Simms v. Board of County Commissioners for Oklahoma County et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
KIZZIE SIMS, individually and as
Special Administrator of the Estate of
Gregory Neil Davis,
)
)
)
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Plaintiff, 	)
v.
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)
)
Case No. CIV-23-780-R
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR OKLAHOMA
COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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)
)
)
)
ORDER
In a prior order [Doc. No. 179], the Court denied in part the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant Sanaria Okongor. Now before the Court is a Motion to
Reconsider and Amend Order Denying her Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 183],
to which Plaintiff responded in opposition [Doc. No. 225].
Where, as here, a party seeks reconsideration of a non-final order, the Court has the
inherent power to revisit and amend the order as justice requires. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b);
Warren v. Am. Bankers Ins. of FL, 507 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007). “For guidance,
the court may look to the standard used to review a motion made pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e).” Ankeney v. Zavaras, 524 F. App'x 454, 458 (10th Cir. 2013)
(unpublished). Under Rule 59(e), “[g]rounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1)
an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and
(3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of Paraclete v.
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Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Reconsideration is typically only “appropriate
where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law”
but is inappropriate “to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could
have been raised in prior briefing.” Id. Stated another way, a motion for reconsideration “is
not a second chance for the losing party to make its strongest case or to dress up arguments
that previously failed.” Voelkel v. General Motors Corp., 846 F.Supp. 1482, 1483 (D. Kan.
1994).
Ms. Okongor contends that the Court misapprehended the pertinent facts and
misapplied the controlling law when it concluded that a genuine factual dispute precluded
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs. She raises two main arguments in support of reconsideration.
First, Ms. Okongor contends the Court erroneously concluded that there were
genuine factual disputes as to whether she fulfilled her gatekeeping role because, as a
licensed professional counselor, she was qualified to treat Mr. Davis’s mental health needs.
Her argument basically boils down to: an LPC like herself is qualified as a matter of law
to diagnose and treat mental disorders1 and, based on her observations of Mr. Davis, she
1 Ms. Okongor’s motion for reconsideration cites to Oklahoma’s Licensed Professional Counselor’s Act,
59 O.S. § 1901 et seq., which defines “counseling” as including diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders.
This authority was not referenced in her motion for summary judgment. Instead, this is how Ms. Okongor
described her role at the jail in her summary judgment briefing: “During these assessments, Counselor
Okongor’s role was to assess and evaluate symptoms; as well as provide crisis intervention and grief
counseling services, if necessary. Ex. 121-6, Deposition of Alicia Irvin, 12:01-03, 90:12-21.” Doc. No. 129
at p. 20 (emphasis in original). In support of this assertion, she cites to page 12 and page 90 of Dr. Irvin’s
deposition, but these pages are not included in the materials she submitted with her summary judgment
briefing. Ms. Okongor’s briefing also asserts that Dr. Irvin had “no criticisms of Counselor Okongor’s
assessments or judgment” and Dr. Irvin “agreed with her decision-making.” However, she does not cite to
specific evidence supporting these statements. See Doc. No. 129 at p. 21; Doc. No. 168 at p. 3. Further, Ms.
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exercised her professional judgment in deciding to continue monitoring Mr. Davis rather
than escalating his care to a psychiatrist or other medical provider.2
To be sure, the mere exercise of professional judgment or even negligent
misdiagnosis does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See Self v. Crum, 439
F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006). And a jury may ultimately agree with Ms. Okongor’s
view of the evidence. But summary judgment is only appropriate where there is “is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Here, there is evidence in
the record that discloses a genuine dispute as to whether Ms. Okongor knew of and
disregarded a substantial risk to the inmate’s health. Namely, the evidence includes the
following:
 Mr. Davis never received a medical screening or evaluation. Doc. No. 121-24.
 Turn Key’s Chief Medical Officer testified that Mr. Davis’s presentation could
indicate a serious medical issue. Doc. No. 150-3, Cooper Depo, 66:13-67:24.
 Plaintiff’s correctional nursing expert opined that Mr. Davis should have been
evaluated to determine if his psychosis was related to a medical issue and Ms.
Okongor should have referred him for a medical evaluation based on the
symptoms he was presenting. Doc. No. 150-7, Roscoe Depo, 50:13-51:12,
69:13-21; Doc. No. 123-2 at p. 7-8.
 Dr. Irvin, Turn Key’s director of psychological services, testified that she could
not speak to whether Mr. Davis’s symptoms would cause her any concern
because she did not clinically see the patient. She indicated that a patient with
psychosis and hallucinations would “possibly” warrant referral to a psychiatrist,
Okongor’s testimony suggests that her role at the jail or abilities were in fact more limited than she is
currently positing. Doc. No. 150-6 at 81:18-21; 88:19-24, 97:2-22.
2 In advancing this argument, Ms. Okongor also contends that “[i]t is undisputed that the medical emergency
in this case” arose when Mr. Davis’s ulcer ruptured and that Plaintiff’s medical expert conceded that the
rupture did not occur until after Ms. Okongor’s second visit. However, as explained in the Court’s prior
order and further below, Plaintiff has repeatedly argued that Mr. Davis suffered substantial harm not just
from his ruptured ulcer, but also from his acute, untreated psychosis.
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but it would vary depending on the patient. Doc. No. 121-6 at 37:11-38:25;
65:16-23
 Ms. Okongor was aware that Mr. Davis was in a prolonged state of psychosis
when she saw him on August 6 and August 9. When asked whether Mr. Davis’s
symptoms gave her any “red flags” and how she uses the information that she
gained from her observations, Ms. Okongor testified that “there was no
immediate concern regarding his welfare.” However, she also candidly
responded that “more information would need to be derived,” including
information about his history, any diagnosis that he had, and his medication
needs. Although acknowledging that more information was needed, she did not
obtain the information. She did not obtain the information because there were
other people, specifically a psychiatrist and medical practitioners, who were
responsible for meeting with the inmates on the mental health floor. When asked
whether she documented any sort of treatment for Mr. Davis, Ms. Okongor
stated that the inmate would first meet with a mental health therapist and then
meet with the psychiatrist. She typically reviews notes from any other providers
before meeting with a patient and, given that the medical and mental health staff
share a medical record and she had no information about his diagnosis or history,
a fair inference is that she was aware that he had not been medically evaluated
or seen by a medical provider. Ms. Okongor also testified that she would
typically try to figure out why the medical screening is not in the record, it is up
to her to obtain more information about the patient, and she did not do that in
this case. Doc. No. 150-6 at 45:3-47:22, 53:11-56:3 71:25-72:25; 102:12-103:6.
A reasonable juror, construing this evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, could conclude that Ms.
Okongor knew (or should have known) of an obvious need for a medical evaluation to
address a serious health issue – his acute psychosis – but she did not do anything about it.3
Instead, Mr. Davis was left to languish in an obvious state of psychosis, without a diagnosis
as to the cause and without any treatment, other than what a jury could reasonably conclude
3 Ms. Okongor contends that Dr. Borislow, a medical expert retained by Plaintiff, “conceded” that Mr.
Davis’s “medical emergency” did not occur until after Ms. Okongor’s last visit. This description takes the
testimony out of context and fails to construe the facts in the nonmovant’s favor. Dr. Borislow repeatedly
indicated that he did not see evidence of a medical emergency “leaving…to the side” or “not including”
Mr. Davis’s neuropsychiatric issue. See Doc. No. 150-8 at 58:5-21; 61:15-25; 62:25-64:7. He further
testified that, in a hospital setting, Mr. Davis’s psychotic presentation, without a prior history or cause,
“clearly…warranted medical and psychiatric evaluation.” Id. at 42:14-43:19.
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was a perfunctory visit from a counselor every three days. Ultimately, even if Ms. Okongor
has the ability, as a licensed professional counselor, to diagnose and treat a “mental
disorder,” there are competing facts and inferences regarding whether Ms. Okongor
recognized a serious need for further treatment and then failed to refer Mr. Davis to
someone who could provide it. Those competing facts and inferences preclude summary
judgment.
Ms. Okongor’s second main argument in support of reconsideration is that there is
no causal relationship between Mr. Davis’ untreated psychosis and his ultimate injury,
which she describes as his death secondary to his perforated ulcer. This argument misstates
Plaintiff’s claim, which is not premised exclusively on his perforated ulcer or death. Rather,
Plaintiff also contends that Mr. Davis experienced significant pain and suffering from his
untreated psychosis and deteriorating condition. For the reasons explained in its prior order,
there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether Mr. Davis suffered a substantial
intermediate harm from the delay in medical treatment or diagnosis for his acute psychosis.
Ms. Okongor’s reframing of Plaintiff’s claim does not warrant reconsideration.
Defendant has not provided sufficient grounds to warrant reconsideration of the
Court’s order denying her request for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.
Accordingly, Ms. Okongor’s Motion to Reconsider and Amend Order Denying her Motion
for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 183] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of April 2026.
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