Michael T. Robillard

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
Michael T. Robillard,
Debtor.
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Case No. 26-31231
Chapter 7
Judge Crist
INTERIM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION OF BROOKVILLE BUILDING
AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY (DOC. 17)
AND FIXING DEADLINE FOR FILING: (I) DISCHARGEABILITY COMPLAINT;
AND (II) OPTIONAL LEGAL MEMORANDUM
I. 	Introduction
Before the Court is the Motion of Brookville Building and Savings Association for Relief
from Automatic Stay (Doc. 11) (the “Motion”), filed on June 18, 2026,1 the Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion of Brookville Building and Savings Association for Relief from Automatic
Stay (Doc. 11) (Doc. 18) filed by Michael T. Robillard (the “Debtor”), by and through counsel, on
July 9, 2026, and Brookville Building & Savings Association’s Reply to Response to Motion for
Relief from Stay (Doc. 25) filed on July 10, 2026 (together, the “Contested Matter”).
This Contested Matter came before the Court for a hearing on July 14, 2026 at 10:30 a.m.
(Eastern Prevailing Time), pursuant to the Court’s Order Scheduling Final Hearing on Motion for
Relief from Automatic Stay, Fixing Date for Filing any Response and Ordering Other Matters
1 A substitute version of the Motion was filed on June 25, 2026. (See Doc. 17.)
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 20, 2026
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(Doc. 12) (the “Scheduling Order”). The hearing was held in-person, and in appearance were Carin
E. Bigley and Erin B. Moore, Counsel for Brookville Building & Savings Association (the
“BB&S”); Rob Rutherford, President/CFO and representative of Brookville Building & Savings
Association; Ira H. Thomsen and Darlene E. Fierle, Counsel for the Debtor; and the Debtor.
II. 	Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and Amended General Order
05-02 (Amended Standing Order of Reference) of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).
III. 	Background
The background leading up to this Contested Matter is largely undisputed. BB&S asserts
that it extended a line of credit to Debtor in late 2023, allegedly reaffirming several prior
obligations. Mot. at 4, ¶ 3. Debtor signed a guaranty. Mot. at 4-5, ¶¶ 3.a.-c. BB&S asserts that it
was owed $625,172.67 as of June 18, 2026, plus interest, on that obligation. And it claims to be
owed $78,764.21, plus interest on an earlier line of credit, entered into on August 31, 2021. Mot.
at 5, ¶ 4.a. BB&S, prior to this bankruptcy, had been pursuing claims against the Debtor in a civil
action filed in the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County, Ohio, Civil Division (the
“Common Pleas Court”), Brookville Building Savings Association v. Dark Star Marble and
Granite Inc., Case No. 2024 CV 03640. A copy of BB&S’s Amended Complaint filed in the civil
action on June 27, 2025,2 was attached to the Motion. Therein, BB&S asserts six causes of action,
plus remedies of piercing the corporate veil, constructive trust, and punitive / treble damages. Am.
Compl. (Ex. C to Mot.). The causes of action asserted therein, which are asserted against all eight
(8) defendants, including the Debtor, allege claims based on:
1) 	Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (R.C. § 1336.01, et seq.);
2) 	Conversion;
3) 	Common Law Fraud / Fraudulent Misrepresentation / Fraudulent Concealment;
2 The Court takes judicial notice of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(1), made
applicable to this Contested Matter by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9017.
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4) 	Breach of Contract / Successor Liability;3
5) 	Civil Conspiracy;
Ultimately, BB&S’s theory of the case is that Debtor conspired to sell assets through an Article 9
sale in order to strip BB&S’s security interest off the assets without Debtor paying his debt.
BB&S filed its Motion just ten (10) days after the Debtor filed his voluntary petition
initiating this chapter 7 case on June 8, 2026. (Doc. 1.) Therein, BB&S requests “that the stay be
lifted so that the Court of Common Pleas be permitted to determine liability, determine damages,
and enter the appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Mot. at 7, ¶ 5.d. However,
BB&S acknowledges that “[a]ny later collection efforts would still require compliance with the
Bankruptcy Code.” Id. In accordance with the Scheduling Order, BB&S filed a Witness List (Doc.
21) and an Exhibit List (Doc. 22) on July 9, 2026.
At the hearing the Court inquired of the parties how they wished to proceed and whether
they wished to present testimony. Counsel for BB&S indicated that they were prepared to present
testimony through Mr. Rutherford, particularly with regard to the chance of success on the merits
element of the five (5) factors courts typically consider in the Sixth Circuit in accordance with In
re Martin, 542 B.R. 199 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2015). Counsel for the Debtor, however, argued that
testimony was unnecessary. Moreover, Debtor did not dispute that the civil action pending in
Common Pleas Court, Montgomery County, Ohio was “trial ready,” the trial having been
scheduled for June 22-26, 2026, after pending for nearly two (2) years,4 and that Debtor had not
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in the civil action. Accordingly, the parties proceeded
without testimony, presenting further legal argument and making reference to and discussing the
loan documents between the parties, the claims asserted by BB&S in the state court action against
Debtor and others, in which BB&S wishes to proceed to trial if stay relief is granted, including but
not limited to the Decision, Order and Entry Denying the Kuhns Defendants’ Motion for Summary
3 The Fourth Cause of Action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship is only asserted against other
Defendants, not the Debtor.
4 The online docket for the civil action, attached as Exhibit 6 to BB&S’s Exhibit List (Doc. 22), reflects that the civil
action was filed on June 28, 2024, of which the Court also takes judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
201(c)(1).
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Judgment (the “Order Denying Summary Judgment”) entered by the Common Pleas Court.5
Counsel for the Debtor focused on whether BB&S or the bankruptcy estate had standing to pursue
claims under Ohio’s enactment of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) in light of
Debtor’s pending chapter 7 case.6
IV. Analysis
Ultimately, there was no dispute at the hearing7 that the relevant analysis for whether there
was “cause” to grant relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), in this
circumstance in which BB&S wishes to proceed to trial in its civil action against the Debtor in the
Common Pleas Court, is set forth in the Martin opinion. See 542 B.R. 199. Under that analysis,
courts consider the following:
1) 	judicial economy;
2) 	trial readiness;
3) 	the resolution of preliminary bankruptcy issues;
4) 	the creditor’s chance of success on the merits; and
5) 	the cost of defense or other potential burden to the bankruptcy estate and impact of
the litigation on other creditors.
In re Martin, 542 B.R. at 202 (citing Garzoni v. K-Mart Corp. (In re Garzoni), 35 F. App’x 179,
181 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing In re United Imports, Inc., 203 B.R. 162, 167 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996));
Junk v. CitiMortgage, Inc. (In re Junk), 512 B.R. 584, 607 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2014)).
Given that there was no dispute over the types of claims asserted in the state court action
(Debtor obviously still defending and disagreeing with the merits of those claims), the trial
readiness of the civil action in Common Pleas Court, having been scheduled for trial on June 22-26,
5 This was entered by the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County, Ohio, Civil Division, in Brookville Building
Savings Association v. Dark Star Marble and Granite Inc., Case No. 2024 CV 03640 on June 9, 2026, of which the
Court also takes judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(1).
6 Although it was ruling upon other defendants’ motion for summary judgment in the civil action, the Order Denying
Summary Judgment discusses the Common Pleas Court’s analysis of the UFTA claims asserted by BB&S in the civil
action.
7 In his Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. 18), Debtor argued that applying the twelve (12) factor test set forth in In
re Sonnax Industries, Inc., 907 F.2d 1280 (2d Cir. 1990) led to the conclusion that relief should be denied; however,
at hearing there was no real dispute that within the Sixth Circuit the Martin factors appear most applicable.
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2026 and another pretrial scheduling conference being currently set for August 19, 2026, and that
BB&S had withstood the only motion for summary judgment to proceed to trial (and that Debtor
had not moved to dismiss the civil action), the Court found that elements one, two, and four of the
Martin test were established in this situation. It is clear that after two years of litigation, and on the
eve of trial, requiring all of the state law claims to be tried in this Court would not be efficient and
would not serve judicial economy. See In re Martin, 542 B.R. at 203 (“the bankruptcy court does
not abdicate its role by holding an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a
potential debt in abeyance in order to allow completion of on-going state court litigation regarding
the cause of action giving rise to the potential debt.”).
Given, however, that BB&S has not yet filed an adversary proceeding in this Court, which
is understandable given that this case was filed on June 8, 2026 and the deadline to file a
non-dischargeability complaint is not until September 8, 2026, this situation presents polar
opposites in respect to the stages of the proceedings—one is ready for trial after two years and the
other has not yet even begun. Both the judicial economy and the admitted trial readiness squarely
weigh in favor of granting stay relief. See, e.g., In re Ellison, No. 25-10859, 2026 Bankr. LEXIS
1271, at *11-12 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio May 20, 2026) (“The judicial economy factor looks at how
much time and energy another court has already invested into the proceedings.” (quoting Hornback
v. Polylok, Inc. (In re Hornback), No. 21-8006, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 3167, at *8 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
Nov. 16, 2021) (citing Junk v. CitiMortgage, Inc. (In re Junk), 512 B.R. 584, 607 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2014))).
As to success on the merits, because relief from stay matters in bankruptcy court are
summary proceedings, because the claims asserted by BB&S in its Amended Complaint have
survived summary judgment and are set for trial, and given that Debtor did not move to dismiss
those claims, there is enough of a chance of success on the merits that it does not warrant this
Court digging in to conduct a mini-trial which would effectively require this Court to analyze the
claims and defenses and determine who was more likely to prevail at trial. See Hornback, 2021
Bankr. LEXIS 3167, at *12-13 (analyzing the success on the merits factor and observing that in
some cases the bankruptcy court does not even need to examine this factor); see also Ellison, 2026
Bankr. LEXIS 1271, at *14 (stating that “all that is required is that the movant make more than a
vague initial showing that he can establish a prima facie case.” (quoting Lewis v. Anderson (In re
Anderson), 670 B.R. 528, 559 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2025))). In short, in this situation in which the
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claims have survived two years of litigation in the Common Pleas Court and are scheduled for trial
it would be an inefficient and unnecessary use of resources for this Court to examine the merits of
those claims in detail. Moreover, Debtor submitted that he did not believe testimony was necessary
on this topic.
As to the third element, “the resolution of preliminary bankruptcy issues,” neither party
presented argument directly on-point, but the Court determined that before it could make a final
determination on whether granting relief would be appropriate (and to what extent and with what
guardrails), BB&S would have to file a complaint pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) and (a)(2),
(4), and/or (6) to seek a determination that any judgment (or part of a judgment) it might obtain in
the Common Pleas Court would be non-dischargeable. Otherwise, proceeding with the litigation
against Debtor in the Common Pleas Court could ultimately be a waste of the Debtor’s time
because any resultant judgment would be discharged in this chapter 7 case. In addition, there is
Debtor’s assertion that the UFTA claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate. Both of these items will
be addressed before making a final ruling, as discussed below.
As to the fifth and final element, there was limited, if any, argument by the parties, but the
Court finds that because this is a chapter 7 case and because Debtor is represented by the same
counsel in that civil action as in his bankruptcy case, this factor likewise weighs in favor granting
relief from the automatic stay for the civil action to proceed to trial.
All of that said, the Court made clear at the hearing that any relief ultimately granted would
be to modify the automatic stay to permit the civil action to proceed to trial against the Debtor, but
with the express limitations that the Common Pleas Court could not determine the issue of
dischargeability of debt under title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), which
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. See Long v. Piercy (In re Piercy), 21 F.4th 909,
918 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Whether a debt is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) is a matter
separate from the merits of the debt itself.” (citing Sill v. Sweeney (In re Sweeney), 276 B.R. 186,
195-96 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2002)) and “the issue of dischargeability cannot be litigated in a state
court”).8 Moreover, even if relief were granted, the automatic stay would not be modified to permit
8 The Piercy opinion further observes that “when the debt at issue is based on a state-court judgment, the bankruptcy
court’s ultimate dischargeability determination may be governed by factual issues decided by the state court, provided
that the requirements of collateral estoppel are met.” 21 F.4th at 918-19 (citing Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224,
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BB&S to collect on any judgment it might obtain in the Common Pleas Court, or to do anything
beyond simply adjudicating the claims asserted in the Common Pleas Court that do not concern
the dischargeability of debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
V. 	Conclusion
In order to finally determine this Contested Matter and whether to grant relief from the
automatic stay, the Movant shall file any adversary proceeding seeking a determination that any
of the debts it alleges are owed by the Debtor to BB&S are not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2), (4), and/or (6), to the extent BB&S determines that it can assert any such claims on
one or more of those bases within the bounds of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011(b),
not later than July 28, 2026. Additionally, the Debtor, Chapter 7 Trustee and BB&S each may
file a memorandum of law, also not later than July 28, 2026, addressing the issue of whether it
is appropriate for BB&S to proceed to trial on its UFTA claim in the Common Pleas Court, or if
such a claim is property of the bankruptcy estate such that the Chapter 7 Trustee has standing to
assert that claim for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and its creditors, such that BB&S should
remain stayed from pursuing that particular claim.
Upon receipt of those filings, the Court intends to issue a final ruling on the Motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Copies to:
Default List
227-28 (6th Cir. 1981) (“ ‘[T]hat Congress intended the bankruptcy court to determine the final result [of]
dischargeability . . . does not require the bankruptcy court to redetermine all the underlying facts.’ When the
requirements are met, ‘collateral estoppel should preclude relitigation of factual issue.’ ”)).
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