USA v. Hall

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLEVELAND DAVID HALL, II,
Defendant.
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Case No. CR-25-341-D
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s “Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained as the
Result of an Ill[e]gally Prolonged Detention and Brief in Support” [Doc. No. 27]. The
government filed a response opposing Defendant’s motion [Doc. No. 38].
On November 19, 2025, the Court held a hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress
at which Defendant appeared personally and through appointed counsel, Michael W.
Noland. The government appeared through Assistant United States Attorney Stephen Hoch,
and presented three witnesses, Oklahoma County Deputy Sheriff Jonathan Williams,
Oklahoma City Police Department Master Sargeant Charles Seale, and Oklahoma County
Sheriff’s Department Lieutenant Jason Hefley. The government also introduced four
exhibits previously submitted with its brief [Doc. Nos. 38-1, 38-2, 38-3, 38-4], three of
which are video recordings made by the officers’ body-worn cameras. The defense also
introduced two exhibits previously submitted with its brief [Doc. Nos. 27-1, 27-2], one of
which is a video recording made by an officer’s body-worn camera. The Court has viewed
all 	videos 	in 	their 	entirety. 	The 	Court 	took 	the 	motion 	under 	advisement. 	Upon
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consideration of the evidence, the case record, and the parties’ arguments, the Court finds
and rules as follows.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Indictment charges Defendant with one count of being a felon in possession of
a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). It alleges that on or about August 5, 2025,
in the Western District of Oklahoma, Defendant, with knowledge that he had previously
been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year,
knowingly possessed a firearm.1 See Indictment [Doc. No. 8]. Defendant moves to suppress
any fruits from the search of Defendant’s rental vehicle pursuant to a traffic stop conducted
on that date. Defendant argues that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally extended past the
time necessary to issue the speeding ticket.2 The evidence received establishes the
following facts pertinent to Defendant’s motion, as found by the Court.
Deputy Williams has over five years of experience working for the Oklahoma
County Sheriff’s Department and is currently assigned to the Criminal Interdiction Team
of Central Oklahoma (CITCO) unit. Just before 8:30 on the morning of August 5, 2025,
Deputy Williams observed a white Jeep Grand Wagoneer with an Alabama license plate
traveling westbound on I-40 at 9 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. He pulled the
vehicle over. Deputy Williams approached the vehicle and discovered the sole occupant,
1 Specifically, the firearm was a CZ, model TT45, .45 ACP caliber pistol, bearing serial
number C00615, which was in and affecting interstate or foreign commerce in that said
firearm had previously crossed state lines to reach Oklahoma.
2 Defendant initially also challenged the reliability of the two drug dogs that were deployed
on Defendant’s vehicle arguing that the officers did not have probable cause to search the
car. But the parties stipulated at the hearing that this is no longer at issue.
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Cleveland David Hall, II, in the driver’s seat. Defendant provided Deputy Williams his
Georgia-issued driver’s license along with a rental agreement for the vehicle.3 Deputy
Williams asked Defendant where he was traveling to, but Defendant did not provide a clear
answer.
Deputy Williams then instructed Defendant to get out of the vehicle and follow him
to his patrol vehicle so he could run his license through the computer. Before going to the
patrol vehicle, Deputy Williams asked Defendant whether he had any weapons on him.
Defendant stated that he had a gun in the vehicle and Deputy Williams told him to leave it
there. Defendant then asked whether he was under arrest; Deputy Williams responded “no,”
but he was being detained. Before stepping into the patrol vehicle, Defendant retrieved the
vehicle keys from his pocket and locked his car.
Once in the patrol vehicle, Deputy Williams began running Defendant’s license and
engaging in casual conversation with Defendant. Deputy Williams asked Defendant
whether he was a convicted felon and Defendant responded “no, look it up.” After this
question, Defendant’s demeanor changed—he began to sigh when asked questions.
Master Sargeant Charles Seale—another member of the CITCO team with over 19
years of experience working for the Oklahoma City Police Department—then arrived on
scene to see if Deputy Williams needed assistance. Deputy Williams told Defendant that
he was having issues running his information and asked whether he had marijuana in the
3 The first rental agreement provided by Defendant was expired. When Deputy Williams
inquired into this, Defendant explained that he extended the rental period and provided an
updated rental agreement, which was also expired.
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vehicle. Defendant responded “no.” But when asked further questions, Defendant stopped
replying. Deputy Williams then asked Defendant why he was shutting down and Defendant
responded that he was waiting for his information to be run. When asked where he was
traveling to, Defendant responded that he was not traveling to Oklahoma, and when asked
whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle, he did not respond. Deputy Williams then
asked Defendant whether he had methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, or U.S.
currency totaling over $10,000.00 in the vehicle, and Defendant did not respond. Defendant
again asked whether he was under arrest and Deputy Williams stated that he was just being
detained. Defendant asked whether he had warrants and Deputy Williams explained that
he was still trying to determine that. He then told Defendant that he was suspicious of his
travel and was going to have a drug dog deployed on his car.
Because Deputy Williams was unable to determine whether Defendant was a
convicted felon when he ran his information,4 he gave Defendant’s license to Msgt. Seale
and asked him to check for information about Defendant. Deputy Williams then called
Sargeant Travis Teague to bring his drug dog to the scene to be deployed on Defendant’s
vehicle. At this point, approximately 13 minutes had passed since the initial traffic stop
took place. It took Sgt. Teague and his drug dog approximately 8 minutes to arrive on
scene; meanwhile, Msgt. Seale was in his own patrol vehicle running Defendant’s license.
4 Throughout the duration of the stop, various technical complications beyond the officers’
control interfered with their efforts to obtain a complete indication of Defendant’s criminal
history.
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When Sgt. Teague arrived and began walking his drug dog around Defendant’s car,
Msgt. Seale relayed to Deputy Williams the information he could find on Defendant—
Defendant had several previous drug-related encounters with law enforcement, three active
DEA investigations, and was involved in a large cocaine seizure in 2012. He could not
determine whether Defendant was a convicted felon. Sgt. Teague then approached the two
officers and explained that his drug dog did not alert on Defendant’s vehicle.
The three officers then discussed their next steps, and Msgt. Seale offered to conduct
a different search of Defendant’s information. They all returned to their respective patrol
vehicles, and Deputy Williams again asked Defendant whether he was a convicted felon.
Defendant only responded by asking whether he was under arrest. Deputy Williams
emphasized to Defendant that if he was not a convicted felon, he would be able to get him
on the road much faster. At this point, approximately 30 minutes had passed since the initial
traffic stop.
Msgt. Seale was still unable to determine whether Defendant was a convicted felon.
Deputy Williams retrieved Defendant’s license from Msgt. Seale so he could call his
dispatch to see if they could gather any information.5 Lieutenant Jason Hefley then arrived
on the scene with his drug dog and asked Deputy Williams if he needed assistance. Deputy
Williams explained to Lt. Hefley that Sgt. Teague walked his dog around Defendant’s car
and the dog did not alert. But Sgt. Teague’s dog was not trained to alert on marijuana, and
5 While Deputy Williams was on the phone with dispatch, he explained that he needed to
determine whether Defendant was a convicted felon because if he was not, he needed to
get him back on the road.
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Lt. Hefley’s dog was.6 Deputy Williams then asked Lt. Hefley to deploy his dog on
Defendant’s vehicle. Lt. Hefley agreed to do so. Approximately 40 minutes after the initial
traffic stop, Lt. Hefley stated that his dog alerted on Defendant’s vehicle. The officers then
determined that probable cause existed to search Defendant’s car.
Upon searching the vehicle, the following items were found: (1) a suitcase
containing 55 rubber-banded-bundles of U.S. currency; (2) a “CZ” brand firearm, with a
.45 caliber magazine loaded with 9 rounds of ammunition (later determined to be stolen),
identifying papers from the IRS with Defendant’s name on them, 2 paper bindles in a large
baggy containing a substance that field-tested positive for methamphetamine, and loose
rubber bands; (3) 2 cell phones; and (4) a black wallet containing $15,000.00 in 3 rubber-
banded-bundles in $100.00 denominations and several debit cards. The total amount of
money recovered was $400,835.00. The entire stop lasted approximately 45 minutes.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“Under the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizures must be reasonable.” United
States v. Torres, 987 F.3d 893, 901 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Gomez-Arzate,
981 F.3d 832, 838 (10th Cir. 2020)). “A traffic stop . . . constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the
Fourth Amendment and is subject to review for reasonableness.” United States v. Mayville,
6 In his briefing, Defendant also argues that if either of the drug dogs did not alert in
accordance with their training, then the officers did not have probable cause to search
Defendant’s car. But at the hearing, the parties stipulated that this also was no longer at
issue, and counsel for Defendant confirmed that he was not disputing that the second dog
alerted on Defendant’s car. See United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“[I]t is well-established that a dog sniff provides the requisite probable cause to search a
vehicle for drugs.”).
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955 F.3d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10
(1996)). “[T]he government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of a . . .
seizure.” United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206, 1216 (citing United States v. Chavez,
534 F.3d 1338, 1343 (10th Cir. 2008)).
“A traffic stop must be justified at its inception and, in general, the officer’s actions
during the stop must be reasonably related in scope to ‘the mission of the stop itself.’”
United States v. Cone, 868 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Rodriguez v. United
States, 575 U.S. 348, 356 (2015)).
“A traffic stop is justified at its inception if an officer has (1) probable cause to
believe a traffic violation has occurred, or (2) a reasonable articulable suspicion that a
particular motorist has violated any of the traffic or equipment regulations of the
jurisdiction.” Kitchell, 653 F.3d at 1216 (quoting United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129,
1134 (10th Cir. 2009)). Defendant does not challenge whether the traffic stop was justified.
Rather, he challenges the reasonableness of the stop, arguing that the length was
impermissibly prolonged. See Def.’s Motion [Doc. No. 27, at 8].
“An officer’s authority to seize a driver ‘ends when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.’” Mayville, 955 F.3d at 830
(citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). “[A]n officer’s mission during a traffic stop is both ‘to
address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.”
Id. (emphasis omitted). “[T]his mission ‘includes ordinary inquiries incident to’ the traffic
stop, which typically involve inspecting the driver’s license, verifying the vehicle’s
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registration and insurance coverage, and checking for any outstanding warrants against the
driver.” Id. (citing Rodriguez, 575 F.3d at 355).
“Because . . . traffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers, the
Court has also included ‘negligibly burdensome’ inquiries an officer needs to make ‘to
complete his mission safely’ among permissible actions incident to a traffic stop.” Id.
(citations omitted). The Tenth 	Circuit “has routinely permitted 	officers to conduct
criminal-history checks during traffic stops in the interest of officer safety.” Id. (citations
omitted). “In determining whether the duration of a traffic stop was reasonable, we consider
whether the officers diligently pursued the mission of the stop.” Id. at 31 (citing Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at 357).
After considering the testimony from Deputy Williams, Msgt. Seale, and Lt. Hefley,
and reviewing the body-worn camera footage of each officer, the Court finds that the traffic
stop was not impermissibly prolonged. Although this stop may have lasted longer than an
average stop, it is clear that the officers were “diligently pursu[ing] the mission of the stop.”
Id. Within the first few minutes of the stop, Defendant made clear to Deputy Williams that
he was in possession of a gun, but he would not reveal whether he had been convicted of a
felony. The 	steps 	Deputy William 	took 	to 	determine 	whether 	Defendant 	had 	any
outstanding warrants or felony convictions are plainly within the bounds of the Fourth
Amendment. See e.g., United States v. Mayville, 955 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2020).
Throughout the entirety of the stop, the officers were working to gather information
regarding Defendant’s criminal history and whether he had been convicted of any felony
offenses—police conduct consistent with the Constitution and 10th Circuit precedent.
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When the officers were presented with difficulties running Defendant’s information, they
continuously tried different databases and dispatch services to retrieve such information.
Further, Deputy Williams can be heard on the body-worn camera audio telling his dispatch
that it is important that he determine whether Defendant is a convicted felon because if he
is not, he needs to get him back on the road. These actions are indicative of diligent police
work.
Defendant analogizes his case to both United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165 (10th
Cir. 2022) and Rodriguez.7 But in Frazier, the officer immediately began calling for a drug
dog to come to the scene rather than begin the standard traffic-related protocols. Frazier,
30 F.4th at 1171. And in Rodriguez, the officer first issued the traffic citation and then
conducted the canine free-air sniff which prolonged the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 352-
53. Not so here. Deputy Williams walked Defendant to his patrol vehicle and immediately
began running his license and attempting to obtain background information. The drug dog
was called as other officers were continuing to run Defendant’s information and did not
itself extend the duration of the traffic stop.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the officers were diligently pursuing the
traffic stop and therefore did not unreasonably extend it longer than necessary. The
government has met its burden to establish that the length of the traffic stop was reasonable.
7 During the hearing, the defense also cited United States v. Tyler, No. 5:23-cr-00092-PRW-
1 (W.D. Okla. 2023), but the Court finds this case to be inapposite.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s “Motion to Suppress Evidence
Obtained as the Result of an Ill[e]gally Prolonged Detention and Brief in Support” [Doc.
No. 27] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5 th day of December, 2025.
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge
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