Warren L. Ellis

1 Debtor does not state whether he seeks to extend the stay as to all creditors or merely to
ABN. As Debtor’s counsel states that he has served all creditors on the Matrix, perhaps he seeks
the former. If so, the Chapter 13 trustee has participated in this contested matter and objects on their
behalf.
UNITED S TATES B ANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR T HE E ASTERN DISTRICT O F PENNSYLVANIA
In re 	: 	Chapter 13
:
WARREN L. ELLIS, SR., 	: 	Bankruptcy No. 05-39345DWS
:
Debtor. 	:
OPINION
BY: 	DIANE WEISS SIGMUND, Chief Bankruptcy Judge
Before the Court is Debtor’s Motion for Continuance of the Stay Beyond 30-Day
Period (the “Motion”) and the Objection of ABN Ambro Mortgage Group. Inc. (“ABN”) and
the Chapter 13 trustee (the “Trustee”) thereto.1 The focus of this bankruptcy case is certain
residential 	real 	estate 	located 	at 	425 	W. 	Abbotsford 	Avenue, 	Philadelphia, 	PA
(the “Property”) which Debtor lost as a result of a sheriff’s sale conducted on November 1,
2005 and now seeks to recover. 	This case is Debtor’s third bankruptcy case, the last
one having been pending within the year preceding the filing of the instant petition on
November 21, 2005. 	Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3), in such case the automatic stay
terminates by operation of law thirty days after the filing of the petition unless extended.
For the reasons that follow, an extension is not warranted in this case.
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2 His son borrowed money to purchase a house at 1746 York Road, Wyomissing, PA.
(“Wyomissing Property”). The ABN mortgage provided additional security for that loan.
3 The Stipulation acknowledges that Debtor made no post-petition payments to ABN, i.e.,
August through October 2004.
4 I shall take judicial notice of the docket entries in this case. Fed.R.Evid. 201, incorporated
in these proceedings by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9017. See Maritime Elec. Co., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank,
959 F.2d 1194, 1200 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991); Levine v. Egidi, 1993 WL 69146, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1993);
In re Paolino, 1991 WL 284107, at *12 n. 19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991); see generally In re Indian
Palms Associates, Ltd., 61 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1995).
While a court may not take judicial notice sua sponte of facts contained in the debtor’s file
that are disputed, In re Augenbaugh, 125 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1942), it may take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts “not subject to reasonable dispute ... [and] so long as it is not unfair to a party to
do so and does not undermine the trial court’s factfinding authority.” In re Indian Palms Assoc.,
61 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 201(f) advisory committee note (1972 proposed
rules).
-2-
BACKGROUND
At an evidentiary hearing held on December 13, 2005, the following facts
were elicited from Debtor. Debtor filed his first bankruptcy case on July 30, 2004.
Exhibit M-2. 	ABN held a mortgage on the Property to secure a loan made to his son.2
Debtor acknowledged his failure to make mortgage payments to ABN in that case but
claimed they began “after I became aware of what was going on.” His explanation of the
missed payments was unintelligible. Although ABN resolved its motion for relief from stay
with a stipulation, Exhibit M-3,3 the bankruptcy case was dismissed shortly thereafter on
a Trustee’s motion for Debtor’s failure to attend the statutory first meeting of creditors.4
While Debtor acknowledges that his address for court mailings was correct, he nonetheless
claims he had no notice of the § 341 meeting and his failure to attend was attributable to lack
of advice from his attorney Michael Kutzer, Esquire (“Kutzer”). I take judicial notice that
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5 The Wyomissing address is the location of his son’s residence. A motion for relief was
filed by the servicer of the mortgage on the Wyomissing Property (represented by the same counsel
as counsel for ABN) who had purchased that property at sheriff’s sale on February 11, 2005 and
sought to evict Debtor. It was granted on May 24, 2005 as unopposed.
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the notice of the § 341 meeting evidences service on debtor at the Property, his Philadelphia
residence. Doc. No. 11.
Debtor’s next case was filed on March 7, 2005, also by Kutzer. In this case, Debtor
gave his actual address as the Property but his mailing address as 1746 York Road,
Wyomissing, Pennsylvania. 5 Again ABN filed a motion for relief from stay alleging
Debtor’s failure to make post-petition payments for the months of April and May. Relief was
granted on July 26, 2005 based on the record made and Debtor’s failure to appear. Exhibit
M-5. Although Kutzer filed an answer contesting the motion, Debtor again avers he did not
appear because he had no knowledge of the hearing. It appears that service was properly
made at the mailing address although it may be that Debtor had been evicted by then.
The motion was granted and served on Debtor by the Bankruptcy Noticing Center (“BNC”)
at both addresses. No reconsideration was sought. About the same time the Trustee filed
a motion to dismiss for failure to make plan payments. 	A certificate of service by the
Trustee indicates service of the motion on Debtor at the mailing address in Wyomissing.
Doc. No. 29. Had he appeared at the hearing, the record would have established that he had
not made the June trustee payment. Exhibit D-2. With no appearance and a payment default,
the Trustee’s motion was granted, 	and the case was dismissed on September 15, 2004.
Debtor again claims no knowledge of the case activity, stating that he did not learn of the
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6 It is not clear from Debtor’s testimony whether there was a second proceeding brought
before the state court but it is clear that Kutzer extracted more money out of Debtor to handle these
matters and treated him with disrespect and lack of professionalism. 	See Transcript at 18-24.
Whether that conduct raises to the level of a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility will
depend on Kutzer’s response to Debtor’s charges. However, Debtor’s efforts to deflect blame for
the failure of his cases from himself to Kutzer cannot succeed. 	Debtor, not Kutzer, had the
obligation to pay the mortgage. If Kutzer did not do an adequate job of representing Debtor in
resisting ABN and the Trustee’s motions in this case, then his quarrel is with Kutzer. ABN should
not have to suffer for the actions of Debtor’s counsel.
-4-
dismissal until it was brought to his attention in late October. 	That testimony is simply
incredible. 	While the Trustee’s certificate of service only reflects the mailing address,
the BNC’s notice shows mailing of the dismissal order on September 18, 2005 to, inter alia,
Debtor at his Philadelphia residence and the Wyomissing mailing address. Doc. No. 37.
With the dismissal order final and no bankruptcy stay as an impediment, ABN went
forward with a sheriff’s sale of the Property on November 1, 2005. The day before the sale
Kutzer filed some type of petition in state court seeking to stay the sale. After a chambers
conference followed by a hearing in open court, the state court judge ruled against
the Debtor.6 The sale went forward and the Property was sold to ABN for $71,000.
Debtor claims that the auctioneer overlooked an $80,000 bid by his brother who was present
with $10,000 and was prepared to bid and able to pay up to $100,000 for the Property.
On these facts, Debtor filed this new bankruptcy and commenced an adversary proceeding
(the “Adversary”) to set aside the sale as a fraudulent conveyance and/or preferential transfer,
contending the Property is worth $175,000. 	He testified that if the sale were avoided,
he intended to pay AMB in full from his deferred compensation plan. 	Notably Debtor’s
Chapter 13 plan does not so provide but merely has him making payments of $35 per month
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for 60 months, a sum which in the aggregate neither pays ABN nor his other secured creditor
American Suzuki. Exhibit M-1.
Having heard Debtor’s sworn testimony that he was capable of saving his Property
at the sale if only his brother’s bid had been recognized, I asked counsel for ABN whether
it would allow Debtor to buy back his Property for the amount of its debt. 	Exhibit M-6.
On questioning by ABN’s counsel, Debtor stated that he was prepared to pay the outstanding
loan amount of $78,000 to recover his Property, and I reimposed the stay on a preliminary
basis to allow Debtor to raise the $78,000 that he claimed was available to settle the matter.
Debtor was given 30 days with a further hearing set for January 17, 2006 to verify that he
had performed.
On January 17th, Debtor testified that he had not been able to raise the $78,000.
There was no explanation as to why no funds were available from the brother who allegedly
was prepared to expend $100,000 to buy the Property at sheriff’s sale had his bid been
recognized. Rather Debtor testified that he contemplated utilizing his deferred compensation
funds for the payment, but was surprised to learn that they were not readily available.
According to Debtor, he had never inquired as to how he could gain access to that money
and only learned after the hearing that he needed to submit a hardship letter and wait six to
eight weeks for Board approval. 	He claimed to have submitted that hardship letter on
December 21, 2005 but failed to make a copy. 	As evidence of the availability of these
funds, he proffered a statement of the City of Philadelphia Municipal Employees Deferred
Compensation Plan showing a balance as of December 31, 2004 of $82,168.57. Exhibit D-3.
While he stated he receives a statement twice a year, he had no more recent statement of
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7 The automatic stay of § 362 has been describes as one of the fundamental debtor
protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors
by stopping all collection efforts, all harassment and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor
to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan or simply to be free of the financial pressures that
drove him into bankruptcy. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess 174-75 (1977); S.Rep. No. 989,
95th Cong. 2d Sess. 49-50 (1978). It also protects creditors by preventing a race to seize the debtor’s
assets. Id.
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his account balance which he believed was even greater now due to payroll deductions.
Unfortunately Debtor’s testimony is belied by his Schedule B verified on November 21, 2005
stating that his deferred compensation program account value is $4,000. There is also no
disclosure of the payroll deductions although his most recent pay stubs indicate that funds
are being withheld for that purpose. Debtor also testified that he contacted another lender
for a back up loan but would need another 30-60 days for its consummation.
DISCUSSION
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”),
11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., made sweeping changes to the rights and remedies of participants
in bankruptcy cases filed, as this case was, after the effective date of BAPCPA on
October 17, 2005. 	As its name implies, Congress sought to address what it perceived as
abuses of the bankruptcy laws by certain debtors. 	One such abuse it identified was the
invocation of the automatic stay by debtors who have no valid bankruptcy objective in filing
their petitions but merely seek to obstruct the exercise of non-bankruptcy remedies by their
creditors. 7 Many debtors do not comply with the Code requirements for documentation,
payment of fees, attendance at § 341 meetings and/or if applicable, payment of the
Chapter 13 trustee. 	While dismissal of the case inexorably follows, the debtor has
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8 This general rule contains an exception not relevant here.
9 It is therefore incumbent upon debtor’s counsel to file the § 362(c)(3) motion
contemporaneously with the petition. 	While I have granted an expedited hearing in this case
because of the newness of the law, I do not intend to do so in the future. As Debtor and his counsel
are aware of the necessity of filing the motion as of the petition date, it would be inappropriate to
(continued...)
-7-
nonetheless gotten the benefit of the automatic stay to block the secured creditor’s sheriff’s
sale or an eviction by the landlord. Most commonly in Chapter 13, after dismissal and the
rescheduling of the creditor’s action, another case may follow – and another – and another
–unless and until the cycle is stopped by an order barring a further bankruptcy. As a result
of a focused program by the United States Trustee, the concerted efforts of institutional
secured creditors and the flexibility of the prior law, the system had responded to this abuse
with court orders barring a further petition being granted in order to bring the system back
into balance and ameliorate the harm to victims of the abusive cases.
These abuses were also the focus of the legislative reform that is now embodied
in BAPCPA. 	The statute takes a different approach to the problem than that which the
courts had implemented. Rather than bar serial filings, the statute alters the incentive that
gives rise to the petition, i.e., the availability of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b),
§ 362(c)(3), § 362(d)(4), § 362(h)(1). 	New subsection (c)(3) is applicable in this case.
It provides that if a case under Chapter 7, 11 or 13 is filed by an individual and if a case of
the debtor was pending within the preceding 1 year period but was dismissed, the stay of
§ 362(a) shall terminate with respect to that debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the
later case.8 The debtor may move to continue the stay upon notice and hearing provided
such motion is made and heard before the stay expires by operation of law.9 The court may
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(...continued)
compromise the adequacy of notice by expediting a § 362(c)(3) motion. In re Wilson, 2005 WL
3693206 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2005) (motion to extend stay not served 20 days prior to the
hearing was insufficient to satisfy creditors’ due process rights).
-8-
grant such motion only if the movant demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in
good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B). For the purpose of this
subparagraph B, “a case is presumptively filed not in good faith (but such presumption may
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence)” if certain facts are shown. A different test
applies whether the stay is being continued as to all creditors or a specific creditor. 	Id.
§ 362(c)(3)(C). As noted above, it is not clear whether Debtor is seeking an extension as to
all creditors or just ABN. However, I find that Debtor’s latest case is presumptively filed not
in good faith on either grounds.
As to ABN, the case is presumptively filed not in good faith if as of the date of
dismissal of the prior case, a motion for relief from stay was either pending or had been
resolved by terminating, conditioning or limiting the stay as to actions against such creditor.
Id. § 362(c)(3)(C)(ii). On the date of dismissal of Debtor’s prior case, ABN’s motion for
relief had been granted. Exhibit M-5. As to creditors generally, I find two statutory reasons
for applying the presumption. 	First, there has not been a substantial change in Debtor’s
personal or financial affairs since the dismissal of the prior case. 	The only change is the
identity of Debtor’s counsel. Indeed Debtor’s circumstances have worsened in that the
Property which is the sine qua non of this and his prior cases is now owned by ABN.
Debtor does not state that he is now more able to perform obligations that he did not
perform in two prior cases. 	Rather his new attorney has fashioned a legal theory which
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seeks to avoid the ultimate consequence of Debtor’s failed cases, the loss of his Property.
Second, there is no other reason to conclude that the case will result in a fully performed
Chapter 13 plan. 	While the basis for this new case is to attempt to avoid a completed
foreclosure sale of the Property as a fraudulent conveyance or preference, Debtor’s
Chapter 13 plan, as discussed below, fails to provide for the payment of ABN if he were
successful. Debtor’s payments of $35 per month for 60 months do not even satisfy secured
debt other than that which would be owed to ABN if Debtor successfully avoided the
foreclosure.
In order to rebut the presumption applied here that the case was filed not in good faith,
Debtor must provide “clear and convincing evidence” to the contrary. Clear and convincing
evidence is that weight of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief
or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence “so clear,
direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the [fact finder] to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” U.S. Fire Ins. Co v. Royal Ins.
Co., 759 F2d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1985). Nor does a finding of good faith mandate that the
court order that the stay be extended. Rather the court may then exercise its discretion to
extend the stay. 	Id. 	On the contrary, the absence of proof of good faith requires that no
extension of the stay be ordered.
I turn now to the evidence elicited from Debtor to determine whether the presumption
that the case has been filed not in good faith has been rebutted. The essence of Debtor’s
position is that he can recover the Property that has been sold by the sheriff through
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10 As I have noted before, it is a common strategy of certain debtor’s counsel to file an
adversary proceeding and urge that the pendency of that action requires the Chapter 13 case to
continue and any efforts for stay relief or case dismissal to be suspended until its adjudication.
Viewing that approach, especially when it has become the modus operandi of an attorney, as a
delaying tactic, I have not unquestioningly accepted the familiar “adversary pending” as a defense
to a trustee’s motion to dismiss or creditor’s motion for relief. Rather I require the plaintiff/debtor
to demonstrate that there is a probability of success on the merits and that the adversary was not
filed merely to obstruct. 	This burden is even heavier where the debtor seeks to continue the
automatic stay.
-10-
the vehicle of the Adversary and then pay off ABN’s judgment through a Chapter 13 plan.
The Adversary avers that Debtor’s brother brought funds to bid $80,000 at the sheriff’s sale
but due to a commotion in the meeting room, his bid was ignored and the Property, alleged to
be worth $175,000, was sold to ABN’s attorney on the writ for $71,000. It is uncontroverted
that Debtor never challenged the validity of the sale in the state court. On these facts, Debtor
seeks to set aside the sale as a fraudulent conveyance and a preference. Exhibit D-1.
Examining the Complaint, the Chapter 13 plan and considering Debtor’s testimony
at both hearings, I easily conclude that Debtor has not sustained his burden under § 362(c)(3)
and that to subject ABN and any other creditor to further delay to allow the prosecution of
this questionable Adversary would be an abuse of the bankruptcy process.
I turn first to the merits of the Adversary which is the foundation of Debtor’s
“reorganization.”10 Debtor lost this Property on November 1, 2005 through a validly
conducted sheriff’s sale which his attorney was unable to stop notwithstanding last minute
efforts in the state court. In In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit
rejected a debtor’s attempt to recover a property after it had been sold at a sheriff’s sale
explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal court from adjudicating
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11 The naming of the Chapter 13 trustee as co-plaintiff did not cure that flaw since, as here,
the trustee neither filed nor joined in the request for relief.
-11-
a claim that was actually litigated in state court or one that is inextricably intertwined with
the state adjudication. Id. at 580. In other words, a lower federal court has no power to take
action that would prevent a state court from enforcing its orders. However, it is Knapper’s
other holding that is implicated by this Complaint. Knapper claimed the sheriff’s sale of
her property was a fraudulent conveyance under state law and could be avoided under
11 U.S.C. § 544. While not stating that a bankruptcy court can never use § 544 to avoid
a state court judgment, the Third Circuit found no authority for doing so in this case. It noted
that § 544 contains the trustee’s avoiding power, the intention being to allow the recovery
of property for the estate.11 There, as here, the debtor sought to recover the property for
herself to the prejudice of her creditor.
In Knapper, the Third Circuit noted that there was no discussion in Knapper’s briefs
of how the sheriff’s sale could constitute a fraudulent conveyances. Here Debtor attempts
an explanation. He states that the sheriff’s sale contained irregularities in that his brother was
present to bid $80,000 and the sheriff did not hear his bid and accepted one for $71,000.
This “irregularity” is proffered to avoid the United States Supreme Court decision in BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114 S.Ct. 1757 (1994) which holds that the price
received at a mortgage foreclosure sale conclusively establishes "reasonably equivalent
value" of the mortgage property, as long as requirements of state's foreclosure law were met.
He then continues that as the Property is worth $175,000, the irregularly conducted sale for
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$71,000 was not for reasonably equivalent value and must be avoided and the Property
returned to him.
When I heard this story at the first hearing, I offered Debtor, upon consent of ABN,
the opportunity to remedy the supposed injury that occurred at the sheriff’s sale. He was
provided thirty days to buy the Property from ABN at the payoff amount of $78,569.72 as of
December 8, 2005. Exhibit M-6. Debtor testified that he could and would do so. With the
stay continued until the follow-up hearing in thirty days, that promise was nonetheless not
fulfilled. Notwithstanding the contention that Debtor’s brother was ready, willing and able
to pay $80,000 to purchase the Property according to the rules of the sheriff’s sale one month
before, he is no where to be found (indeed he was not mentioned) at the hearing when the
Property became available again. Rather Debtor claimed that there was a timing problem
with his ability to provide the funds himself. 	He asserted that he has the money in his
deferred compensation account but could not access it within the 30 days provided. Notably
his Property has been threatened with foreclosure through three bankruptcy cases, and he
never inquired about the procedure for withdrawing this money to save his home. Nor in
thirty days could he garner any evidence to present at the continued hearing that he had that
amount in the account. The statement he supplied is dated December 31, 2004. Exhibit D-3.
While his pay stub evidences a deduction toward the fund, his Schedule I does not reflect it.
Moreover his Schedule B filed on November 21, 2005 listed the asset with a value of $4,000,
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12 It may be that Debtor deliberately undervalued the asset which, if true, would be a
misrepresentation in his schedules filed under penalty of perjury. In any event, he will be held to
the sworn lower and more recent value.
13 Nor has there been any application during this post-hearing period, now another 30 days
since the stay expired, to perform his stated intention to pay off ABN.
-13-
not approximately $80,000 as he now contends.12 It is clear to me that if there is any truth,
and Debtor’s testimony in this hearing did not inspire that conclusion, to the occurrence of
this otherwise unchallenged bidding “irregularity” at the sale, it did not prejudice Debtor.
He would not have been able to save his Property through the bidding process as evidenced
by his inability to save it when given a second chance one month later.
Moreover, the second prong of the fraudulent conveyance theory is equally incredible.
The Property is alleged to be worth $175,000 which is intended to support Debtor’s averment
that the $71,000 sheriff’s sale price was not a fair equivalent value. Notably in Debtor’s last
bankruptcy case, Schedules filed on March 30, 2005 placed a value of $40,000 on the
Property. 	This sudden and self-serving escalation in alleged value is hard to accept on
its face. Moreover, it just does not make sense. With a Property worth $175,000 and given
the opportunity to buy it back for $76,000, it is hard to conceive why Debtor could not raise
the funds by borrowing against the Property. 	While he stated that he had sought a loan,
he produced no evidence of any loan applications nor gave any specific details about his
efforts to raise the money to save this valuable asset. He only noted that he did not believe
it could be timely accomplished, and seemingly as a result abandoned any effort to raise
the funds.13
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14 The only other explanation is that he simply does not want to pay his son’s debt.
-14-
With a house allegedly worth $175,000 and a deferred compensation account
allegedly worth $80,000, I cannot conceive how Debtor could be in the position to lose his
house at a sheriff’s sale. If one accepts his values, it is inexplicable that he could not pay off
ABN. 14 My disbelief concerning the values alleged by Debtor undercuts my willingness to
keep the stay in place and hold this case open to allow Debtor to proceed on either the
fraudulent conveyance or the preference count which are based on these values. If a debtor
seeks to hold a creditor hostage to a third case based on an adversary proceeding which
depends on valuation to succeed, he will have to do something more than merely plead value.
More significantly, even if the Adversary were successful, it proves nothing about the
good faith of this new case. 	At best, a favorable outcome would only avoid the sale and
return Debtor to the status he was in when his last case was dismissed for failure to make
payments to the Trustee. That was precisely where he was when he filed his second case.
To be given a third opportunity to treat ABN’s debt under a Chapter 13 plan, Debtor must
minimally show that there has been some change in circumstances that would establish that
this case would be successful. In other words, as Debtor still has to treat that secured debt
in a Chapter 13 plan, it is his burden to provide clear and convincing evidence that ABN will
be paid. However, his Chapter 13 plan makes no provision to pay ABN. While the plan
states that if he is successful in the Adversary, he will commence regular mortgage payments
and amend the plan to cure the arrears to ABN, he has not demonstrated how that can be
accomplished. To do so will require an additional amount of disposable income not apparent
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from his Schedules I and J which show monthly income of $2,100 and expenses of $2,065.
According to these documents, sworn under penalty of perjury, $135 is his monthly
disposable income. Where is the cure payment coming from? If Debtor has undisclosed
additional income to make the extra payment, why isn’t it included in the plan payment now?
For a $35 per month plan payment he seeks to stay ABN from the exercise of its state law
remedies, living rent free in the Property he no longer owns while he litigates his dubious
Adversary to no purposeful end. I find this case which is premised on such questionable
strategy not to be in good faith and not meriting further bankruptcy relief.
An Order consistent with the foregoing Memorandum Opinion shall be entered.
DIANE WEISS SIGMUND
Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Dated: 	February 24, 2006
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UNITED S TATES B ANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR T HE E ASTERN DISTRICT O F PENNSYLVANIA
In re 	: 	Chapter 13
:
WARREN L. ELLIS, SR., 	: 	Bankruptcy No. 05-39345DWS
:
Debtor. 	:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of February 2006, upon consideration of Debtor’s Motion
for Continuance of the Stay Beyond 30-Day Period (the “Motion”), after notice and hearing
and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Opinion;
It is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.
DIANE WEISS SIGMUND
Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
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Copies to:
David A. Scholl, Esquire
Regional Bankruptcy Center
Law Office of David A. Scholl
#6 St. Albans Avenue
Newtown, PA 19073
Peter J. Mulcahy, Esquire
PHELAN HALLINAN & SCHMIEG, LLP
1617 JFK Boulevard
Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19107
William C. Miller, Esquire
Standing Chapter 13 Trustee
P. O. Box 40119
Philadelphia, PA 19106-0119
Dave P. Adams, Esquire
Office of the U.S. Trustee
833 Chestnut Street
Suite 500
Philadelphia, PA 19107
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