are not defendants in the action)
who issued mortgages that collateralize the RMBS. Residential Capital, LLC and 50 of its
affiliates (“ResCap” or “Debtors”) are Debtors in chapter 11 cases in this Court; that is the hook
that was used to remove this case to federal court, even though only three of the nineteen
securitization trusts involved in this case include mortgages originated or deposited by ResCap.
After the case was removed to the district court on November 19, 2012, it was transferred on that
same day to this Court pursuant to the Amended Standing Order of Reference, M-431 (dated
January 31, 2012) as related to the ResCap chapter 11 cases.
Removal of similar RMBS state court cases has invariably been followed by motions to
remand to state court. With a few exceptions that are easily distinguishable, such motions to
remand have been granted based on either mandatory or permissive abstention under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1334(c)(1) or (c)(2).1
1 	In Dexia SA/NV v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 12 Civ. 4761 (JSR), 2013 WL 636897 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2013), the district court denied a remand motion of an RMBS case that included only state law claims that had been
removed from New York state court. The district court concluded that it had an independent basis for subject matter
jurisdiction upon removal of the action under the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. § 632, since one of the defendants was a
national bank and 18 mortgages included in the securitization trusts (out of nearly 250,000 mortgages included in
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As explained below, with respect to the pending remand motion, the Court files these
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to F ED. R. BANKR. P. 9033,
recommending that the district court—before which a motion to withdraw the reference remains
pending—enter an order remanding the case to state court.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural Posture
On June 22, 2012, Plaintiff Sealink Funding Limited (“Plaintiff” or “Sealink”) filed its
New York state court complaint against Deutsche Bank AG (“DBAG”), Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc. (“DBSI”), ACE Securities Corp., Deutsche Alt-A Securities, Inc. and DB
Structured Products, Inc. (collectively, “Deutsche Bank” or “Defendants”) alleging state law
causes of action in connection with RMBS created, issued and sold by Defendants to Plaintiff.
On October 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed and served an amended complaint (“Complaint”) asserting
the same claims. Defendants removed the action to the district court on November 19, 2012,
which referred the case to this Court as related to the ResCap bankruptcy.
On December 19, 2012 Plaintiff filed a motion in this Court to remand the case to state
court. 2 (“Motion,” ECF Doc. # 9.) The Motion is supported by a Memorandum of Law (the
“Remand Memo,” ECF Doc. # 10) and the Declaration of David L. Wales (the “Wales Decl.,”
ECF Doc. # 11). The Defendants filed an opposition to the Motion (the “Opposition,” ECF Doc.
the trusts) were originated in the Virgin Islands. There is no argument in this case about Edge Act jurisdiction.
Other cases have denied remand motions where the removed state court actions included federal securities law
claims rather than state law claims only. See, e.g., Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 447
B.R. 302, 308-12 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding “related to” jurisdiction and denying motion to remand case that
included federal securities law claims); Mass. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Fund v. Deutsche Alt-A Sec., Inc., 399
B.R. 119, 122-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction in RMBS suit and denying motion
to remand case that included federal securities law claims).
2 	On that same day, the Plaintiff also filed a motion to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court.
(ECF Doc. # 6.) The motion to withdraw the reference is fully briefed and pending in the district court but remains
undecided. The pendency of the motion to withdraw the reference does not affect the jurisdiction of this Court to
act.
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# 19), which is supported by the Declaration of Jason C. Hegt (the “Hegt Decl.,” ECF Doc. #
20). 	Plaintiff filed a reply (the “Reply,” ECF Doc. # 24), which is supported by the Reply
Declaration of David L. Wales (the “Wales Reply Decl.,” ECF Doc. # 22). The Court heard
argument on the Motion on March 5, 2013.3
Plaintiff argues the Court should remand the case because the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the action and, even if jurisdiction exists, either mandatory or permissive
abstention is warranted. While the Court concludes that it has “related to” jurisdiction over the
action, the Court concludes that the case should be remanded to state court because the
permissive abstention factors weigh in favor of remanding this case to state court.4
B. 	Plaintiff’s Claims Based on the Purchase of RMBS
Plaintiff’s assignors purchased approximately $960 million of Defendants’ RMBS in
nineteen issuing trusts between 2006 and 2007. These securities were ultimately downgraded to
junk status, and Plaintiff filed a complaint in New York Supreme Court on June 22, 2012
asserting claims for fraud, fraudulent inducement, and aiding and abetting fraud under New York
law. On October 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed and served an amended complaint (the “Complaint”)
asserting the same claims for fraud.
As alleged in the Complaint, Defendants created, issued, and/or sold RMBS that they
claimed were supported by underlying mortgages that complied with stated underwriting
3 	These same Defendants are also named defendants in another similar RMBS action originally filed in New
York state court by the same plaintiffs’ attorneys, removed to federal court by defendants based on section 1334(b),
and referred to this Court as related to the ResCap chapter 11 cases. See Bayerische Landesbank v. Deutsche Bank
AG (In re Residential Capital, LLC), Adv. Pro. No. 12-01884(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.). The plaintiff in Bayerische also
filed a motion to remand the case to state court. The Court is issuing separate Proposed Findings and Conclusions of
Law on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, recommending remand of the Bayerische action to state court. A motion to
withdraw the reference of the Bayerische case remains pending before a different district judge than the withdrawal
of the reference motion in this case.
4 	As explained below, the Court declines to decide whether remand should be ordered on the basis of
mandatory abstention.
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guidelines and were prudent investments. The Defendants allegedly knew the underlying
mortgages violated these standards and that the RMBS were not prudent investments. According
to the Complaint, Defendants, as the sponsors and underwriters of the RMBS, had exclusive
access to information about the quality of the underlying mortgage pools, including access to the
loan files and the results of their own due diligence. In contrast, Plaintiff alleges that it did not
have access to the loan files or due diligence results and reasonably relied on Defendants’
representations regarding the quality of the mortgage pools backing the RMBS.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against the Deutsche Bank entities that
purchased the underlying loan pools, deposited those loan pools into trusts that they controlled,
structured the trusts into RMBS, and sold the RMBS to Plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendant DBAG controlled the activities of the other defendants, had knowledge of the faulty
practices of the originators whose loans were ultimately included in the securitizations at issue,
and closely oversaw the massive bet against the housing market that was maintained by the
global head of RMBS trading for DBSI. None of the numerous originators of the underlying
loans, including the ResCap entities that entered into underwriting agreements with the trusts, are
named defendants in this action.
C. 	Relationship to the Residential Capital Bankruptcy Proceeding
On May 14, 2012, various Residential Capital entities (the “ResCap Entities”) filed
voluntary petitions for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “ResCap
Chapter 11 Proceeding”). On November 19, 2012, Defendants removed this action to the
District Court on the basis that eight of the nineteen trusts are “related to” the bankruptcy
proceedings of two groups of non-defendants: the ResCap Entities acted as sponsor, depositor
and/or issuer for three of the nineteen securitization trusts involved in this case (the “ResCap
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Trusts”); and American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc. (“AHM”) originated and sold loans to
Deutsche Bank that were securitized in five of the nineteen trusts.5 Eleven of the trusts include
mortgages originated by entities that are not debtors in any bankruptcy case.
Defendants served as third-party underwriter for the trusts and entered into agreements
with certain ResCap Entities that agreed to indemnify Deutsche Bank Securities for “any and all
losses, claims, damages and liabilities . . . caused by any untrue statement or alleged untrue
statement of material fact” in the various offering documents for the certificates issued by the
ResCap Trusts. The ResCap Entities also agreed to pay attorneys’ fees for such proceedings.
Defendants allege that the ResCap Entities’ indemnification obligations arose immediately upon
the filing of this lawsuit. The Defendants filed timely proofs of claim against seven of the
ResCap Entities in these proceedings. The Plaintiff has also filed proofs of claim against four of
the ResCap Entities.
D. 	The Motion Before This Court
Plaintiff argues that the Court should remand the case to New York state court for three
reasons. First, the Court lacks “related to” subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
because (i) the mere filing of a proof of claim for indemnification does not create “related to”
jurisdiction because a party cannot be indemnified for its own fraud; (ii) any effect of
Defendants’ proofs of claim on the bankruptcy estate is speculative at best; (iii) none of the
ResCap Debtors have sought to impact claims by third parties like Plaintiff against defendants
that are not Debtors or affiliates; (iv) this action cannot affect the AHM bankruptcy proceedings
because a plan has already been confirmed; and (v) Defendants’ claims are contingent and
5 	The AHM bankruptcy proceeding is in Delaware bankruptcy court. In re American Home Mortgage
Holdings, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 11047 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del.). The AHM bankruptcy plan of liquidation has already
been confirmed and the effective date has occurred. January 11, 2008 was the bar date for filing proofs of claim in
that case. Defendants filed three proofs of claim in the AHM bankruptcy, two of which were disallowed and one
that was settled by stipulation. See Wales Decl., Ex. D.
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unliquidated, and they will have to be either denied or reduced to a liquidated amount before
there can be any effect on the bankruptcy estate.
Defendants contend that this Court has “related to” jurisdiction over this action because it
is closely related to the ResCap Chapter 11 Proceeding. The Debtors originated loans
collateralizing each of the ResCap Trusts, and sponsored two of these three offerings. The
Debtors, not the Defendants, allegedly possess much of the information regarding the ResCap
Trusts. Defendants characterize their role as limited to underwriter on those offerings, and
further emphasize that they are owed indemnification obligations from the ResCap Entities.
Therefore, Defendants argue that this action could have a conceivable effect on the res of the
bankruptcy estate.
Second, Plaintiff argues that even if this Court finds “related to” jurisdiction, mandatory
abstention is required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) because each of the six factors in the
applicable test (discussed below) are present in this case. While Defendants concede that four of
the six factors are met in this case, they claim that mandatory abstention is not warranted because
section 1334 is not the sole basis for jurisdiction over this action (diversity jurisdiction allegedly
exists as well), and this action could be more timely adjudicated in federal court.
Last, the Plaintiff argues that even if the Court finds that “related-to” jurisdiction exists
and mandatory abstention is not required, permissive abstention is warranted under 28 U.S.C. §
1334(c)(1) for several reasons: (i) none of the Defendants are debtors in the bankruptcy
proceeding; (ii) state law issues overwhelmingly predominate; (iii) nearly all of the Defendants
have their primary place of business in New York; and (iv) the outcome of this action will not
have any effect on the administration of a bankruptcy proceeding. Defendants counter that
equitable abstention is not warranted because this common law fraud case involves no novel or
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unsettled areas of state law, this suit is directly related to the ResCap Chapter 11 Proceeding,
diversity jurisdiction exists, and a jury trial is available in the District Court.
As explained below, the Court concludes that it has “related to” jurisdiction over the
action, but the case should nevertheless be remanded to state court based on permissive
abstention.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	The Court’s Authority to Enter an Order Granting a Motion to Remand
While none of the parties addressed the issue in their briefs or during oral argument, there
is an issue whether a bankruptcy judge may enter a final order remanding an action properly
before the Court based on “related to” jurisdiction. Case law is split on this issue. The claims
asserted in the Complaint against Defendants are all non-core state law claims under section 28
U.S.C. § 157(b). Bankruptcy courts may hear core matters and non-core matters that are
“otherwise related” to a case under title 11, but they may only enter a final order or judgment in
core proceedings unless the parties consent.6 For non-core proceedings, bankruptcy courts may
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court pursuant to the
procedure set forth in FED. R. BANKR . P. 9033; the district court then has the authority to enter a
final judgment after reviewing de novo any matters to which a party timely objects. 28 U.S.C. §
157(c)(1) (“A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is
otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or
judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed
findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has
6 	Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), imposes further limits on a bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter
a final order or judgment even in certain matters that are statutorily core, but it is unnecessary to explore the issues
further here because of the Court’s disposition of the Motion.
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timely and specifically objected.”); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033(b) (“Within 14 days after being
served with a copy of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law a party may serve and
file with the clerk written objections which identify the specific proposed findings or conclusions
objected to and state the grounds for such objection.”).
In considering motions to remand, courts differ on whether the motion to remand itself,
as opposed to the underlying lawsuit, constitutes the “proceeding.” Some courts have found that
a motion to remand is a “core proceeding,” regardless of the underlying claims, because a motion
to remand a “related to” case could only arise in a bankruptcy case, and matters “arising in”
bankruptcy cases are core proceedings. See generally Meritage Homes Corp. v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., 474 B.R. 526, 536-37 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012) (Hoffman, J.) (recognizing the
split in authority and collecting cases). Other courts have found that the “proceeding” referenced
in section 157(c) is the underlying lawsuit rather than the motion to remand. See id. The Court
declines to resolve this issue here.7 A motion to withdraw the reference was filed on the same
day as the motion to remand so there is already a pending motion in the district court that can
only be resolved by that court. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (“The district court may withdraw, in
whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on
timely motion of any party, for cause shown.”). Granting the motion to remand on a final basis
would moot the withdrawal of the reference motion. Rather than doing so, the Court will submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court and leave it to the parties, in
the first instance, to decide whether to seek de novo review of this ruling. If district court review
7 	Whether or not the remand motion in this case is core or non-core, the failure of counsel to raise the issue
of the Court’s authority to enter a final order in briefs or oral argument could be considered implied consent to the
entry of a final order by the bankruptcy judge resolving the Motion. Because there is already a motion pending to
withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court, the Court here elects to simply provide its disposition under Rule
9033 and leave it to the unsuccessful parties to decide whether to object to the determination and seek de novo
review by the district court.
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is sought, the district court could then proceed with the remand and withdrawal motions in
whatever fashion it concludes is appropriate in the circumstances. The Court reserves for
another day the issue whether, in the absence of a pending motion to withdraw the reference, a
bankruptcy court may enter a final order on a motion to remand a case that is only “related to” a
bankruptcy proceeding.
B. 	“Related to” Jurisdiction
1. 	Before Confirmation, “Related To” Jurisdiction Exists Where the Proceeding
May Have a Conceivable Effect on the Bankruptcy Estate
Section 1334(b) provides that a district court has jurisdiction over cases under title 11,
proceedings arising under title 11, proceedings arising in a case under title 11, and proceedings
related to a case under title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Section 157(a) permits the district court to
refer all such cases to the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). Such “related to” jurisdiction is
a broad grant of federal jurisdiction. See City of Ann Arbor Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Citigroup Mortg.
Loan Trust Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 314, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The scope of ‘related to’
bankruptcy jurisdiction has been broadly interpreted by the Second Circuit.”); Bond St. Assocs.,
Ltd. v. Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 174 B.R. 28, 32-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The legislative history
makes it clear that section 1334(b), taken as a whole, constitutes an extraordinarily broad grant
of jurisdiction to the Article III District Court.”).
In the Second Circuit, before confirmation of a chapter 11 plan, “related to” bankruptcy
jurisdiction exists in any civil action where the outcome “might have any ‘conceivable effect’ on
[a bankruptcy] estate.”8 In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1992). To
8 	Post-confirmation, cases in this Circuit and elsewhere apply a more stringent “close nexus” test for “related
to” jurisdiction, but have nevertheless upheld “related to” jurisdiction in RMBS cases. For example, in Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Ace Sec. Corp., No. 11 Civ. 1914 (LBS), 2011 WL 3628852, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011), the district
court held in a post-confirmation RMBS case that it retained jurisdiction under the stricter “close nexus” standard,
explaining that the defendant’s “rights of indemnification arose immediately upon the filing of this lawsuit, covering
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have a “conceivable effect” on a bankruptcy estate, “certainty, or even likelihood, is not
required.” Winstar Holdings, LLC v. Blackstone Grp. L.P., No. 07 Civ. 4634 (GEL), 2007 WL
4323003, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308,
322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Rather, an action has a “conceivable effect” if “the outcome could alter
the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and
which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.”
WorldCom, 293 B.R. at 317 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1995));
see also In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that even where suit “may
ultimately have no effect on the bankruptcy,” jurisdiction is established where a court “cannot
conclude, on the facts before [it], that it will have no conceivable effect”).
Jurisdiction has been held to exist where it is premised on a contractual indemnification
obligation by a bankrupt entity. See, e.g., In re Wolverine Radio Co., 930 F.2d 1132, 1143 (6th
Cir. 1991) (holding that an indemnification provision supported jurisdiction even though the
debtor “would not be affected until and unless [the third party] invoked the indemnification”
provision); WorldCom, 293 B.R. at 318-19 (collecting cases); In re River Center Holdings, LLC,
288 B.R. 59, 63-65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding jurisdiction where the debtor was
contractually obligated to indemnify guarantor who was third party defendant).
Nonetheless, “the potential applicability of indemnification provisions is not by itself the
equivalent of an effect on an indemnifier’s bankruptcy proceedings.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Credit
Suisse Secs. (USA), No. 11 Civ. 2232 (NRB), 2011 WL 4965150, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19,
the costs of litigation regardless of whether Defendants are ultimately found liable. Therefore, this case already
‘affects the interpretation, implementation, consummation, execution, or administration of the confirmed plan[,]’
meeting the ‘close nexus’ test for bankruptcy jurisdiction.” Id. (concluding that it had “related to” jurisdiction but
remanding case to state court); see also Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, 447 B.R. at 308-12 (finding “related to”
jurisdiction where the debtors were contractually obligated to indemnify the defendants based on the “close nexus”
test). Since no plan has been proposed or confirmed in this case, the “conceivable effect” standard is applicable.
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2011). Rather, “[t]he only way defendants’ indemnification claims against the Bankrupt
Originators can actually affect the allocation of property among the estates’ creditors is if
defendants have asserted their claims against the bankrupt estates.” Id. (holding the plaintiffs
failed to establish “related to” jurisdiction in the RMBS action because they did not file proofs of
claim by the bar date in the bankruptcy proceedings of the indemnifying originators); see also
Gen. Electric Cap. Corp. v. Pro-Fac Coop., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 10215 (LTS), 2002 WL 1300054,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2002) (stating that the “potential ramifications are insufficient to render
the claims that have been asserted against the non-debtor Defendants ‘related to’ Debtor’s
bankruptcy proceeding”).
Moreover, “[a]n indemnification right arises at the time the indemnification agreement is
executed, and it constitutes a claim under the Bankruptcy Code even if the act giving rise to the
indemnification has not yet occurred.” Credit Suisse, 2011 WL 4965150, at *5 (citations
omitted). See also In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 209 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that “a right to payment based on a written indemnification contract arises at the time the
indemnification agreement is executed,” and constitutes “a valid contingent claim” in
bankruptcy, even if the act giving rise to indemnification has not yet occurred).
2. 	“Related to” Jurisdiction Exists in this Case
This Court has “related to” jurisdiction over this case. The outcome of the action has a
“conceivable effect” on the ResCap Chapter 11 Proceeding because the ResCap Entities may be
obligated to indemnify the Defendants if they are found liable in the case. The ResCap Entities
may also be obligated to pay a portion of the Defendants’ attorneys’ fees in the action. The
ResCap Entities’ indemnification obligations, to the extent they exist, arose immediately upon
the filing of this lawsuit and the Defendants filed timely proofs of claim in the bankruptcy case.
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Many courts have found “related to” jurisdiction where a debtor and a defendant entered
into an indemnification agreement regarding an RMBS offering, and the defendant filed a proof
of claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding before the expiration of the bar date. See, e.g.,
Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2010)
(finding “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction based on contractual indemnity in RMBS suit);
Mass. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Fund, 399 B.R. at 123 (finding “related to” jurisdiction in
RMBS suit based on AHM bankruptcy); City of Ann Arbor, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 318 (finding
“related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction in RMBS suit); see also Fed. Home Loan Bank of San
Francisco v. Deutsche Bank Sec., No. 10 Civ. 3039 (SC), 2010 WL 5394742, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 20, 2010) (“A number of courts dealing with litigation concerning mortgage-backed
securities have recently determined that claims for contractual indemnity against an entity in
bankruptcy gives rise to related-to bankruptcy jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted).
C. 	Abstention
Not all cases properly removed to federal court based on section 1334(b) jurisdiction
must remain in federal court. A federal court may abstain from hearing such cases under
sections 1334(c)(1) or (c)(2),9 and remand the cases to state court under section 1452(b). See 28
U.S.C. § 1452(b) (“The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand
such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground.”). The Court firmly believes that this
9 	Section 1334(c) provides:
(1) Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11, nothing in this
section prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with
State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim
or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11
or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been
commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the
district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and
can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.
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case can and should be litigated in the Commercial Division in Manhattan. That court is already
handling similar cases. Indeed, the Commercial Division is currently presiding over six RMBS
cases brought by Sealink, the same plaintiff, including one that had been removed to federal
court on the basis of “related to” jurisdiction and then remanded by Judge Swain. See Sealink
Funding Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., No. 12 Civ. 1397 (LTS), 2012 WL 4794450 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 9, 2012). The Sealink cases can most efficiently be handled by the same judge in the same
court. Judge Swain’s colleagues, Judges Kaplan, Sand and Sullivan, have likewise remanded
RMBS cases to the Commercial Division. See Bayerische Landesbank, N.Y. Branch v. Bear
Stearns & Co., et al., No. 12 Civ. 2804 (LAK), (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2012) (Kaplan, J.) (ECF Doc.
# 17) and Bayerische Landesbank, N.Y. Branch v. Merrill Lynch & Co., et al., No. 12 Civ. 3856
(LAK), (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2012) (Kaplan, J.) (ECF Doc. # 15) (collectively, the “BayernLB
Remanded Cases”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 1914 (RJS), 2012 WL
967582 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2012) (Sullivan, J.); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ace Sec. Corp., 2011 WL
3628852 (Sand, J). While the Plaintiff has presented strong arguments supporting both
mandatory and permissive abstention, and while discussing both arguments below, the Court
recommends abstention and remand on the basis of permissive abstention without fully resolving
the issues concerning mandatory abstention.
1. 	The Court Does Not Resolve the Issues Concerning Mandatory Abstention
Mandatory abstention applies under section 1334(c)(2) only if each of the conditions in
that subsection is satisfied. These conditions are: “(1) the motion was timely brought; (2) the
proceeding in federal court is based upon a state law claim; (3) the proceeding is related to a
bankruptcy proceeding, but does not arise under Title 11 or arise in a Title 11 case; (4) section
1334 is the sole basis for federal jurisdiction; (5) an action is commenced in state court; and (6)
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the action can be timely adjudicated in state court.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ace Sec. Corp., 2011 WL
3628852, at *6. The issues here are (i) whether the state court action alleging only state law
causes of action could have been commenced in federal court absent “related to” jurisdiction
under section 1334(b), and (ii) whether the action could be timely adjudicated in state court.
The first issue turns on whether diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Defendants allege that diversity jurisdiction exists under sections 1332(a)(3) and (a)(4) because
the case was brought by a foreign plaintiff (Sealink is an Irish corporation). Section 1332(a)(3)
provides for subject matter jurisdiction in a suit between citizens of different U.S. states and in
which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).
Because this provision requires a U.S. citizen on both sides of an action and there is no U.S.
citizen as a plaintiff in the case, section 1332(a)(3) does not apply. See Bank of New York v.
Bank of Am., 861 F. Supp. 225, 228 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Section 1332(a)(4) provides for subject matter jurisdiction in a suit between a foreign
state, as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1603, and citizens of a state of the United States. A foreign state
includes “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” which includes “any entity which is an
organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.” 28 U.S.C. §
1603(a)-(b). Defendants claim that Sealink constitutes an “organ” of Germany because it was
established to receive, hold and manage RMBS purchased by special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”)
formerly sponsored by Sachsen LB, a German Landesbank, or state-owned bank.10
10 	There are various factors that courts consider when determining whether an entity constitutes an “organ”
under the statute: (1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state
actively supervises the entity; (3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays their
salaries; (4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the [foreign] country; and (5) how the entity is
treated under foreign state law. See In re 650 Fifth Ave. and Related Props., 881 F. Supp. 2d 533, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (finding a U.S. foundation constituted an organ of Iran where it was created by the head of Iran for a national
purpose, the Iranian government was extensively involved in all aspects of the foundation, it was completely
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However, regardless whether Sealink is an “organ” of Germany, and thus a “foreign
state” under section 1603, one of the Defendants, DBAG, is also a German corporation. The
presence of properly joined foreign entities on both sides of the caption would destroy diversity
jurisdiction. See Flores v. Citizens Intern. Bank, No. 92 Civ. 1692 (KMW), 1992 WL 309546, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1992) (“Under Second Circuit law, ‘the presence of aliens on two sides of
a case destroys diversity jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v.
Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1980)); Bank of New York, 861 F. Supp. at 228
n.4 (stating that “diversity jurisdiction does not encompass cases between foreigners on one side
and foreigners and citizens on the other”); L’Europeeane de Banque v. La Republica de
Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Section (a)(4) permits the assertion of
jurisdiction only against defendants who are ‘citizens of a [U.S.] State or of different [U.S.]
States.’”).
The Defendants argue that DBAG was “fraudulently joined” as a defendant and,
therefore, should be excluded in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists. Defendants
bear the burden of establishing fraudulent joinder, see Chin v. CH2M Hill Cos., Ltd., No. 12 Civ.
4010 (HB), 2012 WL 4473293, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (citing Briarpatch Ltd., L.P v.
Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2004)), and it is a particularly heavy burden to
meet. See id.; Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459 (2d Cir. 1998). The burden on a
defendant asserting fraudulent joinder is stricter than the standard for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6)
supervised by the Iranian government, the government chose its board members, and its corporate formality was a
fraud); Ocean Line Holdings Ltd. v. China Nat’l Chartering Corp., 578 F. Supp. 2d 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding an entity was not an organ of the PRC as it was not created for a national purpose, was not actively
managed by the PRC, and was treated under PRC law as a private commercial enterprise). Defendants argue that
because Sealink, an Irish company, was created and funded by state-owned German Landesbanks and serves an
official function of the German government, it constitutes an “organ” of a foreign state. However, Defendants fail to
assert that the German government created Sealink, supervises Sealink, requires the hiring of German employees or
pays the employees’ salaries. In addition, Defendants have not alleged that Sealink holds exclusive rights to some
right in Germany or that it is entitled to special treatment under German law. As such, it is doubtful that Sealink
constitutes an “organ” of Germany for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
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motion to dismiss. See Chin, 2012 WL 4473293, at *6. While the Plaintiff may (or may not)
ultimately be successful in stating a claim against DBAG, the arguments for fraudulent joinder
are “close,” even with the lower threshold to overcome a fraudulent joinder argument. In light of
the strong argument supporting permissive abstention, it is unnecessary to resolve the fraudulent
joinder argument.
The second issue—timely adjudication in state court—is a mixed question of fact and law
involving four factors. See Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd. v. Bank of American Corp., 639 F.3d
572, 580 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Four factors come into play in evaluating § 1334(c)(2) timeliness: (1)
the backlog of the state court’s calendar relative to the federal court’s calendar; (2) the
complexity of the issues presented and the respective expertise of each forum; (3) the status of
the title 11 bankruptcy proceeding to which the state law claims are related; and (4) whether the
state court proceeding would prolong the administration or liquidation of the estate.”). While
Defendants half-heartedly contest whether this action could be timely adjudicated in the
Commercial Division, the factual record regarding timely adjudication is scant and primarily
focused on the number of similar cases already pending in the Commercial Division. The
Second Circuit remanded Parmalat back to the district court after remand was denied to assess
whether that case could have been timely adjudicated in Illinois state court. Id. at 582. While
this Court’s familiarity with the work of the Commercial Division strongly counsels a finding
that the case could be timely adjudicated in state court, Defendants offer mostly argument and no
competent evidence supporting their position.
Therefore, while mandatory abstention would likely be warranted here, the Court finds it
unnecessary to resolve the Motion on that basis.
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2. 	This Case Should Be Remanded Based on Permissive or Equitable Abstention
The Court concludes that this case should be remanded to the Commercial Division based
on permissive abstention. Courts in this district consider several factors when determining
whether to permissively abstain from a case pursuant to section 1334(c)(1), including: (1) the
effect on the efficient administration of the bankruptcy estate; (2) the extent to which issues of
state law predominate; (3) the difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable state law; (4)
comity; (5) the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy
case; (6) the existence of the right to a jury trial; and (7) prejudice to the involuntarily removed
defendants. 	See Sealink Funding Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., 2012 WL 4794450, at *4;
Farace v. Pereira, No. 04 Civ. 1880 (RWS), 2004 WL 1638090, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 22,
2004). The movant bears the burden of establishing that permissive abstention is warranted. See
In re Margulies, 476 B.R. 393, 402 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
The Court finds that the movant has met its burden of establishing that this case should be
remanded on equitable grounds. Only three of nineteen securitization trusts involved in this
case include mortgages originated or deposited by ResCap. The claims relating to the other
sixteen securitization trusts do not involve ResCap or the administration of the bankruptcy
cases. While both the Plaintiff and the Defendants have filed unliquidated proofs of claim in the
Debtors’ chapter 11 cases, which will likely necessitate further proceedings in the bankruptcy
case at some point, section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the bankruptcy court to use
streamlined procedures for resolving disputed claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (“There shall
be estimated for purpose of allowance under this section—(1) any contingent or unliquidated
claim, the fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the
administration of the case”); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 502.04 (16th ed. 2012) (“Section
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502(c) provides a mechanism for estimating the amount of a contingent or unliquidated claim
for purpose of its allowance when the fixing or liquidation of the claim as determined by the
court would unduly delay the administration of the case.”). Litigating the removed action to
judgment would unquestionably “unduly delay the administration of the [bankruptcy] case.”
Such streamlined procedures are not available for adjudicating lawsuits against non-debtor
defendants.
The Defendants argue that the Court will necessarily have to address discovery issues if
the case is remanded to state court. It is certainly true that the bankruptcy court will have to deal
with discovery issues whether this case proceeds in state court or in the district court if the
reference is withdrawn. The Court is already dealing with discovery seeking documents from
the Debtors arising from cases pending in other courts without unduly interfering with the
administration of the bankruptcy case. See In re Residential Capital, LLC, 480 B.R. 529 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2012). But dealing with selective discovery issues is far different from actually
managing and litigating to judgment complex cases involving numerous parties and issues
completely unrelated to the ResCap Chapter 11 Proceeding. ResCap loans constitute only 2.4%
of the loans in all of the trusts at issue, meaning the action is only tangentially related to the
ResCap Chapter 11 Proceeding. See Wales Reply Decl., Exs. E, F. As a result, most of the
discovery in the case will have to be sought outside of the ResCap Chapter 11 Proceeding.
In addition, state law issues clearly predominate. The case involves neither federal law
nor bankruptcy law, and New York state courts are currently handling many similar cases, some
remanded from federal court. See BayernLB Remanded Cases; Allstate Ins. Co. v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., 2012 WL 967582, at *7 (remanding a substantially similar case to New
York state court and noting that “while this case presents some questions of federal law, it does
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not require the resolution of any bankruptcy issues”); Buechner v. Avery, No. 05 Civ. 2074
(PKC), 2005 WL 3789110, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) (“Only state law claims are asserted,
all purportedly arising under New York law. This factor weighs in favor of remand.”); see also
Kerusa Co. LLC v. W10Z/515 Real Estate Ltd. P’ship., No. 04 Civ. 708 (GEL), 2004 WL
1048239, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2004) (remanding “perfectly ordinary state-law actions that
invoke no aspect of bankruptcy law, that proceed against numerous defendants who are not in
bankruptcy and who are jointly and severally liable for all claims and that, even as to the
bankrupt defendant, concern actions taken long before the bankruptcy filing”); Digital Satellite
Lenders, LLC v. Ferchill, No. 03 Civ. 8803 (RWS), 2004 WL 1794502, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
10, 2004) (ordering equitable remand where the “action turns entirely on questions of New York
law [including common law fraud]”). 11
While this case may not include complex or unsettled areas of law, New York state courts
are adept at dealing with such issues and are currently presiding over numerous RMBS cases,
including many remanded from the Southern District and six cases that were initiated by the
same Plaintiff on substantially similar facts. See Sealink Funding Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co.
Inc., 2012 WL 4794450; BayernLB Remanded Cases; Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Ace Sec.
Corp., Index No. 652460/11 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2011); Remand Memo at 16 (New York
Supreme Court Commercial Division overseeing dozens of similar cases). In addition, New
York Supreme Court’s Commercial Division is a specialized division for dealing with complex
commercial cases, such as this case, and the action alleges only state law claims. See Credit
Suisse, 2011 WL 4965150, at *7 (stating that “because the underlying action alleges only state
11 	Federal courts in other districts have also remanded RMBS cases to state courts. See Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 12 Civ. 5854 (WJM) (MF), 2013 WL 221995 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2013); Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC, No. 12 Civ. 03489 (WHW), 2012 WL 6771977 (D.N.J. Dec. 20,
2012).
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claims, the Commercial Division may have an edge in the relevant legal expertise”); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Ace Sec. Corp., 2011 WL 3628852, at *10 (“While federal district courts naturally possess
expertise in applying federal law, this advantage dissipates for cases alleging exclusively state
claims.”).
Judge Swain in the Southern District recently remanded a substantially similar case filed
by the same Plaintiff to state court. Sealink Funding Ltd. v. Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., 2012 WL
4794450. Although the court found that it lacked “related to” jurisdiction because the
defendants failed to file timely proofs of claim in the mortgage originators’ bankruptcy
proceedings, the court explained that it would have permissively abstained from hearing the case
even if it had jurisdiction:
Defendants have not articulated any plausible way in which this
action will affect the efficient administration of the administration
of the Bankrupt Originators’ estates. Plaintiff’s claims exclusively
involve state law. 	Comity considerations favor remand as well,
because “[i]t is well-settled that comity considerations dictate that
federal courts should be hesitant to exercise jurisdiction when state
issues 	substantially 	predominate.” 	Remanding 	to 	state 	court
preserves the parties’ right to avail themselves of a jury trial.
Finally, Defendants have not identified any prejudice that would
result from this action being remanded to state court.
Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court recommends that this action be remanded to
the New York Supreme Court, Commercial Division, from which the case was removed. The
Court directs that the Clerk shall serve forthwith copies of these Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on all parties by mail and note the date of mailing on the docket. Within 14
days after being served with a copy, a party may serve and file with the Clerk written objections
which identify the specific proposed findings and conclusions objected to and state the grounds
for such objections. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after
being served with a copy thereof.
Dated: 	March 20, 2013
New York, New York
_____Martin Glenn____________
MARTIN GLENN
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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