Shaik v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ZAK SHAIK,
Plaintiff,
v.
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD’S OF LONDON, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 24-271 (FAB)
MEMORANDUM 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.1
Plaintiff 	Zak 	Shaik 	(“plaintiff”) 	sued 	Baldwin 	Insurance
Group 	Holdings, 	LLC 	(“Baldwin”), 	Millennial 	Specialty 	Insurance,
LLC (“Millennial”), and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London
(“Lloyd’s” 	and, 	collectively 	with 	Baldwin 	and 	Millennial, 	the
“defendants”) 	alleging 	wrongful 	denial 	of 	insurance 	benefits.
(Docket 	No. 	2.) 	Before 	the 	Court 	is 	a 	Report 	and 	Recommendation
(“R&R”) issued by U.S. Magistrate Judge Gerald L. Jackson (Docket
No. 59) regarding defendants’ renewed motions to dismiss. 	(Docket
Nos. 	52, 	53, 	54.) 	This 	case 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	by 	designation
pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 292(d). 	See 	Docket 	No. 	146. 	For 	the
reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	the 	Court 	ADOPTS 	the 	R&R 	and 	GRANTS
defendants’ motions to dismiss.
1 Senior United States District Judge for the District of Puerto Rico, sitting
by designation.
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB)___ 	__ 	2
I. 	Background
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	he 	owned 	seven 	rental 	properties 	in
Sulphur, 	Oklahoma. 	(Docket 	No. 	2 	at 	p. 	3.) 	He 	contracted 	with
Lloyd’s 	for 	property 	insurance. 	Lloyd’s 	was 	the 	underwriter 	who
issued the policies and Millennium was the insurance agent; Baldwin
is the parent company of Millennium and was not otherwise involved
in 	the 	insurance 	contracts. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	19 	at 	p. 	4-5
(identifying Millennium as the insurance agent); Docket No. 21 at
pp. 5-6 (identifying Baldwin as the parent company of Millennial);
Docket No. 54 at p. 4 (identifying Lloyd’s as the underwriter which
issued 	the 	policies). 	Although 	neither 	plaintiff 	nor 	defendants
provided 	the 	Court 	with 	the 	full 	insurance 	contracts, 	defendants
filed Certificates of Insurance which provide basic details about
the policies. 	See Docket No. 54-1 at pp. 1-2; Docket No. 54-2 at
pp. 	1-2; 	Docket 	No. 	54-3 	at 	pp. 	1-2; 	Docket 	No. 	54-4 	at 	pp. 	1-2;
Docket No. 54-5 at pp. 1-2; Docket No. 54-6 at pp. 1-2; GFF Corp.
v. 	Associated 	Wholesale 	Grocers, 	130 	F.3d 	1381, 	1384 	(10th 	Cir.
1997) 	(“[I]f 	a 	plaintiff 	does 	not 	incorporate 	by 	reference 	or
attach 	a 	document 	to 	its 	complaint, 	but 	the 	document 	is 	referred
to 	in 	the 	complaint 	and 	is 	central 	to 	the 	plaintiff’s 	claim, 	a
defendant 	may 	submit 	an 	indisputably 	authentic 	copy 	to 	the 	court
to be considered on a motion to dismiss.”) 	The certificates list
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB)___ 	__ 	3
Baari Ardmore Housing LLC as the named insured and Zia Shaikh2 as
an additional insured. 	Id. 	The certificates also state that the
coverage 	period 	of 	the 	policies 	was 	from 	March 	10, 	2023 	to
March 10, 2024. 	Id.
On 	April 	26, 	2024, 	a 	tornado 	struck 	Sulphur, 	Oklahoma 	and
caused severe damage to plaintiff’s properties. 	(Docket No. 2 at
p. 4.) 	Plaintiff notified the defendants and demanded compensation
in accordance with his insurance policies. 	Id. 	Defendants refused
payment 	claiming 	that 	plaintiff 	failed 	to 	pay 	his 	premiums 	and
that the policies had been cancelled.3 	Id. at pp. 4-5. 	Plaintiff
sued 	the 	defendants 	for 	$7.6 	million 	dollars 	for 	wrongful 	denial
of coverage, alleging breach of contract and breach of the duty of
good 	faith 	under 	Oklahoma 	law. 	Id. 	at 	pp. 	6-8. 	The 	case 	was
brought in federal court pursuant to the federal court’s diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).4
On February 19, 2026, after each defendant moved to dismiss,
the 	magistrate 	judge 	issued 	an 	R&R 	recommending 	that 	the
2 Plaintiff claims Zia Shaikh is himself.
3 Lloyd’s attached the notices of cancellation for failure to pay premiums to
its 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	but 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	declined 	to 	consider 	them
because they were outside the scope of documents identified by plaintiff in the
complaint. 	See Docket No. 59 at n. 3.
4 Plaintiff failed to allege defendant Lloyd’s principal place of business, but
Lloyd’s conceded in its answer to the complaint that there was diversity of
citizenship between it and plaintiff. 	See Docket No. 55 at p. 2. 	There is no
indication that this conclusion is erroneous, 	and the Court will proceed to
exercise jurisdiction.
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB)___ 	__ 	4
defendants’ motions be granted. 	(Docket No. 59.) 	The magistrate
judge found that, on the face of the complaint, plaintiff’s losses
from 	the 	tornado 	occurred 	outside 	of 	the 	coverage 	period 	of 	the
policy. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	11. 	The 	magistrate 	judge 	also 	found 	that 	the
complaint 	failed 	to 	attribute 	specific 	conduct 	to 	each 	of 	the
defendants, 	thereby 	providing 	insufficient 	notice 	about 	the
charges against them, an independent ground for dismissal. 	Id. at
pp. 	10-11, 	13. 	Last, 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	found 	that 	granting
leave 	to 	amend 	the 	complaint, 	as 	requested 	by 	plaintiff 	in 	the
event 	of 	any 	pleading 	deficiencies, 	would 	be 	futile 	because 	the
loss 	occurred 	outside 	of 	the 	coverage 	period 	and 	any 	amended
complaint would also be subject to dismissal. 	Id. at pp. 14-15.
Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s recommendations.
(Docket No. 60.) 	He argues that (1) the magistrate judge wrongly
treated the coverage period as dispositive and wrongly determined
that 	the 	policies 	did 	not 	cover 	the 	loss, 	(2) 	the 	magistrate
judge’s futility of amendment determination is legally premature,
and 	(3) 	any 	specificity 	deficiency 	in 	his 	complaint 	is 	curable,
and he ought to be given opportunity to do so. 	Defendant Lloyd’s
responded to plaintiff’s objections. 	(Docket No. 63.)
II. 	Legal Standard
A 	district 	court 	may 	refer 	a 	pending 	motion 	to 	a 	magistrate
judge 	for 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation. 	See 	28 	U.S.C.
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB)___ 	__ 	5
§ 636(b)(1)(B); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(a). 	Any 	party 	adversely
affected 	by 	the 	report 	and 	recommendation 	may 	file 	written
objections within fourteen days of being served with the magistrate
judge’s 	report. 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 636(b)(1). 	“A 	party 	that 	files 	a
timely 	objection 	is 	entitled 	to 	a 	de 	novo 	determination 	of 	those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations 	to 	which 	a 	specific 	objection 	is 	made.” 	Lowery
Wilkinson 	Lowery, 	LLC 	v. 	Illinois, 	No. 	25-CV-22-RAW, 	2025 	U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 268063, at *3 (E.D. Okla. Dec. 31, 2025) (citing United
States 	v. 	Raddatz, 	446 	U.S. 	667, 	673 	(1980)). 	“The 	objections
must 	specifically 	identify 	those 	findings 	or 	recommendations 	to
which 	objections 	are 	being 	made” 	and 	“[t]he 	district 	court 	need
not 	consider 	frivolous, 	conclusive, 	or 	general 	objections.” 	Id.
(citing Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.
1987)). 	In 	conducting 	its 	review, 	the 	court 	is 	free 	to 	“accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge.” 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(a)(b)(1).
Pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	12(b)(6)
(“Rule 12(b)(6)”), 	a 	defendant 	may 	move 	to 	dismiss 	an 	action 	for
failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted. 	See
Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	12(b)(6). 	To 	survive 	a 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	motion, 	a
complaint must contain enough factual matter “to state a claim to
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB)___ 	__ 	6
relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 	U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007). 	A 	court 	must 	decide 	whether 	the
complaint 	alleges 	facts 	which 	“raise 	a 	right 	to 	relief 	above 	the
speculative level.” 	Id. at 555. 	“At the motion-to-dismiss stage,
[the 	Court] 	must 	accept 	as 	true 	all 	well-pleaded 	factual
allegations in a complaint and view these allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” 	Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d
1139, 	1141 	(10th 	Cir. 	2013) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and
alterations omitted).
A 	pro 	se 	litigant’s 	pleadings 	should 	be 	held 	“to 	less
stringent 	standards 	than 	formal 	pleadings 	drafted 	by 	lawyers.”
Tatten v. City & Cty. of Denver, 730 F. App’x. 620, 624 (10th Cir.
2018) 	(quoting 	Haines 	v. 	Kerner, 	404 	U.S. 	519, 	520 	(1972)). 	On
the 	other 	hand, 	“a 	pro 	se 	litigant’s 	‘conclusory 	allegations
without 	supporting 	factual 	averments 	are 	insufficient 	to 	state 	a
claim 	on 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	based.’” 	West 	v. 	United 	States,
No. 25-3082, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24165, at *5 (10th Cir. Sept. 18,
2025) 	(quoting 	Hall 	v. 	Bellmon, 	935 	F.2d 	1106, 	1110 	(10th 	Cir.
1991)). 	It 	is 	not 	“the 	proper 	function 	of 	the 	district 	court 	to
assume 	the 	role 	of 	advocate 	for 	the 	pro 	se 	litigant.” 	Hall, 	935
F.2d at 1110.
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB)___ 	__ 	7
III. Discussion
Plaintiff’s 	three 	objections 	to 	the 	R&R 	are 	that 	the
magistrate 	judge 	improperly 	determined 	that 	(1) 	there 	was 	no
insurance coverage under the policies, (2) amending the complaint
would 	be 	futile, 	and 	(3) 	the 	complaint’s 	lack 	of 	specificity 	was
not 	curable. 	None 	of 	these 	objections 	allows 	plaintiff 	to 	avoid
dismissal.
With 	respect 	to 	the 	first 	objection, 	plaintiff 	argues 	that
his complaint alleges coverage pursuant to the policies, and that
concluding otherwise was improper at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
The 	Court 	disagrees. 	“The 	‘basic 	rule 	of 	insurance 	law’ 	in
Oklahoma 	is 	‘that 	the 	insured 	has 	the 	burden 	of 	showing 	that 	a
covered 	loss 	has 	occurred, 	while 	the 	insurer 	has 	the 	burden 	of
showing 	that 	a 	loss 	falls 	within 	an 	exclusionary 	clause 	of 	the
policy.’” 	Ass’n 	Cas. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Veerlakshmi, 	LLC, 	No. 	CIV-23-
00895-JD, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51132, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 12,
2026) (quoting Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 217 F.3d 1291,
1298 	(10th 	Cir. 	2000)). 	It 	is 	plaintiff’s 	burden 	to 	present
evidence 	of 	a 	covered 	loss, 	and 	he 	has 	not 	met 	that 	burden.
Plaintiff failed to provide a copy of the insurance policies under
which 	he 	claims 	coverage, 	but 	the 	Certificates 	of 	Insurance
provided by the defendants indicate that the coverage period ended
on March 10, 2024, over a month before the tornado occurred. 	His
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB)___ 	__ 	8
averment 	that 	the 	policy 	was 	in 	force 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	loss 	is
conclusory, lacking any factual support, and need not be credited.
The same is true of his assertion of possible arguments of renewal,
reinstatement, 	waiver, 	estoppel, 	and 	failure 	to 	comply 	with
statutory 	notice 	requirements 	– 	these 	are 	alleged 	without 	any
factual 	support 	that 	might 	render 	them 	plausible. 	Accordingly,
the magistrate judge did not err in finding that plaintiff’s loss
fell outside of the policies’ coverage.
Plaintiff’s 	second 	and 	third 	objections 	involve 	the
magistrate judge’s finding that any attempt to amend the complaint
would 	be 	futile. 	Plaintiff 	had 	requested 	leave 	to 	amend 	if 	the
Court 	would 	find 	a 	technical 	pleading 	deficiency. 	Although
“[c]ourts 	should 	give 	leave 	to 	amend 	freely, 	especially 	when 	the
plaintiff 	is 	proceeding 	pro 	se[,]” 	leave 	to 	amend 	may 	be 	refused
“upon a showing of futility of amendment.” 	Panicker v. State Dep’t
of Agric., 498 F. App’x. 755, 757 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. 	P. 	15(a); 	Frank 	v. 	U.S. 	W., 	Inc., 	3 	F.3d 	1357, 	1365 	(10th
Cir. 1993)) (internal alterations omitted). 	“A proposed amendment
is 	futile 	if 	the 	complaint, 	as 	amended, 	would 	be 	subject 	to
dismissal.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Jefferson 	Cnty. 	Sch. 	Dist. 	No. 	R-1 	v.
Moody’s Inv.’s Serv., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	he 	could 	amend 	his
complaint 	to 	render 	his 	claims 	plausible. 	He 	argues 	that, 	if
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB)___ 	__ 	9
allowed 	to 	proceed 	to 	discovery, 	he 	could 	attempt 	to 	argue 	that
the policy was renewed or reinstated, or perhaps bring a waiver or
estoppel 	argument. 	But 	these 	are 	mere 	conclusory 	allegations
without 	any 	supporting 	factual 	averments 	that 	might 	suggest 	such
arguments could plausibly exist. 	And, even if the Court believed
that plaintiff could cure the specificity issues in his complaint,
the main issue remains - he is attempting to collect on an expired
insurance 	policy. 	Accordingly, 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	did 	not 	err
in finding that leave to amend the complaint would be futile.
IV. 	Conclusion
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	Court 	ADOPTS 	the 	R&R
(Docket No. 59) and GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss. 	(Docket
Nos. 52, 53, 54.) 	Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 22, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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