Hill v. Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DALTON GAGE HILL, 	)
Administrator and Personal 	)
Representative of the Estate of 	)
Jeffery Allen Hill, deceased, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-1298-D
)
OKLAHOMA COUNTY CRIMINAL 	)
JUSTICE AUTHORITY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Plaintiff brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations
of Jeffery Allen Hill’s constitutional rights [Am. Compl., Doc. No. 53]. Plaintiff filed suit
against several defendants, to include the Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority
(OCCJA) and Brandi Garner (Garner). Defendants OCCJA and Garner filed a joint Motion
to Dismiss [Doc. No. 55]. Plaintiff’s response [Doc. No. 73] was stricken as untimely [Doc.
No. 76]. The magistrate judge issued a show-cause Order [Doc. No. 75], directing Plaintiff
to show cause why Defendants’ motion to dismiss should not be deemed confessed based
on Plaintiff’s lack of response.
Following Plaintiff’s response [Doc. No. 77], the magistrate judge ordered Plaintiff
to respond to Defendants’ motion on or before May 21, 2025 [Doc. No. 86], which Plaintiff
failed to do. The magistrate judge then issued a Report and Recommendation [Doc. No.
98], recommending that the Court deem as confessed OCCJA and Garner’s motion and
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against those defendants. The Court adopted in part the
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magistrate judge’s report, agreeing that Plaintiff should not be permitted to file a response
to the motion to dismiss, but re-referring 	the motion to the 	magistrate judge for
consideration on the merits [Doc. No. 109].
Thereafter, the magistrate judge issued a subsequent Report and Recommendation
[Doc. No. 130], in which she recommends that OCCJA and Garner’s Motion to Dismiss
[Doc. No. 55] be granted. In her report, the magistrate judge provided the following factual
background from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 53]:
Mr. Hill pleaded guilty in Oklahoma County District Court to
leaving the scene of a fatal accident and driving a vehicle without
a valid driver’s license, Doc. 53, at 6. In January 2024, the state
district court sentenced him to a term of life in the Oklahoma
Department 	of 	Corrections, 	but 	he 	remained 	housed 	at 	the
Oklahoma County Detention Center after his plea. Id.
From January 9th through the 13th, Mr. Hill had notified two
separate John Doe Deputies about his ‘severe toothache’ pain. Id.
‘John Doe #2 … relayed the information to [Defendant] Logan’
‘on January 12, 2024, and January 13, 2024.’ Id. On January 18th,
Mr. Hill complained to jail medical staff about the pain in his
‘back 	right 	wisdom 	tooth.’ 	Id. 	That 	day, 	Nurses 	Rachel
Levingston and/or Christy Thompson scheduled Mr. Hill to see a
dentist on January 19, but the dentist was not in that day. Id.
‘On January 18, 2024, Dr. Winchester rescheduled the dental
appointment after Mr. Hill complained of wisdom tooth pain.’ Id.
Dr. Winchester prescribed five hundred milligrams of penicillin
to be taken ‘twice daily for ten (10) days’ with one refill for Mr.
Hill’s complaints of wisdom tooth pain. Id. Mr. Hill’s medical file
showed he was allergic to penicillin. Id. at 8.
On January 19, Mr. Hill called his son and complained about his
tooth pain. Id. at 6. Mr. Hill also voiced his complaint to Deputy
John Doe #2. Id. Mr. Hill was ‘moaning and grumbling to
himself’ for days in his cell and ‘stopped eating food’ for ‘at least
a week before his death.’ Id. at 7.
Three 	days 	later, 	‘Mr. 	Hill 	was 	found 	in 	severe 	pain 	and
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unresponsive by a detention officer in his cell.’ Id. at 6. EMSA
then transferred him to St. Anthony’s Hospital. Id.
The next day, Mr. Hill had emergency surgery and was ‘placed
on a ventilator through a tracheotomy.’ Id. Nurse Denise Kovach
reported Mr. Hill could not swallow because of swelling of his
neck and mouth. Id.
Terry Deason, DDS, examined Mr. Hill, noted his severe reaction
to penicillin, and noted Mr. Hill ‘had to be hospitalized and while
there, had his wisdom tooth removed.’ Id. at 7. No one had
extracted Mr. Hill’s tooth, however. Id.
On January 29, Mr. Hill became septic with multi-organ failure,
and died the following day. Id.
[Doc. No. 130, at 2-3].
To state a § 1983 claim of municipal liability against OCCJA, Plaintiff must allege
(1) the existence of a policy or custom, (2) a direct causal link between the policy or custom
and a constitutional injury, and (3) that the municipality acted with deliberate indifference.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Prince v. Sheriff of Carter
Cnty., 28 F.4th 1033, 1049 (10th Cir. 2022). In recommending that OCCJA and Garner’s1
motion to dismiss be granted, the magistrate judge determined that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint did not sufficiently allege the existence of an OCCJA policy or custom, or that
any OCCJA policy was causally linked to violations of Mr. Hill’s constitutional rights.
[Doc. No. 130, at 10-11]. The magistrate judge further concluded that Plaintiff had not
raised claims under the Oklahoma Constitution against OCCJA and Garner. Id. at 12.
1 In her report, the magistrate judge notes Plaintiff’s representation that he is suing Garner “purely in
her official capacity” as “Jail Administrator,” claiming that “in suing the Jail Administrator in her
official capacity, [he] has brought suit against the [OCCJA].” [Doc. No. 130, at 6] (quoting Doc. No.
53, at 2).
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Plaintiff timely filed an Objection [Doc. No. 136]. First, Plaintiff maintains that he
has sufficiently identified a policy or custom in that Plaintiff’s allegations “resulted from
inadequate staffing, a lack of medical supervision, and deliberate indifference on the part
of jail officials and medical staff.” [Doc. No. 136, at 4]. However, as explained by the
magistrate judge, Plaintiff’s conclusory statements are insufficient to allege the existence
of an OCCJA policy. “A challenged practice may be deemed an official policy or custom
for § 1983 municipal-liability purposes if it is a formally promulgated policy, a well-settled
custom or practice, a final decision by a municipal policymaker, or deliberately indifferent
training or supervision.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760,
770 (10th Cir. 2013).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]o the extent there was any
medical 	delivery 	system 	at 	the 	Jail, 	it 	was 	completely 	inadequate, 	and 	virtually
nonexistent”; that “[o]n information and belief, OCCJA had inadequate written policies
governing inmate health care, and to the extent any such written policies existed they were
neither followed nor enforced”; and that “[a]s a matter of policy and/or custom, inmates at
the Jail were not provided with appropriate or adequate medical assessments[,] medical
treatment plans[,] mental health assessments or evaluations[,] monitoring of medical or
mental health[,] access to mental health or medical personnel capable of and willing to
properly evaluate and treat serious mental health or medical needs[,] emergent mental
health care[,] and/or precautionary measures to prevent injury.” [Doc. No. 53, at 8-9].
Plaintiff also alleges that OCCJA’s policies included “[s]evere limitation of the use of off-
site medical and diagnostic service providers, even in emergent situations”; “nonexistent
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mental health and/or medical assessments, examinations and treatment”; understaffing;
“nonexistent or inadequate training regarding health care”; “fostering an atmosphere and a
system of indifference to the serious health and medical needs of inmates like Mr. Hill”;
and “utterly inadequate mental health and/or medical supervision of staff and inmates.” Id.
at 9-10.
Upon consideration, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge that Plaintiff has not
alleged a formal policy of OCCJA. Although Plaintiff references “inadequate written
policies,” Plaintiff “never provides any details about what these allegedly ‘inadequate
written policies’ are.” [Doc. No. 130, at 10]. And, although a municipality “may also be
held liable if the [challenged] practice is ‘so permanent and well settled as to constitute a
“custom or usage” with the force of law,’” the Court also agrees with the magistrate judge
that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege that the conduct was
“continuing, persistent and widespread.” See Hovind v. Cane, No. 19-605-D, 2019 WL
6219543, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 21, 2019) (citation omitted); see also Gates v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 1993).
As noted by the magistrate judge, “[g]enerally, allegations of an isolated incident
are not sufficient to show the existence of a custom or policy.” Turlington v. Connor, No.
21-CV-0142-CVE-CDL, 2021 WL 6051067, at *7 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 2021) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Rather, “[i]n attempting to prove the existence of such a
‘continuing, persistent and widespread’ custom, plaintiffs most commonly offer evidence
suggesting that similarly situated individuals were mistreated by the municipality in a
similar way.” Carney v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 534 F.3d 1269, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008);
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see also Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 447 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[The plaintiff’s]
failure to allege the existence of similar discrimination as to others seriously undermines
her claim that the City maintained a custom of discriminatory personnel practices.”); see
also Waller v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted) (“Mr. Waller’s allegations—describing only one similar incident of excessive
force prior to his own injuries—fall far short of plausibly alleging a ‘widespread practice’
of excessive force, much less a practice ‘so permanent and well settled as to constitute a
custom or usage with the force of law.’”).
The Court agrees with the magistrate judge that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is
lacking in factual allegations pertaining to the widespread or persistent nature of the
conduct alleged therein. Without alleging examples of OCCJA subjecting other similarly
situated inmates to the conduct alleged in the amended complaint, Plaintiff’s assertion that
OCCJA’s alleged failures constitute “continuing, persistent and widespread” conduct are
conclusory. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to
show the existence of a policy or custom as required for Monell liability.
The magistrate judge further concluded that Plaintiff cannot maintain a state
constitutional claim against OCCJA and Garner. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
states that the Oklahoma Constitution “provides a private right of action for Mr. Hill to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment, which includes protection from the denial of
needed medical care.” [Doc. No. 53, at 12]. In her recommendation, the magistrate judge
relied on Barrios v. Haskell Cnty. Pub. Facilities Auth., in which the Oklahoma Supreme
Court provided that “Sections 7 and 9 of Article II of the Oklahoma Constitution do not
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allow an inmate to bring a tort claim for denial of medical care.” 432 P.3d 233, 241 (Okla.
2018). The magistrate judge further noted that the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims
Act bars constitutional torts arising out of the “operation or maintenance of any prison, jail
or correctional facility.” [Doc. No. 130, at 13] (citing Barrios, 432 P.3d at 239); see also
Okla Stat. tit. 51, § 155 (“The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or
claim results from … [the] operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional
facility[.]”). 	Although 	Plaintiff 	maintains 	that 	“[t]he 	Report 	and 	Recommendation
improperly relies on Barrios,” he articulates no support for this claim and merely maintains
that his state constitutional claim against OCCJA and Garner should not be dismissed [Doc.
No. 136, at 5]. The Court agrees with the magistrate judge that Plaintiff’s state-law claims
are barred by the GTCA’s immunity for claims resulting from jail operations and that these
claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No.
130] in its entirety, and Defendants OCCJA and Garner’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 55]
is 	GRANTED. 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	OCCJA 	and 	Garner 	are 	DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, but without leave to amend at this time.2
2 “Where a plaintiff does not move for permission to amend the complaint, the district court commits
no error by not granting such leave.” Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Regis. Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1238
n.4 (10th Cir. 2013). A district court may properly require a plaintiff to file a motion that complies
with FED. R. C IV. P. 15(a) and LCvR15.1 before considering whether to allow an amendment. See
Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d 1272, 1283 (10th Cir. 2021); see also Hall v. Witteman,
584 F.3d 859, 868 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that plaintiff “must give adequate notice to the district
court and to the opposing party of the basis of the proposed amendment”).
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of January, 2026.
. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge
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