Martinez-Martinez et al v. Figueroa et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JEANETH MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-734-R
)
FRED FIGUEROA, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner 	Jeaneth 	Martinez-Martinez, 	a 	noncitizen1 and 	Salvadoran 	national
proceeding with counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 2,
challenging under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 her detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”). 	After transfer from the Northern District of Texas, United States
District Judge David L. Russell referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Doc. 6. The undersigned set an expedited
briefing schedule, Doc. 7, and the Petition is at issue. For the reasons set forth below, the
undersigned recommends that the Court grant the Petition, Doc. 2, in part and order
Respondents to provide Petitioner a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within
five business days or otherwise to release her if there is no hearing within that time.
1 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
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I. 	Background
Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States on July 28, 2022, near
Hidalgo, Texas, without inspection or parole. 	Pet. at 3-4; Resp. at 7. 	Shortly thereafter,
ICE 	encountered 	Petitioner 	and 	placed 	her 	into 	removal 	proceedings 	before 	the
Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a through the issuance of a Notice to
Appear. Pet. at 40; Resp. at 7; Doc. 12-2 at 1 (Notice to Appear). Petitioner was charged
with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the
United States without inspection. 	Pet. at 40. 	On July 29, 2022, Petitioner was released
from ICE custody. Resp. at 8; Doc. 12-1 at 2. Petitioner alleges she has not violated any
terms of her release. Pet. at 5.
On July 12, 2023, Petitioner filed an Application for Asylum and for Withholding
of Removal. Pet. at 5, 16-38. On January 21, 2026, ICE re-detained Petitioner when she
reported to the Dallas Field Office. Id. at 5; Resp. at 8.
Respondents contend Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Resp. at 1. Petitioner requested a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which
was denied because all IJs are subject to the binding precedent of Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Hurtado holds those noncitizens who entered the country
without admission or parole are ineligible for a bond hearing. Resp. at 8.2
2 According to the online case portal for the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”), an IJ granted Petitioner voluntary departure on April 23, 2026, and “an appeal
is 	due 	by 	May 	26, 	2026.” 	See 	EOIR 	Automated 	Case 	Information, 	at
https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last accessed Apr. 28, 2026) (citation
modified). 	The parties have not informed the Court whether Petitioner intends to appeal
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When Petitioner filed her Petition, she was detained at Diamondback Correctional
Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Pet. at 2, 12. She remains detained there. See ICE Online
Detainee Locator System, at https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited Apr. 28,
2026).
II. 	Petitioner’s Claims
Petitioner asserts three counts in her Petition.
• 	Count I: Violation of Due Process. 	Petitioner alleges her detention
violates substantive and procedural due process under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. Pet. at 6.
• 	Count II: Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”). Petitioner alleges her continued detention violates the INA.
Id. at 7.
• 	Count III: 	Violation of the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”). Petitioner alleges her detention violates the APA because
the decision to apply mandatory detention while removal proceedings
are pending is an arbitrary and capricious agency action. Id.
She asks the Court to order her release “on an order of supervision and under reasonable
conditions” and declare her detention unlawful. Id.3
III. 	Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that she is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C.
timely her voluntary departure. 	Without advisement from the parties that the grant of
voluntary departure impacts her Petition, the undersigned proceeds to address the merits of
her claims.
3 Petitioner includes a claim under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) as Count IV.
Pet. at 7. To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as a prevailing
party, she must seek those separately after a final judgment. 	28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
Thus, the Court need not address this request at this juncture.
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§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
IV. 	Analysis
A. 	Section 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention.
The two sections of the INA at issue that govern detention of noncitizens pending
removal proceedings are 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. 	Section 1225(a)(1) describes an
“applicant for admission” as “an alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted or who arrives in the United States.” Id. § 1225(a)(1) (citation modified). Under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section
1229a.” 	If Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), she is not entitled to a bond hearing. On the other hand, Section 1226(a)
more generally authorizes detention of a noncitizen pending removal proceedings and
entitles the noncitizen to a bond hearing. 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306
(2018) (“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond
hearings at the outset of detention.”) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)).
Petitioner argues she is detained pursuant to § 1226(a). Pet. at 3. Petitioner asserts
her continued detention is unjustified and unauthorized because, inter alia, she “is not a
flight risk or danger to herself or to the public.” Id. at 6. Respondents contend Petitioner
is an “applicant for admission” and therefore properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
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Resp. at 1, 8. 	Further, Respondents claim (1) § 1225(b)(2)(A) is not limited only to
noncitizens “arriving” in the United States, (2) § 1226(a) is reserved for those who do not
fall within the confines of § 1225(b)(2)(A), and (3) any overlap between the two provisions
does not undermine ICE’s interpretation of the two statutes. Id. at 5-7, 11-12.
The undersigned has reviewed the statutory text, Congressional intent, legislative
history, and § 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades, as well as numerous recent
cases addressing this exact issue. For the reasons stated below, and adopting this Court’s
reasoning in Valdez v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1250-R, 2025 WL 3709021, at *3 (W.D. Okla.
Dec. 22, 2025), the undersigned recommends the Court grant the Petition in part to the
extent Petitioner seeks a bond hearing under § 1226(a).
First, the INA limits the scope of the term “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A)
so that section does not apply to noncitizens already living in the United States when
apprehended. 	Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “only applies when a noncitizen ‘applicant for
admission’ is actively ‘seeking admission’ into the United States.” 	Valdez, 2025 WL
3709021, at *3 (citation modified). 	“If all ‘applicants for admission’ are also ‘seeking
admission,’ then § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s inclusion of the phrase ‘seeking admission’ would be
redundant.” 	Perez v. Grant, No. CIV-25-1560-R, 2026 WL 315065, at *3 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 5, 2026) (citation modified). The undersigned best understands mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to arriving noncitizens actively seeking admission at or
near the border or port of entry—not those like Petitioner who have resided in the United
States for years and were not arrested when trying to cross the border.
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In addition, the legislative history and recent amendment of § 1226 indicate that
section applies to noncitizens who previously entered without inspection and were residing
in the United States when apprehended. Notably, after passage of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the Department of Justice explained
that “despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been
admitted or paroled . . . will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” 	Inspection
and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal
Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (citation
modified). Further, Congress’ recent amendment to § 1226 mandating detention for certain
criminal noncitizens renders Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) superfluous.
Finally, this Court, Chief Judge Palk, Judge DeGiusti, Judge Jones, Judge Heaton,
and myriad district courts have recently applied § 1226(a) to govern detention of
noncitizens like Petitioner.4 This conclusion is also in accord with the Second and Seventh
Circuits, 	which 	rejected 	the 	statutory 	interpretation 	of 	§ 	1225(b)(2) 	as 	urged 	by
Respondents. 	See Da Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141, Doc. 78, at 5-7 (2d Cir. Apr. 28,
2026); Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir.
4 See, e.g., Valdez, 2025 WL 3709021, at *3; Coreas v, Noem, No. CIV-26-151-J, 2026
WL 541151, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 26, 2026); Lopez v. Corecivic Cimmaron Corr.
Facility, No. CIV-25-1175-SLP, 2026 WL 165490, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2026);
Ramirez Rojas v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1236-HE, 2026 WL 94641, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan.
13, 2026); Colin v. Holt, CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16,
2025). 	Two Judges in the District have applied § 1225(b)(2)(A) to a similarly situated
petitioner. 	See Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344, at *3
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026); Alvarado Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-25-01231-JD, 2025 WL
3733302, at *12 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025).
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2025). 	But see Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1134-38 (8th Cir. 2026) (agreeing with
Respondents’ interpretation); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 501-08 (5th Cir.
2026) (same).
The undersigned agrees with this Court’s reasoning, the majority of Judges in this
District, and the great weight of authority to conclude Petitioner falls within the confines
of § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A).5 See Perez, 2026 WL 315065, at *3 (finding the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis “persuasive” and concluding § 1226(a) governs a similarly
situated petitioner’s detention “in accordance with the vast majority of district courts in
this judicial district, in the district courts within the Tenth Circuit and across the country to
have address the same issues as those raised by Petitioner”) (citation modified); see also
Brena Escobedo v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1553-R, 2026 WL 989109, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Okla.
Apr. 13, 2026) (acknowledging the 2-1 decisions in Avila and Buenrostro-Mendez but
continuing to find the analysis in Castañon-Nava persuasive).6
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Court apply § 1226(a) to govern
Petitioner’s current detention. 	The Court should grant the Petition in part and order
5 This conclusion is further supported by the fact Petitioner was detained and later released
on recognizance under § 1226 in July 2022. 	Resp. at 8; Doc. 12-1 at 2; see, e.g., Bello
Chacon v. Hermosillo, No. 25-CV-02299, 2025 WL 3562666, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12,
2025) (finding petitioner’s prior release under § 1226 indicates he “was—and continues to
be—subject to discretionary detention under § 1226”).
6 Indeed, on April 28, 2026, a Second Circuit panel unanimously held § 1226 applies to
noncitizens similarly situated to Petitioner. Da Cunha, No. 25-3141, Doc. 78 at 3, 10-11
(agreeing with the Seventh Circuit and the majority of district courts and finding the
analysis in Avila and Buenrostro-Mendez “unpersuasive”).
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Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) before a neutral IJ
within five business days or otherwise release her if she does not have a lawful bond
hearing within that period.
B. 	The proper remedy is a bond hearing.
Petitioner does not request a bond hearing and instead only seeks release “on an
order of supervision and under reasonable conditions.” Pet. at 7. However, Petitioner also
prays the Court “grant any other relief which this Court deems just and proper.” 	Id.
(citation 	modified). 	Consistent 	with 	the 	Court’s 	approach 	in 	previous 	cases, 	the
undersigned recommends Petitioner be afforded a constitutionally sufficient bond hearing
as a lesser remedy than release. 	See Karimov v. Cerna, No. CIV-26-304-R, 2026 WL
950130, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 8, 2026) (“As a remedy, Petitioner requests his immediate
release, but the Court concludes that a bond or custody redetermination hearing is the
appropriate remedy.” (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008))). 	As this
Court previously acknowledged, “Petitioner is entitled to the custody procedures provided
by [§ 1226(a)],” and “the statute provides the Department of Homeland Security the
discretion to either detain a noncitizen or release the noncitizen on bond.” 	Id. (citation
modified). 	As such, “an individualized custody redetermination hearing would provide
Petitioner with the process he is due under the statute.” 	Id. 	(citation modified).
Accordingly, consistent with the Court’s approach in previous cases, the undersigned
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recommends Petitioner be afforded a constitutionally sufficient individualized bond
hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).
C. 	The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s due process and APA
claims.
Petitioner also argues her continued detention without a bond hearing violates her
rights to due process and the APA. 	Pet. at 7. 	If the Court grants Petitioner’s requested
relief for a bond hearing under § 1226(a), the undersigned recommends the Court decline
to decide the merits of Petitioner’s due process and APA claims based on her continued
detention. See, e.g., Valdez, 2025 WL 3709021, at *3 n.2 (declining to decide the merits
of a petitioner’s due process claim when granting a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a)).7
V. 	Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT in
part the Petition for habeas relief by ordering Respondents to provide Petitioner with a
bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days or otherwise release
Petitioner if she has not received a lawful bond hearing within that period. The undersigned
7 Some Magistrate Judges in this District, including the undersigned, have started
considering whether detention of similarly situated petitioners violates due process when
those petitioners raise such a claim and seek a bond hearing specifically requesting the
government bear the burden at such hearing to establish the petitioner’s risk of flight or
danger. Here, the Petition neither requested burden shifting at a bond hearing nor alleged
Petitioner was entitled to such burden shifting. 	See Singh v. Grant, No. CIV-26-279-J,
2026 WL 1035100, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 16, 2026) (declining to address the due process
and burden shifting issue where it was not raised in the petition). 	As such, any relief
recommended in this case as the result of a due process violation would be limited to the
same relief recommended for the INA violation, so the Court need not address it. See id.
at *1 (declining to address a similarly situated petitioner’s due process claim).
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further recommends the Court order Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status
report within seven business days of the Court’s order.
The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636. 	Any objection must be filed not later than May 5, 2026. 	See id.
§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	If a party wishes to respond to the other party’s
objections, such response must be filed not later than May 8, 2026. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2). 	Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual and
legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. 	See Moore v. United States,
950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 28th day of April, 2026.
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