Cogburn v. Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TAMARA LU COGBURN, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 25-CV-19-GLJ
)
FRANK J. BISIGNANO,1 )
Commissioner of the Social 	)
Security Administration 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
OPINION AND ORDER
Claimant Tamara Lu Cogburn requests judicial review of a denial of benefits by the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She
appeals the Commissioner’s decision and asserts that the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) erred in determining she was not disabled. For the reasons discussed below, the
Commissioner’s decision is hereby REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Social Security Law and Standard of Review
Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Social Security
Act “only if [her] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
1 On May 6, 2025, Frank J. Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security. In accordance
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Mr. Bisignano is substituted for Ms. Colvin as the Defendant in this
action.
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[s]he is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering h[er] age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Social security regulations
implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920.2
Section 405(g) limits the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
to two inquiries: whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). See also Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).
The 	Court 	may 	not 	reweigh 	the 	evidence 	or 	substitute 	its 	discretion 	for 	the
Commissioner’s. See Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th
2 Step one requires the claimant to establish that she is not engaged in substantial gainful activity.
Step two requires the claimant to establish that she has a medically severe impairment (or
combination of impairments) that significantly limits her ability to do basic work activities. If the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, or her impairment is not medically severe,
disability benefits are denied. If she does have a medically sever impairment, it is measured at step
three against the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant has a
listed (or “medically equivalent”) impairment, she is regarded as disabled and awarded benefits
without further inquiry. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to step four, where the claimant must
show that she lacks the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to return to her past relevant work.
At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is significant work in the
national economy that the claimant can perform, given her age, education, work experience and
RFC. Disability benefits are denied if the claimant can return to any of her past relevant work or
if her RFC does not preclude alternative work. See generally Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748,
750-51 (10th Cir. 1988).
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Cir. 1991). Instead, the Court must review the record as a whole, and “[t]he substantiality
of the evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its
weight.” Univ. Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). See also Casias, 933
F.2d at 800-01.
Claimant’s Background and Procedural History
Claimant was forty-seven years old at the time of the administrative hearing. (Tr.
43). She completed high school and has past relevant work as a sales clerk. (Tr. 33, 46, 60).
Claimant alleges an amended onset date of September 29, 2022, due to limitations imposed
by insomnia, high blood pressure, incontinence, bipolar disorder, panic attacks, and
anxiety. (Tr. 46, 115).
Procedural History
On June 24, 2022, Claimant applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and supplemental security income
benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85. (Tr. 18, 211-
25). On February 12, 2024, ALJ David R. Wurm, conducted an administrative hearing and
determined Claimant was not disabled on March 28, 2024. (Tr. 18-63). 	The Appeals
Council denied review, making the ALJ’s March 28, 2024, opinion the Commissioner’s
final decision for purposes of this appeal. (Tr. 1-6); See 20 C.F.R. § 404.971.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge
The ALJ made his decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. (Tr. 33-34). At
step two he determined that Claimant had the severe impairments of hypertension, cerebral
vascular accident, carpal tunnel syndrome, and depression/bipolar affective disorder. (Tr.
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21). He found at step three that Claimant did not meet any Listing. (Tr. 22-24). At step four
he found Claimant had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work
except Claimant can stand and/or walk four hours in an 8-hour day and frequently handle,
finger, and feel but cannot be exposed to unprotected heights, work hazards, or uneven
walking surfaces. (Tr. 24). Due to psychologically-based limitations, the ALJ found
Claimant 	can 	carryout 	simple 	instructions, 	occasionally 	interact 	with 	others, 	and
occasionally adapt to changes in a routine work setting. (Tr. 24). The ALJ then concluded
that although Claimant could not return to her past relevant work, she was not disabled
because there was work she could perform in the national economy, i.e., garment sorter,
electronics worker, and mailroom clerk. (Tr. 34-35).
Review
Claimant contends that the ALJ erred by failing to: (1) properly analyze the medical
opinion evidence of Amy Hudson, Ph.D.; and (2) support his findings with substantial
evidence as it pertains to Claimant’s manipulative limitations. The Court agrees as to the
first proposition and finds this matter should be reversed and remanded.
The relevant medical evidence reveals that in February 2022 Claimant established
care with Rachel Burgess, APRN, reporting ongoing anxiety and bipolar disorder. (Tr.
436). Treatment notes reflect Claimant presented with unmedicated hypertension and
appeared restless, fidgety, tearful, and concerningly manic. (Tr. 443, 448). 	Claimant
followed up with Nurse Practitioner Burgess the following month reporting ongoing
difficulties with sleep and manic episodes and examination revealed ongoing stage 3
hypertension despite compliance with medication and a grade IV/VI heart murmur. (Tr.
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462-66). Over the next two months, examinations revealed improvements to Claimant’s
hypertension and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 465-512).
Claimant 	was 	admitted 	to 	Pushmataha 	Hospital 	on 	September 	29, 	2022,
complaining of left sided weakness and slurred speech. (Tr. 574, 613). CT scans of the
brain, with and without contrast, were unremarkable, and a CT of the neck revealed a
hypodense nodule in the right thyroid but was otherwise unremarkable. (Tr. 606-08, 615-
16). Examination on October 1, 2022, revealed slurred speech, mild facial drooping, and
mild weakness of left upper extremity. (Tr. 613-14). Claimant was discharged on October
2, 2022, with instructions to obtain a neurology consult. (Tr. 616). Claimant established
care 	with 	Paris 	Cardiology 	Center 	on 	October 	13, 	2022, 	and 	was 	assessed 	with
cerebrovascular disease. (Tr. 625-31). A subsequent brain MRI revealed a possible old
lacunar infarct in the left basal ganglia and right frontal lobe area. (Tr. 752, 757). Claimant
established care with Shivaram Gowdagere, M.D., for a neurological evaluation, at which
time he encouraged daily exercise and instructed Claimant to follow up every six months.
(Tr. 752).
Thereafter Claimant followed-up with Nurse Practitioner Burgess routinely through
November 2023, reporting ongoing difficulties with abnormal moods (e.g., irritability and
restlessness), slurred speech, and residual left and right-side weakness. (Tr. 834-912). In
November Claimant complained of bilateral hand numbness that had been ongoing for
approximately two months. (Tr. 944). Examination revealed a positive Tinel’s Sign test
with pain radiating to the middle fingers, bilaterally. (Tr. 949). Claimant was assessed with
carpal tunnel syndrome and referred to Paris Orthopedic. (Tr. 949-51). She established care
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with Paris Orthopedic in December 2023, presenting with mild tenderness to palpation and
a positive Tinel’s, Durkan’s, and medial compression tests. (Tr. 958-59).
On October 27th, 2022, Claimant presented for a psychological consultative
examination before Amy Hudson, Ph.D. (Tr. 686-91). Dr. Hudson noted Claimant
“presented with [mental status examination] generally [within normal limits], socially
appropriate and comfortable, somewhat anxious but euthymic.” (Tr. 687). A Montreal
Cognitive Assessment (“MoCA”) was administered, and Claimant obtained a score of 18,
indicative of mild cognitive impairment. (Tr. 689-90). Claimant’s speech was “sometimes
confusing and tangential[,] terse, of little spontaneity, and somewhat halting with mild
dysarthria[.]” (Tr. 687). Dr. Hudson assessed Claimant with “Bipolar DO II MRE
Depressed and major vascular neurocognitive disorder without behavioral disturbance
history of antisocial features” and found Claimant was markedly limited in her capacity for
maintaining persistence and pace for a 4-hour period, interacting with coworkers and
supervisors, and adapting to a workplace stressors. (Tr. 690). She found Claimant could
not understand and remember even simple work instructions and was unable perform
routine repetitive tasks but could likely manage her own finances or choose a trustworthy
payee. (Tr. 690).
In February 2023 Claimant presented for a consultative examination before Russell
Arellanes, D.O., where Claimant presented with good eye contact, appropriate mood and
thought processes, and normal concentration and memory. (Tr. 808-09). Examination
revealed an abnormal sensory examination to light touch on Claimant’s left hand but full
grip strength bilaterally. (Tr. 808-812).
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In 2023, State examiners determined initially and upon reconsideration that
Claimant could perform the full range of light work without any postural or manipulative
limitations. (Tr. 104-05, 120-22). State agency psychologists determined initially and upon
reconsideration that Claimant could understand, recall, and perform simple repetitive tasks,
focus for two-hour periods with routine breaks, pace and persist for an 8-hour work day,
adapt to a usually stable work environment with some changes with forewarning, and
interact 	with 	supervisors 	and 	coworkers 	on 	a 	superficial 	level 	but 	was 	unable 	to
appropriately interact with the public. (Tr. 108-09, 125).
At the administrative hearing, Claimant testified that following her September 29th,
2022, hospital visit, her hands go numb and cramp, she slurs words, and has difficulties
with short-term memory. (Tr. 52). She utilizes a brace for each hand and can use her hands
for approximately 15 minutes before she experiences cramps. (Tr. 53-54). As to her daily
activities, Claimant asserted she vacuums, dusts, and lets her dogs in and out of the house
but cannot engage in these tasks for more than 15-minute intervals. (Tr. 55-56). She is
unable to take a shower and utilize her hands to fasten shoe laces, buttons, or zippers. (Tr.
55-56).
The ALJ then elicited testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”) to determine what
jobs the claimant could perform given the RFC described above. (Tr. 60-63). The VE
testified that such a claimant could perform the representative jobs of garment sorter,
electronics worker, and mailroom clerk. (Tr. 61). Claimant’s counsel then offered a
modified hypothetical in which the individual would be limited to occasional, handling,
fingering, and feeling. (Tr. 62). The VE testified such an individual would be unable to
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perform the identified vocations and would be precluded from the sedentary unskilled
occupations. (Tr. 62).
In his written opinion at step four, the ALJ extensively discussed Claimant’s hearing
testimony and much of the evidence of record. (Tr. 25-34). He then found that Claimant’s
statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not
entirely consistent with treatment records (Tr. 26). The ALJ found Dr. Arellanes’s opinion
unpersuasive because it did not contain a medical assessment of claimant’s physical
abilities and he was not a mental health specialist. (Tr. 29).3 He found Dr. Hudson’s opinion
unpersuasive because it was internally inconsistent and not consistent with the evidence of
record. (Tr. 30). In reaching this conclusion the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Hudson’s specific
opinion that Claimant could not understand and remember simple work instructions or
perform 	routine 	repetitive 	tasks 	was 	not 	supported 	by 	her 	findings. 	(Tr. 	29-30).
Conversely, the ALJ then found the state agency physician’s medical findings partially
persuasive, but noted the record supported greater limitations with respect to Claimant’s
manipulative limitations in light of Claimant’s bilateral hand numbness. 	The ALJ also
found the state agency psychologists findings partially persuasive, noting that the record
did not support a finding that Claimant was unable to interact and tolerate contact with the
public. (Tr. 32).
I. 	Medical Opinion of Dr. Hudson
3 The ALJ’s opinion indicates the February 11, 2023, consultative examination was conducted by
David Lewis, D.O. (Tr. 29). However, the record reflects that it was administered by Dr. Arellanes.
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Claimant first asserts the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical opinion of Dr. Hudson
in addressing both the supportability and consistency factors. For claims filed on or after
March 27, 2017, medical opinions are evaluated pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and
416.920c. Under these rules, the ALJ does not “defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, 	including 	controlling 	weight, 	to 	any 	medical 	opinion(s)[.]” 	20 	C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(c). Instead, the ALJ evaluates the persuasiveness of all medical
opinions and prior administrative medical findings by considering a list of factors. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b). The factors are: (i) supportability, (ii) consistency,
(iii) relationship with the claimant (including length of treatment relationship, frequency
of examinations, purpose and extent of treatment relationship, and examining relationship),
(iv) specialization, and (v) other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion
or prior administrative finding including, but not limited to, “evidence showing a medical
source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an understanding of our
disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c),
416.920c(c). Supportability and consistency are the most important factors in evaluating
the persuasiveness of a medical opinion and the ALJ must explain how both factors were
considered, although the ALJ is generally not required to explain how the other factors
were considered. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). The supportability factor
examines how well a medical source supported their own opinion with “objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(C)(2).
Whereas the consistency factor calls for a comparison between the medical opinion and
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“the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources” in the record. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
As to the supportability factor, Claimant challenges the ALJ’s indication that Dr.
Hudson’s opinion states the mental status examination was generally within normal limits
because “[n]owhere in the report does Dr. Hudson categorize the examination or her
findings as ‘essentially normal.’” Docket No. 13, at p. 17. However, Dr. Hudson’s report
specifically states that Claimant’s mental status examination was generally within normal
limits, and the ALJ’s opinion further acknowledges the various cognitive impairments Dr.
Hudson identified in her examination. (Tr. 29-30, 687). At its crux, Claimant’s argument
here is that the Court should reweigh the evidence. The ALJ explained how Dr. Hudson’s
medical findings were not sufficiently supported by her own findings and explanations.
This is the type of determination the ALJ is empowered to make, and it must not be
disturbed, even if the Court might have weighed the evidence differently. Allman v. Colvin,
813 F.3d 1326, 1333 (10th Cir. 2016) (“ALJ was entitled to resolve such evidentiary
conflicts and did so. . . . Concluding otherwise would require us to reweigh the evidence,
a task we may not perform.”).
Claimant also argues the ALJ erred in assessing the consistency factor by not
discussing Claimant’s visits with her primary care provider wherein Nurse Practitioner
Burgess routinely recorded Claimant’s mood and affect as abnormal. The Court agrees.
The ALJ found Dr. Hudson’s opinions inconsistent with “other evidence in the record
noting that the claimant was cooperative. She exhibited good eye contact. Her mood was
appropriate with clear thought processes. Memory and concentration was [sic] normal.”).
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(Tr. 30). This assessment fails to address Dr. Hudson’s opinion that Claimant is not capable
of understanding and remembering simple work instructions and cites only to Claimant’s
consultative examination with Dr. Arellanes’s as being inconsistent—an opinion that the
ALJ found unpersuasive because, inter alia, Dr. Arellanes was not a mental health
specialist. 	Additionally, the ALJ’s assessment fails to engage with or acknowledge the
evidence consistent with Dr. Hudson’s opinions, e.g., Claimant’s visits with Nurse
Practitioner Burgess which routinely documented Claimant’s abnormal mood and affect in
addition to Claimant’s irritability, restlessness, and difficulties sleeping. 	(Tr. 834-912).
See Coronel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 2585660, at *3 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 2, 2023)
(“[T]he ALJ failed to address how the evidence he relies on to reject these limitations
impacts the supportability or consistency of Dr. Farrow’s opinion.”). The ALJ may not
only address the evidence that is favorable to his decision while disregarding the evidence
that contradicts it. Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 2004) (“It is
improper for the ALJ to pick and choose among medical reports, using portions of evidence
favorable to his position while ignoring other evidence.”); see also Briggs ex rel. Briggs v.
Massanari, 248 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although the ALJ need not discuss all
of the evidence in the record, he may not ignore evidence that does not support his decision,
especially when that evidence is ‘significantly probative.’”) (internal citations omitted);
Clifton v. Chater¸79 F.3d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n addition to discussing the
evidence supporting his decision, the ALJ also must discuss the uncontroverted evidence
he chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence that he rejects.”)
(internal citations omitted).
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While it is true the ALJ does acknowledge some of Claimant’s visits with Nurse
Burgess, including her October 4, 2022, visit where Claimant reported being irritable and
restless in addition to experiencing symptoms of anxiety and depression, (Tr. 27), the ALJ
nevertheless emphasized positive findings, such as Claimant being oriented to person,
place and time with intact memory, while disregarding that the same records frequently
reflected an abnormal mood and affect. (Tr. 27-28, 738, 949). Most importantly, it remains
unclear to the Court how the ALJ determined the opinion of Dr. Hudson, a mental health
professional, is inconsistent with the longitudinal record based on the medical opinion of
Dr. Arellanes, a record that he determined to be unpersuasive because Dr. Arellanes is not
a mental health specialist. The Court must be able to follow the logic, and here it cannot.
See Jagodzinski v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4849101, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 2013 (“When the
ALJ has failed to comply with SSR 96-8p because he has not linked his RFC determination
with specific evidence in the record, the court cannot adequately assess whether relevant
evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.”) (citing Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1187 (D. Kan. 2003)).
II. 	Handle, Finger, and Feel
Claimant next argues the ALJ failed to support his RFC with substantial evidence
in finding Claimant could frequently handle, finger, and feel. The Court disagrees and finds
no error here.
In evaluating Claimant’s manipulative limitations, the ALJ found the opinions of
the state agency physicians partially persuasive because the record contained evidence
consistent 	with 	greater 	manipulative 	limitations. 	The 	ALJ 	discussed, 	inter 	alia:
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(i) Claimant’s November 2, 2023, visit to Paris Orthopedic Clinic where she presented with
bilaterally hand numbness and a positive Tinel’s sign, as well as (ii) the December 14,
2023, follow-up visit where Claimant continued to report wrist pain and exhibited a
positive Tinel’s sign and medial compression tests. (Tr. 28). 	The ALJ also discussed
Claimant’s consultative examination with Dr. Arellanes where she exhibited no deficits in
grip strength and the state agency medical physicians’ opinions that Claimant need no
manipulative limitations. In essence, Plaintiff’s argument here is a request for the Court to
reweigh the evidence, which it simply cannot do. See Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615,
621 (10th Cir. 2006).
Nonetheless, because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence of
record, the decision of the Commissioner is therefore reversed and the case remanded to
the ALJ for further analysis of all the evidence in the record. If such analysis results in any
change to Claimant’s RFC, the ALJ should redetermine what work Claimant can perform,
if any, and ultimately whether she is disabled.
Conclusion
In summary, the Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is not supported
by substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were not applied. Accordingly, the
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration is REVERSED and
the case REMANDED for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2026.
______________________________________
HON. GERALD L. JACKSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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