Holbrook v. Anchor Glass Container Corporation

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
KATHLEEN HOLBROOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANCHOR GLASS CONTAINER
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR
MEMORANDUM 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge1
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	defendant 	Anchor 	Glass 	Container
Corporation 	(“Anchor 	Glass”)’s 	motion 	to 	reconsider 	the 	court’s
denial of summary judgment on plaintiff’s discriminatory discharge
claim in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
as 	amended 	by 	the 	ADA 	Amendments 	Act 	of 	2008, 	42 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	12101
et seq. 	(Docket No. 55.) 	For the reasons stated below, the Court
DENIES Anchor Glass’ motion to reconsider.
I. 	BACKGROUND2
Ms. Kathleen Holbrook filed this action against Anchor Glass
on August 16, 2022, asserting claims of a hostile work environment,
sexual harassment, and gender discrimination in violation of Title
1 Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 292(d). 	See Docket No. 181.
2 The facts of the case are in the Court’s Opinion and Order at Docket No. 48.
Holbrook v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., Civil Case No. 22-229, 2026 WL 1244381
(E.D. Ok. May 6, 2026).
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VII 	of 	the 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	of 	1964, 	42 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	2000e, 	et 	seq.
(“Title 	VII”), 	retaliation 	and 	disability 	discrimination 	in
violation of the ADA, as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; and discrimination based on her use of
her leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”). 	(Docket No. 2.) 	On September 26,
2022, 	Anchor 	Glass 	answered 	the 	complaint. 	(Docket 	No. 	14.)
Discovery ended on August 28, 2023. 	(Docket No. 24.)
On 	August 	14, 	2023, 	Anchor 	Glass 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment. 	(Docket 	No. 	25.) 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	responded 	on
September 25, 2023, and Anchor Glass replied on October 10, 2023.
(Docket 	No. 	37; 	Docket 	No. 	38.) 	On 	May 	23, 	2024, 	the 	motion 	was
referred to Magistrate Judge Jason A. Robertson. 	(Docket No. 39.)
Magistrate 	Judge 	Robertson 	issued 	a 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	on
December 	23, 	2024, 	recommending 	the 	Court 	grant 	Anchor 	Glass’
motion 	for 	summary 	judgment. 	(Docket 	No. 	42.) 	On 	May 	6, 	2026,
the 	Court 	adopted 	in 	part 	the 	R&R, 	and 	dismissed 	all 	claims 	with
prejudice 	except 	Ms. 	Holbrook’s 	discriminatory 	discharge 	claim
pursuant to the ADA. 	On May 22, 2026, Anchor Glass filed a motion
to 	reconsider 	the 	Court’s 	denial 	of 	the 	summary 	judgment 	on 	the
discriminatory discharge claim, and Ms. Holbrook opposed. 	(Docket
No. 55; Docket No. 57; Docket No. 60.)
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. 	Motion for Reconsideration
“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize
that creature known all too well as the ‘motion to reconsider’ or
‘motion 	for 	reconsideration’ 	. 	. 	. 	[but] 	a 	district 	court 	always
has 	the 	inherent 	power 	to 	reconsider 	its 	interlocutory 	rulings.”
Warren v. Am. Bankers Ins. of Fla., 507 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir.
2007). 	The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[g]rounds
warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change
in 	the 	controlling 	law, 	(2) 	new 	evidence 	previously 	unavailable,
and 	(3) 	the 	need 	to 	correct 	clear 	error 	or 	prevent 	manifest
injustice.” 	Servants 	of 	Paraclete 	v. 	Does, 	204 	F.3d 	1005, 	1012
(10th Cir. 2000). 	“[A] motion for reconsideration is appropriate
where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position,
or the controlling law.” 	Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Anchor 	Glass 	argues 	that 	the 	Court 	committed 	a 	clear 	error
when 	it 	denied 	summary 	judgment 	on 	Ms. 	Holbrook’s 	discriminatory
discharge 	claim. 	The 	Court 	found 	in 	Anchor 	Glass’ 	favor 	on
Ms. Holbrook’s failure to accommodate claim because she failed to
show that there was a vacant position to which she could have been
reassigned 	to. 	Anchor 	Glass 	argues 	that 	the 	same 	finding 	also
sinks her discriminatory discharge claim because showing a vacant
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position 	existed 	is 	necessary 	to 	render 	her 	a 	“qualified
individual.” 	(Docket No. 55 at pp. 4-6.)
A claim for discriminatory or wrongful discharge differs from
a 	failure 	to 	accommodate 	claim 	in 	that 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	must 	prove
that 	“[Anchor 	Glass] 	acted 	with 	a 	discriminatory 	animus 	against
her 	because 	she 	had 	a 	disability.” 	Aubrey 	v. 	Koppes, 	975 	F.3d,
995, 	1014 	(10th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(citing 	Lincoln 	v. 	BSNSF 	Ry. 	Co., 	900
F.3d 	1166, 	1204 	(10th 	Cir. 	2018)). 	To 	establish 	a 	prima 	facie
case, 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	must 	show 	that 	“[s]he 	is 	disabled 	within 	the
meaning of the ADA; . . . that [s]he is qualified for the job held
or desired; and . . . that [s]he was discriminated against because
of h[er] disability.” 	Id.; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).
“The 	term 	‘qualified 	individual’ 	means 	an 	individual 	who,
with 	or 	without 	reasonable 	accommodation, 	can 	perform 	the
essential 	functions 	of 	the 	employment 	position 	that 	such
individual 	holds 	or 	desires.” 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	12111(8). 	There 	is 	a
two-step 	inquiry 	as 	to 	whether 	an 	employee 	is 	qualified. 	First,
a 	plaintiff 	must 	show 	that 	he 	or 	she 	could 	perform 	the 	essential
functions 	of 	the 	job 	he 	or 	she 	holds 	or 	desires, 	i.e., 	functions
that 	bear 	more 	than 	a 	marginal 	relationship 	to 	the 	job 	at 	issue.
Milton v. Scrivner, 53 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 1995). 	“[This]
inquiry 	is 	not 	limited 	to 	the 	employee’s 	existing 	job 	. 	. 	. 	[but
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also] 	includes 	an 	employee 	who 	has 	the 	ability 	to 	do 	other 	jobs
within the company that such disabled employee ‘desires.’” 	Smith
v. 	Midland 	Brake, 	Inc., 	a 	Div. 	of 	Echlin, 	Inc., 	180 	F.3d 	1154,
1161 (10th Cir. 1999). 	Second, if and only if it is shown that a
plaintiff 	cannot 	perform 	the 	essential 	functions 	of 	the 	job, 	the
plaintiff must show that reasonable accommodation by the employer
would enable him or her to perform those functions. 	Scrivner, 53
F.3d at 1123.
While 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	stated 	that 	she 	could 	not 	perform 	the
essential functions of her position in the Hot End, she expressed
her 	desire 	to 	work 	in 	the 	Cold 	End 	without 	any 	accommodation, 	a
position 	she 	had 	worked 	earlier 	in 	her 	career 	with 	Anchor 	Glass.
(Docket No. 25-1 at p. 92; Docket No. 37-1 at p. 90.) 	Accordingly,
Ms. Holbrook “has the ability to do other jobs within the company.”
See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1161. 	Anchor Glass does not argue
that Ms. 	Holbrook could not do the essential functions of the Cold
End 	position. 	In 	fact, 	Anchor 	Glass 	ignores 	the 	fact 	that 	being
qualified 	does 	not 	solely 	apply 	to 	the 	job 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	held 	in
the Hot End but that it also applies to the job she desires at the
Cold 	End. 	See 	id. 	Because 	Anchor 	Glass 	does 	not 	argue 	that
Ms. Holbrook 	cannot 	do 	the 	essential 	functions 	of 	a 	Cold 	End
position, she has made a prima facie showing that she was qualified
for a Cold End position.
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Anchor 	Glass’ 	argument 	that 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	must 	show 	that 	a
vacant 	position 	existed 	to 	which 	she 	could 	have 	been 	reassigned
was addressed in the Court’s opinion and order. 	See Docket No. 48.
A 	failure 	to 	accommodate 	claim 	and 	a 	discriminatory 	or 	wrongful
discharge claim are two distinct causes of action pursuant to the
ADA. 	See Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 912 (10th
Cir. 2004). 	In a failure to accommodate claim, the relevant issue
is 	whether 	Anchor 	Glass 	took 	reasonable 	steps 	to 	reassign
Ms. Holbrook 	to 	a 	vacant 	position. 	Id. 	at 	912 	n. 	6. 	The 	Court
already 	granted 	summary 	judgment 	on 	Ms. 	Holbrook’s 	failure 	to
accommodate 	claim.3 	The 	issue 	in 	a 	wrongful 	or 	discriminatory
discharge 	claim 	- 	the 	surviving 	claim 	- 	is 	whether 	Anchor 	Glass
terminated 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	because 	of 	her 	disability. 	Id. 	Because
Ms. 	Holbrook 	has 	made 	the 	requisite 	prima 	facie 	showing 	that 	she
was a qualified individual, whether her discharge is based on her
disability is a fact-finding question for the jury. 	Accordingly,
the Court denies Anchor Glass’ motion for reconsideration.
3 As part of Ms. Holbrook’s burden in her failure to accommodate claim, she had
to prove that an existing and available job was available. 	See Koppes, 975
F.3d at 1012-13. 	Ms. Holbrook failed 	to do so, for which 	reason the Court
granted summary judgment in Anchor Glass’ favor on that claim.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Anchor Glass’ motion
to 	reconsider 	the 	Court’s 	denial 	of 	summary 	judgment 	on
Ms. Holbrook’s discriminatory discharge claim pursuant to ADA.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 25, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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