Hammer v. Commissioner of Social Security

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DARRYL HAMMER,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. 3:25-CV-01119-CEH
JUDGE CARMEN E. HENDERSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MEMORANDUM 	OPINION 	AND
ORDER
I. Introduction
Darryl Hammer (“Hammer” or “Claimant”), seeks judicial review of the final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). This matter is before me by consent of the
parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (ECF No. 9). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner of the Social Security’s
nondisability finding and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint.
II. Procedural History
On May 11, 2022, Hammer filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging a disability onset
date of June 1, 2020. 	(ECF No. 8, PageID #: 51). 	The applications were denied initially and
upon reconsideration, and Hammer requested a hearing before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”). 	(Id.). 	On February 22, 2024, an ALJ held a hearing, during which Claimant,
represented by counsel, and an impartial vocational expert testified. (ECF No. 8, PageID #: 71-
102). 	On May 8, 2024, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Hammer was not disabled.
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(ECF No. 8, PageID #: 51-66). 	The ALJ’s decision became final on April 22, 2025, when the
Appeals Council declined further review. (ECF No. 8, PageID #: 32-34).
On May 30, 2025, Hammer filed his Complaint to challenge the Commissioner’s final
decision. (ECF No. 1). The parties have completed briefing in this case. (ECF Nos. 11, 13, 15).
Hammer asserts the following assignments of error:
(1) The ALJ’s RFC conflicts with all jobs found Plaintiff can
perform and the conflict was not reasonably resolved.
(2) The ALJ erred in evaluating the opinions from the State agency
psychological 	consultants, 	rendering 	the 	mental 	RFC
unsupported by substantial evidence.
(ECF No. 11 at 1).
III. Background
A. Relevant Hearing Testimony
The ALJ summarized the relevant testimony from Hammer’s hearing:
The claimant is fifty-three years old. At the hearing, the claimant
testified that he had mid and low back pain, which caused issues
standing and walking. Additionally, he testified that he was able to
stand or walk, for a time, however the pain in his back would
return. The claimant further testified that he had to lie down on his
right 	side 	during 	the 	day. 	Regarding 	household 	chores, 	the
claimant testified that he was able to help out with some chores,
however he had to do chores gradually. He was not able to wash
laundry, however he was able to make a simple meal, such as a
sandwich, sweep floors, and wash some dishes. Moreover, the
claimant testified that he had some issues with remembering what
happened on television shows he was watching, he had difficulty
paying attention while his fiancé’s daughter was talking to him,
and he was not a social person and did not like to be around others.
(ECF No. 8, PageID #: 58).
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B. Relevant Medical Evidence
The ALJ also summarized Hammer’s health records and symptoms:
Prior to the alleged onset date, it was noted in the file that the
claimant was assaulted with a baseball bat in 2016, which caused
blurry vision in his left eye. (Ex. 4F pg. 2).
The claimant was seen at urgent care on May 10, 2022, with a
laceration to his right leg after a wall fell on him while tearing
down an old barn. (Ex. 1F pg. 1). Physical examination revealed a
steady gait, sacroiliac (SI) joint tenderness, and normal muscle
strength. (Ex. 1F pg. 2). X-rays demonstrated mild to moderate
chronic 	degenerative 	disc 	disease 	at 	L3-S1. 	(Ex. 	1F 	pg. 	4).
Additionally, the claimant was given a Tetanus shot due to the
puncture wound in his right leg, and prescribed Cyclobenzaprine
and Methylprednisolone. (Ex. 1F pg. 3).
On September 24, 2022, the claimant was seen for a consultative
examination, and he had normal muscle strength and normal range
of motion. (Ex. 4F pgs. 5-8). Additionally, straight leg raise testing
was negative, his sensation was intact, and he had a limping gait.
The claimant was noted to have, without correction, vision of
20/200 in his left eye and 20/20-1 in his right (Ex. 4F pgs. 4, 5).
The claimant was seen at the emergency room on October 2, 2022,
secondary to low back pain that radiated down his left leg. (Ex. 6F
pg. 5). He stated that his Lidocaine patches provided no relief, and
his exam found normal mood and affect, left-sided back pain, and
no gross deformities. (Ex. 6F pg. 7). X-rays showed moderate
degenerative disc disease at L3-4, and severe L4-S1, with probably
advanced L5-S1 facet joint osteoarthritis as well as mild anterior
compression deformities of the T11, 12, and L1 vertebral bodies,
likely psychologic and/or old trauma. (Ex. 6F pg. 12).
Jennifer Campbell, PA-C, saw the claimant on February 3, 2023, at
urgent care, and he reported abdominal pain and his right ear was
clogged. 	(Ex. 	7F 	pg. 	2). 	Her 	exam 	demonstrated 	minimal
abdominal 	distention, 	and 	his 	right 	tympanic 	membrane 	was
retracted with minimal fluid. (Id.). Ms. Campbell recommended
Flonase and Zyrtec. (Ex. 7F pg. 3).
On April 12, 2023, the claimant was seen for a psychological
consultative 	examination, 	and 	Dr. 	Conn’s 	exam 	revealed
appropriate eye contact, adequate grooming and hygiene, and he
was cooperative. (Ex. 8F pg. 9). Additionally, the claimant did not
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show evidence of psychomotor slowing or agitation, he had a
depressed mood and his affect was stable and appropriate. (Id.).
The claimant further stated that he was anxious and experienced
nightmares, flashbacks, intrusive thoughts, a persistent negative
view, an exaggerated startle response, and he felt disconnected
from others. (Ex. 8F pg. 10). He was able to count forward by
three’s, however he was unable to count backward by seven’s, and
his memory was “somewhat impaired.” (Id.). The claimant was
able to remember one of three simple words after a delay of several
minutes, and he could recite four digits forward and in reverse.
(Ex. 8F pgs. 10, 11).
(ECF No. 8, PageID #: 58-59).
C. Opinion Evidence at Issue
The ALJ also considered medical opinions from consultative examiners Dr. Anwer
Aldhaheri and Dr. Amanda Conn; the State agency consultants; and Dr. Meghana Karande.
(ECF No. 8, PageID #: 61-63). 	The relevant opinions and the ALJ’s consideration of them are
set forth in more detail below with respect to Plaintiff’s arguments.
IV. 	The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ made the following findings relevant to this appeal:
1. 	The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2025.
2. 	The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
June 1, 2020, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and
416.971 et seq.).
3. 	The claimant has the following severe impairments: lumbar spine
degenerative disc disease; thoracic spine compression deformities;
left eye vision loss; and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (20
CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. 	The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925
and 416.926).
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5. 	After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform 	light 	work 	as 	defined 	in 	20 	CFR 	404.1567(b) 	and
416.967(b) except the claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds and can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, crouch,
kneel, stoop, and crawl. He can have occasional concentrated
exposure to extreme cold. He cannot work around unprotected
heights or unprotected moving mechanical machinery. He cannot
perform any occupational driving. He can perform work that does
not require binocular vision (i.e., meaning he can perform tasks
that could be accomplished with a patch on one eye). The claimant
can 	have 	occasional 	interaction 	with 	the 	general 	public,
supervisors, and coworkers. Further, with the general public and
coworkers, his interaction should be superficial in nature defined
as the ability to be in the proximity of others, able to exchange
greetings and engage in casual conversation, and to consist of
interactions of short duration for a specific purpose such as work-
related exchanges.
6. 	The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR
404.1565 and 416.965).
…
10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20
CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and 416.969a).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from June 1, 2020, through the date of this
decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
(ECF No. 8, PageID #: 54-55, 58, 64-65).
V. Law & Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
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preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’” 	Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council
becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007)
(citing Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535,
538 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, it must be affirmed, “even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently.”
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (6th Cir. 1983)).
B. Standard for Disability
The Social Security regulations outline a five-step process that the ALJ must use in
determining whether a claimant is entitled to supplemental-security income or disability-
insurance benefits: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether
that impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals any of the listings in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant can perform her past relevant
work in light of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) if not, whether, based on the
claimant’s age, education, and work experience, she can perform other work found in the
national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d
640, 642–43 (6th Cir. 2006). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of producing sufficient
evidence to prove that she is disabled and, thus, entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a).
Specifically, the claimant has the burden of proof in steps one through four. Walters v. Comm’r
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of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step
five to establish whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform available
work in the national economy. Id.
C. Discussion
Hammer raises two issues on appeal: (1) the ALJ’s RFC conflicts with all the jobs she
found Plaintiff could perform and the conflict was not reasonably resolved; and (2) the ALJ
erred in evaluating the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants, rendering the
mental RFC unsupported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 11 at 1).
1. 	Conflict Between RFC and Available Jobs
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s step five finding that he could perform other work such that
he was not disabled. (ECF No. 11 at 9).
At step five, the Commissioner has the burden of proof to show “that other work exists in
significant numbers in the national economy” that the claimant can do based on his RFC. 	20
C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2). 	To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding
“supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to
perform specific jobs.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir.
1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This substantial evidence may be in the
form of vocational expert testimony in response to a hypothetical question, but only if the
question accurately portrays [the claimant’s] individual physical and mental impairments.”
Baker v. Barnhart, 182 F. App’x 497, 500 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). 	On occasion, a
vocational expert’s testimony will conflict with the information included in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”). 	Lindsley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 603 (6th Cir.
2009). 	“In an effort to insure that such actual or apparent conflicts are addressed, the Social
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Security Administration has imposed an affirmative duty on ALJ’s to ask the [vocational expert]
if the evidence that he or she has provided ‘conflicts with [the] information provided in the
DOT’” and obtain a reasonable explanation for apparent conflicts between the expert’s evidence
and the DOT. Id. (quoting SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4).
Here, the ALJ concluded that based on Plaintiff’s RFC and the vocational expert’s
testimony, Plaintiff would be able to perform work as a production assembler; assembler, small
products; and assembler, electrical accessories. (ECF No. 8, PageID #: 65). The ALJ provided
the following explanation regarding conflicts between the expert’s testimony and the DOT:
Although the vocational expert's testimony is inconsistent with the
information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles,
there is a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy. At the
hearing, the vocational expert testified that the DOT does not
address interaction with coworkers and supervisors, and vision
issues. 	However, 	the 	vocational 	expert 	testified 	that 	in 	his
experience the above stated jobs do exist in the national economy
and 	are 	within 	the 	above 	stated 	residual 	functional 	capacity
assessment. Considering the qualifications of the vocational expert,
the undersigned adopts the opinion of the vocational expert that
these jobs would be capable of being performed within the above
residual functional capacity assessment. (Ex. 10E; SSR 00- 4p).
(ECF No. 8, PageID #: 65).
Plaintiff argues that despite finding that Plaintiff was limited to “work that does not
require binocular vision (i.e., meaning he can perform tasks that could be accomplished with a
patch on one eye),” all the jobs the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could perform “require binocular
vision due to depth perception requirements.” 	(ECF No. 11 at 9). 	Plaintiff asserts that the
vocational expert’s lone statement that he “relied on his experience … regarding the ‘vision
issue’ simply does not provide for a reasonable explanation that resolves the conflict between the
DOT and the RFC for monocular vision.” (Id. at 10).
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ permissibly relied on the vocational expert’s
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testimony, which was based on his experience. 	(ECF No. 13 at 6). 	The Commissioner asserts
that “before relying on VE testimony, the ALJ must (1) ask the VE about any possible conflict
and (2) obtain a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict” and because the VE testified
that his testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), “the ALJ
did all that she was required to do.” (Id. at 6-7).
Plaintiff replies that he “demonstrated conflict between all jobs found by the VE and the
DOT due to the fact Plaintiff is blind in one eye and cannot have depth perception” and the
vocational expert’s experience “does not satisfy a reasonable explanation for such an obvious
conflict.” (ECF No. 15 at 2).
While Plaintiff frames his argument as challenging the ALJ’s failure to resolve a conflict
between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT, there is no “apparent conflict” between
the DOT and the expert’s testimony. 	Plaintiff’s argument focuses on the identified jobs each
having a requirement for depth perception. See DOT 706.687-010 (occasional depth perception
for production assembler); DOT 706.684-022 (frequent depth perception for assembler, small
products); DOT 729.687-010 (frequent depth perception for assembler, electrical accessories).
However, the vocational expert’s testimony did not contradict this requirement but rather
indicated that the jobs could be performed even with the limitations identified by the ALJ.
Notably, while the ALJ included in the RFC that any work “not require binocular vision (i.e.,
meaning he can perform tasks that could be accomplished with a patch on one eye),” the ALJ did
not include a limitation regarding depth perception. 	(See ECF No. 8, PageID #: 57). 	Thus,
Plaintiff’s argument is actually challenging the ALJ’s RFC finding and its lack of a depth
perception limitation.
However, even framing Plaintiff’s argument as a challenge to the RFC, his argument
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fails. Plaintiff does not cite any evidence in the record to support that he had issues with depth
perception. (See ECF No. 11 at 7-10). Nor did Plaintiff’s counsel argue at the ALJ hearing that
Plaintiff experienced any issues with depth perception. 	(See ECF No. 8, PageID #: 71-102).
Despite failing to raise the issue to the ALJ, Plaintiff now raises the depth perception issue for
the first time in this Court, citing two internet articles indicating that “[f]or accurate depth
perception, you generally need to have binocular (two-eyed) vision” and “[b]ecause your depth
perception depends on information from both your eyes and your brain, anything affecting your
overall vision can impact your depth perception.” 	(ECF No. 11 at 10 (emphasis added)).
However, the use of “generally” and “can” in these sources is far from conclusive evidence that
the lack of binocular vision always amounts to issues with depth perception. In fact, one article
Plaintiff relies on explicitly indicates that while “[p]eople who rely on vision primarily in one
eye … may struggle with depth perception,” “some people who have had good vision in one eye
for a long period of time may find they have acceptable depth perception.” 	Kierstan Boyd,
Depth 	Perception, 	American 	Academy 	of 	Ophthalmology 	(Mar. 	23, 	2018),
https://www.aao.org/eye-health/anatomy/depth-perception. 	Plaintiff failed to cite any evidence
in the record to support that he actually suffered limitations regarding depth perception. 	Further,
the ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in failing
to include a depth perception limitation in the RFC and Plaintiff’s first argument is meritless.
2. 	Consideration of Medical Opinions
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinions from the State agency
psychological consultants such that the mental RFC is not supported by substantial evidence.
(ECF No. 11 at 10).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering
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all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). Under the current regulations,
the SSA “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to
any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s).” 	20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a).
Nevertheless, an ALJ must “articulate how [he] considered the medical opinions and prior
administrative medical findings” in adjudicating a claim. 	Id. 	Medical source opinions are
evaluated using the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c). The factors include: supportability;
consistency; the source’s relationship with the claimant; the source’s specialized area of practice,
if any; and “other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion.” 	20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(c). 	The ALJ is required to explain how he considered the supportability and
consistency of a source’s medical opinion but generally is not required to discuss other factors.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). 	Under the regulations, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be” and “[t]he more consistent a medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical
sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical findings(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
Here, at both the initial and reconsideration level, the State agency psychological
consultants concluded Plaintiff was moderately limited in his ability to interact appropriately
with the general public; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from
supervisors; and get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting
behavioral extremes. 	(ECF No. 8, PageID #: 122, 133). 	The following additional explanation
was provided: “He can interact w/others on a brief superficial basis. Since his accident he claims
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that all other people are ‘stupid’, and he does not want to deal with them. He is able to maintain
his relationship with his girlfriend and presents as positive during medical appointments.” (Id.).
The ALJ provided the following explanation of her consideration of the State agency opinions:
The State agency psychological consultants found that the claimant
could interact with others on a brief and superficial basis. (Ex. 4A
pg. 8; Ex. 6A pg. 8). The undersigned has considered these prior
administrative 	medical 	findings 	and 	concludes 	that 	they 	are
generally 	persuasive. 	The findings 	may 	be supported 	by 	the
evidence reviewed by the State agency consultants; however, they
are not entirely consistent with a complete review of the medical
records. The evidence does not support relating the limitation for
superficial 	interaction 	to 	the 	claimant’s 	interactions 	with
supervisors. During his consultative examination, the claimant did
not report interpersonal conflict with supervisors, and he had not
been terminated from a job due to behavioral, or interpersonal,
issues. (Ex. 8F pg. 13). As such, while it would be reasonable to
limit all exposure (supervisors, co-workers, and the public) to an
occasional basis, the record is not consistent with a limitation for
only superficial interaction with supervisors. The undersigned has
accounted for the finding limiting the claimant to brief interaction
with others by including a limitation for occasional interaction
with 	supervisors, 	co-workers, 	and 	the 	general 	public 	and
superficial as to the general public and coworkers.
(Id. at PageID #: 63).
Plaintiff argues that because the State agency consultants did not “distinguish between
supervisors, co-workers, or the public,” the ALJ erred in failing to include a limitation to
superficial interaction with supervisors despite including the limitation as to co-workers and the
public. (ECF No. 11 at 11). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ rejected the opinion because the record
did not show interpersonal conflict with supervisors, but the record “also showed no problems
with co-workers,” and the ALJ failed to provide a reasoning why the superficial interaction
limitation was not applied to supervisors. 	(Id. at 13). 	Additionally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ
ignored evidence that would support likely problems with supervisors. 	(Id. at 13-14). 	Finally,
Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ stated the opinions are ‘not entirely consistent with a complete
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review of the medical records,’ but the ALJ only points to the consultive examination which [the
State agency consultants] clearly reviewed themselves” such that it is “unclear what additional
medical records the ALJ relied upon to discount the State agency psychological opinions.” (Id.
at 14).
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ “properly analyzed the persuasiveness of the
prior administrative medical findings, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b), and reasonably limited Plaintiff
to occasional and superficial interaction with coworkers and the public and occasional interaction
with supervisors.” 	(ECF No. 13 at 8). 	The Commissioner argues that the consultative
examiner’s report Plaintiff cites provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision that
Plaintiff was capable of more than superficial interaction with supervisors and the “fact that the
ALJ could have used the consultative examiner’s report to find Plaintiff less limited than the ALJ
did—i.e., capable of more than superficial interaction with both supervisors and coworkers—
does not undermine the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision.” (ECF No. 13 at 9).
Plaintiff replies that “if [he] can interact with all ‘others’ on a brief, superficial basis,
there was no proper basis for the ALJ to distinguish between co-workers, the public, and
supervisors.” (ECF No. 15 at 2-3 (record cite omitted)).
The Court agrees with the Commissioner. 	The ALJ’s decision makes clear that he
considered both the supportability and consistency factors and found the opinion’s limitation to
only superficial interaction with supervisors was not consistent with Plaintiff’s statements during
the consultative examination. (ECF No. 8, PageID #: 63). Notably, in describing his past three
jobs to the consultative examiner, Plaintiff “denied getting in any arguments or trouble,”
reported that his employers “loved” him, and he performed at “a 10 anywhere” he worked. (Id.
at PageID #: 442-43). Based on this, the consultative examiner indicated that “the claimant did
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not endorse any interpersonal conflict with supervisors or coworkers while on the job and has
never been terminated from a job for behavioral issues or interpersonal conflicts.” 	(Id. at
PageID #: 450). 	The ALJ reasonably relied on this evidence to support that the State agency
opinions limiting Plaintiff to only superficial interaction with supervisors were inconsistent with
the overall record. 	As the Commissioner argues, the fact that the ALJ could have drawn
different conclusions from this evidence—for instance, that Plaintiff was also not limited in his
interactions with coworkers—does not negate that it is substantial evidence in support of the
ALJ’s ultimate conclusion. 	See Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Soc., No. No. 24-3201, 2024 WL
4603964, at *5 (6th Cir. 2024) (ALJ’s finding that plaintiff could properly interact with
supervisors and coworkers was supported by plaintiff’s own testimony that he worked “decently
well” with classmates on projects and “merely cit[ing] competing evidence” was insufficient to
challenge ALJ’s conclusion). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second argument also fails.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration’s final decision denying Plaintiff benefits. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED.
Dated: January 22, 2026
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