Evans v. Green Tree Servicing LLC et al

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
In re: 	M ARLON W. EVANS,
Debtor
Case No. 	06-31171
Adv. No. 	06-3239
M ARLON W. EVANS,
Plaintiff
v.
G REEN TREE S ERVICING , LLC, ET AL.,
Defendants
Judge Waldron
Chapter 13
DECISION ON ORDERS (1)
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC.
28); (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT
GUARANTY BANK’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 25)
AND (3) DENYING GREEN TREE
SERVICING LLC’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 29)
DATED AT DAYTON, OHIO this 4th day of June, 2007:
Introduction
This adversary proceeding concerns a dispute between two creditors, Green
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 04, 2007
____________________________________________________________
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 12

2
Tree 	Servicing, 	LLC 	(“Green 	Tree”) 	and 	Guaranty 	Bank 	SSB 	dba 	Home 	Equity
(“Guaranty 	Bank”), 	concerning 	which 	creditor 	has 	the 	priority 	secured 	position 	in
connection with a manufactured home and Marlon W. Evans, the Debtor (“Evans” or the
“Plaintiff”), who seeks to determine Green Tree a wholly unsecured creditor. 	The issue
presented is whether Green Tree’s fixture filing on a manufactured home, affixed to a
parcel of real estate, remained, during the relevant time period, a properly perfected
security interest. The court determines Green Tree’s security interest expired during the
relevant time period and, under applicable Ohio law, Guaranty Bank has the priority
secured position. 	Further, under applicable bankruptcy law, Green Tree is a wholly
unsecured creditor.
Procedural Background
On February 1, 2007, the court entered an order establishing deadlines for filing
motions 	for 	summary 	judgment 	(Order: 	Establishing 	Dates 	for 	Filing 	Motions 	for
Summary 	Judgment 	and 	Ordering 	Other 	Matters 	– 	Doc. 	21). 	The 	parties 	filed
stipulations (Doc 23) and joint exhibits (Doc. 24).
Marlon 	W. 	Evans, 	the 	Debtor/Plaintiff 	filed 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment (Doc. 28). Guaranty Bank filed Defendant Guaranty Bank, SSB dba Home
Equity’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	(Doc. 	25). 	Green 	Tree 	Servicing 	filed 	a
response to the summary judgment motions of Evans and Guaranty Bank (Doc. 32).
Evans filed a reply brief (Doc. 34).
Green Tree also filed a motion for summary judgment (Green Tree Servicing
LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29)). Guaranty Bank filed a response (Doc.
33) and Evans also filed a response (Doc. 31).
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 12

3
Jurisdiction
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the Standing Order
of Reference entered in this District. 	This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(2)(K).
Summary Judgment Standard
This court reviewed the summary judgment standard in a recently reported decision:
The familiar standard to address the parties' filings is contained in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and is applicable to bankruptcy adversary
proceedings by incorporation in Bankruptcy Rule 7056. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c) states, in part, that a court must grant summary
judgment to the moving party if:
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
In order to prevail, the moving party, if bearing the burden of persuasion
at trial, must establish all elements of its claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2556, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the
burden is on the non-moving party at trial, the movant must: 1) submit
affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim; or 2) demonstrate to the court that the nonmoving party's
evidence 	is 	insufficient 	to 	establish 	an 	essential 	element 	of 	the
nonmoving party's claim. Id. at 331-332, 106 S.Ct. at 2557. Thereafter,
the opposing party “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d
538 (1986) (citations omitted); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249-251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All
inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-
588, 106 S.Ct. at 1356-57.
Gemini Servs., Inc. v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc (In re Gemini Servs., Inc.),
350 B.R. 74, 80-81 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006), quoting, Roberds, Inc. v. Broyhill Furniture
(In re Roberds, Inc), 313 B.R. 732, 735 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004).
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 12

4
Facts
Evans is the owner of real property at 1455 Camden-College Corner Road,
Camden, Ohio, which is located in Preble County (the “Real Property”) (Stipulations, ¶
1) and was acquired by Evans in a quit-claim deed recorded on April 23, 1997
(Stipulations, ¶ 2). 	Evans purchased a 1998 Four Seasons Manufactured Home (the
“Manufactured Home”) (Stipulations, ¶ 3) in January 1998 from D & J Mobile Homes
and signed a retail installment contract and security agreement 1 (Stipulations, ¶ 4, Joint
Exhibit I). The contract and security agreement were assigned to Green Tree, who was
listed as a lienholder on the Ohio certificate of title (Stipulations, ¶ 4, 5; Joint Exhibit II).
On October 12, 1998, Green Tree filed a financing statement in the Preble County
Recorder’s Office. 	No continuation statement has ever been filed by Green Tree
(Stipulations, ¶ 13).
Prior to the date of the filing of the financing statement (October 12, 1998), the
Manufactured Home was delivered to the Real Property and “was permanently affixed
to and became a part of the Plaintiff’s real estate . . . on a poured concrete foundation
and 	connection 	to 	electric 	service, 	a 	septic 	tank 	and 	an 	underground 	cistern.”
(Stipulations, ¶ 7). 	Evans used the Manufactured home as his residence (Stipulations,
¶ 9). 	The certificate of title was never surrendered to the Clerk of the Preble County
Court of Common Pleas or any other state official (Stipulations, ¶ 10).
The Plaintiff executed a promissory note in favor of Guaranty Bank on December
14, 2000 (Stipulations, ¶ 22). Guaranty Bank secured its loan with a mortgage recorded
1 Paragraph 3 stated “SECURITY INTEREST: I give you a security interest under the applicable
certificate of title law or Uniform Commercial Code in the Manufactured Home and any property added or
attached to it, to secure my obligation under this contract . . . . I agree to execute any application for
certificate of title or ownership, financing statement or other document necessary to perfect your security
interest in the Manufactured Home. . . . “
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 12

5
on January 22, 2001 in Preble County (Stipulations, ¶ 15).
Analysis
A manufactured home, which would often be considered an item of personal
property, changes its character when it is affixed to real property. 	Initially, Ohio law
treats a manufactured home as a vehicle and any lien is noted on the certificate of title.
Ohio Revised Code §§ 4501.01(B) (a manufactured home is included within the general
definition of a vehicle), 4505.01 (a manufactured home is defined as a motor vehicle
under the Ohio certificate of title law) and 4505.13(B) (a lien on a vehicle must be noted
on the certificate of title). See also Ohio Revised Code § 4501.01(MM) (a manufactured
home 	is 	defined 	by 	Ohio 	Revised 	Code 	§ 	3781.06(C)(4)). 2 Once, 	however, 	a
manufactured home is affixed to real property, Ohio law treats it as a fixture – part of the
real estate – and in order to perfect a security interest in a fixture, a financing statement
must be filed with the State of Ohio. See Ohio Revised Code § 1309.32, as effective
prior to July 1, 2001. 3 Green Tree did file a financing statement on October 12, 1998; 4
2 For simplicity, the court cites the current versions of these particular statutes. There is no dispute that
the Manufactured Home, prior to becoming a fixture, was considered a motor vehicle under Ohio law.
3 (A) In this section and in the provisions of sections 1309.38 to 1309.43 of the Revised Code referring to
fixture filing, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Goods are “fixtures” when they become so related to particular real estate that an interest in them
arises under real estate law.
(2) A “fixture filing” is the filing in the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed or
recorded of a financing statement covering goods that are or are to become fixtures and conforming
to the requirements of division (D) of section 1309.39 of the Revised Code.
* * * * *
(B) A security interest under sections 1309.01 to 1309.50 of the Revised Code may be created in goods
which are fixtures or may continue in goods which become fixtures, but no security interest exists under
sections 1309.01 to 1309.50 of the Revised Code in ordinary building materials incorporated into an
improvement on land.
(C) Sections 1309.01 to 1309.50 of the Revised Code do not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon
fixtures pursuant to real estate law.
(D)(1) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting interest of encumbrancer or
owner of the real estate where:
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 12

6
however, significantly for this decision, Green Tree has never filed a continuation
statement, which is fatal to Green Tree’s position.
If the law currently in effect was in effect in 1998, Green Tree may have had a
stronger position. Under the law currently in effect - Ohio’s enactment of revised Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, effective July 1, 2001 - a manufactured home
financing statement is generally valid for thirty years. See Ohio Revised Code §
1309.515(B).
The law currently in effect specifically addresses financing statements filed prior
to July 1, 2001, by stating, in unambiguous language, that the prior law concerning
continuation statements applies to such financing statements. 	Ohio Revised Code §
1309.705(D). 5 Prior to July 1, 2001, the default rule of requiring a continuation
(a) The security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest of the encumbrancer or
owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing
before the goods become fixtures or within ten days thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of
record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate; or
(b) The security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encumbrancer or
owner is of record, the security interest has priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in
title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is
in possession of the real estate; or
(c) The conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or equitable proceedings
after the security interest was perfected by any method permitted by sections 1309.01 to 1309.50
of the Revised Code.
(2) Whether or not the property is a fixture, a security interest in readily removable factory or office
machines or readily removable replacements of domestic appliances that are consumer goods, which
security interest has been perfected by any method permitted by sections 1309.01 to 1309.50 of the
Revised Code and has been perfected before the property was installed in the real estate, has priority
over the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate.
4 The parties dispute whether the Plaintiff’s signature on this filing was completed by Green Tree pursuant
to a valid power of attorney. 	However, since the court ultimately finds the financing statement lapsed on
or about October 12, 2003, the court need not address the validity of the power of attorney to reach its
determination.
5 Ohio Revised Code 1309.705(D) states that “[t]he filing of a continuation statement after July 1, 2001,
does not continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before that date. However, upon the
timely filing of a continuation statement after July 1, 2001, and in accordance with the law of the
jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in sections 1309.301 to 1309.342 of the Revised Code, the
effectiveness of a financing statement filed in the same office in that jurisdiction before July 1, 2001,
continues for the period provided by the law of that jurisdiction.”
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 12

7
statement every five years applied to manufactured homes. 	Ohio Revised Code §
1309.40(B)(1) (as in effect prior to July 1, 2001). 6 As an alternative to filing a
continuation statement, Green Tree could have filed an initial financing statement for the
Manufactured Home under the law in effect after July 1, 2001. See Ohio Revised Code
§ 1309.706. 7 It is undisputed that Green Tree never completed either filing. 	Since
Green Tree’s financing statement expired on or about October 12, 2003, its secured
position did not remain perfected and Guaranty Bank is entitled to the first and best
6 Ohio Revised Code § 1309.40(B)(1) stated, in part, that “[e]xcept as provided in divisions (B)(2) and (F)
of this section, filed financing statement is effective for a period of five years from the date of filing. The
effectiveness of the financing statement lapses on the expiration of the five-year period unless a
continuation statement is filed prior to the lapse. . . .” 	The exceptions of Ohio Revised Code §
1309.40(B)(2) and (F) did not apply to the facts of this adversary proceeding.
7 Ohio Revised Code § 1309.706 states:
(A) The filing of an initial financing statement in the office specified in section 1309.501 of the Revised
Code continues the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before July 1, 2001, if:
(1) The filing of an initial financing statement in that office would be effective to perfect a security interest
under this chapter.
(2) The financing statement filed before July 1, 2001, was filed in an office in another state or another
office in this state; and
(3) The initial financing statement satisfies division (C) of this section.
(B) The filing of an initial financing statement under division (A) of this section continues the effectiveness
of the financing statement filed before July 1, 2001:
(1) If the initial financing statement is filed before July 1, 2001, for the period provided in section 1309.40
of the Revised Code, as it existed prior to July 1, 2001, with respect to a financing statement; and
(2) If the initial financing statement is filed after July 1, 2001, for the period provided in section 1309.515
of the Revised Code, as it exists on July 1, 2001, with respect to an initial financing statement.
(C) To be effective for purposes of division (A) of this section, an initial financing statement shall:
(1) Satisfy the requirements of sections 1309.501 to 1309.527 of the Revised Code, as they exist on July
1, 2001, for an initial financing statement;
(2) Identify the financing statement filed before July 1, 2001, by indicating the office in which the financing
statement was filed and providing the dates of filing and file numbers, if any, of the financing statement
and of the most recent continuation statement filed with respect to the financing statement; and
(3)Indicate that the financing statement filed before July 1, 2001, remains effective.
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 12

8
secured priority position on the Manufactured Home, a fixture on the Real Property.8
Green Tree argues that its lien position cannot be invalidated because Evans
never surrendered the certificate of title to the Preble County Clerk. As noted in Cluxton
v. Fifth Third Bank, 327 B.R. 612, 615 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2005), citing, Snyder v. Hawkins,
2004 WL 48882 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2004), “Ohio courts have held that a failure to
precisely follow the statute by a county auditor does not negate the mobile home
becoming part of the real property by operation of law.”
Further, whatever significance the surrender of the certificate of title to the Preble
County Clerk may have under Ohio law for tax purposes, an otherwise lapsed fixture
filing does not remain valid because an owner failed to surrender a certificate of title on
a manufactured home after affixing it to his land. The court notes that a recent
unreported decision from Judge Perlman held that surrender of the certificate of title is
not a necessary prerequisite to a valid fixture being created in a mobile home. In re Hull,
Case No. 	06-12431 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio March 5, 2007) (unreported decision; but
available at the court’s website). 	The court does not rely on this unreported decision;
but, nevertheless, agrees with its conclusion.
Green Tree also argues that Guaranty Bank had notice of Green Tree’s interest
8 This analysis is consistent with Ohio Attorney General Opinion No. 1996-036, which suggests in
establishing a properly perfected lien on a manufactured home, a creditor should note the lien on the
certificate of title and file a fixture filing when the property becomes affixed to real property. 	Although
these opinions are not binding on the Ohio courts, the analysis given is consistent with the plain language
of the relevant statutes. In addition, Opinion 1996-036 cites to Hoagland v. Beabout (In re Beabout), 110
B.R. 883 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990), in which the bankruptcy court held that, interpreting Illinois’s similar
version of Article 9, a creditor, in order to have lien priority over a mortgage, must file a fixture filing after a
mobile home ceased to be personal property and became a fixture. The court notes the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Boyd v. Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp. (In re Kroskie), 315 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2003) is not
helpful in this analysis, since it was a narrow decision holding that the Michigan’s Mobile Home
Commission Act was the exclusive method to perfect a security interest. This statute has no analogous
statute in Ohio. 	Even more importantly, Boyd was effectively overruled by a later Sixth Circuit panel
because the Michigan legislature clarified that Boyd was decided incorrectly. See Meoli v. Citicorp Trust
Bank (In re Oswalt), 444 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2006).
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 12

9
from the certificate of title, the 1998 financing statement and a credit report of Green
Tree’s lien and the purpose of perfection is to provide third parties with notice. 	This
argument presupposes that such notice would obviate Green Tree’s obligations under
Ohio’s 	enacted 	version 	of 	the 	Uniform 	Commercial 	Code 	to 	maintain 	a 	properly
perfected fixture filing by substituting a different and uncodified form of notice. 	The
court cannot give credence to this legal assumption because it has no basis in the
language of the relevant statutes. 	Green Tree cites no relevant case law or other
authority for such a proposition.
Further, Green Tree also provides no basis to conclude that Guaranty Bank’s
mortgage would not extend to the Manufactured Home once it was affixed to the Real
Property. 	Under Ohio common law, the Manufactured Home, affixed to the real
property prior to the Guaranty Bank’s mortgage in 2001 (Stipulations, ¶ 7 and ¶ 15), is a
fixture. 	It is part of the Real Property and Guaranty Bank’s lien extends to not only the
land, but the Manufactured Home affixed to it.
Green Tree also argues the Debtor lacked the requisite intent to create a fixture
under the Supreme Court of Ohio’s landmark fixture precedent, Teaff v Hewitt, 1 Ohio
St. 511 (1853). Teaff established a simple three part test:
The true criterion of a fixture, is the united application of the following
requisites, to wit: 1st. Actual annexation to the realty, or something
appurtenant thereto. 2d. Application to the use, or purpose, to which that
part of the realty with which it is connected, is appropriated. 3d. The
intention of the party making the annexation, to make a permanent
accession to the freehold.
The undisputed evidence, however, demonstrates that the Manufactured Home
was (1) affixed to the Real Property, (2) to be used as a home on the Real Property and
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 12

10
(3) the Debtor intended this to be a permanent home on the Real Property.9 See also In
re Jarvis, 310 B.R. 330, 335-36 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (“With respect to the issue of
intent, Ohio law looks not simply at the intent to affix a chattel to a parcel of reality, but
beyond, asking whether the affixor, in fact, intended to ‘devote the chattel to the use
and service of the land or structure already a part of the land, in such manner to
enhance the serviceability of the whole as a permanent unit of property to whatever use
it may be devoted.’”; citation omitted)
Finally, Green Tree argues Paragraph 8 of the contract between Green Tree and
Evans (Joint Exhibit I) provided that the Manufactured Home would not be attached to
real estate without Green Tree’s consent. 	Without again detailing the controlling effect
of applicable Ohio law governing filings and priorities, the Evans’ deposition, the only
other relevant evidence in the record as to this issue, establishes that D & J Mobile
Homes, the assignor of the contract to Green Tree, was more than aware of Evans’
intention and consequently waived any protection of such a contractual provision. 10 As
an assignee of the contract, that waiver is enforceable against Green Tree. See Allied
9 Green Tree argues that the Debtor always intended Green Tree to have a security interest in the
Manufactured Home. This decision does not dispute that security interest per se, but instead finds that
Guaranty’s mortgage is superior to the lien of Green Tree, which, ultimately, is a wholly unsecured lien.
The issue is not one of the existence of a security interest; rather, it is a question of the priority of security
agreements, in the context of the chapter 13 case. 	Once the Manufactured Home became a fixture,
Guaranty Bank’s mortgage included the Manufactured Home because it is affixed to the Real Property as
a fixture.
10 In the deposition of the Plaintiff by Green Tree Counsel (Doc. 30, p. 20-21), the following questions and
answers were given:
Q. Who did the setup for the home, who delivered it and –
A. 	D&J
Q. 	What is the home placed on? 	Is it on these I-beams, cross-footers?
A. It’s on the outside wall and then there’s – on all the cross-footers, there’s poured pads and it’s on
that anchored with lag bolts into the foundation.
Q. Did you get the dimensions of the home from D&J prior to building the footers – I mean prior to
building the foundation?
A. They gave me a blueprint for the foundation. (emphasis added).
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 12

11
Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Uneco Realty Co., 146 Ohio App.3d 136, 144 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2001), citing, Inter Ins. Exchange of the Chicago Motor Club v. Wagstaff, 144 Ohio
St. 457 (1945) (“An assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor with respect to the
assignor's rights and remedies against the obligor.”)
Having determined that Guaranty Bank’s lien has priority over any lien of Green
Tree, the only remaining issue is whether there is any equity to which Green Tree’s lien
can attach. 	The Sixth Circuit has held that a debtor, in a chapter 13, can modify the
rights of a lien on a debtor’s principal residence, if that lien cannot attach to any equity
in the residence. Lane v. Western Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663 (6th
Cir. 2002).
The parties agree, at the time of filing, Evans was indebted to Guaranty Bank in
the amount of $121,098.69 (Stipulations, ¶ 14). 	In addition, Preble County was owed,
as of the date of filing, $8,607.29 in taxes and assessments (Stipulations, ¶ 18). 	The
Plaintiff has a filed appraisal of $115,000 for the Real Property (Stipulations, ¶ 20).
There is no evidence contradictory to this appraisal. 11
Accordingly, Green Tree’s lien has no equity to which it can attach. 	Pursuant to
the holding in Lane, the lien of Green Tree is avoided as wholly unsecured.12
Conclusion
Green 	Tree’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	(Doc. 	29) 	is 	DENIED. 	The
summary judgment motions of Guaranty Bank (Doc. 25) and the Plaintiff, Marlon W.
Evans (Doc. 28), are GRANTED. Separate orders will be simultaneously entered.
11 At the pretrial telephone conference on January 31, 2007, the parties agreed with the court that the
cross-motions for summary judgment would obviate any need for an evidentiary hearing.
12 Counsel for the Plaintiff may submit a separate order for the release of Green Tree’s lien consistent
with the form of the May 2, 2007 default order against another Defendant, MGIC Credit Assurance
Corporation (See Doc. 35) that provides for release of the lien upon the Debtor’s chapter 13 discharge.
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 11 of 12

12
c:
Marlon 	W. 	Evans, 	1455 	Camden 	College 	Corner 	Road, 	Camden, 	Ohio 	45311
(Debtor/Plaintiff)
Daryl R. Douple, Esq., 130 West Second Street, Suite 1900, Dayton, Ohio 45402 (Atty.
for the Debtor/Plaintiff)
David J. Demers, Esq., Three North High Street, P.O. Box 714, New Albany, Ohio
43054 (Atty. for the Defendant, Green Tree Servicing, LLC)
James P. Hickey, Esq., 4 East Schantz Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45409-2244 (Atty. for
Guaranty Bank SSB dba GB Home Equity)
###
Case 3:06-ap-03239 Doc 37 Filed 06/04/07 Entered 06/05/07 12:10:05 Desc Main
Document Page 12 of 12