Betsa v. City of Avon Lake, Ohio et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JEREMY BETSA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF AVON LAKE, OHIO, et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NO. 1:25-cv-2478
DISTRICT JUDGE
DONALD C. NUGENT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Jeremy Betsa’s Motion for a
temporary restraining order (TRO), Doc. 23, which on January 2, 2026, the
Court referred to me for a report and recommendation, Doc. 28. Defendants
City of Avon Lake and its employees and representatives oppose Betsa’s
Motion, Doc. 25, and Betsa filed a reply brief, Doc. 29. For the reasons
explained below, I recommend that the Court deny Betsa’s Motion.
Background
On November 14, 2025, Betsa was Avon Lake’s fire chief. Doc. 1, at 5.
That day, he filed in this Court a nine-count Complaint against Defendant City
of Avon Lake and twelve of its employees or representatives, and Defendant
Local 1361 International Association of Fire Fighters and two of its officers.
Doc. 1, at 1–6. Betsa states that in July and August 2025, the City disciplined
and suspended him. Id. at 17, 20. He alleges that, in doing so, all or some of
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the Defendants: violated his due process rights; violated his First Amendment
rights and Ohio law when they retaliated against him for protected speech and
chilled his speech; defamed him; invaded his privacy by sharing his private
and medical information; violated the Ohio Public Records Act; engaged in civil
conspiracy; and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Id. at 25–57. Betsa
also alleges that some of the Defendants’ actions violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and analogous provisions of
Ohio law. Id. at 62.
On December 15, 2025, Betsa filed an “Emergency Motion for temporary
restraining order” against the City Defendants. Doc. 23. In his Motion, Betsa
explained that since he filed his Complaint in mid-November, the City “served
[him] with two new disciplinary documents.” Id. at 2. Betsa alleges that these
items “strongly suggest that Defendants have taken new adverse actions
following [his] engaging in protected activity—including filing this lawsuit[.]”
Id. As a result, Betsa asks the Court for an order “preventing Defendants from
taking further adverse employment actions based on procedurally defective
processes that threaten to interfere with [his] ability to assert his federal
claims in this action.” Id. at 3–4.
On December 29, the City defendants filed an opposition to Betsa’s
Motion. Doc. 25. They urge the Court to deny Betsa’s Motion “based on
abstention 	under 	Younger, 	Pullman 	and 	Colorado 	River 	abstention
[doctrines]” and that, if the Court were to reach the merits of the Motion, the
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Court should deny it. Doc. 25, at 1. The basis for the Defendants’ abstention
argument is the fact that Betsa has a pending lawsuit in state court, “wherein
he has also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin
the discipline against him.” Id. at 2; Doc. 25-1 (Betsa’s state-court, TRO
motion). Betsa, in his Motion, concedes that he has a “parallel state-court
filing” “in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas.” Doc. 23, at 3; Doc. 32-1.
The District Court referred Betsa’s Motion to me on January 2, 2026.
Doc. 28. That day, I set a hearing by videoconference for January 6. See Order,
1/2/2026. On January 5, Betsa filed a reply brief advising the Court that on
December 30, 2025, the City terminated him effective December 31. Doc. 29,
at 2, 6. He states that his TRO motion in this Court is not duplicative of his
“state proceedings.” Id. at 7. He also argues that abstention doctrines are
“inapplicable where, as here, [he] seeks to enjoin ongoing constitutional
violations rather than interfere with state adjudication of disciplinary merits.”
Id. at 7.
Legal Standard
When considering a TRO under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65,
courts consider whether the plaintiff meets its burden in establishing the
following four factors: (1) whether the moving party has a strong or substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the moving party will suffer
irreparable harm unless injunctive relief is granted; (3) whether the requested
relief will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether injunctive relief
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is in the public interest. Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless and Service
Employees Int’l Union, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Jones v.
Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009). “These factors are not prerequisites
but are factors that are to be balanced against each other.” Overstreet v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002).
Discussion1
To recap, Betsa has two lawsuits pending related to the same factual
matter—one in state court and one in federal court. Also pending in both cases
are Betsa’s TRO motions. The heart of Betsa’s lawsuits, and his TRO motions,
are his claims that the City suspended him, and later terminated him, in
violation of Ohio law and his federal due process rights. At the TRO hearing,
Betsa explained that his Ohio lawsuit focuses on his state-law claims, whereas
his federal lawsuit focuses on federal claims. See also Doc. 23, at 3.
Betsa’s state-law claim is that the City’s actions violated Ohio civil-
service law, including Ohio Revised Code § 124.34. Id. Section 124.34 outlines
the steps a City such as Avon Lake must take when it suspends or removes a
classified employee such as Betsa. Ohio Rev. Code § 124.34, Reduction in pay
or position— suspension—removal. At the hearing, Betsa confirmed that he is
1 	The fact that the City terminated Betsa after he filed his TRO Motion
does not moot Betsa’s Motion. See Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246, 251 (1946);
Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 666 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744 (E.D.
Mich. 2009); see also Balow v. Michigan State Univ., 24 F.4th 1051, 1062 n.8
(6th Cir. 2022).
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not alleging that section 124.34 does not comport with due process. Rather,
Betsa is only alleging that the City didn’t follow section 124.34.
With these facts in mind, I turn to the analysis of Betsa’s TRO motion.
Likelihood of success on the merits
Betsa hasn’t shown a likelihood of success on his due process claim
because this Court should abstain from deciding the issue under the authority
of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
“Under Younger abstention … a federal court must decline to interfere
with pending state civil or criminal proceedings when important state interests
are involved.” O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted). “Younger abstention is not a question of jurisdiction, but is rather
based on ‘strong policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction.’”
Id. (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S.
619, 626 (1986).
A federal court must abstain under Younger from granting injunctive
when three requirements are satisfied: “(1) there must be [related] on-going
state judicial proceedings; (2) those proceedings must implicate important
state interests; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state
proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d
638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sun Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Brennan, 921
F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1990)).
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These three requirements are satisfied here. First, Betsa has a related,
on-going judicial proceeding in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas.
Second, whether Ohio cities correctly follow Ohio law when suspending a
classified employee is an important state interest. And third, Ohio courts
provide an opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.2
Betsa argues that his Ohio case only alleges state-law violations and
that his federal case only alleges federal law violations. But in his federal
complaint, 	Betsa has 	alleged that 	the City 	“failed to 	honor” 	the 	rights
established in Ohio Revised Code § 124.34. Doc. 1, at 27, ¶78. Moreover, in his
Ohio complaint, Betsa alleges a violation of due process rights under Article I,
section 16 of the Ohio constitution. Doc. 32-1, at 5–11. But “[b]ecause Ohio and
federal law offer virtually the same due process protections, Ohio courts will
look to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court to interpret Ohio’s
Due 	Process 	Clause.” 	Simone 	v. 	Cleveland, 	No. 	1:23-cv-1114, 	2023 	WL
8480083, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 2023); see also Walsh v. Erie Cnty. Dep’t of
Job & Fam. Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, 757 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“‘due course of
law’ under § 16 of the Ohio Constitution has the same meaning as ‘due process
2 	Betsa has not argued, or met his burden to show, that any of the narrow
Younger exceptions would apply. See Gunderson v. Burnaugh, No. 2:25-cv-301,
2025 WL 1424634, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 15, 2025) (listing the Younger
exceptions: “(1) “the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is
conducted in bad faith”; (2) “the challenged statute is flagrantly and patently
violative 	of 	express 	constitutional 	prohibitions”; 	and 	“(3) 	there 	is 	‘an
extraordinarily 	pressing 	need 	for 	immediate 	federal 	equitable 	relief’”)
(citations omitted).
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of law’ under the federal Constitution. Thus, there is no difference respecting
due process of law in the Constitution of the United States and that of Ohio.”).
Even if Betsa had cleanly separated his state-law and federal claims in
the relevant venues, which he has not done, abstention under Younger would
still be warranted. This is so because Betsa’s procedural due process claim is
inextricably intertwined with his state-law procedural issues which he has
raised in his state case. Indeed, Betsa concedes that he is not arguing that
Ohio’s disciplinary and termination procedures are unconstitutional. This
means that if the City properly adhered to Ohio law when it suspended and
terminated Betsa, it necessarily did not violate Betsa’s due process rights.3
And Betsa has only asked the Ohio court—not this Court—to determine
whether the City properly adhered to Ohio law. So the Ohio court should
resolve Betsa’s state-law claim before this Court wades into Betsa’s related due
process claim. See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 611 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Unless the procedures established by statutes, rules, and the common law
are challenged as insufficient, there is neither need nor justification for
constitutional decisionmaking.”); see Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985)
(“Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider
nonconstitutional grounds for decision. This is a ‘fundamental rule of judicial
restraint.’”) (citations omitted); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
3 	If the state court were to find that the City did not properly adhere to
Ohio law, then whether the City’s actions also violated Besta’s due process
rights would be a separate issue for a court to resolve.
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U.S. 568, 582 (1979) (“Before deciding the constitutional question, it was
incumbent on those courts to consider whether the statutory grounds might be
dispositive.”); see Crook v. Baker, 813 F.2d 88, 91 (6th Cir. 1987) (“It is obvious
that if it were determined that the Regents had not the power, under Michigan
law, to revoke the degree, that would have ended the matter, and it would have
not been necessary, indeed would not have been proper, to have decided the
federal constitutional question. That being so, the district court should have
first resolved Crook’s state law contention.”).
As 	for 	Betsa’s 	claims 	alleging 	First 	Amendment 	violations 	and
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act,
he has not carried his heavy burden to show he is entitled to injunctive relief.
At the hearing, Betsa focused on his due process claim. In his memorandum in
support of his TRO motion, Betsa says that he “engaged in protected activity
by 	filing 	this 	federal 	lawsuit, 	asserting 	ADA 	and 	Rehabilitation 	Act
protections, and previously disclosing medical information in HR processes.”
Doc. 23-4, at 3. These statements referencing the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
are insufficient to show that Betsa would have a likelihood of success on the
merits of these claims.
And in support of his First Amendment claim, Betsa states that “the
Defendants initiated … new disciplinary action immediately after” Betsa filed
his lawsuit. Doc. 23-4, at 4. But in his Motion, Betsa references a “new
disciplinary document[]” dated November 12, 2025, Doc. 23, at 2, which is two
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days before he filed his lawsuit, Doc. 1, at 66. And in his reply brief, Betsa
references a late-October “investigative brief” that the City issued to him. Doc.
29, at 3. So Betsa’s reliance in his motion brief on temporal proximity alone to
show that the City retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit is not sufficient
to show a likelihood of success on the merits.
Irreparable harm
Betsa has not shown irreparable harm. Because this Court should
abstain from the merits of Betsa’s due process claim, he has not shown that he
could succeed in federal court on this claim. And Betsa has not shown a
likelihood 	of 	success 	on 	his 	First 	Amendment 	claim. 	So 	any 	alleged
constitutional 	violation, 	alone, 	cannot 	serve 	as 	irreparable 	harm. 	See
Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 579 (6th Cir.
2002) 	(explaining 	that 	while 	a 	constitutional 	violation 	alone 	can 	cause
irreparable harm, such a presumption of is unwarranted when there is no
likelihood of success on the merits of the claims). Betsa argues that he has
suffered and will suffer financial pain for losing his job and health benefits.
But “[t]he fact that an individual may lose his income for some extended period
of time does not result in irreparable harm, as income wrongly withheld may
be recovered through monetary damages in the form of back pay.” Overstreet,
305 F.3d at 579 (“The Court concludes that Mr. Overstreet will not suffer
irreparable harm by virtue of the fact that he may lose his job while this
litigation is pending…. Indeed, ‘[t]he loss of a job is quintessentially reparable
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by money damages.’) (citation omitted); Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d
507, 511 (6th Cir. 1992) (“a plaintiff’s harm is not irreparable if it is fully
compensable by money damages”).
At the hearing, Betsa argued that his termination resulted in immediate
loss of health insurance, which not only he but also his family rely on. The City
stated that if Betsa were to prevail, he would be entitled to back-benefits as
well as back pay. Because Betsa’s job loss and attendant benefit loss is
reparable by money damages, see Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 579, he has not shown
that he will suffer irreparable harm.
Substantial harm to others and public interest
For the third factor, Betsa argues that the City would not be harmed if
he were reinstated because it has not yet hired a fire chief to replace him. For
the fourth factor, Betsa submits that the public interest is served by holding
public officials accountable for any wrongdoing. In response, the City says that
the public has an interest in a properly run fire department. These factors do
not weight heavily on either side, but slightly favor the City.
Balancing of factors
All of the factors favor the City, including the most important factor of
the likelihood of success on the merits. I therefore recommend that the Court
deny Betsa’s TRO Motion, Doc. 23.
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Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Court deny
Betsa’s TRO Motion, Doc. 23.
Dated: January 7, 2026
/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Failure to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520,
530–31 (6th Cir. 2019).
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