Ronald J. Sagasser

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
RONALD J. SAGASSER
Debtor
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 25-31350
Chapter 7
Judge Buchanan
DECISION AND ORDER DENYING AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE [Docket Number 26]
[This opinion is not intended for publication.]
This matter is before this Court on Alfred Wm. Schneble III, Administrator of the Estate
of Barbara J. Neely (“Movant”)’s Amended Motion for Relief from Stay [Docket Number 26]
(“Motion”). Neither the Debtor nor any other party filed a response.
In the Motion, Movant states that he is the successor administrator of the probate estate of
Barbara J. Neely. In late August 2025, Movant asserts that he obtained bank records evidencing
that the Debtor, Ronald J. Sagasser (“Debtor”), who was the prior probate estate administrator for
Ms. Neely until removed, had engaged in improper withdrawals of money from Ms. Neely’s
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 7, 2026
Case 3:25-bk-31350 Doc 41 Filed 10/07/26 Entered 10/08/26 10:21:51 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 6

probate estate accounts. Movant instituted a lawsuit against the Debtor in the Probate Common
Pleas Court of Montgomery County, Ohio (the “Probate Court”) on September 9, 2025. The
probate estate was not listed as a creditor in Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules and Movant claims he
did not receive notice of the Debtor’s July 12, 2025 bankruptcy filing until January of 2026. This
notice occurred only after a trial in the Probate Court and a decision, judgment and certificate of
judgment rendered against the Debtor in the amount of $207,255.86 plus 8% interest per annum
and court costs (collectively the “Judgment”). Movant requests relief from the automatic stay to
proceed with the state court action and collection efforts on the postpetition judgment.
For the reasons that follow, the Movant’s request for relief from the automatic stay is
denied, without prejudice.
A. 	The Motion Lacks Clarity Regarding Whether the Claim Against the Debtor
Arose Prepetition or Postpetition
By the fact that the Movant requests relief from the automatic stay to proceed with
collection efforts suggests that the Movant believes the probate estate’s claim against the Debtor
is a prepetition claim subject to the stay. However, the facts contained in the Motion do not make
that clear nor does the Movant advance any particular theory regarding how to determine when the
probate estate’s claim arose.
Facts surrounding the timing of the Debtor’s alleged bad acts and, possibly, when those
facts could reasonably be discovered, as well as the appropriate legal test to be applied, will
determine whether the claim arose prepetition making it subject to the automatic stay. See Bennett
v. Morton Bldgs., Inc. (In re Bennett), Adv. No. 14-3144, 2015 WL 8147588, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS
4107 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 2015) (discussing the various tests for determining whether a
claim arose pre- or postpetition); Jeffries v. Buckley (In re Buckley), 404 B.R. 877 (Bankr. S. D.
Ohio 2009) (same). Any future filing by the Movant should address this issue.
Case 3:25-bk-31350 Doc 41 Filed 10/07/26 Entered 10/08/26 10:21:51 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 6

B. 	The Post-Petition Judgment Was Obtained in Violation of the Automatic Stay
and the Movant Has Not Requested an Annulment of the Stay
Were the claim determined to be a prepetition claim, then the Motion suffers from another
deficiency and that is the failure to request an annulment of the Stay with respect to the Judgment.
The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of “the commencement or
continuation . . . of a judicial . . . action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have
been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
In this instance, the Movant instituted a lawsuit in the Probate Court and obtained the Judgment
against the Debtor after the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition. Accordingly, although the
Movant may not have been aware of the bankruptcy filing at the time, both the lawsuit in Probate
Court and the Judgment would be in violation of the automatic stay assuming the claim arose
prepetition.
Actions such as these taken in violation of the stay are generally “invalid and voidable and
shall be voided absent limited equitable circumstances.” Easley v. Pettibone Michigan Corp. (In
re Easley), 990 F.2d 905, 911 (6th Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, bankruptcy courts retain authority to
annul the automatic stay in appropriate circumstances to retroactively validate an action taken by
a party at a time when he was unaware of the automatic stay. Easley, 990 F.2d at 909-10
(suggesting that the limited equitable circumstances include “where the debtor unreasonably
withholds notice of the stay and the creditor would be prejudiced if the debtor is able to raise the
stay as a defense, or where the debtor is attempting to use the stay unfairly as a shield to avoid an
unfavorable result”). “Pursuant to [11 U.S.C. § 362(d)], the bankruptcy court may annul the
automatic stay upon the request of a party in interest, after notice and hearing.” In re Thompson,
Case No. 22-24041, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 1615, *8, 2023 WL 11853238, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
June 20, 2023).
Case 3:25-bk-31350 Doc 41 Filed 10/07/26 Entered 10/08/26 10:21:51 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 6

Assuming, again, that the claim arose prepetition, Movant has not requested the annulment
of the automatic stay to request the validation of the postpetition Judgment against the Debtor.
Accordingly, granting relief from the automatic stay to allow Movant to proceed with collection
efforts is not appropriate at this time.
C. 	Movant Has Not Initiated an Adversary Proceeding to Determine Whether the
Debt is Excepted from Discharge
Movant further asserts that the failure of the Debtor to list the probate estate as a creditor
in the Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules provides a basis for relief from the automatic stay. Movant
appears to assume that the omission of a prepetition debt from the schedules automatically excepts
the debt from discharge and makes it subject to collection efforts outside the purview of this Court.
This assumption is incorrect.
Section 523(a)(3) provides the only exceptions from discharge for debts omitted from a
debtor’s schedules:
(a) A discharge under section 727 . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt—
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(a)(1) of this title, with the name,
if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to
permit—
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this
subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had notice
or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing; or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this
subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a
determination 	of 	dischargeability 	of 	such 	debt 	under 	one 	of 	such
paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case
in time for such timely filing and request;
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3); Zirnhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467, 469 (6th Cir. 1998).
Case 3:25-bk-31350 Doc 41 Filed 10/07/26 Entered 10/08/26 10:21:51 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 6

In Madaj, the Sixth Circuit clarified that, when an omitted prepetition debt falls under
§ 523(a)(3)(A), (i.e., it is an unsecured debt not of a kind specified in § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6)), the
unscheduled debt is dischargeable in a no-asset chapter 7 case such as this one. Madaj, 149 F.3d
at 468-69. The Sixth Circuit arrived at this conclusion because, under § 523(a)(3)(A), the
dischargeability of the omitted debt hinges on whether or not the omitted creditor had notice or
actual knowledge of the case in time to file a timely proof of claim—the rationale being that “an
injustice will result if the debt is discharged in a situation where the creditor never had the
opportunity to participate in the distribution of the assets of the estate.” Id. at 470. In a no-asset
chapter 7 case, however, there is no deadline set for filing a proof of claim because there are no
assets for creditors to recover. Id. Accordingly, “creditors in a no-asset case do not stand to gain
by having their debts scheduled, nor do they stand to lose by having their debts omitted from the
schedules,” rendering the notice function served by the scheduling of debts far less important. Id.
Nonetheless, a prepetition debt omitted from a debtor’s schedules may be excepted from
discharge in a no-asset chapter 7 case under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B). Section 523(a)(3)(B),
however, “does not create an automatic exemption to discharge when a Chapter 7 debtor fails to
schedule or list a creditor.” Jones v. Warren Construction (In re Jones), 296 B.R. 447, 448 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 2003) (emphasis in original). “Rather, the unscheduled creditor must be without timely
notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy case and the creditor must have a claim ‘of a kind specified’
in § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6).” Id. (“A plain reading of § 523(a)(3)(B) makes the existence of a claim
that would be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6) an element of the unscheduled
creditor’s burden of proof for nondischargeability.”); see also Reinhart FoodService, LLC v. Riley
(In re Riley), Adv. No. 19-1008, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 2577, at *49-50, 2021 WL 4227701, at *16
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 2021). In order to determine whether these requirements are met, the
Case 3:25-bk-31350 Doc 41 Filed 10/07/26 Entered 10/08/26 10:21:51 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 6

omitted creditor must file a complaint requesting a determination of whether the debt is excepted
from discharge under § 523(a)(3)(B). See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(f); In re Wilson, 511 B.R. 103,
106 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
At this point, the Movant has not filed a complaint requesting a determination that the
unscheduled debt be excepted from the Debtor’s discharge under § 523(a)(3)(B). Instead, the
Motion focuses on Movant’s desire to pursue collection efforts. Assuming, again, that the probate
estate’s claim arose prepetition and is subject to the automatic stay, collection efforts are premature
without a determination as to the dischargeability of the debt.
D. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, the Motion [Docket Number 26] is DENIED, without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution List:
Default List Plus
Alfred Wm Schneble, III, Esq.
Case 3:25-bk-31350 Doc 41 Filed 10/07/26 Entered 10/08/26 10:21:51 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 6