Ewere v. Mullin et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CHARLES AIFUWA EWERE, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-320-SLP
)
ROBERT CERNA 	)
et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Charles Aifuma Ewere, a noncitizen,1 seeks a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. United States District Judge Scott L.
Palk 	referred 	the 	case 	to 	the 	undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	for 	initial
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 8.2 Petitioner also filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction. Doc. 11. Respondents have responded to
each, and Petitioner has likewise replied to each. Docs. 10, 16, 18, 19. So they
are at issue.
1 	This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	“uses 	the 	term 	‘noncitizen’ 	as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578
n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
2 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
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The 	Court 	should 	consolidate 	Petitioner’s 	motion 	for 	preliminary
injunction with a decision on the merits of the habeas petition. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 65(a)(2) (“Before or after beginning the hearing on a motion for preliminary
injunction, the court may advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it
with the hearing.”). And, for the reasons below, the undersigned recommends
the Court grant the petition and order Petitioner’s immediate release.
I. 	Factual background and procedural history.
Petitioner, 	a 	Nigerian 	citizen, 	maintains 	he 	and 	his 	family 	are
Christians 	who 	do 	not 	believe 	in 	female 	genital 	mutilation 	against 	the
expectations of traditional community members. Doc. 11, at 3. His daughter
was kidnapped and forced to undergo female genital mutilation and died from
the attack. Id. 	at 4. After her death, the Eweres received threats of beatings
because of their disrespect for the community culture. Id. The family fled
Nigeria as a result. Id. at 5.
Petitioner entered the United States on March 15, 2022, near Del Rio,
Texas. Doc. 10, Ex. 3. Two days later, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) paroled him into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Doc. 1,
at 2; Doc. 11, at 3. Petitioner sought asylum on March 6, 2023. Doc. 10, Exs. 1,
2. ICE placed Petitioner into standard removal proceedings on December 10,
2024, but did not revoke his parole or return him to custody. Id. Since his
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release in 2022, he has shown up for every check-in, maintained lawful
employment, held a valid driver’s license, and has no criminal history. Id. at 3.
He did not violate any condition of his release. Id. During a regular check-in
on January 21, 2026, ICE detained Petitioner “without any allegation of
misconduct, violation of conditions, or any material change in circumstances.”
Id.
ICE 	has 	charged 	Petitioner 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 	(INA
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i)), and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)) as
an applicant for admission allegedly lacking valid immigrant entry documents
and as a noncitizen “present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled.” Doc. 1, at 4; see Doc. 10, Ex. 3, at 4.
II. 	Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner raises three grounds for relief:
Ground One: violation of the INA;
Ground Two: violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); and
Ground Three: Violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.
Doc. 1, at 19-24. In sum, he argues that the revocation of his parole without a
pre-deprivation hearing and his continued detention without an individualized
bond hearing violates the INA, the APA, and his due process rights by
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depriving him of his constitutional liberty that accrued during the three plus
years he was living in the United States. Id. at 2-3, 17-18; see also Doc. 11, at
5-6, 10-12; Doc. 16, at 4-8.
Petitioner asks this Court to (1) Order that Respondent produce all
documents related to Petitioner’s detention, including but not limited to, the I-
213–Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, Form I-862–Notice to Appear
(NTA), 	I-200–Warrant 	for 	Arrest 	of 	Alien, 	and 	I-286–Notice 	of 	Custody
Determination; (2) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring that Respondents
release Petitioner or, in the alternative, provide Petitioner with a bond hearing
pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a) 	within 	seven 	(7) 	days; 	(3) 	Declare 	that
Petitioner’s detention is unlawful; and (4) Order that Respondents are enjoined
from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Doc. 1, at 25.3
3 	In his motion for preliminary injunction, Petitioner largely seeks the
same 	relief 	but 	also 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	enjoin 	Respondents 	from
restricting his travel to the Dallas-Ft. Worth area, where he resides and works,
and from imposing any condition that would interfere with his ability to work
and to prepare for his legal proceedings. Doc. 11, at 14-15. He also asks the
Court to enjoin Respondents from relocating him outside of this District while
this action is pending, and to issue an order to show cause. Id. Petitioner’s
latter two requests were rendered moot in the Court’s order for response. See
Doc. 5. Petitioner also has requested an award of costs and fees. Doc. 1, at 26.
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III. 	Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are
properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88
(2001)).
“When called on to resolve a dispute over a statute’s meaning,” the Court
should “seek[] to afford the [statute’s] terms their ordinary meaning at the time
Congress adopted them” and to “exhaust all the textual and structural clues
bearing on the meaning.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 160 (2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted). This Court’s “‘sole function’ is to apply the
law as the Court finds it, . . . not defer to some conflicting reading the
government might advance.” Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Oklahoma
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 107 F.4th 1209, 1222 n.11 (10th Cir.
2024) (stating that the court “must independently interpret the statutory
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phrase irrespective of the parties’ positions”), judgment vacated on other
grounds, 145 S. Ct. 2837 (2025).
IV. 	Discussion.
A. 	The Court has jurisdiction to consider the petition.
Respondents assert Petitioner’s arguments are jurisdictionally barred.
Doc. 10, at 10, 16. The Court should disagree.
In Cortes v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1176-SLP, 2026 WL 147435, at *3 (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 20, 2026), which the undersigned incorporates herein, the Court
concluded it had subject matter jurisdiction over the detention issue in the
Petition, 	i.e., 	determining 	whether mandatory detention 	under § 	1225(b)
applies or discretionary detention under § 1226(a) applies pending a decision
on Petitioner’s removal. This Court, consistent with other district courts
throughout the country, has dispensed with arguments by the Government
that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) deprive the Court of jurisdiction when
a noncitizen challenges their detention under § 1225(b). Cortes, 2026 WL
147435, at *2-3; Cruz-Hernandez v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1378-D, 2026 WL 18932,
at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 2, 2026); Hasan v. Crawford, 800 F. Supp. 3d 641, 650
n.7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025) (“Federal courts throughout the country have
similarly found that these jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not deprive the
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federal courts of jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s challenge to the legality
of his detention.” (collecting cases)).
B. 	Section 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention.
Petitioner asserts that Respondents violated the INA by detaining him
under the mandatory detention provision in § 1225(b)(2). Doc. 1, at 8-9. He
argues this provision does not apply to him because he had previously entered
and had been residing in the United States for more than three years. See id.
at 15-17. So, as someone who is not a recent arrival seeking inspection and
admission 	into 	the 	United 	States, 	Petitioner 	asserts 	his 	detention 	is
governed—not by § 1225(b)(2)—but by § 1226(a). Id. at 16. Respondents
contend that Petitioner and other noncitizens who have entered the country
without being admitted are applicants for admission under § 1225(a)(1) who
are seeking admission under § 1225(b)(2)(A), whether they are passively
residing in the country or not. Doc. 10, at 16-19.
Section 1225(a)(1) describes an “applicant[ ] for admission” as “an alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United 	States.” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(a)(1). 	According 	to 	its 	plain 	language,
“§ 1225(b)(2)(A) applies ‘in 	the case 	of an alien who is 	an 	applicant for
admission, if the examining officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
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detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.’” Cortes, 2026 WL
147435, at *4 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added by Cortes)).
This section “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking
admission into the country.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018).
Section 1226(a), on the other hand, “authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal
proceedings.” Id. (emphasis added). “Section 1226(a) sets out the default rule:
The Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an
alien ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.’” Id. (quoting § 1226(a)). “‘Except as provided in [Section 1226(c)],’ the
Attorney General ‘may release’ an alien detained under § 1226(a) ‘on . . . bond’
or ‘conditional parole.’” Id. (quoting § 1226(a)(1)-(2)).
This Court has previously compared §§ 1225 and 1226 and decided
noncitizens like Petitioner are entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226. See,
e.g., Cortes, 2026 WL 147435, at *3-7; see also Lopez v. Corecivic Cimarron
Corr. Facility, No. CIV-25-1175-SLP, 2026 WL 165490, at *3-7 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 21, 2026). The Court should reach the same result in this case.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “unambiguously requires that an ‘applicant for
admission’ 	also 	be 	‘seeking 	admission’ 	for 	the 	section 	to 	control,” 	and
“[n]oncitizens ‘seeking admission’ are those who have not effected an entry into
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the United States.” Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *4
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025). Because Petitioner was paroled into the country
over three years ago, he is not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention
requirement. Numerous Judges in this District have held likewise. See, e.g.,
Ramirez Rojas v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1236-HE, 2026 WL 94641, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 13, 2026) (“The court also agrees that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A),
governs petitioner's detention.”); Valdez v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1250-R, 2025 WL
3709021, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025) (“Because Petitioner has been
unlawfully 	living 	in 	the 	United 	States 	for 	many 	years 	without 	seeking
admission, this provision does not apply to him. Instead, Petitioner’s detention
is controlled by § 1226(a).”); Escarcega v. Olson, No. CIV-25-1129-J, 2025 WL
3243438, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025) (“[B]ased on the plain language of
§—1225(b)(2)(A), the phrase ‘seeking admission’ only applies to noncitizens
who are presently and actively seeking lawful entry into the United States at
the border.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted));4 see also
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir.
4 	But see Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344,
at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026) (holding § 1225 applied to the petitioner's
detention); Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302, at *12
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2026) (same).
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2025) (“[I]t is Congress's prerogative to define a term however it wishes, and it
has chosen to limit the definition of an ‘applicant for admission’ to ‘an alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). It could easily have included noncitizens
who are “seeking admission” within the definition but elected not to do so.”).5
As well as determining that if “all ‘applicants for admission’ are also ‘seeking
admission,’ then § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s inclusion of the phrase ‘seeking admission'
would be redundant and courts should avoid statutory interpretations that
‘make[ ] any part [of the statute] superfluous.’ ” Escarcega, 2025 WL 3243438,
at *3 (quoting Fuller v. Norton, 86 F.3d 1016, 1024 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Respondents argue the Court should reconsider because Petitioner’s
asylum request transforms him into one who is actively seeking admission into
the country. Doc. 10, at 15. Petitioner’s asylum application does not convert
him into an “applicant for admission.” See, e.g., Malacidze v. Noem, No. CIV-
25-1527-D, 2026 WL 227155, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2026) (concluding “a
pending asylum application does not render § 1225(b)(2)(A) applicable to
Petitioner”); Li v. Grant, No. CIV-25-1426-HE, 2026 WL 147438, at *1 (W.D.
5 	But see Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1137-38 (8th Cir. 2026) (applying
§ 1225 to a similar habeas challenge); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th
494, 506 (5th Cir. 2026) (Same).
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Okla. Jan. 20, 2026) (finding Ҥ 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply even though
petitioner filed an application for asylum”).
When Petitioner was detained after residing in the country for over three
years, he was not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Instead, Petitioner is subject to § 1226 and is at least “entitled to a prompt
bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to § 1226(a).” Cortes, 2026
WL 147435, at *7.
C. 	Respondents 	violated 	their 	own 	regulations 	and
Petitioner’s 	due 	process 	rights 	when 	they 	revoked
Petitioner’s parole without written notice or a reasoned
explanation of changed circumstances.
Petitioner maintains that Respondents violated their own regulations
and his due process rights when they revoked his grant of parole under
§ 1182(d)(5) without notice or a showing of changed circumstances. Doc. 1, at
17-21, 20-23; Doc. 16, at 3-6. He argues that “[t]here were no changes in
Petitioner’s conduct, circumstances, or risk profile that would justify his
revocation of parole.” Doc. 11, at 11. And that he had a protected liberty
interest in his freedom from physical custody due to his conditional release. Id.
at 11-12; Doc. 16, at 5-7. Respondents have not responded to these assertions.
“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to
deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. Freedom from
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imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); cf. Trump v.
J.G.G., 	604 	U.S. 670, 673 (2025) 	(“‘It is 	well 	established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal
proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Individuals who have been
conditionally 	released 	from 	detention 	have 	a 	protected 	interest 	in 	their
“continued liberty.” Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147 (1997). “This is true
even when the released individual is subject to extensive conditions of release.”
Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025).
When the government promulgates regulations “with the force and effect
of law,” agencies are bound to follow their own “existing valid regulations.”
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265, 268 (1954).
Pertinent here, “[t]he statutes and regulations governing immigration and
removal proceedings afford important procedural safeguards to detainees.”
Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 698-99.
1. 	Statutory and regulatory framework.
Petitioner states he arrived at the border for inspection in 2022 and ICE
paroled him into the United States two days later under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
Doc. 1, at 17. This section grants discretion to officials in the Department of
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Homeland Security (DHS) to “parole into the United States temporarily under
such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for
admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Any revocation of
this parole must be based on a decision by a DHS official that either “the
purpose for which parole was authorized” has been accomplished or that
“neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued
presence of the [noncitizen] in the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (stating the DHS Secretary may revoke parole
“when the purposes of such parole . . . have been served”). And the parole will
only be terminated when “written notice” of this decision is served on the
noncitizen. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i).
2. 	Respondents 	did 	not 	comply 	with 	the 	applicable
regulations before revoking Petitioner’s parole.
As Petitioner points out in his reply to Respondents’ response to the
habeas petition, “Respondents fail to account for Petitioner’s parole under
§ 1182(d)(5).” Doc. 16, at 3. They do not answer Petitioner’s claim that they
revoked 	his 	parole 	without 	notice 	or 	a 	reasoned 	decision 	demonstrating
changed circumstances warranting his detention. The most they provide to the
Court is a copy of Petitioner’s Notice to Appear issued on December 10, 2024.
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Doc. 10, Ex. 3. But this Notice did not contain information about his parole
and, as Respondents admit, DHS did not take Petitioner into custody until
January 2026. Doc. 1, at 14. So the Court concludes Respondents violated their
own regulations when they revoked Petitioner’s parole without notice of a
reasoned decision for the revocation. See, e.g., Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 804
F. Supp. 3d 395, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“Respondents provide no indication that
an individualized determination was made as to the revocation of Munoz
Materano’s parole; nor do they articulate, even now, either that the purpose
for which Munoz Materano’s parole was authorized has been accomplished, nor
that neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants his continued
presence in the United States.”); Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123,
1137-38 (D. Or. 2025) (“This is a grant of discretionary authority, but it has a
mandatory requirement—parole may be terminated or revoked only when in
the Secretary’s opinion the parole’s purposes have been met.”).
3. 	Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights
when they summarily revoked his parole.
This Court analyzes Petitioner’s due process claim to determine whether
he has a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and what
process is necessary to ensure any deprivation of that liberty interest aligns
with the Constitution. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
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(1989). In examining the necessary process, the Court turns to the three factors
set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) “the private interest that will be affected
by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute 	procedural 	safeguards”; 	and 	(3) 	“the 	Government’s 	interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976). Petitioner maintains that these factors weigh in favor of his
release. Doc. 11, at 9-14. And the undersigned agrees.
“When the government grants [a noncitizen] parole into the country, it
creates a liberty interest intimately tied to freedom from imprisonment.”
Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); see also
Iza v. Arnott, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026) (“Individuals
released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interest
in their ‘continued liberty.’” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972))); Sahil v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2026 WL 560216, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 27,
2026) (finding “that noncitizens acquire a liberty interest once released from
immigration detention”). Petitioner’s interest in physical freedom “is the most
elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004);
see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (stating that an individual’s interest in
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being free from detention “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process]
Clause protects”). Respondents deprived Petitioner of his protected status
when they revoked his parole and placed him in custody.
Turning to the Mathews factors, the Court finds that Petitioner has a
significant private interest in remaining free from detention after spending
years on parole. To be sure, “Congress may make rules as to aliens that would
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003).
But that power remains “subject to important constitutional limitations.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695. And it does not erase Petitioner’s significant
interest in remaining free from detention.
Respondents 	do 	not 	challenge 	Petitioner’s 	assertions 	that 	he 	was
“granted 	parole 	and 	released 	[] 	from 	custody” 	in 	March 	2022, 	that 	he
“appeared 	at 	all 	required 	check-in 	appointments, 	maintained 	continuous
residence in Dallas, Texas, remained steadily employed, obtained and renewed
employment authorization and a valid driver’s license, and was never arrested,
charged, or accused of any criminal or immigration violation.” Doc. 1, at 18.
During this time his interest in release grew even stronger as he worked and
presumably 	“form[ed] 	the 	other 	enduring 	attachments 	of 	normal 	life.”
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. The first Mathews factor favors Petitioner.
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Second, the Court considers “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The
risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is considerable
where he has not received any notice of the reason for his parole revocation
and simple procedures exist which would mitigate those risks.
“Constitutionally inadequate notice also often leads to constitutionally
inadequate opportunity to be heard, because opportunity to be heard must be
meaningful to be constitutionally sufficient.” Saqib v. Andrews, 2026 WL
350830, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026). Petitioner received no procedural
safeguards to determine whether the revocation of his parole and his detention
were justified, and thus Respondents have detained him without any stated
cause. This factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. See, e.g., E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley,
795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the Government may
believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner does not eliminate its
obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with due
process.”); see also Gualpa-Lumbi v. Hoover, 2026 WL 452351, at *11 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 18, 2026) (“[Petitioner] was previously released and permitted to go
about 	living 	for 	years 	in 	the 	United 	States 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	his
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immigration proceedings before being detained in 2025. . . . [which] show[s]
that [Petitioner] is at risk of being erroneously deprived of his freedom.”).
Finally, the Court considers the Government’s interest, including any
fiscal or administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “While this Court
recognizes that the government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws,
the government’s interest in re-detaining [P]etitioner without adequate notice
and an opportunity to challenge the revocation of his release is low.” Saqib,
2026 WL 350830, at *6; see, e.g., Diaz v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T[he Court concludes that the government’s interest in
re-detaining Petitioner . . . is ‘low,’ particularly in light of the fact that
Petitioner[] has long complied with his reporting requirements.”). And the
Court can discern no significant administrative or fiscal burden associated
with placing the burden on the government to follow its own regulations. See,
e.g., Iza, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (“An alien’s opportunity to be heard regarding
the revocation of his parole is only meaningful if the government comports with
its own internal standards regarding parole revocation.”). Especially given that
Petitioner’s detention was not deemed necessary for almost four years.
The undersigned concludes Respondents breached their own regulations
and violated Petitioner’s due process rights when they summarily revoked his
parole. Based on these findings, the undersigned recommends the Court grant
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the habeas corpus petition and release Petitioner from detention subject to the
same conditions that governed his earlier parole.
D. 	The 	Court 	should 	decline 	to 	consider 	Petitioner’s 	APA
claim.
Petitioner alleges Respondents violated the APA because they “failed to
consider 	[his] 	individualized 	circumstances 	and 	extraordinary 	compliance
history.” Doc. 1, at 21.
Because Petitioner’s claim for relief “‘necessarily imply the invalidity’ of
[his] confinement,” his claim “fall[s] within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas
corpus and thus must be brought in habeas.” J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 672; see also
id. at 674 (“[G]iven 5 U.S.C. § 704, which states that claims under the APA are
not available when there is another ‘adequate remedy in a court,’ I agree with
the Court that habeas corpus, not the APA, is the proper vehicle here.”)
(Kavanaugh, J. concurring); Soberanes, 388 F.3d at 1310 (“Challenges to
immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” (citing
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687). The Court should deny Petitioner’s request for
relief under the APA.
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V. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Petitioner’s habeas petition and order his immediate release from
detention.6 Specifically, the undersigned recommends the Court:
• 	order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from
their custody;
• 	enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without
notice 	and 	a 	pre-deprivation 	hearing 	before 	a 	neutral
decisionmaker;
• 	order Respondents to submit a declaration pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1746 affirming they have released Petitioner from
custody.7
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by April 22,
6 	Should the Court adopt this Report and Recommendation, it should find
Petitioner’s remaining requests for relief to be moot.
7 	To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to an award of fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act fees and costs (EAJA) as a prevailing party,
Petitioner must seek that award separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B); see also Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025)
(interpreting “EAJA’s broad language to unambiguously authorize fees in
habeas actions challenging immigration detention”).
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2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72.8 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely
objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation
disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the
captioned matter.
ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2026.
8 	Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has
reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation to five
days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition
(noting that rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas
corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings
under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484
F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases
may be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that
“while 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	may 	be 	applied 	in 	habeas
proceedings, they need not be in every instance – particularly where strict
application would undermine the habeas review process”).
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