McCoy v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DELANEY A. MCCOY
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
CASE NO. 1:25-cv-988
DISTRICT JUDGE
DAN AARON POLSTER
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Delaney A. McCoy1 filed a complaint against the Commissioner
of Social Security seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
denying their applications for child’s insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. Doc. 1; Tr. 10. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g) and 1383(c). The Court referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge under
Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation.
Following review, and for the reasons stated below, I recommend that the
District Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
1 	McCoy’s preferred pronouns are they, them, and theirs, as reflected
throughout this recommendation. Tr. 446.
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Procedural Background
In October 2022, McCoy filed applications for child’s insurance benefits
and supplemental security income alleging a disability onset date of November
20, 2023, their date of birth.2 Tr. 192, 236. McCoy alleged disability due to
autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), dissociative identity
disorder, and seizure disorder. See Tr. 228. The Commissioner denied McCoy’s
application initially and on reconsideration. See Tr. 116–24, 127–33.
In October 2023, McCoy requested a hearing. Tr. 142. Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) Joseph Hijjar held a telephonic hearing in April 2024. Tr.
45. McCoy appeared, testified, and was represented by counsel at the hearing.
Id. Qualified vocational expert Allison K. Reno also testified. Id. In April 2024,
the ALJ issued a written decision, which found that McCoy was not entitled to
benefits. Tr. 10.
In June 2024, McCoy appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals
Counsel. Tr. 189. In March 2025, the Appeals Counsel denied McCoy’s appeal,
Tr. 	1, 	making 	the 	ALJ’s 	April 	2024 	decision 	the 	final 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner. Tr. 10–32; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
2 	“Once a finding of disability is made, the [agency] must determine the
onset date of the disability.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 193 F. App’x
422, 425 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Evidence3
Personal, Vocational, Educational Evidence
McCoy was born in 2003 making them approximately 21 years old at the
time their applications were filed. See Tr. 192. They have a high school
education and have never worked. See Tr. 228–29.
Medical Evidence
The ALJ summarized the undisputed record of medical evidence in his
decision as follows:
The claimant’s early medical records are largely
unremarkable. For example, at a well child visit in
July of 2011 (age 7), the claimant was noted to be
doing 	well 	in 	2nd 	grade, 	and 	their 	physical
examination 	was 	unremarkable 	(10F/124-125
(07/27/11)). At a psychiatric evaluation in April of
2012, 	the 	claimant 	was 	assessed 	with 	ADHD
(10F/116-121 (04/12/12)). At a follow-up about a
month later, the claimant’s symptoms had improved
with 	medication, 	and 	their 	mental 	status
examination 	was 	unremarkable 	(10F/113-115
(05/14/12)). By January of 2013, the claimant and
their 	mother 	reported 	that 	the 	claimant’s
medication was working “really well” and their focus
at 	school 	had 	improved 	(10F/111 	(01/04/13)). 	In
2014, the claimant reported making straight As,
enjoying school, and otherwise doing well (10F/102
(10/31/14)). In 2015, the claimant had some trouble
with organization and became distracted when their
medication wore off in the afternoons, but their
examination 	was 	unremarkable, 	and 	the 	record
reflects the claimant was not on a Section 504 Plan
at that time (10F/96-100 (10/19/15)). The claimant’s
2016 follow-up visit was similarly unremarkable
(10F/90-94 (11/04/2016)). The claimant did not have
3 	The recitation of medical evidence and testimony is not intended to be
exhaustive and is generally limited to the evidence cited in the parties’ briefs.
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further medical follow-ups until 2020. At a well child
visit in September of 2020 (age 16), the claimant and
their mother reported that the claimant had no
headaches or motor or vocal tics. They also reported
participating in organized sports. The claimant’s
physical examination was unremarkable (1F/16-20
(09/05/20)).
The 	claimant’s 	remarkable 	examination 	findings
and reports include the following: in June of 2020,
the claimant reported grief following the passing of
their father in March of 2020 (10F/86-88 (06/01/20))
and underwent a psychiatric evaluation that month
(10F/78-86 	(06/11/20)). 	At 	a 	well 	child 	visit 	in
September of 2020, the claimant and their mother
reported that the claimant was doing well in school;
their mood was stable; they had no headaches or
motor or vocal tics; they were able to focus and
initiate tasks; and they were not hyperactive or
impulsive. 	They 	also 	reported 	participating 	in
organized sports. The claimant’s mental status was
noted 	as 	“attentive.” 	The 	claimant’s 	ADHD
medication 	regimen 	was 	continued 	(1F/16-20
(09/05/20)). In November, of 2020, the claimant was
assessed with MDD (10F/73 (11/17/20)).
I note that in 2018, the claimant was evaluated for
a Section 504 Plan at school for ADHD; however,
there is no such Plan in the record effective between
2018 and 2020. Rather, the claimant’s 11th grade
Section 504 Plan is in the record, and it included the
following accommodations: receiving a copy of class
notes; 	preferential 	seating; 	extended 	time 	on
assignments; and tutoring. The Plan notes that as
an 11th grade student, the claimant was receiving 2
As and 4 Ds in their academic classes, and they had
difficulty staying focused (3F/2- 8 (eff. 12/08/20-
12/07/21)).
At a psychotherapy intake on December 10, 2020,
the 	claimant 	reported 	depression 	and 	suicidal
ideation following the death of their father. On
examination, the claimant was well groomed; they
had unremarkable motor activity; their speech was
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normal; their mood was euthymic and their affect
was congruent; they had fair insight, judgment, and
impulse control; their memory was intact; and their
attention 	was 	good 	(2F/28-30 	(12/10/20)). 	The
claimant 	underwent 	counseling. 	The 	claimant
typically was engaged during the sessions; they
sometimes had anxiety or depression, but typically,
their affect was full range; they had easy rapport;
they were coherent; their activity was average; and
they 	had 	average 	eye 	contact 	(e.g., 	2F/26-27
(12/17/20); 2F/10-11 (02/18/21); 2F/8-9 (02/25/21);
2F/6-7 	(03/01/21); 	2F/3-4 	(03/11/21); 	2F/1-2
(03/18/21); 5F/25-26 (06/17/21); 5F/16-17 (07/15/21).
The claimant also described their alters to their
counselor 	(e.g., 	5F/15, 	17-22 	(07/01/21 	through
07/29/21) (Liz and Thyme); 5F/12 (08/05/21) (Arus));
5F/9-10 (08/19/21) (Mellie and Cher); 5F/6 (08/26/21)
(Arum)). During these examinations, the claimant
was 	well 	groomed; 	their 	motor 	activity 	was
unremarkable; 	their 	behavior 	was 	drastic; 	their
speech was normal; their mood was euthymic with a
congruent affect; their insight and judgment were
fair; their memory was intact; their attention was
good; and their thought content was preoccupied
(e.g., 	5F/8 	(08/19/21); 	5F/11 	(08/05/21); 	5F/15
(07/29/21)).
The 	claimant 	had 	an 	epilepsy 	consultation 	in
February of 2021 following a reported grand mal
seizure on February 19th and episodes of “zoning
out” happening three to four times per week since
the start of high school. They also reported declining
grades at school. Based on the claimant’s and their
mother’s reports, the claimant initially was assessed
with three possible seizure types (aura (general
tonic clonic), dialeptic, and psychic), and they were
referred for an EEG and MRI (4F/63-68; 10F/65-69
(02/22/21)). 	However, 	the 	claimant’s 	EEG 	was
normal (4F/59-61 (03/01/21)). Several months later,
the claimant reported having seizure-like activity
including inability to move (while still coherent) and
muscle spasms. The claimant’s general examination
was unremarkable, including a normal gait, full
muscle strength bilaterally, and normal deep tendon
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reflexes bilaterally. The claimant was admitted for
observation; imaging of the claimant’s brain was
unremarkable (10F/152-154 (04/15/21)), as was an
EEG 	during 	that 	time 	(4F/48). 	However, 	video
monitoring during the EEG captured 1 staring event
and 5 right leg and left face jerking episodes, even
though the EEG did not show changes to suggest
they were epileptic seizures in origin. The claimant
was 	assessed 	with 	psychogenic 	non-epileptic
seizures 	(PNES) 	(4F/6-53; 	10F/36-54 	(04/15/21-
04/17/21)). At a follow-up, the claimant reported that
the episodes lessened to 1-2 per day (down from 10
per day) (4F/1-5 (07/19/21)). At a well child visit in
April of 2022, the claimant’s physical examination
was unremarkable (9F/10-15 (04/02/22)).
In June of 2021, at a follow-up with the claimant’s
psychiatric provider, the claimant and their mother
noted the possibility of repeating 11th grade. The
claimant’s 	alter 	“Nova” 	was 	present 	during 	the
examination, which was unremarkable (10F/28-34
(06/01/21)). In September of 2021, the claimant was
doing better overall in that their PNES seizures
persisted but were less frequent; their therapy was
effective; the claimant’s ADHD medication could
help with afternoon seizures; and the claimant was
doing well in the first week of school. The claimant’s
mental status exam was unremarkable (10F/16-23
(09/03/21)). Their exam in October of 2021 was
substantially similar (10F/9-15 (10/29/21)). Also in
October of 2021, the claimant’s Section 504 Plan was
reviewed. 	It 	noted 	decreased 	concerns 	with 	the
claimant’s ability to complete assignments, but some
concerns with attention and concentration. The Plan
included the same accommodations as in their prior
504 	Plan. 	It 	also 	noted 	that 	the 	claimant 	was
receiving 4 As, 1 D, and 1 F in their classes (7F/8-23
and 	8F/4-17 	(eff. 	10/20/21-06/03/22)). 	At 	a
consultative psychological examination in October of
2021, the claimant was pleasant and cooperative;
they were well groomed; they were soft spoken, but
their 	speech 	was 	otherwise 	unremarkable; 	their
affect was full range and appropriate; their mood
was dysthymic, but not tearful; they were alert and
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fully 	oriented; 	their 	attention 	and concentration
were intact; their recent and remote memory was
intact; and their insight and judgment were age
appropriate. The examiner assessed the claimant
with ADHD and MDD (6F/4-5).
At a well child visit in April of 2022, the claimant
reported poor academic performance and a normal
mood; on examination, the claimant was attentive,
and 	the 	balance 	of 	their 	examination 	was
unremarkable (9F/10-15 (04/02/22)). The claimant
underwent additional counseling in 2022 to address
their mental health with additional alters (11F/1-26
and 17F/1-5, 11-13, 19-20, 22-23, 25-26, 28, 30, 33,
39, 43, 64-70 (06/17/22 through 12/29/22) (including
Danny, Firefly, Nina, Joey, Ginger, Sunny, Atlas)),
but there were no examination findings noted. The
claimant’s counseling records for the period January
of 2023 through March of 2024 are similar (see
17F/6- 10, 14-18, 21, 24, 27, 29, 31-32, 34-38, 40-42,
44-60 (01/06/23 through 03/15/24) (adding Sock and
Valla)).
At a consultative psychological evaluation in April of
2023, the claimant was well groomed; they were
friendly and cooperative; they acknowledged feeling
stressed, but had good rapport; they made excellent
eye contact; their speech was unremarkable; their
affect was broad and their mood was unremarkable
and stable; they reported having some anxiety and a
history of panic attacks, but none currently; they
were 	alert 	and 	fully 	oriented; 	their 	cognitive
functioning 	was 	unremarkable; 	their intellectual
functioning 	was 	average; 	and 	their 	insight 	and
judgment were fair (14F/3-4). The claimant also
underwent a psychiatric diagnostic evaluation in
September of 2023. On examination, the claimant
was anxious; their affect was full and appropriate;
they were well groomed; they were fully oriented;
their speech was unremarkable; their memory was
intact; their attention span was intact and they were
focused; their judgment was unimpaired; and their
insight 	was 	good. 	The 	claimant’s 	mental health
nurse 	practitioner 	adjusted 	the 	claimant’s
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medications (15F/6-12, 30-36 (09/21/23)). At a follow-
up visit about a month later, the claimant reported
improvement 	with 	the 	new 	medication 	regimen,
including 	lessening 	depression 	and anxiety, 	and
their examination was unremarkable (15F/13-17,
37-41 	(10/13/23)). 	In 	November, 	the 	claimant
reported doing “really well,” and their examination
was 	again 	unremarkable 	(15F/18-22, 	42-46
(11/17/23)). The claimant’s January 2024 follow-up
was 	substantially 	similar. 	(15F/23-28, 	47-52
(01/05/24)).
Tr. 23–26.
Opinion Evidence
The ALJ described his evaluation of the relevant4 medical opinion
evidence as follows:
I am not persuaded by the opinion of consultative
psychological 	examiner 	Deborah 	Koricke, 	Ph.D.,
dated October 22, 2021 (6F), who opined that the
claimant had no verbal skills; they had difficulty
acquiring and using information; they had difficulty
focusing and completing tasks; and they had no
problems with self-care, but could not be left alone
due 	to 	their 	seizure 	disorder 	(6F/6). 	I 	am 	not
persuaded by this opinion because it is not entirely
supported 	by 	Dr. 	Koricke’s 	examination 	of 	the
claimant: 	the 	claimant 	was 	pleasant 	and
cooperative; they were well groomed; they were soft
spoken, 	but 	their 	speech 	was 	otherwise
unremarkable; 	their 	affect 	was 	full 	range 	and
appropriate; their mood was dysthymic, but not
tearful; they were alert and fully oriented; their
attention and concentration were intact; their recent
and remote memory was intact; and their insight
and judgment were age appropriate (6F/4-5). Dr.
Koricke’s opinion also is based on the childhood
domains 	of 	functioning 	rather 	than 	an 	adult
assessment 	of 	the 	claimant’s 	work-related
4 	In the interest of brevity, I have included only the ALJ’s discussion of
the opinion evidence that McCoy challenges in their briefing.
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limitations. Moreover, the opinion is not consistent
with the other evidence of record which suggests
that the claimant has limitations interacting with
others and some mild limitations in other areas of
functioning, as explained in detail in the Paragraph
B Criteria Analysis above. Accordingly, I find this
opinion unpersuasive.
I 	find 	partially 	persuasive 	the 	opinion 	of
consultative psychological examiner Charles Misja,
Ph.D., dated April 26, 2023 (14F), who opined that
the claimant has no limitations in understanding,
remembering, or applying information; minimal to
intermediate 	limitations 	in 	concentrating,
persisting, 	or 	maintaining 	pace 	and 	responding
appropriately to supervision and to coworkers; and
their mental health is exacerbated by stress which
could 	impact 	the 	claimant’s 	ability 	to 	respond
appropriately to work pressures in a work setting. I
find this opinion partially persuasive because it
generally is supported by Dr. Misja’s examination of
the claimant: the claimant was well groomed; they
were friendly and cooperative; they acknowledged
feeling stressed, but had good rapport; they made
excellent 	eye 	contact; 	their 	speech 	was
unremarkable; 	their 	affect 	was 	broad 	and 	their
mood was unremarkable and stable; they reported
having some anxiety and a history of panic attacks,
but 	none 	currently; 	they 	were 	alert 	and 	fully
oriented; 	their 	cognitive 	functioning 	was
unremarkable; 	their 	intellectual functioning 	was
average; and their insight and judgment were fair
(14F/3-4). However, Dr. Misja’s opinion that the
claimant could have up to “intermediate” difficulty
maintaining 	attention 	and 	concentration 	is 	not
supported by his examination, where the claimant’s
attention 	and 	concentration 	were 	unremarkable
even 	though 	the 	claimant’s 	ADHD 	was 	then
unmedicated. Additionally, Dr. Misja’s opinion that
the 	claimant 	would 	have 	difficulty 	responding
appropriately to work pressures is based only on the
claimant’s and their mother’s reports rather than
the examination, where the claimant acknowledged
feeling stressed, but was able to complete tasks
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appropriately. Moreover, the more complete record
supports that the claimant’s ability to concentrate,
persist, or maintain pace is only mildly limited
insofar as the claimant’s ADHD is well controlled
with medication (whereas the claimant was not
medicated 	during 	Dr. 	Misja’s 	examination; 	see
14F/2). That said, Dr. Misja’s opinions regarding the
claimant’s abilities to understand, remember, or
apply information, and to interact with others are
generally 	consistent 	with 	the 	other 	evidence 	of
record noted in the Paragraph B Criteria Analysis.
Accordingly, I find this opinion partially persuasive.
I am not persuaded by the opinion of the claimant’s
counselor, 	Nadine 	Constantini, 	LISW, 	dated
September 13, 2021, opining that the claimant was
not capable of functioning appropriately at home,
school, or at work due to their physical and mental
health (5F/1-2). I am not persuaded by this opinion,
in part, because counselor Constantini is not an
acceptable medical source under our regulations (see
20 CFR 404.1502(a) and 416.902(a)). Additionally,
the 	opinion 	is 	inherently 	neither 	valuable 	nor
persuasive because it is on an issue reserved to the
Commissioner (i.e., whether the claimant is able to
work) (see 20 CFR 404.1520b(c) and 416.920b(c)).
Moreover, to the extent that the opinion could be
construed to opine that the claimant has extreme
physical or mental functional limitations, it is not
supported 	by 	Counselor 	Constantini’s 	own
examinations of the claimant: the claimant typically
was engaged during the sessions; they sometimes
had anxiety or depression, but typically, their affect
was full range; they had easy rapport; they were
coherent; their activity was average; and they had
average eye contact (e.g., 2F/1-4, 6-11, 26-27; 5F/16-
17, 	25-26). 	During 	these 	examinations, 	whether
presenting as the claimant or an alter, they were
well 	groomed; 	their 	motor 	activity 	was
unremarkable; 	their 	behavior 	was 	drastic; 	their
speech was normal; their mood was euthymic with a
congruent affect; their insight and judgment were
fair; their memory was intact; their attention was
good; and their thought content was preoccupied
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(e.g., 5F/8, 11, 15). Counselor Constantini’s opinion
also is not consistent with the other evidence of
record; for example, at recent visits, the claimant
reported improvement with medication and doing
“really 	well,” 	and 	their 	examinations 	are
unremarkable (e.g., 15F/13-28, 37-52). Therefore, I
am not persuaded by this opinion.
Tr. 29–30.
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. 	Born on November 20, 2003, the claimant had not
attained age 22 as of November 20, 2003, the alleged
onset 	date 	(20 	CFR 	404.102, 	416.120(c)(4) 	and
404.350(a)(5)).
2. 	The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since November 20, 2003, the alleged onset
date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
3. 	The 	claimant’s 	severe 	impairments 	are 	best
described 	as 	follows: 	psychogenic 	non-epileptic
seizure 	disorder; 	neurocognitive 	disorder;
personality 	discover; 	major 	depressive 	disorder
(MDD); and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. 	The 	claimant 	does 	not 	have 	an 	impairment 	or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments
in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 	404.1525, 	404.1526, 	416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926).
5. 	After careful consideration of the entire record, I find
that 	the 	claimant 	has 	the 	residual 	functional
capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional 	levels 	but 	with 	the 	following
nonexertional 	limitations: 	they 	can 	never 	climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; they must avoid all
exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous moving
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machinery, and commercial driving; and they can
adapt to occasional and superficial interactions with
the public (where superficial means no arbitration,
mediation, negotiation, or being responsible for the
safety of others).
6. 	The claimant has no pas relevant work (20 CFR
404.1565 and 416.965).
7. 	The claimant was born on November 20, 2002, and
was 0 years old, which is defined as a younger
individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset
date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8. 	The claimant has at lease a high school education
(20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. 	Transferability of job skills is not an issue because
the claimant does not have past relevant work (20
CFR 410.1568 and 416.968).
10. Considering 	the 	claimant’s 	age, 	education, 	work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform (20
CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and 416.969a).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as
defined in the Social Security Act, from November
20, 2003, through the date of the decision (20 CFR
404.350(a)(5), 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
Tr. 12–32.
Standard for Disability
Eligibility for social security benefit payments depends on the existence
of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), 1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
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period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).
An ALJ is required to follow a five-step, sequential analysis to make a
disability determination:
1. 	Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful
activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled.
2. 	Does 	the 	claimant 	have 	a 	medically
determinable impairment, or a combination of
impairments, 	that 	is 	“severe”? 	If 	not, 	the
claimant is not disabled.
3. 	Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal
one of the listed impairments and meet the
duration requirement? If so, the claimant is
disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next
step.
4. 	What is the claimant’s residual functional
capacity and can the claimant perform past
relevant 	work? 	If 	so, 	the 	claimant 	is 	not
disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next
step.
5. 	Can 	the 	claimant 	do 	any 	other 	work
considering the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience? If so, the claimant is not disabled.
If not, the claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d
417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Social Security Ruling 11-2p, 2011 WL
4055665, at *3 (Sept. 12, 2011) (setting out the same five-step analysis for cases
involving “young adults”). Under this sequential analysis, the claimant has the
burden of proof at steps one through four. Jordan, 548 F.3d at 423. The burden
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shifts to the Commissioner at step five “to prove the availability of jobs in the
national economy that the claimant is capable of performing.” Id. “The
claimant, however, retains the burden of proving her lack of residual functional
capacity.” Id. If a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis and meets the
duration requirements, the claimant is determined to be disabled. Walters
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).
Standard of Review
A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions unless it
determines “that the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has
made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”
Jordan, 548 F.3d at 422. “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’” under which
“a court … asks whether” the “existing administrative record … contains
‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek
v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citations omitted). The substantial
evidence standard “is not high.” Id. Substantial evidence “is ‘more than a mere
scintilla’” but it “means only[] ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. at 103 (citations
omitted). The Commissioner’s “findings … as to any fact if supported by
substantial evidence [are] conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek, 587 U.S. at
99.
A court may “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or
decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.
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2007). Even if substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence
supports 	a 	claimant’s 	position, 	a 	reviewing 	court 	cannot 	overturn 	the
Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial evidence also supports the
conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,
477 (6th Cir. 2003). This is so because there is a “zone of choice within which”
the Commissioner can act, without fear of judicial “interference.” Lindsley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Felisky v.
Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Discussion
1. The ALJ complied with Social Security Ruling 11-2p.
McCoy first asserts that the ALJ failed to evaluate their education
records consistent with Social Security Ruling 11-2p. Doc. 8, at 9.
Ruling 11-2p, offers guidance on how an ALJ should consider and
evaluate certain evidence regarding disability in young adults. See SSR 11-2p,
2011 WL 4055665 (Sept. 12, 2011). Young adults are defined as “people
between the ages of 19 to approximately 25.” Id. at *2. The Ruling further
provides that a claimant’s educational records “may indicate how well a young
adult can use his or her physical and mental abilities to perform work
activities.” Id. at *14. In considering a claimant’s educational records, the ALJ
is instructed to consider a variety of sources, including: (1) medical sources; (2)
school programs, including special education and individualized education
plans (“IEP”); (3) psychosocial supports and highly structured or supportive
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settings; and (4) extra help and accommodations. Id. at 9–20. While Social
Security Rulings do not have the force of law, they are binding on ALJs. See
Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 n.1 (1984) (citing 20 C.F.R., Part 422).
McCoy asserts that the ALJ “improper[ly] reject[ed]” the educational
evidence of record. Doc. 8, at 11. McCoy, however, omits a key step in their
analysis. In particular, they claim that “the ALJ’s stated reasons for dismissing
[educational] evidence runs contrary to the requirements provided in SSR 11-
2p.” Doc. 8, at 8. But McCoy does explain how or why the ALJ’s “stated reasons”
were inconsistent with Ruling 11-2p. Instead, they assert that “[c]ourts in
other circuits have found error when the ALJ failed to consider educational
records as required by SSR 11-2p.” Id. at 8. Perhaps so, but McCoy doesn’t
claim that the ALJ failed to consider anything. See id. From there, McCoy
simply cites evidence without explaining whether the ALJ considered it, before
asserting that the ALJ’s RFC “contains no mental limitations pertaining to
concentration, persistence, or pace and her ability to stay on task in a work
environment.” Id. at 9.
This manner of presentation doesn’t establish anything, let alone that
the ALJ either failed to consider—or did not weigh as strongly as McCoy would
have hoped—evidence. Indeed, McCoy recognizes that the ALJ discussed
McCoy’s teacher’s statement and their 504 plans.5 See Doc. 8, at 10. Notably,
5 	A 	504 	Plan 	is 	an 	educational 	accommodation 	plan 	developed 	in
accordance with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plan is
created to provide disabled students with equal access to education.
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McCoy 	never 	cites 	the 	portion 	of 	Ruling 	11-2p 	that 	the 	ALJ 	allegedly
contravened. And, as the Commissioner notes, Ruling 11-2p only requires that
the ALJ “consider relevant school records” not adopt any specific limitations
suggested by those records. See Doc. 10, at 8 (citing Anthony L. v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-605, 2023 WL 5349509, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2023)).
Considering that there is no requirement that the ALJ discuss some
specific, unidentified aspect of McCoy’s educational records, it is clear that
McCoy’s argument amounts to a dispute over the ALJ’s weighing of the
evidence. But the ALJ is solely responsible for weighing the evidence. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (explaining how the ALJ will consider and weigh medical
opinions and prior administrative medical findings); see also Rottmann v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 817 F. App’x 192, 196 (6th Cir. 2020)) (“this court does not
weigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve conflicts in testimony—that’s the
ALJ’s job.”). And, absent evidence to the contrary, the ALJ’s statement that he
considered the entire record, see Tr. 21, is presumed true. See NLRB v. Newark
Elec. Corp., 14 F.4th 152, 163 (2d Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Chemical
Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926) (“The presumption of regularity supports
the official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official
duties.”); cf. Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 864 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that the
Appeals Council “state[d] that it ‘considered the entire record which was before
the administrative law judge, including the testimony at the hearing’”).
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The ALJ cited ample evidence to support his RFC finding, dedicating
over five pages to analyzing McCoy’s allegations and the opinion evidence of
record. 	See 	Tr. 	26–31. 	And, 	when 	rejecting 	as 	unpersuasive 	McCoy’s
educational records, the ALJ explained that although those “records reflect
some of the claimant’s grades and the accommodations they received at school,”
the “accommodations do not support that the claimant experiences functional
limitations in any areas of mental functioning with respect to performing work-
related activities.” Tr. 30. It is plain, both from the ALJ’s decision and McCoy’s
own briefing, that the ALJ “considered” McCoy’s educational record. See Doc.
8, at 8; Tr. 30. And, to the extent that McCoy is arguing that the ALJ’s finding
that the educational records were unpersuasive was alone reversible error,
McCoy has not cited anything to support that argument. See Doc. 8, at 8–9
(citing 	cases 	that 	simply 	support 	an 	ALJ’s 	obligation 	to 	evaluate 	the
educational records).
Moreover, McCoy’s bare citation to record evidence does not provide a
basis for remand because it is possible for there to be substantial evidence in
the record that supports disparate conclusions. Jones, 336 F.3d at 477 (“we
must defer to an agency’s decision ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the
record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.’”). None of McCoy’s
arguments 	show 	that 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	is 	unsupported 	by 	substantial
evidence. And any argument to that effect would fail because the ALJ’s RFC
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determination was explicitly adopted from the state agency consultant’s
opinions, which themselves provide substantial evidence. See Kurman v.
Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-1837, 2022 WL 1067568, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2022)
(“There is ample case law concluding that State Agency medical consultative
opinions may constitute substantial evidence supporting an ALJ’s decision”)
(collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 765072 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 14, 2022).
For all the reasons stated, McCoy’s first issue does not provide a basis
for remand.
2. The ALJ adequately explained his consideration of the medical opinion
evidence and relied on substantial evidence in determining McCoy’s RFC.
McCoy next challenges the ALJ’s consideration of the medical opinion
evidence. See Doc. 8, at 9. On review, however, it is apparent that McCoy is
actually advocating their belief that the ALJ should have placed more weight
on, and found persuasive, three medical opinions that support McCoy’s desired
outcome.
The Commissioner is required to evaluate the persuasiveness of all
medical 	opinions 	using 	the 	following 	factors: 	supportability; 	consistency;
treatment relationship, including the length, frequency, purpose, and extent;
specialization; and other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(a), 416.920c(c)(1)–(5).
Supportability and consistency are the most important factors. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(a). Supportability means that “[t]he more relevant the objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source
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are to support his or her medical opinion[] … the more persuasive the medical
opinions … will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency means “[t]he more
consistent a medical opinion[] … is with the evidence from other medical
sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical
opinion[] … will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2). The Commissioner must
explain the supportability and consistency factors when discussing a medical
opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). “[A]n ALJ need not,” however, “specifically
use the terms ‘supportability’ or ‘consistency’ in his analysis.” Cormany v.
Kijakazi, No. 5:21-cv-933, 2022 WL 4115232, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2022)
(citing cases). The Commissioner is not required to discuss the remaining
factors. Id. “A reviewing court evaluates whether the ALJ properly considered
the factors as set forth in the regulations to determine the persuasiveness of a
medical opinion.” Toennies v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 2841379, at *14
(N.D. Ohio June 1, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
McCoy first collectively argues that “the ALJ performed an improper
consistency factor evaluation of Dr. Koricke, Dr. Misja, and Ms. Constantini[.]”
Doc. 8, at 10. To this end, they argue that (1) “the ALJ failed to compare
[McCoy’s] 	educational 	records 	with 	these 	opinions 	when 	evaluating
consistency,” and (2) “failed to compare these medical opinions to each other
when finding them not persuasive.” Id. Both of these arguments are flawed.
For starters, McCoy does not identify any legal authority requiring an
ALJ to articulate a comparison of an opinion to a particular piece of evidence
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or other opinion in the record. Indeed, as the Commissioner notes, nothing
“obligat[es]” an ALJ “to determine how” different medical “opinions compare to
each other.” Chaney v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:22-cv-1291, 2023 WL
5509429, at *11 n.2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2023); see Doc. 10, at 11 (citing Chaney
and Stanley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:18-cv-1733, 2019 WL
4480183, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2019) (noting that “the Sixth Circuit has
held that the regulations ‘do[] not instruct an ALJ to compare the consistency
of treating and examining physicians opinions to each other’, instead, an ALJ
is instructed ‘to compare the consistency of a physician's opinion to the record
as a whole’”)); cf. Sallaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3825, 2024 WL 2955645,
at *6 (6th Cir. June 12, 2024) (“Sallaz identifies no authority limiting ALJs to
relying on a rebuttal medical opinion when [evaluating the persuasiveness of
opinion evidence]”). But, even if there were such an obligation, McCoy does not
point to anything that would support the idea that a failure to do so amounts
to reversable error.
Additionally, McCoy’s argument appears to be equal parts a challenge
to the ALJ’s consideration of medical opinion evidence and a rehashing of their
earlier argument that the ALJ improperly rejected as unpersuasive their
educational records. See Doc. 8, at 11 (conflating arguments regarding the two
required factors for consideration under applicable regulations and the ALJ’s
evidence of “functioning during school hours” to argue that greater limitations
should have been found). But McCoy’s argument heading indicates only a
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challenge to the ALJ’s consideration of the supportability and consistency
factors, so any superfluous arguments are deemed forfeited. See Doc. 5, at 3
(“Each introductory heading in the Argument or Analysis section of a brief
must correspond to the argument presented under the heading. Failure to
comply with this requirement may result in (a) waiver of the arguments in the
heading and in the text following the heading; (b) striking of the offending
brief; and (c) other appropriate sanctions. Similarly, bald assertions of error––
those unsupported by explanation and argument––will be deemed waived.”).
This leaves McCoy’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider the
required consistency factor, which fails for at least two reasons. First, McCoy
does not cite the ALJ’s discussion of the three opinions at issue. See Doc. 8, at
10–11. Second, the face of the ALJ’s decision shows that he did explain how he
considered the consistency factor when he discussed the opinions at issue. See
Tr. 29–30. For example, the ALJ explained that Dr. Koricke’s opinion was not
persuasive because it “is not consistent with the other evidence of record which
suggests that the claimant has limitations interacting with others and some
mild limitations in other areas of functioning, as explained in detail in the
Paragraph B Criteria Analysis above.” Tr. 29. And, as to social worker
Constantini’s opinion, the ALJ explained that his opinion was unpersuasive
and “not consistent with the other evidence or record; for example, at recent
visits, the claimant reported improvement with medication and doing ‘really
well,’ and their examinations are unremarkable[.]” Tr. 30. Lastly, the ALJ
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explained that Dr. Misja’s opinion was partially persuasive because, although
the complete record was inconsistent with some of Dr. Misja’s findings, the
”opinions regarding [McCoy’s] abilities to understand, remember, or apply
information, and to interact with others are generally consistent with the other
evidence of record noted in the Paragraph B Criteria Analysis.” Tr. 29–30. The
face of the ALJ’s opinion thus belies McCoy’s argument that the ALJ failed to
consider the consistency of these three opinions.
Second, McCoy contradictorily argues that (1) the ALJ erred when he
“failed to perform a proper supportability analysis of Dr. Koricke’s opinion,”
Doc. 8, at 13, and, in the very next sentence, (2) “[t]he ALJ states that Dr.
Koricke’s opinion is not supported by her examination,” id. McCoy then cites
portions of Dr. Koricke’s opinion to assert that the ALJ failed to explain how
those portions did not support Dr. Koricke’s opinion. Id. at 13–14. In so
arguing, McCoy ignores that the ALJ’s decision complied with the regulation.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). Specifically, the regulation merely requires that
the ALJ explain how he considered the supportability factor, which the ALJ
did when he stated:
I am not persuaded by this opinion because it is not
entirely supported by Dr. Koricke’s examination of
the 	claimant: 	the 	claimant 	was 	pleasant 	and
cooperative; they were well groomed; they were soft
spoken, 	but 	their 	speech 	was 	otherwise
unremarkable; they were alert and fully oriented;
their attention and concentration were intact; their
recent and remote memory was intact; and their
insight and judgment were age appropriate (6F/4-5).
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Tr. 29 (emphasis added). Notably, the evidence that McCoy cites in support of
their argument, Doc. 8, at 14–15, was considered by the ALJ because it is
contained within the record document, 6F, that the ALJ cited. See Tr. 472–78
(Exhibit No. 6F).
Moreover, McCoy’s citation to specific portions of Dr. Koricke’s opinion
neither shows that the ALJ failed to consider that evidence, see Kornecky v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[a]n ALJ can
consider all the evidence without directly addressing in his written decision
every piece of evidence submitted by a party”) (quoting Loral Defense Systems–
Akron v. N.L.R.B., 200 F.3d 436, 453 (6th Cir. 1999)), nor that the ALJ’s
decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, see Jones, 336 F.3d at 477.
Instead, McCoy’s citation to other evidence illustrates not that the ALJ failed
to comply with the requirement that he consider the supportability and
consistency, but that McCoy disagrees with the ALJ’s findings and believes
that he should have reached a different conclusion. This difference of opinion
does not support remand.
Based on the reasons stated, McCoy’s second issue does not provide a
basis for remand.
3. The ALJ’s RFC formulation, which accounted for McCoy’s seizures, is
supported by substantial evidence.
McCoy lastly challenges the ALJ’s alleged failure to account in the RFC
for McCoy’s stress induced seizures. Doc. 7, at 13.
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To 	evaluate 	the “intensity, 	persistence, 	and limiting 	effects 	of 	an
individual’s symptoms,” the ALJ considers medical evidence, the claimant’s
statements, other information provided by medical sources, and any other
relevant evidence in the record. See Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304,
at *4 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Other relevant evidence includes:
(i) Your daily activities; (ii) The location, duration,
frequency, 	and 	intensity 	of 	your 	pain 	or 	other
symptoms; 	(iii) Precipitating 	and 	aggravating
factors; (iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side
effects of any medication you take or have taken to
alleviate 	your 	pain 	or 	other 	symptoms;
(v) Treatment, other than medication, you receive or
have 	received 	for 	relief 	of 	your 	pain 	or 	other
symptoms; (vi) Any measures you use or have used
to relieve your pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying
flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes
every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and (vii) Other
factors concerning your functional limitations and
restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). “The ALJ need not analyze all seven factors, but
should show that he considered the relevant evidence.” Hatcher v. Berryhill,
No. 1:18-cv-1123, 2019 WL 1382288, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2019) (citing
Cross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2005)).
The heart of McCoy’s third issue is that they believe the ALJ failed to
properly account for the severe impairment of psychogenic non-epileptic
seizure disorder in the RFC. Doc. 8, at 15. To this end, McCoy alleges that the
ALJ failed to explain why there was “no work-related stress limitation” in their
RFC to account for their stress-triggered seizures. Id. McCoy does not,
however, propose what sort of limitation should have been included to account
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for this limitation. They also do not claim that the ALJ failed to consider any
of the factors listed in Ruling 16-3p. See Doc. 8, at 15 (simply pointing out that
SSR 16-3p requires an ALJ to consider certain factors when evaluating an
individual symptoms). But even if McCoy had attempted to argue that the ALJ
didn’t discuss one or more factors, the ALJ is not obligated to discuss the
factors in his decision––Ruling 16-3p simply requires that the ALJ consider
the factors, which the ALJ repeatedly said he did. See e.g., Tr. 13, 14, 21. And
McCoy 	has 	not 	made 	shown 	anything 	that 	would 	contradict 	the 	ALJ’s
statement. So it is presumed true. See NLRB v. Newark Elec. Corp., 14 F.4th
at 163.
Moreover, the ALJ also adopted the same limitations that the state
agency consultant’s opined, which McCoy does not argue was an error. The fact
that the ALJ adopted the persuasive findings of the state agency consultants
provides substantial evidence to support the RFC findings. See Kurman, 2022
WL 1067568, at *7. So to the extent that McCoy argues that “the RFC is not
supported by substantial evidence,” Doc. 8, at 15, that argument fails.
The ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence
because it aligns with the findings of the state agency reviewers, as the ALJ
explained. See Tr. 28–19 (stating that “the residual functional capacity finding
is supported by, and consistent with, the evidence of record, including the
medical evidence, examination findings, the persuasive portions of the medical
opinions of record, and the claimant’s allegations consistent with the medical
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evidence” and finding that that the state agency medical consultants and state
agency psychological consultants’ opinions were persuasive) (emphasis added).
McCoy’s third issue, thus, does not support remand.
Conclusion
For all of the reasons stated, I recommend that the Court affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
Dated: January 23, 2025
/s/James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure
to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–31 (6th
Cir. 2019).
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