Blanchard v. Garfield Co Court et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JAMES R. BLANCHARD, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-450-G
)
GARFIELD CO. COURT 	)
HOUSE et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Doc. 1. As Defendants, he names Garfield County District Judge
“Haild,”1 	Assistant 	District 	Attorney 	Jimmy 	Bunns, 	Jr., 	Enid 	Police
Department Officer Tunnels, three other unnamed Enid Police Officers, and
the Garfield County Courthouse. Id. at 1, 2, 4. United States District Judge
Charles Goodwin referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 4, 25. The
undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the Complaint based on failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
1 	Plaintiff is referencing Garfield County District Judge Dennis Hladik.
See https://courtclerk.garfieldok.com/judges (last visited Nov. 20, 2024).
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I. 	Procedural background and Plaintiff’s claims
Plaintiff was convicted of one count of Possession of a Firearm After
Former Felony Conviction in Garfield County, Case No. CF-2020-204. Doc. 1,
at 	6; 	State 	v. 	Blanchard, 	No. 	CF-2020-204,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=garfield&number
=cf-2020-204 (last visited Nov. 20, 2024) (Blanchard I).2 Following Plaintiff’s
no contest plea, the state district court sentenced him to a suspended sentence
of twenty years’ imprisonment and released him from custody. Blanchard I
(docket entries dated May 14, 18, and 28, 2021). Plaintiff did not move to
withdraw his plea within ten days and did not otherwise directly appeal his
conviction and sentence to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA).
The State of Oklahoma sought to revoke his suspended sentence on June
16, 2021. Id. (docket entry dated June 16, 2021). On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff
stipulated to the state’s application and the state district court revoked ten
years of his suspended sentence to be served in the custody of the Oklahoma
2 	The Court takes judicial notice of the state court dockets related to this
case. See United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1214 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“[E]xercising discretion ‘to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in [this]
court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the
disposition of the case at hand’” (quoting United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d
1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007))).
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Department of Corrections. Id. (docket entries dated June 25 and 29, 2021).
Plaintiff 	did 	not 	directly 	appeal 	the 	partial 	revocation 	of 	his 	suspended
sentence to the OCCA.
On January 21, 2022, Plaintiff applied for post-conviction relief in the
Garfield County District Court. Id. (docket entry dated Jan. 21, 2022). The
state district court denied Plaintiff’s post-conviction application three days
later. Id. (docket entry dated Jan. 24, 2022). Plaintiff had twenty days to appeal
the denial to the OCCA, but he did not do so. See Okla. Crim. App. R. 5.2(C)(1)
(“The party desiring to appeal from the final order of the District Court under
Section V of these Rules MUST file a Notice of Post-Conviction Appeal with
the Clerk of the District Court within twenty (20) days from the date the order
is filed in the District Court.”). The OCCA later denied his petition for an
appeal out of time, which Plaintiff had filed July 13, 2022, because he did not
first move for an appeal out of time in the district court. See Blanchard v. State,
No. 	PC-2022-622,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&numbe
r=PC-2022-622&cmid=133309 (last visited Nov. 20, 2024) (Order dated July
27, 2022) (Blanchard II).
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Plaintiff filed a federal habeas corpus petition on September 29, 2022.
Blanchard 	v. 	Oklahoma, 	No. 	CIV-22-902-D 	(W.D. 	Okla. 	Sept. 	29, 	2022)
(Blanchard III). Because Plaintiff challenged the revocation of his suspended
sentence in Blanchard I, rather than the validity of his underlying conviction,
the Court construed it as a petition arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. (Doc.
11, at 1 n.1 (citing Leatherwood v. Allbaugh, 861 F.3d 1034, 1041 (10th Cir.
2017) (“A state prisoner’s challenge to the revocation of a suspended sentence
is properly brought under § 2241.”)). Finding the petition had been filed outside
the 	one-year 	statute 	of 	limitations, 	the 	Court 	dismissed 	the 	petition.
Blanchard III, (Docs. 11-13). Plaintiff did not appeal this dismissal.
On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second habeas corpus petition,
this time under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his arrest and conviction in
Blanchard I. Blanchard v. Oklahoma, No. CIV-22-858-G (W.D. Okla. Sept. 2,
2022) (Blanchard IV). Finding this petition had also been filed outside the one-
year statute of limitations, the Court dismissed the petition. Blanchard IV,
(Docs. 23, 29). Plaintiff did not appeal this dismissal.
On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action under § 1983. Doc. 1. Though
not a model of clarity, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants under the
Fourth 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendments 	of 	the 	United 	States 	Constitution
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alleging 	illegal 	search 	and 	seizure, 	entrapment, 	false 	arrest, 	false
imprisonment, and unlawful criminal sentences arising from his conviction in
Blanchard I.3 He claims that at the time of his arrest, he possessed only toy
guns, that sometime during his arrest the four Enid Police Officers turned off
their dash and body cams, and that later Judge Hladik knowingly had him sign
documents agreeing to “illegal sentences.” Id. at 6-12.
Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and monetary damages. Id. at 14.
He contends Defendants are responsible for pain and suffering caused by being
arrested and imprisoned for no reason, having to wear a shackle and chains
while being repeatedly transferred between the Garfield County Courthouse
and prison, people seeing him wearing the same during those transports, and
the Defendant Officers calling him a “conviction felon.” Id. He seeks criminal
charges 	against 	the 	Defendant 	Officers 	for 	perjury, 	release 	from
3 	Plaintiff also references the following Garfield County cases involving
his other criminal charges and convictions: Case No. CM-2019-555, CM-2019-
600, CM-2019-717, CM-2019-929, CM-2019-1043, CM-2020-107, CM-2020-
604, and CF-2020-383. Doc. 1, at 3, 5, 6, 12, 16. He does not describe or
challenge the arrests and convictions in those cases. It appears he references
them because when the state court 	sentenced Plaintiff to a twenty-year
suspended sentence in Blanchard I, it entered a universal release in all of
Plaintiff’s ongoing criminal cases and the later revocation of that sentence was
noted in the other cases as well. Blanchard I, (docket entry dated May 18,
2021).
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imprisonment, and $2,000.00 per day for each day he was in jail and prison.
Id. at 14, 16.
II. 	The Court must screen the Complaint.
Federal law requires the Court to screen complaints filed by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b).
This Court construes “[a] pro se litigant’s pleadings . . . liberally,” holding
them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The Court, however, may not serve as
Plaintiff’s advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta,
525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
III. 	Plaintiff seeks relief from immune parties and fails to state a
claim.
A. 	Judge Hladik is entitled to judicial immunity.
Beyond Judge Hladik’s presiding over Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings in
Blanchard I, Plaintiff alleges that the judge knowingly had Plaintiff sign
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documents agreeing to illegal convictions and sentences. Doc. 1 at 6, 12. Even
presuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations, he cannot state a viable claim
against 	Judge 	Hladik. 	Judges 	named 	in 	their 	individual 	capacities 	are
“absolutely 	immune 	from 	liability 	for 	[their] 	judicial 	acts.” 	Stump 	v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–59 (1978); see also Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v.
Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1156 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining judicial immunity
applies 	when 	the 	judge 	is 	named 	in 	his 	individual 	capacity). 	“[J]udicial
immunity is an immunity from suit.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
Thus, “judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or
malice . . . .” Id. Rather, immunity is overcome in only two circumstances:
“First, a judge is not immune from liability for . . . actions not taken in the
judge’s judicial capacity.” Id. “Second, a judge is not immune for actions,
though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id.
at 12. To that end, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the
action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. “[T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must
be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Id.
Plaintiff sets forth no facts suggesting Judge Hladik acted outside his
judicial capacity. “[W]hether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the
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nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a
judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the
judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Plaintiff’s allegations
involving Judge Hladik deal with his conduct in district court during Plaintiff’s
criminal proceedings. Thus, Plaintiff was dealing with Judge Hladik in his
judicial capacity and Judge Hladik is immune from Plaintiff’s claims. See Van
Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1435–36 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Judges of courts
of limited jurisdiction are immune from civil liability when they act within
their jurisdiction.”).4
B. 	Defendant “Bunns”5 is entitled to sovereign immunity.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bunn, whom Plaintiff
names in his official capacity only, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and
state sovereign immunity. During Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings, Defendant
4 	Plaintiff also does not plead any conditions that would entitle him to
injunctive relief against a judicial officer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“[I]n any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”); see also Knox v.
Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that the plaintiff
could not obtain injunctive relief against defendant state-court judges unless
the conditions of § 1983 were satisfied, which the plaintiff had not shown).
5 	Plaintiff is referencing Assistant District Attorney Jimmy Bunn, Jr. See
Blanchard I, (docket sheet).
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Bunn was acting as an employee or agent of the Office of District Attorney for
the Fourth Judicial District. Plaintiff’s claims against him turn on his role as
the prosecuting attorney in Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings. Doc. 1 at 2, 6, 10-
12, 18.
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims are treated as claims against the public
entity itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985). Congress
abrogated sovereign immunity for municipalities when it enacted § 1983, but
not for instrumentalities of the states. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against public
entities and against public employees in their official capacities are barred if
the entities/employers are arms of the state.
“[U]nder Oklahoma law, a district attorney is an arm of the state.”
Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (10th
Cir. 	2001); 	see 	also 	Okla. 	Stat. 	tit. 	19, 	§ 215.30(B) 	(“All 	appointees 	and
employees of district attorneys, . . . shall be deemed to be state officers or
employees for all purposes.”). So both the district attorney’s office and its
employees, in their official capacities, are subject to sovereign immunity. Thus,
Plaintiff’s claims seeking monetary damages against Defendant Bunn, in his
official capacity, are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and
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should be dismissed. See Cleveland v. Martin, 590 F. App’x 726, 730 (10th Cir.
2014) (“Because the defendants are employees of the . . . Oklahoma County
District Attorney’s Office, the Eleventh Amendment applies to the official-
capacity claims for damages.”).
Courts 	recognize 	an 	exception 	to 	sovereign 	immunity 	regarding
injunctive relief where a plaintiff (1) alleges “an ongoing violation of federal
law” and (2) “seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Williams v.
Utah Dep’t of Corrs., 928 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Verizon Md.
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). But Plaintiff’s requested
injunctive relief remedies—release from prison and criminal charges against
the Defendant Enid Police Officers—are unavailable in § 1983 actions. See
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973) (“[A] state prisoner [seeking
release by] challenging his underlying conviction and sentence on federal
constitutional 	grounds 	in 	a 	federal 	court 	is 	limited 	to 	habeas 	corpus.”);
McCleary v. Meyer, No. CIV-07-816-W, 2008 WL 1803775, at *9 (W.D. Okla.
April 21, 2008) (explaining the court was “unable to grant Plaintiff’s request
that the court order the criminal prosecution of any individuals” because only
“prosecutors have discretion in deciding whether to bring criminal charges”
(citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978))). The Court should
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dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	Defendant 	Bunn 	based 	on 	Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity.
C. 	Heck bars Plaintiff’s remaining claims.
The Court must dismiss any claim that, if resolved in Plaintiff’s favor,
“would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” See Beck
v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). In other words, where success in
a prisoner’s § 1983 action “would implicitly question the validity of conviction
or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination
of 	his 	available 	state, 	or 	federal 	habeas, 	opportunities 	to 	challenge 	the
underlying conviction or sentence.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751
(2004). Heck’s “favorable termination” rule applies regardless of the form of
remedy sought. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (explaining
that “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no
matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of
the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of confinement or its duration.”).
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The 	undersigned 	finds 	that 	success 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	“would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” so Plaintiff’s
action cannot proceed “until the conviction has been overturned.” See Beck, 195
F.3d at 557, 558 n.3 (applying Heck, 512 U.S. at 487); see also Ramos v.
Shepherd, 415 F. App’x 48, 48-49 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that dismissal
under Heck was proper, where plaintiff “allege[d] the sheriff’s deputy gave
perjured testimony, and that the remaining defendants improperly failed to
bring the perjured testimony to the court’s attention”). Plaintiff’s conviction for
possession of a firearm after former felony conviction in Blanchard I remains
valid, as it has not been overturned on appeal or other collateral attack.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the remainder of
Plaintiff’s complaint as barred by Heck.
IV. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
dismiss the complaint in its entirety under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) because
Plaintiff seeks relief from immune Defendants, and he fails to state a claim
upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. And to the extent that Plaintiff seeks
release from confinement, the proper avenue is a writ of habeas corpus.
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The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this
report and recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before December
12, 2024, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to
make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives the right to
appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v.
United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	terminates 	the 	referral 	to 	the
undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2024.
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