Jones et al v. Comanche County Facilities Authority et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CHARLES JONES, Individually and as )
Personal Representative of the Estate )
Of Matthew Tyler Jones, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-385-PRW
)
COMANCHE COUNTY FACILITIES )
AUTHORITY et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Charles Jones, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate
of Matthew Tyler Jones (Plaintiff), represented by counsel, brings this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations under state and federal law. (ECF No. 1-3). United
States District Judge Patrick W. Wyrick has referred this matter to the undersigned
magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C).
Defendant Comanche County Board of County Commissioners (The Board) has filed a
Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff has filed a response and The Board has filed a reply.
See ECF
Nos. 7, 10, 12. The Court should DENY the Motion to Dismiss.
I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff originally filed this case in Comanche County District Court and Defendant
Comanche County Facilities Authority (CCFA) removed the action to this Court.
See ECF
Nos. 1, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3. The basis of the lawsuit concerns the stabbing death of Comanche
County Detention Center (CCDC) inmate Matthew Jones (Mr. Jones) on or about August
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23, 2023. (ECF No. 1-3). At the time of Mr. Jones’ death, Defendants Calvin Riss, Edward
Brown, and Markie Ishman were also inmates at the detention center and were housed
in the same unit, or pod, as Mr. Jones. (ECF No. 1-3:6). According to the Complaint, the
moving force behind Mr. Jones’ injuries and ultimate death may be attributed to various
“unlawful policies and customs” of the CCDC in place at the time of his death, along with
“systemic failures at the CCDC and the individual jail personnel’s acts and omissions
constituting deliberate indifference towards [Mr.] Jones.” (ECF No. 1-3:20). Specifically,
Plaintiff references:
• CCFA’s “pattern of overpopulation,” in the entire facility;
• CCFA’s “pattern of overcapacity” in Mr. Jones’ particular cell;
• CCFA’s failure to adequately monitor inmate population and perform full
and proper site checks;
• CCFA’s “pattern of inadequate staffing levels and ratios;”
• Decisions made by Jail Administrator William Hobbs regarding the alleged
aforementioned deficiencies, along with Defendant Hobbs’ alleged failure to
address the alleged aforementioned deficiencies;
• Defendant Hobbs’ ratification of decisions made by his subordinates which
ultimately contributed to Mr. Jones’ death; and
• A failure to train and/or supervise CCDC personnel regarding the alleged
aforementioned deficiencies.
(ECF No. 1-3:6-7, 20, 21).
As Defendants, Plaintiff has named: (1) The CCFA; (2) The Board; (3) William
Hobbs; (4) Calvin Riss; (5) Edward Brown; (6) Markie Ishman; (7) Calvin Wynn; and (8)
John/Jane Does I-X.
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(ECF No. 1-3:1, 4-5). Plaintiff sues each individual Defendant in his/her individual capacity
only and seeks monetary damages.
See ECF No. 1-3:1, 4-5, 23-24, 28-29, 31-32, 33, 34.
Plaintiff sets forth seven claims for relief.
In Claim One, Plaintiff seeks liability against John/Jane Does I-X, alleging each
individual failed to supervise and protect Mr. Jones, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (ECF No. 1-3:23).
In Claim Two, Plaintiff seeks liability against the CCFA, The Board, and Defendant
Hobbs, alleging liability based on the individual actions of John/Jane Does I-X and
“systemic failures” related to: (1) overcrowding at the CCDC, which led to inadequate
monitoring of inmates; (2) overcrowding in particular cells within the CCDC, which led to
inadequate monitoring of inmates; (3) failure to oversee/monitor inmates by performing
adequate site checks; and (4) inadequate staffing. (ECF No. 1-3:25). Plaintiff also alleges
that Defendant Hobbs, in particular, failed to address the aforementioned issues, and
ratified the decisions of subordinates regarding their decisions related to said issues.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges liability based on a failure to train CCDC personnel regarding the
operational issues which form the basis of the alleged systemic failures. (ECF No. 1-3:24-
28).
Plaintiff asserts Claim Three against the CCFA, alleging negligence under
Oklahoma state law for failing to properly monitor Mr. Jones while he was in the CCDC
and failing to protect him from harm at the hands of other inmates. (ECF No. 1-3:29-30).
Plaintiff asserts Claim Four against Defendants Riss, Brown, Ishman, and Winn,
alleging assault and battery in violation of Oklahoma state law, specifically alleging that
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these Defendants attacked and stabbed Mr. Jones, causing him severe injury and
ultimately, death. (ECF No. 1-3:31-32).
In Claim Five, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Riss, Brown, Ishman, and Winn are
liable under a theory of wrongful death under Oklahoma state law for causing injuries to
Mr. Jones which ultimately resulted in his death. (ECF No. 1-3:32).
In Claim Six, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Riss, Brown, Ishman, and Winn are
liable under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Oklahoma state
law based on the actions allegedly committed by these Defendants which resulted in Mr.
Jones’ death. (ECF No. 1-3:32-33).
Finally, in Claim Seven, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Riss, Brown, Ishman, and
Winn are liable under a theory of conspiracy under Oklahoma state law, alleging these
Defendants “all conspired and worked together to cause injury and, eventually, the death
of Matthew Jones.” (ECF No. 1-3:33).
II. THE BOARD’S MOTION TO DISMISS
The Board: (1) seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
alleging Plaintiff lacks standing, in his individual capacity, to assert federal claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
alleging Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 7 &
12). The Court should deny the Motion to Dismiss.
A. Defendant’s First Proposition
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit individually and as the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Matthew Tyler Jones.
See ECF No. 1-3. The Board has moved for dismissal
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under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(1),1 arguing that Plaintiff cannot bring claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his individual capacity; that “[a Section 1983 lawsuit] does not
accrue to a relative of the deceased.” (ECF No. 7:5). In response, Plaintiff stated that he
“has not made any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an individual capacity,” but has only
asserted
state law claims in his individual capacity, rendering this point moot. (ECF No.
10:2). The Board agrees that this point is moot.
See ECF No. 12:2.
B. Defendant’s Second Proposition
Next, The Board has moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against it under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Under this rule, to survive a motion to dismiss, a “complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in this context, “refer[s] to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much
of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.’”
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility requirement “serves not only to
1 A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) takes one of two
forms: a facial attack or a factual attack.
Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1148
n. 4 (10th Cir. 2015). A facial attack questions the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations.
Id.
In reviewing a facial attack, a district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true.
Id. In a factual attack, the moving party may go beyond allegations contained in the complaint
and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends.
Id. When reviewing a
factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of
the complaint’s factual allegations.
Id. Instead, the court has wide discretion to allow affidavits,
other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.
Id.
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weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable
prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim
against them.”
Id. at 1248. To that end, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. However, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge
that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted). In this case, The Board
urges two bases for dismissal.	
See ECF No. 7:6-13. The Court should reject both
arguments.
First, The Board argues that it is not a proper Defendant because it lacks final
policy-making authority regarding the operation of the CCDC. (ECF No. 7:7-13). According
to The Board, “under Oklahoma law, the county sheriff is the official with final policy-
making authority regarding the operation of the county jail.” (ECF No. 7:9). Even so, The
Board, citing 60 O.S. § 176, argues that this law has been abrogated by Oklahoma
statutes with regard to a county jail operated by a public trust (in this case the CCFA)
which “steps into the shoes of the county and the sheriff for the purpose of operating the
county jail.” (ECF No. 7:11-12). In this vein, The Board argues that it “has no express
authority to act on behalf of or otherwise control a public trust, even though the county
may be its beneficiary.” (ECF No. 7:12). Specifically, the Board cites Okla. Stat. tit. 6, §
176.1(D), which states that “the affairs of the public trust shall be separate and
independent from the affairs of the beneficiary in all matters or activities authorized by
the written instrument creating such public trust including, but not limited to, the public
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trust's budget, expenditures, revenues and general operation and management of its
facilities or functions.” But this Court has recently rejected this premise, noting that this
statute does not presumptively preclude a suit against a board of county commissioners
in the presence of a jail trust because “Oklahoma law requires that the Board be named
‘[i]n all suits or proceedings by or against a county[.]’ ”
See Neal v. Oklahoma Cnty.
Criminal Justice Authority, No. CIV-24-575-JD, 2025 WL 1104777, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Mar.
5, 2025),
adopted, 2025 WL 928825 (Mar. 27, 2025) (citing
Hill v. Okmulgee Cnty. Crim.
Just. Auth., 2019 WL 11000375, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 18, 2019) (quoting Okla. Stat. tit.
19, § 4).
The Board also cites 19 O.S. § 513 which provides “it is unlawful for any public
trust ... to fail to comply with the provisions of any statute or rule relating to duties and
responsibilities required to operate, manage and provide services to any person in the
custody of such facility.” But again, this Court has recently found that this statute “speaks
to duties, not liability, and does not negate the statutory provision regarding naming the
Board.”
Neal, 2025 WL 1104777, at *3 (citing
Hill, 2019 WL 11000375, at *2). Thus, in
the instant case, this Court should conclude that “Oklahoma law does not preclude the
Board from liability at this stage.”
Id. See Avelar v. Oklahoma Cnty. Criminal Justice
Authority, No. CIV-24-909-D, 2025 WL 716831, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 14, 2025)
(recommending denying county board’s motion to dismiss which argued liability, if any,
attributable to a county jail trust in lieu of a county board of commissioners, stating:
“determining a party’s responsibility for a policy that leads to a federal rights violation
involves a fact-specific inquiry, and although a county’s sheriff has charge and custody of
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the jail, the board of commissioners sets policies, including fiscal policies, that may be
implicated in a violation of a county inmate’s federal rights (citing
Kauble v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Cnty. of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. CIV-17-729-D, 2018 WL
912285, at *3-4 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 15, 2018)),
adopted, 2025 WL 715374 (W.D. Okla. Mar.
5, 2025);
see also Bonilla v. Gerlach, No. CIV 23-1060-R, 2024 WL 457172, at *3 (W.D.
Okla. Feb. 6, 2024) (denying motion to dismiss in part because “these statutes do not
necessarily relieve the sheriff of his own statutorily imposed duties and liabilities with
respect to the operation of a county jail”);
Second, The Board argues that “Plaintiff’s only allegation regarding [The Board]
relating to the operation of the CCDC is that it ‘had authority over and control of funding
for the CCFA and CCDC,’ ” and “the Complaint is entirely devoid of any allegation
indicating that either the CCFA or the CCDC were not adequately funded.” (ECF No. 7:13).
In response, Plaintiff points to its allegations in the Complaint in paragraphs 21, 22, 23,
and 44 which specifically allege that The Board had authority and control over funding
the CCFA and CCDC. (ECF No. 7:9). Indeed, the Court should find that these allegations
are sufficient to allege liability against the Board based on its funding authority for the
Jail which includes ensuring adequate funding allocated to staffing and overcrowding,
which are the primary bases of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
See supra; ECF Nos. 1-3; 7:9.
At this stage, the Court should conclude that the Board is a proper party to this
action and deny the Motion to Dismiss.
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III. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should deny the Board’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 7).
The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and
Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by July 28, 2025, in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Petitioner is further advised that failure to make
timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review
of both factual and legal issues contained herein.
Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120,
1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
IV. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation does not terminate the referral by the District
Judge in this matter.
ENTERED on July 10, 2025.
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